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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to examine the effectiveness of the ECOWAS Parliament in conflict 
prevention in West Africa.  From a holistic perspective, it also discusses the emergence of 
regional parliaments and specifically analyses their contribution to conflict prevention.  
 
This thesis is the first to assess how the ECOWAS Parliament attempts to prevent conflict 
in West Africa and how effective this has been. It presents the argument that, bodies such 
as the ECOWAS-P which are mandated as the legislative organs in a region otherwise 
noted for protracted conflicts play a crucial role in preventing conflict. The study employed 
participant observation (specifically in the ECOWAS-P), case study methods, elite 
interviews, parliamentary and archival research.  
 
The thesis greatest contribution lie in undertaking an institutionalist approach to conflict 
prevention and drawing from public administration developed and applied a performance 
management tool to help assess how the ECOWAs-P has succeeded at this task.  It finds 
that with no provision made for the parliament in the regional conflict prevention mechanism, 
it has had to employ normative initiatives to be relevant in conflict prevention. The research 
exposes that the lack of a universal suffrage mode of election of EMPs emphasises its 
democratic deficit. 
 
The thesis concludes that, the ECOWAS-P as a new institution provided under the revised 
treaty of 1993 is increasingly gaining more responsibility as a body for conflict prevention 
and prospectively the enhancement of its powers by the draft supplementary act passed in 
December 2014 will help it in making binding laws.  
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1. Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This research project focuses on the role of the regional parliament of the Economic 
Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) in preventing conflicts in the member states. 
Specifically, how effective the parliament has employed its conflict prevention policy, the 
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) in two different scenarios; latent conflict 
(Guinea) and post-conflict (Sierra Leone).  
 
This is core and relevant to the existence of West Africa’s integration process because the 
region has witnessed a total of fifty military led coups; forty-three bloody failed coups, eighty-
two coup plots, seven civil wars, other forms of political conflicts McGowan (2006), 
(ECOWAS 2009, HIIK 2012). These conflicts are literally interlinked and cyclical in nature 
spiralling across borders and becoming a major factor that affects West Africa’s security. 
Insecurity in neighbouring countries due to civil strife in others is a reality which was 
experienced as the Liberian crisis had a ‘domino effect’ on Sierra Leone and Guinea, and 
with further rippling effects in Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia and Cote d’Ivoire (Aning 1996, 
Olukoshi 2001, Bah 2012, Adedeji 2004).  Adverse effects on these countries are on 
economic, political and social prospects and in worst case scenarios have(Murdoch and 
Sandler 2002) served as geographical exports of conflict (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, 
Raleigh and Hegre 2009).   
 
In West Africa, conflict prevention is in the first instance associated with the ECOWAS 
executives as the vanguard of peace, however, as representatives of the citizens of the 
region, the parliament can be said to be uniquely placed as a natural forum for consensus 
building (Dutta, Hajdu et al. 2007, O'Brien, Stapenhurst et al. 2008, Dri 2009).   
 
In the spirit of ‘African solutions to African problems, the preferred prevention initiatives 
emanate from the efforts of a calibre of personalities and organizations including agencies 
within the UN system; international financial institutions; regional organizations; and major 
governments through bilateral development and security assistance. Others include non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), the private business sector, philanthropists, royalty, 
eminent personalities(including celebrities), (Cousens, Kumar et al. 2001, Zartman 2011, 
van Leeuwen 2013) and those in the immediate geographical area of the issue starting 
usually with the government.  This has been phrased as a ‘multi-tooled, multi-actored, 
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multileveled concept’ by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan(Annan 2002) and a 
‘culture of prevention’ (Kabia 2009).  
 
ECOWAS now takes a proactive rather than a reactive approach to support the that belief 
that acting before high levels of conflict intensity is better than trying to end them, expressed 
as ‘prevention is better than cure’ (Miall, Ramsbotham et al. 1999, Bercovitch, Kremenyuk 
et al. 2008). It will suffice to state that, conflict prevention is thus not just a high ideal, but a 
prudent option that sometimes works (Miall, Ramsbotham et al. 2005, Zartman 2011).   
In West Africa, there exists no study of the effectiveness of the regional parliament on 
conflict prevention. Most of the writings are focused on the ECOWAS executives and 
commission’s role on sector development, trade liberalisation, dependency and regional 
security. Some of these scholars research on the African Union (AU) by Murithi (2005), 
Makinda and Okumu (2008), Francis (2006), (2006), Akokpari, Ndinga-Muvumba et al. 
(2008) and Okolo and Wright (1990). Directly on the ECOWAS Parliament, authors include 
Eze (2004) and Salih (2013) with the latter’s seminal chapter ‘African Regional Parliaments: 
Legislatures without Legislative Powers’ recognising a conflict prevention role for the 
parliament but not with a meausring instrument. 
 
1.2 Original Contribution 
This thesis seeks to make an original contribution in a number of ways. First, as issues of 
conflict prevention have been the exclusive preserve of the Executives within the ECOWAS 
integration project, this thesis seeks to build and extend existing knowledge on 
institutionalist accounts of the causes and remedies of conflict. Second, the thesis makes a 
contribution towards the gap in the literature on regional governance and conflict 
prevention. Most research focuses on institutions like the EU, ASEAN, NATO and others. 
Third, this thesis also provides pertinent description on what on the parliament’s aims to 
achieve through conflict prevention and how it works towards making this successful. 
Fourth, it assesses the ECOWAS-P’s effectiveness in two case studies and draw out 
lessons for both policy makers and academics. Therefore, it contributes to the burgeoning 
legislative literature on how regional parliaments work differently from national parliaments, 
and the nuances that are unique to their existence. Thus it extends the knowledge of the 
causes and remedies of conflict in the two cases.  Finally, it contributes to studies on the 
ECOWAS integration projects and its quest for supranational status, and promoting peace 
and stability.  
 
3 
 
1.3 Research Aims and Problem 
First, the original Treaty founding ECOWAS (1975) focused on issues of integration 
pertaining to economics and Unity as espoused in the then continental body Organization 
of African Unity (now African Union(AU)) charter on notions of Pan-Africanism (ECOWAS 
1975). But incrementally, ECOWAS edged towards a sub-regional integration that identifies 
more favourable options boosting member states’ chances of promoting security and 
democracy within their borders effectively.  
 
This was the Cold War era and in the midst of super power rivalries, ECOWAS realising a 
direct correlation between development and security in the region attempted to coordinate 
this by establishing two protocols to deal with regional security. One was the 1978 Protocol 
Relating to Non-Aggression mainly to ensure that sovereign states existed free of fear of 
attack or aggression by one state towards another; and the other 1981 Protocol on Mutual 
Assistance on Defence was an agreement that ‘any armed threat or aggression directed 
against any member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the community’ 
(Bah 2012). 
 
Second, the post-Cold War scenario was further complicated with the continuous presence 
of former colonial powers being central to the development of their former colonies through 
patronage, and the emergence of globalisation. There is the Anglophone influence led by 
the British and US (Nigeria, Ghana, The Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone) and then the 
Francophone influence by France (Benin, Burkina Faso, La Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo); to an extent Portuguese influence in Cape Verde is 
strong but its minimal in the politics of the sub-region in general.  
 
Significantly, to have relevance in global politics, regions needed to be seen as 
spearheading new development paradigms. Subtly, these powers are unwilling to relinquish 
their power over the regions for varied reasons, and these come into play at the helm of the 
driving forces in decision-making and most especially on conflict prevention initiatives 
(Breslin and Higgott 2000, Buzan and Wæver 2003, Acharya 2009, Fawn 2009) 
 
Equally important, is the role of the African Union and the United Nations on conflict 
paradigms in which they defer to the ECOWAS organ as a whole without necessarily 
instituting what measures each institution under the body undertakes/plays. Thus in the 
midst of these conglomerate of measures and manipulations, the ECOWAS Parliament’s 
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efforts if any, are subsumed under the general framework of the sub-regional body 
ECOWAS. 
 
The Heads of States met regularly to review progress and also make new laws to govern 
the sub-region on varied issues and gradually started making decisions on security on an 
ad hoc basis and these only became structured with the emergence of a parliament in the 
revised Treaty. 
 
Third, the1993 Revised ECOWAS treaty was therefore the main catalyst to reintroduce a 
comprehensive approach through the ECPF as new intra-conflicts and wars serve to unite 
West Africa in ways that would not have been achieved during the cold war (ECOWAS 
1993). 
 
Though provision for a community parliament was made in the revised treaty, it was without 
protocols to establish its mandate and guide its work until 1999, and then following, it was 
inaugurated in 2002 and started working. As a sub-region of strong executive leaders, albeit 
in the midst of pseudo-democratic, and some near democratic countries, the mantra of the 
body that by establishing a parliament it was looking to move from an ‘ECOWAS of States 
to an ECOWAS of People’ and lends credence to their resolve to make the sub-region one 
that is representative of the wishes of the populations of West African countries. 
 
The inauguration of the community parliament served as an incremental gain on issues of 
harmonising and coordinating protocols and polices on conflict prevention as it helps to 
harness all the ad hoc policies into a coordinated unit of the ECOWAS Conflict prevention 
Framework (ECPF). 
 
 The need for such a framework is deemed important as the realisation dawned that conflict 
prevention does not have to do with only the military aspects of security but also, the human 
and social aspects are as important especially if the sub-region is to experience democratic 
peace in context. 
 
Inherently, the parliament embody issues of supranational challenges in executing its 
mandate within the framework of working with the fifteen countries in the union. The 
mandate of the parliament in relation to the general set up of the sub-regional body; how it 
execute, implement and monitor policies; and its processes for ensuring that conflict does 
not erupt in the nations states is an understudied aspect of West Africa’s integration project 
which this research will explore. 
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The problem this research project seeks to address, therefore, is not an explanation of why 
ECOWAS as an institution intervenes in conflict situations; or why member states are 
engulfed in intra-conflicts situations as pertains in some countries, or what ECOWAS does 
to mitigate escalating conflicts. Instead, this thesis takes a case study approach through 
participant observation and multidisciplinary concepts aimed at investigating the extent to 
which one of the institutions under the sub-regional structure ECOWAS, the community 
parliament, has engaged the issues of conflict prevention in member states, and how 
effective this has been.  
 
This makes it possible for issues of democratic deficit between supranational and 
sovereignty to be captured, and demonstrates the empirical nature of how a parliament can 
implement policies, juxtaposed against national interests, identity and domestic politics.  
 
The study does not explore the relationship between the evaluation of the conflict prevention 
policy and its implementation. It deliberately circumvents the tendency to assimilate rather 
maintaining evaluation as retaining its enlightenment function whilst the study of 
implementation focuses on the learning accrued through implementation of the policy.  
 
This research will therefore develop a tool to measure effectiveness and connect 
international relations with drivers of policy making. This conceptually will inform both areas 
to establish a proper understanding of the issues in studying supranational parliaments and 
policy implementation. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
The central research question of this thesis is: 
How effective is the ECOWAS Parliament at preventing conflict in West Africa? 
 
The preliminary hypothesis is that ‘The ECOWAS Parliament continues to work with 
members states on conflict prevention mechanisms in West Africa, and though these have 
not served to mitigate all conflicts in the region it has served to minimise escalation in the 
face of recurrent instability’.  
 
The thesis argues that, the ECOWAS Parliament enters its Fourth Legislature with the 
passage of the draft supplementary act establishing formal interactions between the 
ECOWAS Commission and Parliament on mediation at this stage. During the First 
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Legislature (2000-2005), the leadership of the Speaker spawned a lot of opportunities to 
embark on mediation (Mano River Union crisis; Ivoirian crisis) whereas during the Second 
Legislature (2005-2010), in the cases of Guinea and Niger, it was the National Parliament’s 
initiative to engage the ECOWAS Parliament in the mediation process (two ad hoc 
ECOWAS Committees in charge of continuous negotiations with Guinea and Niger were 
created). 
 
Therefore, it is as yet not fulfilling or exercising its role as a fully-fledged parliament for 
democratic development, but is positioning itself because it is assuming a role within the 
much larger context of a continuous process. Ironically it also means that it has received 
increased but stilted attention in recent years but ultimately, the intent is to assume effective 
legislative and democratic oversight functions and mandates to be a viable democratic 
organ in the region 
   
The central research question generates the following sub-questions under five themes: 
 
a. Institutional structure for the ECOWAS-P 
As the parliament was set up under the tenets of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993), how 
does it rank in the hierarchy of authority amongst the other organs; for instance, are 
decisions made at the Parliament on conflict prevention issues binding on member states? 
The assumption is here, as West Africa have strong Executives, sovereignty will also be a 
strategy used to oppose legislative leadership on matters of sub-regional governance. 
Thus, do the Authority of Heads of States and Governments’ defer policy making to the 
parliament or governments, and do member states recognise policies as emanating from 
national or regional? 
 
b. Bureaucratic analyses 
How institutionally competent and equipped is the parliament, as a legislature in the sub-
region? There is then the broader question of linking policy decision-making and 
enactment/implementation. As member states come to parliamentary sessions with their 
national agenda how are these debated and finally made into policy to reflect a ‘West 
Africanness’.  
 
How does the Secretariat function, how is it set up and funded amongst other issues? A 
strong executive secretariat exists in the ECOWAS Commission with the Authority leading 
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on decision-making, to what extent does the parliament work independently according to its 
mandate? 
 
c. Democratic deficit  
 This aims to review how the member states perform their democratic functions or lack 
thereof. Most West African States clearly feel more of national identities than regional, 
especially as the parliament is unelected. Thus there is need to examine how the 
representatives are chosen or appointed and to what extent they represent the interest of 
their nationals in decision-making processes. The formal accountability mechanisms that 
exist if any, and how citizens perceive representatives’ ability to legislate on their behalf. 
Also, as some countries in the sub-region are in conflict, or have disputed elected leaders 
in office, to what extent the parliament ensures that it is not viewed as an instrument for 
legitimising and maintaining autocratic regimes in office.  
 
d. Role in regional conflict and security  
What are the processes undertaken by parliament and how have member states (Guinea 
and Sierra Leone) adapted these in their national police? How are these implemented and 
monitored?  
 
e. Status of the collective security mechanism  
Turning towards security issues on since the 1990’s ECOWAS still remains one of the most 
insecure regions in the world.  What has been the main motivations for developing a security 
framework like the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) and to what extent 
has it been effective? 
 
1.5 Central Argument 
  
In the ECOWAS region, conflict prevention initiatives have been consistently undertaken 
and managed by the executive arm of the region’s integration project to the detriment of 
other organs within its set up. This thesis therefore argues that, despite a lack of mandate, 
the Parliament has increasingly carved out a role for itself in undertaking conflict prevention 
in West Africa. 
  
Additionally, the thesis argues that, the ECOWAS Parliament enters its Fourth Legislature 
with the passage of the draft supplementary act establishing formal interactions between 
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the ECOWAS Commission and Parliament on mediation at this stage. During the First 
Legislature (2000-2005), the leadership of the Speaker spawned a lot of opportunities to 
embark on mediation (Mano River Union crisis; Ivoirian crisis) whereas during the Second 
Legislature (2005-2010), in the cases of Guinea and Niger, it was the National Parliament’s 
initiative to engage the ECOWAS Parliament in the mediation process (two ad hoc 
ECOWAS Committees in charge of continuous negotiations with Guinea and Niger were 
created). 
  
Therefore, it is as yet not fulfilling or exercising its role as a fully-fledged parliament for 
democratic development, but is positioning itself because it is assuming a role within the 
much larger context of a continuous process. Ironically it also means that it has received 
increased but stilted attention in recent years but ultimately, the intent is to assume effective 
legislative and democratic oversight functions and mandates to be a viable democratic 
organ in the region. Central Argument 
  
In the ECOWAS region, conflict prevention initiatives have been consistently 
undertaken and managed by the executive arm of the region’s integration project to 
the detriment of other organs within its set up. This thesis therefore argues that, 
despite a lack of mandate, the Parliament has increasingly carved out a role for itself 
in undertaking conflict prevention in West Africa. 
  
Additionally, the thesis argues that, the ECOWAS Parliament enters its Fourth 
Legislature with the passage of the draft supplementary act establishing formal 
interactions between the ECOWAS Commission and Parliament on mediation at 
this stage. During the First Legislature (2000-2005), the leadership of the Speaker 
spawned a lot of opportunities to embark on mediation (Mano River Union crisis; 
Ivoirian crisis) whereas during the Second Legislature (2005-2010), in the cases of 
Guinea and Niger, it was the National Parliament’s initiative to engage the ECOWAS 
Parliament in the mediation process (two ad hoc ECOWAS Committees in charge 
of continuous negotiations with Guinea and Niger were created). 
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Therefore, it is as yet not fulfilling or exercising its role as a fully-fledged parliament 
for democratic development, but is positioning itself because it is assuming a role 
within the much larger context of a continuous process. Ironically it also means that 
it has received increased but stilted attention in recent years but ultimately, the intent 
is to assume effective legislative and democratic oversight functions and mandates 
to be a viable democratic organ in the region. 
 
1.6 Importance of the study 
One of the remarkable untold stories in recent strides to ascertaining democratic freedoms 
has been reticence of regional parliaments. Regional entities of the global South, especially 
Africa now have parliamentary organs showing a clear ambition towards a European Union 
(EU) Parliament style organ (Kingah and Cofelice 2012); demonstrating recognition on the 
importance of regional assemblies.  
 
In contemporary geopolitics, Africa occupies a strategic place in its relations with the United 
States (Obama 2009, Bouchat 2010, McGovern 2011), China(Alden 2007, Van Dijk 2009), 
Russia (Matusevich 2007) and the United Kingdom (Porteous 2008, Chafer and Cumming 
2011). Notably the US’s African Command military bases in Africa (Copson 2007); China’s 
intensified diplomatic and economic activities (Alden, Large et al. 2008, Aning and Lecoutre 
2008) and with the economic leverage by the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(BRICS) (Purushothaman and Wilson 2009, Schoeman 2011).  
 
Besides, Africa's economic trends have remained positive despite protracted social 
conflicts; with a comparative advantage in resources(Alao 2007, Dowden 2010) notable 
reduction in the number of conflicts, and some democratic progress, Conflict prevention 
strategies (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse et al. 2011) are significant if Africa is to continue as 
a strategic partnership (Mekenkamp, van Tongeren et al. 1999, Olonisakin 2004). 
 
First, regionalism is widespread and every country in the world belongs to at least one 
regional grouping and parliaments have been set up to demonstrate the consolidated gains 
of integration projects across several economic and political spheres. Second, this helps 
improve our descriptive knowledge of legislatures work in conflict prevention. 
Demonstrating through the research questions, this thesis will showcase how by examining 
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the structure, policies and implementation patterns of the legislature, these can be modelled 
into conceptualised and theorized patterns.  
Third, this will help in improving our understanding of theory on how important regional 
organisations are in dealing with conflict in general, and how effective it can be when the 
different institutions embedded in it are explored to measure particular spheres of policy 
implementation.  
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
This thesis contains nine chapters. Chapter two reviews the literature on emergence of 
regional parliaments, their structure in Africa, the sources of conflict and the conflict 
prevention/resolution methods employed to mitigate these issues, and how the parliament 
is represented.  Chapter three is on the methodology and approaches employed as relates 
to the core research questions. A review of the methods is made and justification given for 
the case study approach, as well as a discussion on how data was collected and analysed. 
Chapter four provides the conceptualised institutionalist analyses on parliaments, regional 
parliaments and the ECOWAS parliament. In addition the development of the ‘tool of 
effectiveness’ and its indicators discoursed. In chapter five the ECOWAS Parliament is 
examined in relation to its institutional set up, mandate and degree of policy implementation 
in conflict prevention. This chapter draws useful empirical inferences from the field work as 
well as archival documents. Chapter six examines latent conflict case study (Guinea) whilst 
chapter seven examines the post-conflict initiatives in Sierra Leone. Chapter eight 
provides the analyses and research findings by employing useful deductions from the 
preceding chapters and applying the tool for effectiveness to the extent of effectiveness. 
Finally, chapter nine summarises policy implications, recommendations and conclusions. 
It also makes suggestions on future avenues of research, including recommendations that 
can be adopted to improve the work of the parliament. 
 
1.8  Conclusion 
This introductory chapter states the overall purpose of this PhD thesis aimed at undertaking 
a study of the ECOWAS Parliament and effectiveness in conflict prevention. To ensure a 
logical flow, there was also a historical, geographical and institutional overview of the 
parliament thereby placing the study in context. 
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2. Chapter Two: Regional Parliaments and conflict prevention in West Africa 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter appraises literature on parliaments in the international and regional context 
and in particular, emphasis is placed on their emergence, dynamics, relevance within the 
African setting and purposely for conflict prevention.  
This chapter critically compares competing definitions of parliaments, discusses the 
regional parliaments that exist, drawing out some of the weaknesses and gaps in the 
literature to which this thesis aims to respond. 
 
The main question in this study ‘how effective is the ECOWAS Parliament in preventing 
conflict in West Africa?’ ultimately helps in providing a clearer picture of the numerous 
overlapping factors that precipitate the agenda of the ECOWAS-P and to what level 
outcomes are considered effective.  
 
The overarching hypothesis is premised on the assumption that the ECOWAS Parliament 
continues to work with member states on conflict prevention mechanisms in West Africa, 
and though these have not served to mitigate all conflicts in the region it has served to 
minimise escalation in the face of recurrent instability. To this end, the supplementary 
questions for this phenomenon enumerated in in the introductory chapter of this research, 
occupy the main focus for this chapter in helping to establish measured outcomes.   
 
The literature review conducted for this study reveals that scholarly works on ECOWAS is 
varied as it evaluates African integration and its regional blocs generally, on different 
aspects of regionalism, but however, remains, on the whole, unstructured. Additionally, 
there are active intellectual debates on national parliaments in all its facets, with 
accompanying discussions of regional parliaments, a caveat here being ‘the European 
parliament’ with a deficit of other regional parliaments in other parts of the world. Meanwhile, 
almost all existing studies seeking to measure performance of parliament in any sphere are 
descriptive studies which lack explanatory power. Most of them also harbour an empirical 
puzzle thus the literature reviewed here will explore these attempts, whilst the next chapter 
interacts with both theory and empirical findings. The chapter also denotes theoretical and 
intellectual traditions and arguments that define their significance.  
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Section 2.1 defines what parliaments are and gives an overview of national, regional 
(international) perspectives. Section 2.2 examines how these regional parliaments are 
defined and structured in Africa. Section 2.3 discusses the features and characteristics of 
ARPs whilst Section 2.4 explores the EU parliament as sui generis in the emerging 
supranational environment of regional parliaments. Section 2.5 defines regional 
parliaments in the context of this research. Section 2.6 then explores parliaments and 
conflict prevention, paying heed to the specific causes and types of conflicts in Africa (West) 
and who the major actors in conflict prevention have been. Section 2.7 elaborates briefly 
on the case for the ECOWAS-P and Section 2.8 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.2  Defining Parliaments (Forms, Types, Categories) 
The word ‘Parliament’ is a derivative of the French verb ‘parler’-‘to speak or talk’. This 
became the French word ‘parlement’ and appeared in the English language in the latter part 
of the 13th century (Ayto 2005:368). Parliament is also called Assembly, Legislature, and a 
myriad of names all over the world. It is an institution central to political systems and attracts 
prolific scholarship from academics including Norton (1990), (1998) and Eulau (1985:1-10).  
 
These scholars emphasise that, modern parliaments embody inherent advantages of 
consolidating best practices by establishing a pattern of constant continuity and change in 
legislative research. These scholars have also made strides ascribing in relative terms 
succinct definitions of the boundaries of parliaments as subject of research and openness 
to study.  
 
However, these developments showcasing theoretical strides in advancing legislative 
research still emphasise the location of legislative research in the context of constitutional 
governance which are not ideal for regional legislatures as these are state led. In a nominal 
sense, a typical parliament is a place for people to discuss, exchange views and speak on 
issues of concern in communities.  
 
2.2.1 National Parliaments 
There is abundance of literature discussing national parliaments’ roles and functions in 
different ways. These include cross cutting agreements on established patterns that 
parliaments or assemblies fulfil on various functions, including representation, deliberation, 
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legislation, authorising revenue and expenditure, making and unmaking government, 
scrutiny (questions and interpellations, emergency debates and committee investigations), 
conflict prevention, political recruitment and socialisation to democratic norms.  
 
However, a caveat made by Norton (1990:1) seeks to draw attention to the core function 
mirrored in legislatures, ‘that of giving assent to measures that by virtue of that assent, are 
to be binding on society’. But at the same time, legislatures do have different practical roles, 
spanning the globe wither as bicameral, unicameral, federal (Norton 1990) and in recent 
literature these include regional categories. 
 
Insistently, Norton (1998:ix) and Herman and Lodge (1978) maintain, that, even though 
some scholars bemoan the ‘decline of legislatures’ through the 20th Century, on the 
contrary the reverse holds true. More than 150 countries including the European Parliament 
were developed in the 1990s; including parliaments from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Additionally, various transitions to democracy in other parts of the world suggest we may 
‘indeed…be living in the age of parliaments’(Norton 1998). 
 
This increase in parliaments therefore correlates to great scholarly interest in how they 
function; how they transition from a regime to another; role of national parliaments in the 
EU and institutional change within established legislatures. These developments Norton 
(1998:ix-14) insist, indicates that though cross-national legislative studies are a welcome 
advancement in promoting a greater understanding of legislative institutions, they become 
a ‘poor relation’ within the wider field because they are overshadowed by research on 
specific legislatures (Norton 1998). 
 
To this end, various scholars reiterate an over emphasis on the US Congress which serves 
to analyse institutions from different perspectives, yet with little that helps to generalise 
about others. Two principal observations made by Norton (1998) concludes that; first 
legislatures are worthy of study by virtue of sheer numbers and historical persistence and 
second, imperative for cross-national research. This is because it will help shape the focus 
of legislative studies, as for instance parliaments of Western Europe in cross-legislative 
studies. Significantly one may state the obvious for parliaments in other parts of the world 
which are less studied like Africa. Similarly, globalisation has witnessed the marginalisation 
of 20th century governance and parliament’s policy making role, yet paradoxically 
emphasising their institutionalisation and relevance in the political system. 
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 These are reflected in relationships that have developed between parliaments and facets 
of the political system; with citizens and organised interests (CSOs, civic bodies), courts 
and executive governments.  
 
According to Norton (1998:7), a parliament can therefore demonstrates it is institutionalised 
when it exhibits certain characteristics in its internal set up. Similarly, Loewenberg, Squire 
et al. (2002) establishes that to the extent that legislatures are formal bodies meeting in 
designated spaces and carrying out peculiar tasks they are institutions. However, there 
exists the challenge of various definitions to which institutionalisation has been subjected 
making a universal definition difficult. Norton however presents basic features as those of 
regularity-rules and patterns of behaviour and specific structure (Norton 1998). 
 
Thus according to Pridham (1990:170-180), (2000:64;134) the next dichotomy for defining 
institutionalised legislatures by the internal environment is reflected thus; a legislature that 
just meets in plenary sessions with a few rules and procedures, have undeveloped practices 
and patterns of behaviour is not characterised and institutionalised. On the contrary, 
legislatures with developed rules of procedure, established practices, and patterns of 
behaviour are deemed as possessing ‘organisational articulation’ and an institutionalised 
parliament.  
 
Other scholars have attempted to streamline these characteristics to be autonomous and 
universal rather than sets of discretionary rules. The aim is to explore the extent to which 
legislatures exhibit these attributes and their adaptability to constitutional and political 
proclivities, and organisational structure imbibing developed committees, leadership and a 
record of rules and procedures.  
 
According to Norton (1990), Loewenberg, Squire et al. (2002), Pedersen (2012), 
legislatures are considered to be institutionalised when developed over time and continue 
to adapt to a myriad of political developments within the context in which they exist. Thus 
legislatures in Western Europe are considered developed as they exhibit most of the 
characteristics discussed above but this has not precluded their continuous study in the 
literature.  
 
However for parliaments in understudied contexts like Africa, there is much to catch up on. 
Additionally, there is need to continue studying the parliaments within the context in which 
they are developing institutionally and hypothesise based on these rather than departing 
from this development ad embarking on research aimed at only studies on comparison with 
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European trends. These though relatively informative for other legislative developments, 
studying them in tandem as related to the above, will maximise knowledge and learning for 
developing legislatures in other less institutionalised political systems.  
 
 
Though there are general statutory functions of parliaments, perspectives in the literature 
on these functions describe some as those of vulnerable legislatures in the developing 
world.  According to Mezey (1979:81) these include policy making stages/formulation, 
deliberation and oversight; whilst Riggs (1975), O’Brien (2005) emphasise how coup 
d’états’ and other civil unrests affect the development of parliaments in these countries. In 
summary, Mezey (1979:733), O'Donnell (1979:763) and Smith (2003) analyse ‘third world 
legislatures’ and bureaucracies to be institutions seldom dominant in their political systems. 
These they assert, typically exert some influence on public policy through private rather 
than public arenas on lesser decisions, through efforts of individual legislators rather than 
collectively. 
 
Therefore in applying the domestic analogy presumption, regional parliaments are expected 
not only to fulfil similar functions, but also hold executive of member states accountable.  
Fulfilling these functions requires:  
1. The legislation or binding legal and administrative instruments for organising, 
implementing and monitoring integration policies 
2. The alignment of national and regional policy objectives where, in case of 
contradiction between the two, compromise is reached even though the national goals 
are at least momentarily made subservient to the regional goals 
3. The benefits of regional integration are so tangible that they outweigh the pursuance 
of narrow national course of action. 
 
2.2.2 Parliaments within the International System 
Emergence, Significance and Growth 
The place of legislative institutions in the mechanisms of the international legislative system 
is normally discussed as a component of the legislation of international institutions and 
organisations. There is no ‘World Parliament’ and thus most international parliaments and 
legislatures operate within the framework of international organisations thereby 
underpinning an international-regional-national interface and nexus. 
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Dunoff (2013:110) states that the first scholar to probably use parliament in an international 
context is William Penn’s (1944) seminal work. This was in the context of seeking practical 
attempts to address recurring conflict in Europe which prompted Penn’s call for a parliament 
of Europe. The democratic body’s purpose was to be greater representation of collective 
and individual interests, whilst serving as arbiter amongst feuding states. Therefore, this 
buttresses the point of the original set up of parliaments of this nature as possessing a 
functional interest in conflict prevention in their DNA. Progressively, there have been 
blueprints on international and regional parliaments concentrating on defence, and 
advocating on normative stance leading to the creation of a global system of arbitration and 
federations.  
 
Importantly, the work of pioneering parliamentarians William Randal Cremer1  and Frederic 
Passy2 which resulted in the creation of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in 1889 set the 
real blueprint for IPIs and the utility of arbitration as international norm. The IPU according 
to Zarjevski (1989) was the first IPI tasked with peaceful disputes settlement and originally 
served as an arbitrator in quarrels amongst states.  This conception gained global 
prominence and attracted other parliamentarians including Fredrik Bayer3 who intimated 
that the primary function of an inter-parliamentary network should be spreading knowledge 
about arbitration (UIA 2012),   whilst Richard Bartholdt4 believed the practical use of 
arbitration was the first step to a world parliament. 
 
 These notions connote the conceptualisation of parliamentary diplomacy as advanced by 
Stavridis (2002), Cutler (2006:82-83) and Šabič (2008 2008a:259). For instance, Cutler 
(2006) argues that parliamentary diplomacy 'represents an important middle ground 
between the traditional level of interstate diplomacy whilst Šabič (2008) emphasises that 
records of such activities date as far back as the late 1880s. 
 
Thus, the creation of a world parliament has been intrinsic to the concept of a federation or 
an institution which will prevent war. However for scholars like Rosenau and Czempiel 
(1992), such a world governing system with a ‘central authority with capacity to enforce 
decisions at a global scale’ is at best a distant prospect, proposing that focus must rather 
                                            
1 Co-founder of the IPU, Member, (British House of Commons 1885-1895), Nobel Peace Prize 
winner, 1903;   
2 Co-founder of the IPU, (Member, French National Assembly 18881-1889), Nobel Peace Prize 
winner (with Henri Dunant 1901)  
3 Nobel Peace Prize winner, 1908, (Member, Parliament of Denmark, 1872-1922) 
4 (Member, US Congress 1893-1915) 
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be on the ‘tangible’ object of research that is with the various forms of ‘governance without 
government’. 
 
Regional parliaments are also commonly conceptualised as ‘International Parliamentary 
Institutions’ (IPIs) with different origins and causes as researched by scholars including 
Costa, Dri et al. (2013). However for Šabič (2008:260) after World War Two, ‘the public 
demand for a better transparency of decision-making in international politics’ rose to 
prominence for their activities. These are attributed to factors including globalisation, a 
democratisation embedded in the Wilsonian fourteen points and most especially in the post-
war period with decolonisation processes, the Cold War and post-Cold War dynamics of 
intra-state conflicts. Whilst there was a proliferation in terms of rise of new parliamentary 
institutions, others became renamed or rebranded from existing ones.  
 
In similar analyses, Elorriaga (2004:35) emphasises how technological advancement has 
revolutionised communication for possibilities in parliamentary diplomacy. These in turn 
allow for more than ‘just technical parliamentary cooperation’. Further, the notion of IPIs as 
institutions that facilitates dialogue has increasingly become embedded in the mandates of 
parliaments across the world. Furthermore, scholars like Costa, Dri et al. (2013) categorised 
regional parliaments into different models considered to be the advanced forms-
‘supranational’ or as ‘supranational in the making’, and ‘non-supranational’. 
 
Several competing definitions of regional parliaments have been provided, each with 
strengths and weaknesses. Concretely though, regional parliaments fall under the purview 
of International Parliamentary Institutions.  
 
 
Variety and classification  
 
According to (Cutler 2006): 
‘an IPI is a regular forum for multilateral deliberations on an established basis of an either 
legislative or consultative nature, either attached to an international organization or itself 
constituting one, in which at least three states are represented by parliamentarians […] who 
are either selected by national legislatures in a self-determined manner or popularly elected 
by electorates of the member states’. 
 
In distinguishing IPIs, Cutler (2001) puts forward four types; ‘Congress’, ‘Assembly’, 
‘Parliament’ and ‘Legislature’; which refer to stages of institutional development and not 
18 
 
depiction of specific names of individual IPIs per se. Additionally, the ‘three transitions 
between succeeding pairs of types may be referred to as initiation, take-off and spill-over’ 
(Cutler 2001:215).  
 
Employing a broader definition Šabič (2008a:258) portrays IPIs as ‘institutions in which 
parliamentarians cooperate with a view to formulating their interests, adopting decisions, 
strategies or programs, which they implement or promote, formally and informally, in 
interactions with other actors, by various means such as persuasion, advocacy or 
institutional pressure’ (Šabič 2008). 
 
With respect to categorising IPIs, Šabič (2008) also develops a different approach and 
argument with the proposition that, IPIs can be grouped into two general categories with 
the criteria of ‘international parliamentary organs’(IPOs) which are organs of international 
governmental organisations composed of parliamentarians or, as ‘international 
parliamentary associations’(IPAs) which exists without reference to how they are 
constituted, or the extent to which the appointment is reflective of the political proclivities in 
their national parliaments.  
 
Other scholars such as, like Malamud and De Sousa (2007) gives a simple typology of 
‘integration parliaments’ and the rest’. They reiterate the need to keep IPIs that deal with 
integration processes distinct from other IPIs as their fundamental objectives are different. 
They further go on to illustrate this by stating that, placing the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE PA) as a higher form of IPI 
as portrayed by Cutler (2001) is not accurate as it is still at a lower level then the European 
Parliament. To them, the key issues have been missed in that analysis since the roles and 
objectives of these two IPIs are different. Also, this does not consider the fundamental 
differences between what is a regional parliamentary assembly and an inter-regional 
parliamentary assembly.  
 
Parliaments can also be distinguished according to their functions: Malamud and Stavridis 
(2011:106) posits these as ‘“representation, legislation, control of the executive, and 
leadership recruitment and socialisation’. Most of the legislative and oversight functions are 
absent in inter-parliamentary bodies. 
 
In this regard, Fernández (2007) presents an important difference between ‘multinational’ 
parliamentary assemblies like OSCE, NATO and the IPU and ‘mixed assemblies typified by 
inter-regional institutions like the EU-ACP, Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly 
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(EMPA) and the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EUROLAP). According to 
Costa, Dri et al. (2013), other scholars have attempted more ‘refined classifications but 
these all build on the categorisations by Cutler (2001) and Šabič (2008).  
 
First, offering a diachronic description of existing IPIs as ‘International Parliaments, de Puig 
(2008) argue that ‘international parliamentarism’ is relatively new and partly reflects the 
evolution of the world system. Thus, there is the need to reiterate the importance of ‘external 
factors’ the development of IPIs and de Puig de Puig (2008)outlines four distinct phases: 
‘The first experiences’ (mainly of the IPU) and the new era of ‘supra-state parliamentary 
development following the end of the war; the period of the two ‘blocs’ (Bipolarity); the ‘after 
the wall’ phase (Post-Cold War era) and the current ‘one world’ era, that is to say 
globalisation. 
 
Emphasising that this list is by no means exhaustive a classification of existing institutions, 
de Puig (2008:30) however has carefully differentiated between ‘parliaments’ and other 
institutions. The criticism is that this approach is overly inclusive because different 
parliamentary Committees, Presidents, and Speakers Conferences have been lumped 
together. Yet, a historical approach is laudable as it systematically presents the evolution 
of the total process of parliamentary development, but at the same time, it is also deemed 
fallible as it is considered merely reacting to the geopolitics and historical contexts of 
specific periods. 
 
Therefore their impact has been left out of the assessment by de Puig (2008) but rather 
contain an over-emphasis on the particular nature of the EU Parliament, the only parliament 
deemed having real powers (de Puig 2008:33-34;40) risking the excess of ‘mimesis’ which 
can derive from this type of approach. 
 
Second, using the term ‘Transnational Parliamentary Assemblies’ (TPAs), Kraft-Kasack 
(2008:535) developed nine criteria covering various functions in an empirically grounded 
typology differentiating between parliaments, assemblies and conferences.  TPAs are 
conceptualised to be three types of  parliamentary forms existing beyond the nation-state 
Kraft-Kasack (2008:544) listed according to a 13 points developed criteria. From related 
research, Kraft-Kasack (2005) still argues that the distinctive feature among parliaments, 
assemblies and conferences is the decision-making rule, especially as they espouse 
decision-making beyond the state.  
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This therefore raises questions for legitimacy of policies and outputs.  Also, it is important 
to recall that there is more than one model, even in regionally and geographically defined 
areas.  
 
Third, a different approach is the normative perspective put forward by Kissling (2011:9-49) 
as the main objective is to showcase prospects of a ’global parliamentary assembly’. 
Developing several categories and classifications, various terms are employed to define 
these. Kissling defines IPIs as ‘Government Run/Inspired Non-governmental 
Organisations’(GRINGOs) became the acronym generated which coincidentally is a 
derogatory term for citizens of the United States usually describing imperialist tendencies 
in the Latin American countries (Kissling 2011).  
 
This is followed by a definition of ‘international or regional parliamentary organisations’ and 
‘international or regional specialised agencies’ respectively. These two echo Sabic’s (2008) 
differentiation of IPOs and IPAs but it is still different from Kissling’s (2011) approaches; 
and the final category is ‘parliamentary organs of international or regional organisations’ 
which is more attuned to the institution studied in this research.  
 
 
In discussing the list of GRINGOs, Costa, Dri et al. (2013:8-10) recalls how IPAs operate 
with additional meetings, for parliamentary presidents/speakers a difference made by Šabič 
(2008) analyses. But at the same time, proposing a sub-division of GRINGOs as ‘issue-
related networks’ makes it possible for the sectoral interest to define the unit, which is very 
useful.  
 
The approach has however been criticised for containing too many divisions and sub-
divisions and as such the blurring of the complex prevailing reality overly emphasise the 
legal dimensions of parliamentary institutions being studied. This is because; international 
law represents only one facet of the international community or the international system. 
Yet, at the same time it confirms the need for an inter-disciplinary approach to understand 
this new phenomenon. 
 
Fourth, also located centrally in the same vein as work from Cutler (2001) and especially 
Šabič (2008) differentiations of IPOs and IPAs, Cofelice (2012), Rocabert, Schimmelfennig 
et al. (2014) uses the dimension of ‘powers’ and the question of ‘empowerment’, including 
origins, structure and functions as criteria to categorise IPIs. Thus three distinct categories 
have been identified by Cofelice and Stavridis (2014) parliamentary organs at the highest 
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of what is an ‘incremental pyramid’, with most powers including in some case co-legislative 
mandates (as exemplified in the EP); parliamentary organisations possessing mainly 
deliberative and consultative powers (as currently pertains in the ECOWAS Parliament) and 
transnational networks of parliamentarians, with mainly lobbying and confidence building 
power. 
 
Examining why some IPIs are empowered and others are not, Cofelice (2012),  includes 
‘inter-regional’ parliamentary assemblies under ‘parliamentary organs,’ one more category 
that conforms and adds to the need for more discussion in the literature. At the level 
parliaments work, and how they can go beyond their national status, scholars like Malamud 
and Stavridis (2011) tables three ways in which this is undertaken: 
 
1. By influencing foreign policy mainly through national parliaments  
2. By conducting parallel diplomatic relations, known as parliamentary diplomacy 
3. By establishing and empowering parliaments as representative bodies of 
international, often regional, organisations 
 
On the issue of a handful of IPIs receiving significant scholarly attention, Šabič (2008) 
reiterates that the EU Parliament is a typical example whilst on another level majority of IPIs 
receive scarce and large descriptive work. 
 
Thus existing research of IPIs, except the EU Parliament according to Šabič (2008) usually 
focuses on topics like their history, structure and formal with less attention to their context, 
factors impacting on their existence and activities as well as their prospects. He argues that 
by only employing methods of ‘measuring’ performance through their formal power only the 
small number comprising of international governmental organisations can be considered. 
 
 To understand a broader format, the idea of studying ‘effectiveness’ of IPIs as an institution 
is also not tenable, as it does not always have results that are visible as its activities makes 
data generation difficult, thus different criteria based on different approaches are more 
viable. He argues for not studying the effectiveness of these institutions at the individual 
level, but rather through a whole of parliament approach; whereas this thesis looks at 
effectiveness in a specific policy area.  
 
Šabič’s (2008) thesis is that IPIs should be studied as international actors who have 
assumed the role of norm entrepreneurs, persuading others to be accepting of new values 
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and norms. This is because, studying them from an international context perspective 
presents a disaggregate perspective and as such can no longer be explained through their 
national context alone, or through states as the key actors, but through less formal 
processes of decision and policy making. 
 
In developing a conceptualised working definition of regional parliaments to guide this 
research, a synthesis of definitions by Cutler (2006), Malamud and De Sousa (2007) and 
Šabič (2008) will be employed. The conceptualisations above emphasise the need of taking 
care not to lump national and regional parliaments together. The assumption here is that, 
as with respect to institutional approach, the parliament is deemed as neutral in its effect as 
it can affect both regional executive decisions and national executive decisions.  
 
The discussion serves to emphatically establish the distinguishing features which are 
markedly different between regionally based and non-geographical IPIs, trans-globally and 
even inter-regionally. These are very important distinctions as reflectively they embody 
categorisation of the complex reality within which regional parliaments are located and as 
such serves as good insights for study. For instance, the myriad of categories and 
definitions are a significant indication of the many reflections and debates amongst scholars 
on the number of IPIs, their existence and understanding, exactly what their role and impact 
have been, enforcing the need to research into their effects on specific sectors of 
governance, and policy and decision-making. 
 
For instance, de Puig (2008) counts 40 IPIs, whilst Kissling (2011) adds up to 100 
meanwhile other scholars even have 150 through the inclusion of newer versions of IPIs 
redefined from former institutions. However, these differences demonstrate the need to 
categorise IPIs to be able to compare like with like Warleigh-Lack (2006) Söderbaum and 
Tavares (2009), define some in their unique context and contribute clear empirical analysis 
on specific IPIs and their relative impacts on decision-making and policy. Thus in this 
regard, it serves a purpose to undertake a brief comparison of the European Parliament 
and the ECOWAS Parliament as that is not the thrust of this thesis. 
 
The definitional issue of parliament still remain very essential to understanding their nature, 
existence and impact. Costa, Dri et al. (2013) even assert that, there a lot of bodies using 
the term ‘parliament’ but which are not actual parliamentary institutions but rather organs in 
which people are only what they call ‘talking’. That, to call an institution a parliament does 
not confer on it that same status as in contemporary times this word has gained new 
definitions in public law and political science perspectives. 
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According to Stavridis (2002:10) there are also some groupings that use the term 
‘parliament’ but which have no decision-making or legislative power. For instance, the 
Balkan Parliament comprising business entrepreneurs, students and academics; the 
European Youth Parliament which just promotes European issues amongst young people 
as well as the Oxfam based network of young leaders from 150 countries called 
International Youth Parliament. Similarly, there are others that are seen as simply misusing 
the term such as, the World Parliament of Religions, the Naas Youth Parliament, and the 
Parliamentary Forum on the International Conference on Financing for Development or 
Council for a Parliament of World Religions. 
 
In this thesis, regional parliaments are recognised as products of treaties freely entered into 
by sovereign states and are mostly limited instruments of the legislative enforcement of 
States’ treaty obligations. Treaties provide the legal foundations for operationalising 
international and regional parliaments of this kind, therefore States as parties to such 
treaties do have significant influence in determining the limits of mandates and scope of 
operations of the legislative frameworks.  
 
Ultimately, regional parliaments function within the limits allowed by the sovereign existence 
of the signatory parties to the treaties and other associated instruments creating them. To 
this extent, research pertaining to regional legislatures necessarily must bring to the fore 
the theoretical discussions on the nature and patterns of relationships that exist or ought to 
exist between regional parliaments and the national parliaments of the sovereign states that 
created them. At the same time, it must also examine the relationship between the 
parliament and other bodies under the regional scheme. 
 
2.3  The Structure for International and Regional Parliaments in Africa 
 African RECs according to Barkan (2008) portray generic transformations as they are 
developing sophisticated institutional mechanisms and are at various degrees of 
development. These attributes invariably hold true for their corresponding legislative 
frameworks and existing arguments rest on the notion that, emergence of regional 
parliaments as legislative branches of African Economic Community (AEC) integration 
communities should be explained against the backdrop of the challenges confronting 
African societies and states. Additionally, these institutions were founded coincidentally with 
the democratic resurgence of the 1990s, popularly referred to as the third wave of 
democratisation in Africa (Huntington 1991). The political environment of this era offered 
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much for civil society and the RECs to review democratic aspects of the institutions.  The 
quest for democratic governance loomed large, and considerable importune, internal and 
external pressures necessitated new ideas for regional governance.  
 
Principally, all the regional parliaments are offshoots developed from the AU as depicted in 
Table 2.1. The PAP is in sync with its evolution as a continental legislature and is in a quest 
for proper democratic representation by member states.  The correlating legislatures of the 
RECs are; the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community (CEMAC), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC).  
 
These parliaments are located in context and the exegesis below inform the approaches 
and context given to these institutions in this research (see Appendix 1: Taxonomy of 
African Regional Parliaments (ARPs).  
 
2.3.1 Pan-African Parliament (PAP) 
The PAP was inaugurated on March 18, 2004 pursuant to Articles 7 and 14 of the AEC 
Treaty, and Articles 5 and 17 of the Constitutive Act of the AU. It encompasses the 
geographical scope of both sub-regional and national parliaments in Africa, comprising five 
representatives each from all the 54 member states.  
 
Definitively, as it was created after most of the other parliaments had been created, or at 
about the same period there is an inherent lack of a well-defined relationship between 
different parliamentary bodies and the continental parliament.  Originally, the regions were 
to serve as the building blocs for a strong continental legislature.  Further, Article 2 (3) of 
the PAP Protocol envisions a gradual evolution of the PAP into a legislative body, where its 
members shall be elected by universal adult suffrage. 
 
2.3.2 East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) 
The East African Legislative Assembly created by Article 49 (1) of the EAC Treaty 1999, 
was inaugurated in November 2001. It is the second attempt to set up a regional parliament 
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in the region as an earlier attempt had to be abandoned in 1977 caused by what Baregu 
(2005:56) describes as competing, narrow, national, self-interest, divergent ideologies and 
parochial sovereignty’.  
 
Functionally, EALA has progressed from an original membership of three to five member 
states and its members are indirectly elected through the national parliaments, but these 
members are not MPs. The national parliaments act as electoral colleges to elect members. 
Including all the usual functions of a regional parliament, it is also the only regional 
parliament that is mandated by the founding treaty to make laws which bind member states. 
 
2.3.3 Parliament of UEMOA (P-UEMOA) 
The treaty to establish the Parlement de l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine 
(UEMOA-P)  was signed in January 2003. The member states of UEMOA are Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo who are also 
members of the ECOWAS-P. Conversely, the latter is considered far more established.  
 
2.3.4 SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) 
 
As the preamble of the Constitution of SADC-PF states: 
 
 ‘We, the Representatives of the people of Southern African Development 
Community, having solemnly resolved to constitute a Parliamentary 
Consultative Assembly to be known as the Southern African Development 
Community Parliamentary Forum with a view to developing into a regional 
Parliamentary structure, for the purpose of strengthening the capacity of the 
Southern African Development Community by involving Parliamentarians of 
Member states in its activities’. 
 
The SADC-PF was established as an autonomous institution of SADC according to Article 
9(2) (SADC 1997:18). It was formally approved by the Communique of the 1997 SADC 
Summit. Launched in July 1996, it is the first regional parliamentary structure of this kind in 
Africa. However as can be gleaned from the quote above, it is a nominal ‘forum’ of MPs 
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from its member countries and not yet a real parliament, though it performs some form of 
‘legislative’ functions. 
This further restricts its mandate and until its repeated transformation into a fully-fledged 
parliament is finalised, its mandate is limited. In response to this challenge, the SADC-PF 
developed a draft protocol on the establishment of an ideal parliament (Draft Protocol 
Executive summary on the SADC Parliament). The protocol defines among other issues, 
the powers, functions and relational linkages among the proposed parliamentary body, 
national parliaments and other organs of SADC. The SADC-PF does not have a reporting 
relationship to Summit and other SADC institutions, but collaboratively on matters of 
common interest. 
 
2.3.5 The Inter-Parliamentary Union of IGAD Member States (IPU-IGAD) 
The Inter-Parliamentary Union of IGAD Member States (IPU-IGAD) was established on 
November 28, 2007 when the Speakers of the parliament of its member states signed the 
March 21, 1996 Agreement establishing IGAD in February 2004.  Covering the Horn of 
Africa, its membership include, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The 
IGAD (the main organ) has undertaken significant work in agriculture, the environment, 
economic cooperation and social development. Worth noting is the work of the Committee 
on Early Warning and Response (CEWARN), which has been actively addressing conflicts 
along and across the borders of member states. 
 
2.3.6 Network of Parliamentarians of the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS) 
Established in 2002, the ECCAS protocol only entered into force in 2009. It is a 
parliamentary forum comprising of the ten member states of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Launched in Angola in November 
2002, its mandate is to oversee good political governance in member states/region. Also, it 
makes recommendations to the national governments for greater participation of the private 
sector and civil society in decision making concerning national conditions in member states. 
The protocol also paved the way for practical work towards a REPAC secretariat in Malabo, 
Equatorial Guinea. 
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2.3.7 ECOWAS Parliament (ECOWAS-P) 
ECOWAS introduced a parliament in its revised treaty of 1993. However, whilst the Protocol 
for the ECOWAS Parliament (ECOWAS-P) was signed in 1994, it only entered into force in 
March 2000. The ECOWAS-P held its first session in January 2001. The parliament is in its 
third legislative tenure which will end in November 2015. As this parliament is the main 
focus of this research, chapter four is dedicated to discussions and analyses on it.  
 
2.4 Features and Characteristics 
This section summarises exisiting characteristics of ARPs as emphasised by (Terlinden 
2004:1) in the following: 
 
 ‘Although African regional parliaments and parliamentary assemblies are intended 
to assume the legislative and democratic oversight functions of regional integration 
organisations in the long run, they so far remain at an infant stage of organisational 
development and are far from exercising the roles that fully-fledged parliaments 
play in democratic setups. However, in the course of renewed efforts to complement 
economic integration with broader political dimension of regional integration, 
regional assemblies receive increased attention and have gained in significance 
over recent years’ 
 
This suggests that, where parliaments are involved it is invariably at the end of processes 
where the exercise of their power of ratification was required, albeit as fait accompli. In time, 
‘the political dimension of integration experienced new emphasis, involving a strong call for 
good governance, accountability and transparency’ according to Terlinden (2004:2), these 
are primary functions of parliaments. 
 
In context, scholarly works point to a combination of factors accounting for delayed 
emergence of regional parliaments in spite of the aggressive pursuits of integration on the 
African continent. Notably, the lack of political will for effective integration. The fact that 
Africa contain very strong executive Presidents with wide powers, that remain 
unaccountable and unchecked by weak national parliaments, including inadequate legal 
texts and weak institutions plague the emergence and effective role of parliaments. This 
therefore gives African parliaments a far lesser prominent role than the EU in the politics of 
regional integration. Under these circumstances, exploration of the legislative dimensions 
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of regional integration in Africa has attracted scant attention in scholarly literature, whilst an 
analysis of the specific role of regional parliaments is either skewed towards the EU 
process, or virtually non-existent in other instances, until recent with a few scholars seeking 
to expand research in these areas. 
 
The ECOWAS Parliament is therefore not an exception in this regard. As a new institution 
operationalised at the beginning of the 21st Century, it has had to negotiate many political 
challenges in its quest to be understood and become relevant within the institutional 
architecture of the regional community bodies. It is yet to fully benefit and appreciate the 
full import of a regional parliament in the process of integration. 
 
Thus, the inadequacy of scholarly work on the ECOWAS Parliament compared to the other 
community institutions, in the process of the regional integration in West Africa can be 
explained within this matrix. 
 
2.4.1 Legitimacy and Mandates for law-making 
ARPs according to Salih (2013), are ‘overburdened and undermined’ by broad mandates. 
These mandates are in turn dominated by conflict management and undermined by their 
subordinate position vis-a-vis the executive. Ultimately the impact is negative on their 
capacity to become effective institutional mechanisms for regional political integration. The 
lack of real powers based on democratic governance principles, therefore limits their role 
(Salih 2013:156-163). 
 
However, emphasising the relevance of parliaments to the new democracies of Africa, Salih 
(2005) also states their essence to social cohesion because they reflect the variety of 
citizens’ preferences expressed through elections, and with emerging opportunities 
continually changes roles. Further, there is recognition of contextual challenges gained 
through their unique development which exhibits- the specificity of Africa’s political culture.  
Although Salih (2005) traces their development through pre-colonial institutions he also 
maintains that they have been influenced by western democratic ideals of partisanship and 
political parties through the colonial experience. Similarly, Balch (2007) and Rupiya (2007) 
discuss challenges hitherto faced by parliamentary bodies due to limitations imposed by 
national borders. But as Africa’s conflicts spiralled across borders, new tactics and 
approaches were developed for economic cooperation, conflict resolution, and 
peacebuilding regionally. 
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The scope of the law-making functions of ARPs are mutually constrained in content and 
competence. Excepting the EALA5 all ARPs have ‘consultative’ and ‘advisory’ mandates.  
In contradistinction, this is principally evident in the area of legislation as the Councils and 
the Summits hold legislative functions extending their executive powers.  
 
Measuring parliaments by the kinds of laws passed as outputs from its processes, O'Brien, 
Stapenhurst et al. (2008) discuss the degree to which these laws then become an effective 
tool in determining strong legislations or the degree of autonomy a parliament possesses. 
These they argue distinguishes it as a viable law making institution. They emphasise that, 
irrespective of the type of parliament, several factors accounts for how influential a 
parliament exercise its functions.  This is demonstrated in the generic parliamentary model 
of power developed in this research to add onto the concept as illustrated in Figure 2.1 
showcasing how parliaments with greater powers and independence are at the top and the 
bottom, incorporating an opposite scenario.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Models of Parliamentary Power   
Source: Developed by author using data from (O'Brien, Stapenhurst et al. 2008:3) 
                                            
5 As indicated, EALA has a role in law-making as it can propose and vote on Motions and Bills 
provided these have no cost implications on any fund of the EAC. However, the Summit of Heads of 
State and Government have an effective veto right over EALA’s legislation (EAC 1999: Art.59-64) 
thus EALA’s legislative rights are earnestly constrained too for ultimately, this weakens the scope 
and relevance of prospective laws.  
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The original concept presented by O'Brien, Stapenhurst et al. (2008) is illustrated by the 
upward mobility of the blue arrow in Figure 2.1. This can be connoted in their estimation as 
the only way is upwards, and if a parliament becomes transformational it cannot slip 
backwards. However considering the challenges facing parliaments in Africa, there is 
definitely evidence of parliaments slipping backwards in post-conflict environments and 
starting all over with ‘rubber-stamp’ challenges. Thus, the maroon arrow builds on this 
conceptualisation and aims to demonstrate that in the case of regional parliaments, there 
is need for contextualisation and not evaluation on a spectrum of a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach.  
 
Succinctly put, rubber-stamp parliaments simply endorse decisions made elsewhere and 
brought to the parliament for assent; emerging parliaments may be transitioning either from 
authoritarian or another type of political system or parliament to another usually balancing 
challenges of facilities, knowledge base, human resource to be able to meet political 
demands but with a little bit more power than a rubber-stamp parliament. Median position 
are the informed parliaments also called arena legislatures visualised as a societal 
barometer where political differences are debated and speeches articulated; whereas at the 
pinnacle is transformative parliaments which are considered rare and could qualify as the 
‘Holy Grail’ of legislatures. At this level, the legislature represents diverse interests and 
independently moulds policy. 
 
The various levels correlates in parts to research from Norton (1990), (1998) descriptions 
using policy making scenarios; Salih (2013) notions of African parliaments being 
‘legislatures without legislative powers’ and Costa, Dri et al. (2013) analysis of 
‘supranational’, or ‘supranational in the making’ and ‘non-supranational’ as already 
discussed elsewhere in this research. 
2.4.2 Representation  
Membership 
African parliaments and legislative bodies have been argued to be disconnected from the 
day-to-day realities and challenges citizens face. According to Judge (1995), Longley 
(1996), and  Malamud and De Sousa (2007), if the crisis of relevance seems stark in some 
national contexts, then at regional levels the challenge for parliamentarians is multiplied. As 
a fundamental aspect of politics focuses on representative systems, it has evolved from an 
old style medieval or modern parliamentarianism to the kind we now regard as democratic, 
it has taken on many forms giving rise to its current form (de Puig 2008). 
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It is estimated that there are more than 9,210 parliamentarians among Africa's population 
of 700 million people; one legislator for every 76,000 people (Salih 2005, Stapenhurst, 
Draman et al. 2012). All parliaments build relationships at the continental, regional or 
national level. They exist also in platforms and networks on issues including poverty, anti-
corruption, climate change, conflict prevention, gender, small arms and light weapons 
amongst others.  
 
As illustrated by Table 2.1 below, the PAP has parallel relationships with both regional and 
national parliaments. The former sends delegates independently of those that are appointed 
by the latter. Thus one could argue that this can lead to duplication, and pressure on scarce 
resources needed for strengthening parliaments with respect to time of sittings and tenures.  
Table 2.1: Relationship of the PAP to ARPs 
Source: Developed by author using data from various ARPs documents and websites 
 
All ARPs except EALA have their members nominated, appointed or selected from within 
their national parliaments. However EALA members are elected by political parties 
represented in parliament, but the MPs themselves are ineligible. According to  Eze 
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(2004:11) this procedure is believed to broaden the political space and might allow the 
assembly to focus more on its regional mandate. Yet there are existing arguments this 
rather leads to a disconnection between the regional and national assemblies at the 
expense of the EALA’s ability to drive the regional agenda at the national level. 
 
Further, all the other ARPs utilising the indirect approach contain inherent advantages. 
These are inexpensive compared to universal adult suffrage, though the latter is definitively 
preferable in terms of democratic participation, legitimacy and inclusiveness. However, 
ARPs cannot, and to an extent do not want to meet these expenses; for instance the 
ECOWAS-P is the only one whose founding document foresees such direct general 
elections for the future. 
 
2.4.3 Oversight and accountability 
 
According to Karuuombe (2008: 2) parliaments’ exclusion from Africa’s integration projects 
has not advanced domestication and implementation of integration projects. Referencing 
SADC, Karuuombe insist that the continued negation of this cardinal role which can 
potentially enhance integration is the missing link in the integration process.  
 
Additionally, a challenge to effective oversight is the role of political parties’ representation, 
which may inadvertently effect undue adherence to party loyalty at the expense of oversight 
mandate. For instance MPs as members of political parties are obliged to be demonstrating 
party loyalty. Generally, this is a weak position of national parliaments and can be a 
limitation to a regional parliament’s influence on oversight of the regional executive.  
 
Reflectively, regional parliaments can be only as strong as, but not stronger than their 
constituent elements, the national parliaments. At the national level, parliaments can invite 
any person to address their plenaries, and this is adopted by regional parliaments. The PAP 
can also request officials of the AU to attend its sessions or to produce documents (AU 
2001:Articles 11-15)  as well as the ECOWAS-P. However, these would have no practical 
value if invited officials refuse cooperation. 
 
Budgetary oversight at the regional level is not executed as at the national level where 
parliaments’ exert influence by providing checks and balances on the executive’s spending 
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and guiding the allocation of funds. However, the ECOWAS-P issued a resolution in 
September 2002 calling for the enhancement of its powers to make consultation on the 
adoption of the community budget obligatory (ECOWAS-P 2002). Currently, core budgets 
of EALA and the ECOWAS-P are part of the respective budgets of their regional 
organisations. Administering a budget allocated from the overall budget of the regional 
organisation implies a high degree of dependence on regional executives and national 
governments, who can arbitrarily threaten the parliaments’ existence or effective ability to 
work. 
 
Functionally, ARPs should monitor the regional executives’ activities but this relationship is 
not formalised. Thus ARPs have limited mandates enabling them to hold executives 
accountable. In the absence of clearly defined working relationships, ARPs also depend on 
the executive bodies for information and documentation further hindering effective 
parliamentary performance.  Similarly, Staff function as gatekeepers of decisions of 
Summits and Councils and this practically affect the oversight relationship.  
 
2.4.4 Conflict Prevention Frameworks 
The Constitutive Act mandated the AU and RECs on enhancing their security and 
peacebuilding frameworks. Therefore all the institutions have conflict prevention 
frameworks to contend with at their respective regional institutional level. However, ARPs 
do not have explicit mandates. Thus in a bid to ensure their relevance and help push the 
aspirations of a culture of prevention to be realised on the continent, there has been a 
steady attempt at employing strategies that would help make this feasible. This interwoven 
relationship is illustrated in Table 2.2 below.  
 
As demonstrated, some of the ARPs have standing committees working on issues of peace 
and security and carving out normative roles for the parliamentary institutions.  
 
Until 2012, UEMOA was not inclined to lead on peace and security issues ceding this role 
to ECOWAS, considered more qualified and experienced in the region. However, the 
conflicts in Mali and Niger, and the subsequent discontent with ECOWAS leaders’ handling 
of issues prompted UEMOA to be proactive in introducing strategies in this regard. Notably, 
this is a burgeoning area which will need to be streamlined (Hagberg and Körling 2012, 
Whitehouse 2012, Cristiani and Fabiani 2013). Essentially, these frameworks are not 
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diametrically different in content from the other, and Nathan (2010a) signals the probability 
of some being fashioned specifically in response to particular conflicts in respective regions.  
 
However, there is a major challenge in attempting to construct ARPs participation in conflict 
prevention in Africa as information is scattered, unstructured and at best more attuned to 
their executive wings. As ARPs have no explicit role in these frameworks, normatively, the 
vision of a  prevention culture created entry points for parliamentary diplomacy (Weisglas 
and de Boer 2007), and some of the normative codifications in the respective frameworks 
further enhances these roles. This normative evolution has coincided with changes in the 
institutional setting for multilateral conflict prevention, improved through a significant 
increase in and recalibration of the capabilities for the pursuit of early warning, good offices, 
and root causes for prevention. 
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Table 2.2: ARPs and Conflict Prevention Frameworks 
Source: Compiled by author using data from web pages of ARPs; Terlinden 2004; SADC-PF 
Strategic Plan 2011-2015; SADC-PF Constitution; ECPF 2011; ECOWAS-P Strategic Plan 2010-
2015; Elowson and Cecilia Hull Wiklund; Meyer 2008;  EALA 2009; Adar 2008;  
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Alternatively, Rupiya (2007) identifies areas parliaments can assist in conflict prevention to 
include equitable distribution of socio-economic development across regions and 
communities, income and opportunity distribution policies using the national budget. 
Similarly, Balch (2007)  maintains that a defining characteristic of the 20th century was the 
emergence of regionally focused political structures and that the international community 
seems to have discovered parliamentarians, at long last as the intersection of collective 
efforts to help democratize and develop Africa; from bodies in Europe to the African Union. 
The PAP for instance, is charged with nothing less than ensuring the full participation of 
Africans in governance, development, economic integration and decision-making.  
 
They discuss transparent decision-making structures, such as electoral processes, and 
enabling parliamentary committees to hold all-party debates on key contentious issues, as 
ways of parliament’s role in conflict prevention. Other aspects are civil control of the armed 
forces and police, oversight of military budgets and military involvement in politics. They 
assert that, if sufficiently resourced, parliaments can act to provide transparency in the 
diversion of government finances toward military efforts, and can interact with international 
donors to ensure that humanitarian assistance is targeted equitably.  
 
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) 
 
The ECPF was developed in January 2008 to inform and guide conflict prevention efforts. 
It has fourteen components through which it aims to act as a drawback on the shortcomings 
on earlier provisions and is the most comprehensive framework aimed at ensuring 
ECOWAS’ conflict prevention capacity. Thus, it comprehensively integrates existing 
initiatives of ECOWAS institutions and mechanisms responsible for conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding including: 
 Adoption of the Protocol on non-Aggression 1978 
 Adoption of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters 1981 
International Judicial Cooperation 
 Establishment of the ECOWAS Peacekeeping Force 
 Adoption of the Protocol on the fight against Corruption 
 Convention on small arms and light weapons  
37 
 
 
Table 2.3 The 14 components of the ECPF 
Source: (ECPF January 2008) 
 
Although initially conceived as an economic integration mechanism, ECOWAS has become 
famous for its conflict prevention, management, peacemaking and peace- keeping 
initiatives in member countries (especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea- Bissau, Mali, 
Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire) (Adeniji 1999, Woodhouse 2000).    
 
To a much lesser extent are its ‘low profile’ but equally important activities in areas of ‘new’ 
regional security concerns such as small arms and light weapons proliferation, and control 
and combating the scourge of human trafficking Internal divisions in Liberia boiled over into 
a civil' war in 1990. During an ECOWAS Summit in the same year, an essentially 
Anglophone group of ECOWAS states formed an ECOWAS Mediation Committee to look 
for ways of resolving the Liberian conflict. This committee subsequently formulated and 
adopted a peace plan for Liberia that included, among other things, the establishment of 
the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Olonisakin 1996, Tuck 2000, Adebajo 2002, 
Adebajo 2002, Kabia 2009). Since the first regionally led peace operation took place in 
Liberia by the ECOMOG, regional organizations have played a prominent role in the 
conduct of international peace operations and yet remain vastly understudied in the 
literature on peace operations as the majority of studies focus on UN peacekeeping (Adedeji 
2004, Tavares 2011). 
 
 Moreover, these organizations have increasingly assumed responsibility for the 
international conduct of peace operations as insufficient funding, limited capabilities and 
precarious political will have hindered the UN’s ability to respond. Wide references to a UN 
‘overburden’ or ‘over-extension’ in the realm of peacekeeping appear in the literature 
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(Francis 2009, Besada 2010, Franke 2010). Furthermore, no comprehensive studies have 
specifically compared the practice of regional organizations engaged in peace operations 
(Olonisakin 2000, Doyle and Sambanis 2011).  
 
ECOMOG in reality had its backbone in the Nigerian armed forces and financial resources 
(Adisa 1994, Synge 1999). Following its intervention in the Liberian conflict (1990-1998), it 
turned its attention to the conflicts in Sierra Leone (19961999), Guinea-Bissau (1998-2000), 
Guinea-Bissau/Liberia (2001) and Cote d’Ivoire (2002), Mali 2010-Present (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 
1994, Olonisakin 2000, Adebajo 2002, Arthur 2010). ECOWAS has established a 
sophisticated security management system, based on its 1999 Protocol on the Mechanism 
for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (popularly 
known as the mechanism) and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance, signed by ECOWAS heads of state in late 2001(ECOWAS 1993, Senghor 
1999, Aning and Bah 2009).   
 
The institutions of ECOWAS charged with implementing the mechanism include the 
Authority of the Heads of State and Government, the Mediation and Security Council, the 
Defence and Security Commission, and the ECOWAS Commission. It is important to note 
that some decision-making authority on matters relating to peace and security has been 
devolved to the Mediation and Security Council, and the Parliament (unlike SADC, where 
its organ structure at heads of state level retains ultimate authority regarding political, and 
defence and security matters). However, no authority has been ceded ‘upwardly’ to the 
African Union Peace and Security Commission (Gandois 2011).  
 
The provision of the ECOWAS's Mechanism is worth attention to illustrate one of the policies 
finally codified into the ECPF(Meyer 2010). As the Sub-regional Peace and Security 
Observation system, contained in Chapter IV, this early warning provision is aimed at 
stemming the spate of crises in West Africa sub-region by forestalling their explosion 
through preventive devices.  
 
The early warning system consists of an ‘Observation and Monitoring Centre located at the 
Secretariat’; and ‘Observation and Monitoring Zones within the sub-region’. Their functions 
include; collecting and analysing data, preparing reports for the Executive Secretariat, 
collaborating with the UN, AU, research centres and relevant international regional and sub-
regional organisations (ECOWAS 1993, Souaré 2007, Mwagiru 2010).  
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The Mechanism further breaks up member states of ECOWAS into Observation and 
Monitoring Zones. Each zone contains between 3 to 5 member states with zonal capitals 
as illustrated in Table 2.4: 
 
 
Table 2.4  Early Warning System of ECOWAS 
Source:(ECOWAS 1999:16) 
 
There is no substantial difference between the functions of the Centres and the Zones. The 
only notable difference is while the observation centre collects data and information 
generally, the Zonal Bureaux shall, 'on a state by state basis and day-to-day basis, collect 
data on indicators that impact on the peace and security of the Zone and the sub-
region’(Rusu 2001, Aning 2004, Souaré 2007).  
 
However there is a central point department at the ECOWAS Commission responsible for 
collating, synthesising, analysing and drawing up policy direction from the information. A 
utility system operationalised in partnership with civil organizations, West Africa Civil 
Society Forum (WACSOF) and West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) called the 
ECOWAS Peace Exchange is a web based software tool that enables journalists and other 
stakeholders to feed into the system. 
 
Two observations can be made in connection with the early warning system; first though 
preventive devices of this nature may not be an ingenious discovery by ECOWAS, its nature 
and elaborate structure make it significantly distinguishable from previous experience. For 
instance, Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides for pacific resolution of disputes amongst 
states. The application of the provision under this Chapter is contingent on the outbreak of 
a dispute though not generally involving use of arms (United Nations 2011). The implication 
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of the ECOWAS early warning system is much more comprehensive, and if faithfully 
implemented, may yield better results. It is geared towards locating potential causes of 
conflicts and constituting appropriate organs to deal with such.  
 
Second, the Mechanism also provides for the Council of Elders which is mandated to deal 
with a given conflict situation whenever the need arises. Thus there is a great interaction 
between the institution of the Monitoring Centres and Monitoring Zones and the Council of 
Elders. While the activities of the Centres and Zones are particularly tailored towards 
avoidance of conflicts, the Council of Elders undertakes the responsibility of pacific 
resolution of eventual disputes. In addition, the zonal focus allows for the maximisation of 
resources with guaranteed optimal results. The narrowing of preventive activities of the 
Centres and Zones will undoubtedly go a long way in avoiding a dissipation of energy and 
strategy. 
 
In further efforts to achieve the concrete results expected from the Early Warning System 
(EWS), the Mechanism provides for the establishment of a 'framework for the rational and 
equitable management of natural resources shared by neighbouring Member States which 
may be causes of frequent inter-State conflicts.' The final provisions of the Mechanism 
worthy of commentary are those that relate to the task of peacebuilding in the aftermath of 
a conflict. These are contained under Chapter IX of the Mechanism. 
 
The ECPF is undoubtedly a major contribution to the corpus of enactment on the regulation 
of collective security. In substance and size, it is a remarkable improvement on the previous 
Protocols as it takes several bold steps and breaks new ground on many frontiers. From 
the incorporation of the thorny doctrine of humanitarian intervention to the inclusion of early 
warning, trans-border regulation of crime, the institution of a stand-by force to implement its 
commitments, the Mechanism presents us with a fresh vision of collective security.  
 
Rather than limit its vision to the classical notion of collective security--the use of collective 
force to repel an aggression--ECOWAS reinterpreted this concept using a more holistic 
paradigm. Not only does this Mechanism afford us the highly needed opportunity to re-
appraise the practice of collective security by regional Organisations, it candidly helps us to 
re-evaluate the place of the United Nations system in the crucial task of maintaining 
international peace and security. 
 
However, the framework must not be treated as an article of faith. There are obvious pitfalls 
in some of the provisions that should be of concern. Although how well the framework will 
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fare upon implementation must at this point remain conjectural, it is possible to make some 
projections. ECOWAS will certainly experience difficulties, both of a legal nature and 
otherwise. Implementing provisions regulating natural resources shared by neighbouring 
states, unsolicited restructuring of democratic and governmental structures of a Member 
State, may soon prove a step too far into the sovereignty of Member States. 
 
 Other practical problems that should be expected will include circumstances in which there 
are military takeovers of the governments of the most powerful and wealthy members of the 
organisations. It remains doubtful whether ECOWAS would have the capacity to authorise 
enforcement action entirely on its own against a military junta in Nigeria for instance. This 
country contributes the most share in terms of human and material resources to ECOWAS 
missions. 
 
In other words, organisations should not only aim for establishing effective operations, but 
also for establishing effective operations quickly. Some would argue that more time is 
needed to achieve the highest quality operation possible. It is true that guaranteeing that 
member states will provide sufficient resources contributes to slowness of decision-making, 
but I argue not that quality should be sacrificed for efficiency but rather that efficiency should 
be taken seriously as a means for enhancing prospects of success.  
 
Regional organisations that have intervened in these cases secure legitimacy for their 
interventions in alternative ways by tying their mandates to relevant peace operation 
demands, such as a supportive UN resolution calling for regional support or an official 
request from the government of the affected state. Ultimately, there can be severe 
consequences for decision-makers that ‘decide to defer the deployment of peacekeeping 
soldiers until after a peace agreement’. To a large extent one can intimate that decision-
makers face a trade-off between peacekeeping and peacemaking, and initiating conflict 
prevention initiatives on a regular basis (Diehl and Lepgold 2003, Diehl 2008).   
 
For legislators maintaining legitimacy in the perceptiveness of local actors is critical to the 
long-term success of any operation invested in reclaiming security, and in hindsight on 
developments in Africa, parliaments are keen to lead(Anderson 1999).  
 
First, response rates matter to the long-term effectiveness of peace operations and conflict 
prevention initiatives, and elite decision-makers in regional organisations recognise that the 
longer an organisation takes to respond to the conflict and fulfil its issued mandate, the 
prospects of cultivating sustainable peace diminish as violence continues, death tolls rises 
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and local actors increasingly perceive the organisation and its actions as illegitimate 
(Acharya 2007, Hardt 2009, Donno 2010).   
 
Secondly, an organisation’s capacity is no panacea to the conflicts in which it engages. 
Organisations with relatively less capacity have equally proven to be successful in 
operations in their respective regions. Rather, increased capacity can strengthen the impact 
of a response to conflict specifically by means of securing necessary resources and by 
largely determining an organisation’s staying power. As discussed, authors often point to 
the formal structures and rules that institutionally bind the European Union (EU) as a source 
of its operational success in peacebuilding (Acharya 2007, Kingah and Van Langenhove 
2012, Kluth 2013).  
 
2.4.5 Subsidiarity and the Institutions 
‘The Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the 
Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and 
stability in Africa…’ (AU 2002:Article 16:1) 
 
Lending credence to the mantra of ‘African Solutions to African Problems’, devolving 
responsibility of conflict prevention to regional actors has gained expediency in the new 
approaches on the continent. Unfortunately, there is paucity of research examining the 
subsidiary role of the PAP with regional parliaments, or relationship amongst the ARPs. 
Thus on this level, some scholars (O'Brien 2000, Møller 2005) review the subsidiary role 
between the Pan-African parliament and the ECOWAS parliament by just elaborating on 
the institutional structures and challenges it will face, analyse security dilemmas and 
attempts at ensuring peace, or discusses both institutions in some comparative form. 
 
The multitude of international norms that have been adopted by the African Union (AU), 
which in theory are applicable to the member states remain by and large ignored.  But, in 
the importation of liberal norms with little chance of enforcement ARPs are paradoxically 
similar. 
 
A seminal report assessing the progress of the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) (AU 2010), concluded that there is a little subsidiarity, but there is need for improved 
coherence and partnership if the relationship is to be sustainable. It demonstrates that de 
jure there is the principle of subsidiarity because most of the conflict prevention frameworks 
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recognises a role for the AU; but de facto this lacks clarity in terms of specific 
responsibilities. Additionally, as the PSC Protocol states that the ‘modalities for this 
partnership shall be based on their respective comparative advantage and the prevailing 
circumstances’ this assertion is to guarantee flexibility in determining of roles and 
responsibilities the regional organisations remain primarily inter-governmental rather than 
supranational (Ssempebwa 2004:13) and there is a reluctance to cede national sovereignty 
rights to regional levels. But evidently the components of APSA are all developing at 
independent paces and there have been several instances when regions have taken 
unilateral decisions on enforcing peace without the input of the AU as demonstrated by 
ECOWAS in the Liberia and Sierra Leonean cases. 
 
Furthermore, most of the ARPs were established and working within their regional security 
mechanisms before the AU was formed in 2002. Thus there is the issue of ‘who learns from 
whom’ as the latter deem this an area in which the ARPs have more expertise. According 
to Adebajo (2010) this makes following AU recommendations incoherent though it is 
supposed to be the coordinating organisation. The existing eclectic frameworks and 
practices underscored by the enduring political histories, sometimes of hostilities between, 
and amongst member states makes subsidiarity obviously inconsistent guaranteeing, 
tensions and competition, rather than promoting comparative advantage. 
 
Similarly, key factors continuously hamper this subsidiary role.  For example ECOWAS 
operates in the ‘space’ of regional and continental mechanisms in relation to the AU. Thus 
the manner in which the principle of subsidiarity is applied, and the extent to which it is 
practicable will determine its success in dealing with security threats on the continent, such 
as terrorism and the seemingly endless civil wars. 
 
Ultimately most studies on the relationship of the conflict mechanisms fail to criticise this 
empirically-weak link and are mostly concerned with a general assessment of the 
mechanisms. Therefore, this research will also fill this gap by discussing the subsidiary 
parliamentary relationship between the regional and continental bodies in conflict 
prevention. The continuous discussions in literature about the inter-governmental system 
of the 1975 treaty being jettisoned and a supranational system being pursued should be the 
angle from which academia concentrates as ECOWAS continuously attempts to turn into a 
supranational institution. 
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Finally, a complex dimension to discourse on the regional-national interface in 
parliamentary relations hitherto discussed by several authors is the introduction and 
emergence of the EU Parliament with its own brand of legislative tradition and culture. The 
evolution of the continental parliament and its interaction with nation States, in a quest for 
proper representation is recounted by Ngweny (2007) giving the difference between the role 
of the continental level and regional parliaments. Whilst it is not in doubt that this is very 
valuable contribution to this research there is no attempt to present a focus on the principle 
of subsidiary between these parliaments and how this will affect their functions in 
parliament/differ from region to region. 
 
2.5  The EU Parliament as sui generis in the emergence of supranational 
legislative order 
The European Parliament hailed worldwide as a classic example of transnational 
democracy has over the years transformed into a body with a co-legislative powers. Until 
1979, the EU Parliament was a consultative forum to be consulted on a small range of 
legislative proposals prior to their adoption by the European Council as can be evidence in                              
Table 2.5: Some Benchmarks of the EU Parliament. Worth noting is the fact that the 
Parliament was nevertheless given the right to dismiss the Commission in a vote of censure 
with a two-thirds majority. The system whereby ministers alone could adopt legislation 
suffered from ‘democratic deficit’ and Parliament had to fight for its powers; this it has done 
with considerable success (Corbett, Jacobs et al. 2005:2-4).  
 
The EU Parliament over the past four decades has evolved both in scope and powers to 
being a bicameral system in conjunction with the Council. This role was supposed to be 
enhanced through the new EU Constitution which is unfortunately facing an impasse after 
it could not pass the referendum in crucial EU states.         
 
The parliament regarded as sui generis, has been transplanted, adopted and adapted to 
globally, and is redefining the role of international and indeed regional parliaments across 
different contexts and cultures. Over the last decade there has been a revival in scholarly 
interest in the European Parliament, inspired principally by the addition of the cooperation 
(1987) and co-decision (1994) procedures to the legislative arsenal of the European Union 
(EU), essentially expanding its powers.  
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According to Kreppel (1999) when it comes to perceptions on regional integration schemes 
generally, the EU is deemed as what one call ‘the model’ thus the conformity to, or departure 
from this model therefore provides the framework for discussing other regional integration 
bodies, most especially those in Africa and other developing parts of the world. 
 
Whilst the EU may be fraught with problems of its own, according to Wiener and Diez (2009) 
its development is increasingly gaining acceptability and attention globally, though the 
results and impacts are a far cry from being uniform or even significantly comparative. This 
is because, due to context, culture, and other reasons, wholesale transplanting of the EU’s 
model has been impossible, and significantly wide variations exist between what the EU 
Parliament represents and what regional parliaments of the RECs seeking to replicate the 
EU process do in practice.  
 
However, for Kreppel (1999) the extent of the EU Parliament’s legislative power, and 
especially the influence that legislative procedure has on this power, continue to be areas 
of significant debate. A cause of much debate has been a general paucity of significant 
empirical data about EU Parliament’s influence. This has led to an overtly theoretical 
approach, particularly in the examination of the influence of the EP’s legislative procedures. 
Most of these studies refer to the data on EU Parliament amendment success rates 
published by the Commission and the parliament. 
 
Unfortunately, this data is available only at the aggregate level, making it difficult for ‘small 
n’ studies, and little or no information about the significance of the individual amendments 
or what exactly constitutes ‘adoption’ is available. The weakness of the existing empirical 
data has long allowed various theoretical models of EU Parliament influence to coexist, 
competing for dominance without the ability to effectively test their relative veracity. 
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                             Table 2.5: Some Benchmarks of the EU Parliament 
                             Sources: EP web pages; (Campion and Lidderdale 1953, Bond 1997, Corbett, Jacobs et al. 2005, Cofelice and Stavridis 2014)
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2.6 Defining Regional parliaments in context to this research 
 
In determining an appropriate definition of regional parliaments to guide this research, there 
are two observations to finally consider. First, in agreement with the assertion of Katz and 
Wessels (1999:10), experiences from different parts of the world suggest that not all 
parliaments are legislatures because some have only a deliberative and/or advisory 
mandate. Apart from being ‘…central institutions for political legitimacy’, the best well-
known and commonly understood function of a national parliament, at least in the African 
context, is representation. Second, as Wanyande (2005) accurately observes: 
 
‘...any political community will have diverse interests, which must be addressed. 
The complexity of modern societies makes it difficult, if not impossible, to have 
every person present his or her interest directly to the governing authority. 
Parliaments, through elected leaders, perform this representational role 
…Parliament provides a forum for the aggregation of diverse interests, and the 
processing and conversion of those interests into policy decisions...’ 
(Wanyande 2005:67). 
 
The definition I have developed guiding this research is ‘a regional parliament is…’ 
‘an international parliamentary institution with legislative and/or consultative 
mandate and power which holds sessions/meetings according to established 
rules of procedures, with members who have been elected, appointed or 
selected from their respective national parliaments, or elected by citizens of the 
member states. Therefore as a regional parliamentary institution it is 
transnational, within a specific geographical location, serving the interest of a 
regional organisation or a regional policy with which it is sometimes 
institutionally bound…’ 
 
Even though there are a myriads of analytical tools, categories, classifications and analysis 
and conceptualisations by various authors; a contextualised definition highlighting the 
usefulness of aspects for the case under study with a description of the parliament will 
cover, structure, membership, and competences. As the phenomenon of IPIs is still a new 
area for research, definitive classification may be a challenge though the academic 
contributions so far are serving to clarify and illuminate the landscape.  
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In this study, the definition is therefore a combination of Cutler (2001), effective distinction 
provided by Šabič (2008) as International Parliamentary Associations (IPAs) and 
International Parliamentary Organs (IPOs), and Malamud and de Sousa (2007). In addition, 
several other distinctions that are not mutually exclusive; one IPI belonging to another IPI 
or not; involved in a multilevel parliamentary system or not; supranational or not; of a 
regional or inter-regional kind; selecting members through direct elections or not without 
imposing a restrictive typology. 
 
First, in as much as there are sui generis debates of growth of the EU Parliament in the 
1960s–1980s and also more recent active support, the institution provides both expertise 
and funding to help diffuse the European model to other continents. Though scholars 
including Costa and Foret (2005) argue that the European experience mainly benefitted 
from very specific and unique conditions easy to replicate so other models might not be that 
successful. However, as the focus of this research is not a comparison with the EU 
Parliament, these might become subject for further studies. 
 
Second, scarce resources are an underlying institutional challenge to the effective operation 
of any regional parliament, as most of them have to depend on contributions to the 
executive integration organ and also individual member parliaments. Reflectively, 
developed institutions like the EU do not face the challenges of means and funding, and as 
such are able to also be more effective in their activities.  
 
Third, the challenges of the emergence and proliferation of regional parliaments also 
creates a competition  for scarce resources, and at the same time raises additional 
questions of cost of these institutions and whether there is even a need for all these regional 
parliaments. Thus, the issue of ‘rationalisation’ is prevalent around the existence of the 
numerous institutions and whether the y are useful; with another being whether there are 
prevailing economies of scale or existing path dependency. More importantly is the 
overriding notion that ‘it is easier to create an international organisation than to bring it to 
an end – even if it becomes totally useless or inactive’ (Costa, Dri et al. 2013).  
 
Finally, addressing definitional and conceptual issues in context helps in deciding the type 
of parliament being research, and this empirical evidence then goes on to help confirm the 
levels of impact parliaments have. Here, informal arrangements are as important as formal 
ones, and there is also a relevance to the level of institutionalisation especially with regard 
to its overall impact, be it actual or only potential. 
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2.7  Parliaments and Conflict Prevention in West Africa 
The African continent over the past fifty years has demonstrated substantial levels of fragility 
at both states and regional levels. Ranging from ‘strong men-rebel leaders-Boko Haram’ 
compounded by shared global drivers such as regional (in) security; religious, ethnic and 
gender differences; oppression, border disputes and political influences in specific contexts 
have all been contributory factors. 
 
A central role for parliamentarians in peace, prosperity and efforts at democratisation of 
Africa seems to have been discovered as a tool to put them in the driving seat of the political 
process. To this end, a plethora of handbooks, toolkits and guidelines have emerged in 
recognition of what parliamentary bodies can do, prescribing training, information exchange 
and enactment of conflict sensitive laws as vital to ensure lasting peace and prosperity in 
Africa (Aning 1996, Francis 1999, Aning 2004, Francis 2006, Kaplan 2006, Balch 2007, 
Salih 2013). 
 
In recognition of the rising number of parliaments that are operating in conflict affected 
societies, the World Bank Institute and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 
commissioned studies conducted by O'Brien, Stapenhurst et al. (2008) examining issues 
facing developing parliaments in the hope of strengthening parliaments’ capacity to tackle 
their diverse challenges and meet growing community expectations.  
 
Though their study is the national level, this thesis will benefit immensely from the empirical 
and prior research carried out in this particular research, which also looks at how 
parliaments play a very necessary part in transitions from conflict to peace and stability 
especially in addressing root causes of conflicts and preventing a reoccurrence because of 
their representative status.  
 
Emphasising a crucial role of parliaments as peace builders, O'Brien, Stapenhurst et al. 
(2008) discuss the ability of parliaments to monitor how public expenditure is spent. They 
examine forums are created for dialogues to oversee the executive’s judicious use and 
implementation of resources. This is because conflicts also emanate from challenges within 
constitutional and electoral systems. 
 
 Applying this analogy of national scenarios, this is conceptualised to demonstrate how 
parliament effectively prevent conflict through the execution of its core functions of 
representation, law-making and oversight, emphasising the premise that, meaningful 
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participation and representation is important if this is to be a realistic achievement or goal; 
and confer legitimacy on parliament as it instils public confidence in the credibility of its 
work. 
 
In West Africa, conflict prevention is in the first instance associated with preventive 
diplomacy and influence including the classic ‘carrot and stick’ diplomacy associated with 
Realpolitik. The regional parliament therefore occupy a unique position. It possesses the 
power of parliamentary diplomacy which it employs in mediation and negotiations. As 
representatives of the citizens of the sub-region, it makes them natural forums for 
consensus building. 
 
As well, the everyday parliamentary business of debates, discussions, motion hearings, 
passage of resolutions, reviewing and amending protocols and initiatives for enhancing their 
powers are normative progress towards creating enabling environments that ensures a 
nexus between the parliament and conflict prevention as relates to the sub-region. Suffice 
it to say that, parliamentarians of regional parliaments work beyond the framework of their 
traditional functions to build relationships and dialogues with other international, national 
and peer-groups on issues of conflict prevention. Parliamentarians can intervene in areas 
that traditional diplomats cannot venture. 
 
2.7.1 Causes of Conflicts 
This section aims to only emphasise a selective list of drivers of conflict which are common 
narrative. This is because the scale of this subject means each aspect requires its own 
range of literature review which is not the focus of this thesis. Thus, this section will 
necessarily partially contribute to providing the proper context only for this research, with 
respect to causes which also impact the development of parliaments in the region.  
 
Colonial heritage 
The great push for the colonisation of Africa occurred in the late nineteenth century with 
Europe vying for the ownership of Africa at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 which 
settled the political partitioning of Africa. This acted as the Scramble for Africa (1875-1912), 
the term used to describe Europe's rush to colonise and divide the African continent (Gavin 
and Betley 1973, Schmidt and Arndt 2010).   
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At the time, Warburton (2005) and (Morrison 2006) agree that France, Germany, Great 
Britain, and Portugal were the major players controlling most of colonial Africa. Various 
descriptions have also been accorded to this phenomenon including ‘carving Africa into 
spheres of control’ by De Blij and Muller (1985); ‘slicing up Africa like a cake’ advanced by 
Pakenham (1992) and even the ‘division of the earth’ according to Schmidt and Arndt (2010) 
amongst others.  
 
It is argued that the nature of Western rule left Africa neither politically nor economically 
prepared for independence, thus creating a fundamentally undermined security condition in 
most states from the outset. After colonial rule was firmly established in Africa, the only 
change in possessions came after World War One. Germany's four colonies were placed 
under the League of Nations, which established a mandate system for other colonisers to 
administer the territories.  
 
 As a result, the colonial powers already with functioning bureaucracies, were less inclined 
to rely on indigenous institutions, and thereby established a pure model of alien bureaucratic 
autocracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, countries under Britain had a less uniform 
development in the structure of a colonial state as a result of the indirect rule (Lugard 1922, 
Perham 1934, Crowder 1964, Young 1994) of regional administration.  
 
In contrast, French colonies were at the extreme of a central command deriving from the 
Governor right down to the village level through a singular hierarchy referred to as 
‘Assimilation’ (Crowder 1964, 1976, Ayittey 1992, Diouf 1998). However, the administration 
in rural areas, either under the French or the British did not introduce participation in 
decision-making at the community level (Busia 1967, Manning 1998). 
 
Grand narratives of decolonisation abound, and one is the western capitalist view based on 
what Frederick Cooper identifies as ‘Europe’s self-perceived movement toward state-
building, capitalist development, and modernity’. This vision posits a form of historical 
progress against which African, Asian and Latin American history appears as a failure and 
on the other, there is the grand narrative of nationalist victory based on stories of triumphant 
resistance told with a ‘rather macho air to the narrating of confrontation’ (Taoua 2003, 
Cooper 2005). According to Hydén (2006) and Kinzer (2009), all these impacted the 
conditions stimulating occurrence of conflicts. Furthermore, Africa was governed as 
components of strategic economies not reflective of the reality and ultimately these led to 
calamitous consequences like the events in Rwanda. 
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Figure 2.2: Colonial rule in Africa 
 Data Source: (De Blij and Muller 1985) 
 
Reasons advanced by authors including Poku and Mdee (2011) state that, it was because 
colonial powers instituted forms of extremely patriarchal forms of governing and thereby 
could not successfully encourage emerging democratic structures. Local knowledge and 
content were excluded in generating tenets of direct trade benefits which occasioned the 
issue of single raw material resource economies. Moreover, there was a disregard to 
capacity building which effectively served to erode competence as the continent was not 
prepared for the demands of democracy (Akaki 2008) as standardised by the West.   
 
Cold War Dynamics 
Several narratives exist on the impact of the Cold War on Africa’s internal democratic 
experiments and its social, political and economic cohesion decades after the formal end of 
this era. A salient assertion is that, the Cold War contributed to both the militarisation of 
states and undermining of political legitimacy of governments. Scholars including Hydén 
(2006) insist the strongest examples of this phenomenon is the civil wars of Angola and 
Mozambique. The period accentuated by a lack of superpower interest in colonising Africa, 
rather made Africa a proxy ‘battlefield’ on which ironically war could not be literally waged. 
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 Therefore, as stated by Cramer (2006) and Ndikumana and Emizet (2003) both sides 
instituted expediency regimes. These were militarised with no legitimacy and internally 
rulers remained unaccountable. These included those of Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo (then Zaire) and Somalia which were heavily propped up through patronage, 
patriarchy and military dominance. Underscored by a scramble for power, these countries 
ultimately became unsustainable and repercussions have weighed heavily overtime into 
present times. 
 
Furthermore, Kinzer (2009) contends that funding and accelerated militarisation from patron 
networks invigorated actors to pursue power through war rather than democratic processes 
as examples of DRC, Mozambique, and Somalia show. Aid usually included military 
packages of training which in turn served as training brigades for elite presidential guards 
as utilised by Bozize Bokassa, Idi Amin, Mobutu Sese Seko and Gnassingbe Eyadema just 
to mention but few. Ultimately, these leaders represented the renowned image of an African 
military dictator ‘resplendent’ in a pressed uniform of medals and flanked by a well-
functioning military command.  
 
Additionally, Kinzer (2009) draws attention to the fact that, leaders who are protagonists of 
civil war have rather received asymmetric forms of military training, as for example the case 
of Paul Kagame’s (Rwanda) Cuban training in military intelligence and espionage, or Jonas 
Savimbi’s Chinese training in Maoist-style guerrilla warfare. 
 
External Actors 
The environment of an enabling arms trade and continuous military assistance by the 
international community has redefined a new role which impacts on the perpetuation on 
conflicts. According to LeMelle and Stulman (2009), the United States military sales to 
countries regarded as strategic allies on the ‘war on terror’ has accrued a lot of revenue 
with the country and its manufacturers continue to make millions of dollars.  
 
This according to Schroeder and Lamb (2006) and Spear (2006) precipitated the violations 
of UN arms embargoes which effectually drove conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan 
and created long-drawn-out challenges in DRC and Somalia. Similarly,  Muchai (2002) 
bemoans how the DRC continues to be plagued with conflicts as the stockpile of weaponry 
on every side comes from the Cold War cache. 
 
In contemporary times, the debates are more on the establishment of the United States 
Africa Command (AFRICOM) and other strategic US security investments and how these 
55 
 
are impacting the general security environment (LeMelle and Stulman 2009, Ojakorotu and 
Whetho 2009). 
 
Identity politics and social influence 
Considerable discussions in research abounds on Africa’s ethnic, geographic or religious 
divisions as a popular explanation for conflicts covering the infamous Hutu vs Tutsi; 
Christians versus  Muslims; Somali clans; Nigeria’s region including challenges with Boko 
Haram and the rise of Al Qaeda in West Africa precipitating conflicts in Mali and Niger 
amongst others.   
 
Increasingly, these conflicts defy the norm of monetary gains as incentive (Jackson 2002) 
for participation and the new war theory according to Kaldor (2013) is best placed in offering 
an understanding. These conflicts belie a complex overlap of divisions, sub-divisions, 
factions, and alliances principally socially constructed or manipulated in typically pragmatic 
modes (Hydén 2006).  
 
The New War theory offers the explanation that, core actors in these conflicts have taken 
advantage of  state weakness and poor socio-economic opportunity, including the reduced 
significance of national identity, to manipulate social divisions and incite civil war on the 
prime basis of identity rather than any belief of promoting state or society (Kaldor 2007).  
 
Competition for natural resources 
There is evidence to suggest that countries with a wealth of natural resources can have 
these resources fuelling civil wars and other conflicts as witnessed in Angola, the DRC and 
Sierra Leone (Gberie 2005, Cramer 2006). Conversely, absence of resources can also 
cause conflicts as experienced in Somalia (Webersik 2008).  
 
According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), civil wars only occur if the economic conditions 
exist to make them financially viable. This model has been applied widely on African 
conflicts but as discussed above, there are new conflicts which defy this logic and as such, 
it is a model that can be employed up to a point to explain conflicts in Africa, but not totally. 
It excludes non-economic explanations thus religious and ethnic inclinations as triggers for 
war, or indeed political exclusion are not covered by the model. 
 
A further distinction riposte to the question of resource conflicts or the ‘resource curse’ as 
this has become known is that, poor economic opportunities and low incomes correlates 
with the incentive for people to choose violence in the greed or grievance debates (Hoeffler 
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2011). Remarkably, this tempering of the ‘greed or grievance’ debate according to 
Ramsbotham (2005) means it now harbours mutual characteristics with what is regarded 
as the model’s prime competing academic model, that of Azar’s (1990) stance on 
‘protracted social conflict’. Apart from the model, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) have 
contributed significantly in establishing the incidence of civil war and the rising trend of 
conflict in Africa.  
 
This study explore a lot of insights as it demonstrates that in comparison to the rest of the 
developing world, Africa is not fundamentally different from other regions; incidences of 
conflict from 1965-1999 are within the expected results for a global model, and it is important 
to note that numerous African countries have not experienced civil war, including Malawi, 
Cameroon, Namibia, Ghana, Zambia and many others. Moreover, the study demonstrates 
that many African countries nonetheless are at greater risk of war than developing countries 
in other regions due to their comparative degree of structural underdevelopment, a disparity 
that can be accounted for by Africa’s divergent economic conditions and globally poor 
economic performance (Collier and Hoeffler 2002).  
 
Weak States and Institutions 
According to Jackson (2010), weak states are characterised by institutional weakness, 
political instability, centralisation of power, unconsolidated democracy, economic crisis, 
external vulnerability, social divisions, lack of national identity, and an ongoing crisis of 
legitimacy. These make them have a higher propensity and vulnerability to civil war. 
 
In the absence of a universally accepted definition of ‘weak states’, they can be 
characterised as entities confronting inimitable security dilemma, with  varied array of 
threats both internally (mutinies, armed factions or rebellions,) and externally (powerful 
regional actors or spill-over fighting from neighbouring states as happened in Sierra Leone 
from Liberia). Furthermore, the emergence of ‘big men’ in Africa has led to grievances from 
corruption, poverty and a failure to uphold the social contract which motivates rebellion. The 
collapse of the relationships between a regime, the military, and the general population is 
often the catalyst for civil disorder, looting and ultimately civil war (Jackson 2010). 
 
Africa has experienced significantly more civil wars and violent conflicts since the 1960s 
than any other major region around the world; however it cannot be suggested that any 
single aspect is central in explaining this phenomenon. The conditions for civil war can only 
exist under a government that lacks legitimacy, and governments in Africa have struggled 
to gain legitimacy for a diverse range of reasons. Nonetheless a number of predominant 
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factors have contributed significantly. Governance, security and development provide the 
three fundamental dimensions of all societal systems, and poor governance and economic 
weaknesses have undermined the ability for African states to provide security, enhancing 
their prospects for civil war. 
 
2.7.2 Major Actors on Conflict prevention 
African RECs particularly, the AU and ECOWAS are discussed in literature as openly 
embracing the promotion of ‘security regionalism’. They are recognised as having gained a 
wealth of experience and proven their mettle, the latter as establishing the blueprint for 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) intervention in conflicts militarily. Prominent 
works sustaining this point include Hettne’s (1994) Aning’s (2004), Adedeji’s (2004), 
Adebajo and Rashid’s (2004) and  Adebajo, Adesina et al’s (2012) work on ECOWAS. 
 
However, these roles are not translated into a confidence in improving structure and 
regional entities efforts in reshaping democratic and governance institutions. For instance 
Lavergne (1997) and Synge (1999) dismiss the viability of real efforts in promoting 
democratic ideals. But in contrast, scholars including  Zartman (2011) categorise West 
Africa as one of the few regions possessing a regional organisation with any pretension to 
promote common standards of governance for member states in spite of internal divisions, 
and reluctance of other states to accept the leadership of the respective would-be regional 
hegemon Nigeria (Clapham 2003, Robson 2011). 
 
For instance, there is significant scholarship on the institution of ECOWAS itself without the 
specific role played by the parliament (Hook and Kearns 1999, Elowson, MacDermott et al. 
2010) as well as the literature on issues of conflict prevention being skewed to the organ’s 
role in conflict prevention in the post-Cold War era (Deng and Zartman 1991, Kanet 1998, 
Mekenkamp, van Tongeren et al. 1999, Bercovitch, Kremenyuk et al. 2008, Kabia 2009). 
The question remains, to what extent has the Community fostered democratic regionalism 
and what are the impediments militating against its march towards becoming a renowned 
Community Parliament like the European Parliament. 
 
Also on contemporary issues of conflict scholars give more attention to the ECOWAS 
Commission (Adedeji 2004, Aning 2004, Francis 2009, Gadin 2010) with scant attention to 
the ECOWAS Parliament’s contribution to conflict prevention in the sub-region. The trend 
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is a lot of discourse analysis and narratives of conflicts with only minimal accounts of the 
role of ECOWAS and to a limited extent, the parliament. 
 
Additionally, there is a trend for the literature to focus on why Africa needed to adopt 
integration to address development dilemmas, and the responses concentrate on the ability 
to accelerate paces of development and quickly integrate into the global economy (Asante 
1996, UNECA 2000, UNECA 2007). This is also emphasised in the works of scholars 
including Harrison (1991) and Te Velde and Bezemer (2006). However, these studies 
remain focused on Africa as a general entity and not necessarily applicable to strides in the 
political aspects of regionalism in West Africa.  
 
In Table 7.3: Major Actors and Strategies on Post-conflict Peacebuilding, it illustrates the 
interwoven relationship between the major players in the maintenance of regional peace. 
The global dimension which is not included in that diagram is the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission. Thus the major actors in a nutshell are the UN, AU Commission, RECs and 
the Mechanisms. However to ensure an efficient function of these actors, synergy is 
required and as already discussed this is primarily lacking inducing challenges in 
implementation. 
 
2.8 The case of the ECOWAS Parliament: the existing knowledge base 
As demonstrated, ECOWAS is usually not unpacked to showcase what each institution 
under the regional group does in the case of conflict prevention specifically. It is the aim of 
this research to help close this gap by contributing to a better understanding of the role and 
activities of the ECOWAS Parliament in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Many 
analysts of the integration process in Africa seek to explain the ineffectiveness of the RECs 
in achieving their objectives on the grounds of political, economic and socio-cultural factors 
such as political instability, poor economies and cultural mistrust among neighbouring 
countries amongst others (Adar, Juma et al. 2010). Important as these are, they ignore 
other important factors that underpin the effectiveness of the integration process.  
 
For instance scholars and practitioners’ assessment including copious works on the AU by 
Murithi (2005) in ‘The African Union: Pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development’,  and  
Makinda and Okumu (2008) in ‘The African Union: Challenges of Globalisation, Security, 
and Governance’  have no legislative analysis.  In legal articles on the African Union, 
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parliaments are hardly mentioned Packer and Rukare (2002) and renowned scholars on 
African integration including David Francis leave out any discussion on the legislatures as 
evidenced in his works (Francis 2006, Francis 2006).  
 
Additionally, seminal work undertaken by scholars Akokpari, Ndinga-Muvumba et al. (2008) 
on Africa and practitioners, who worked with the African Union (AU), providing pioneering 
literature only diagnose key challenges, on security and governance and make only short 
general commentary about the parliaments  in their research findings. Directly on the 
community parliament however, Gasiokwu (1997) gives an exegesis of the parliament’s 
form, norms and values as well as functions and tops this with its prospects and challenges. 
There is also an attempt to evaluate why the European project is the benchmark but not 
achievable in the foreseeable future of the parliament’s life. He illustrates how the mandate 
and powers of the legislature are weak and this means it has no control over the budget of 
the community; which is prepared by the Executive Secretary and approved by the 
Authority, except the parliament’s own budget which is even subject to scrutiny by the 
Commission. However when he makes assertions that parliaments in international 
institutions perform only in accordance with the request made to them by other organs of 
the organisation as the case of ECOWAS Parliament shows, there is need to pause and 
reflect on this because empirically the parliament has been proactive in several cases 
without referrals from other organs and these are areas this research can contribute to. 
Also, bemoaning the lack of powers of the parliament without evaluating what powers the 
parliament really exercises is too general and does not afford one a good basis to make 
deductions on competence and impact. Neither does it ensure that the role they can play 
can be evaluated appropriately. 
 
Meanwhile, O’Brien (2005) views ‘Parliament’ as one of the best tools a nation has for 
managing conflict and poverty. He argues that it is a prime institution through which to 
address divergent interests of multiple groups facilitated by the nature of parliamentary 
processes, and relationships within and outside parliament. However on regional 
parliamentary peacebuilding, his thesis is that, scarcity of resources prevents the 
development of regional parliamentary relationships. But he ends up discussing loose and 
informal setups of regional parliamentary bodies in broad terms and not those that are 
formed by statues, treaties or indeed formal structures. He is also putting parliament within 
the wider development context and adding variables of equitable distribution of resources 
and economic development as a direct correlation why parliamentarians can attempt to 
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guard against the creation of an enabling environment that is prone to the escalation of 
conflict. 
 
An emphatic assortment is however made by Hettmann and Mohammed (2005) that the 
creation of a regional parliament in 2000 formally made it possible for parliamentary 
oversight of the security sector in West Africa. But, the ECOWAS parliament is still a 
fledgling transitioning in regional democratic governance, with current functions as ‘merely’ 
an advisory body, with no real legislative powers. Thus to ensure real democratic regional 
integration in West Africa, more bold steps need to be taken towards enhancing its powers 
assuring a more organised and functional structure.  
2.9  Conclusion 
The literature reviewed reveals efforts made by ECOWAS to create mechanisms for conflict 
prevention with some focus on considerable international community support for these 
peace initiatives. However as demonstrated, these all leave a significant gap as there are 
no attempts to separately present a critical analysis on what the different institutions making 
up ECOWAS seeks to do, or have done specifically on conflict prevention in the sub-region. 
Notably, most of the efforts at resolving conflicts in West Africa have literature skewed to 
the creation of a mechanism for conflict resolution whilst others focus on ECOWAS’s 
employment of ECOMOG for conflict resolution (as in Liberia and Sierra Leone).  
 
Therefore there is significant scholarship on the nature of the institution of ECOWAS as a 
body in West Africa which is a paradigm for the containment and management of conflict, 
be it of an ethnic nature or arising out of other forms of diversity. But there is no significant 
research on the ECOWAS Parliament; its prospects, structure or contribution to conflict 
management in the sub-region. This therefore is pioneer research to link the two organs in 
the area of conflict resolution in West Africa by demonstrating how parliament has and can 
contribute to conflict management in West Africa.  
 
Research on the ECOWAS-P’s initiatives on conflict prevention goes beyond filling a gap 
in literature, by contributing to a better understanding of the role and activities of the 
ECOWAS-P in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, because it is critically relevant to the 
prevention of current and future conflicts. Similarly, a lot of work has been published on the 
new interplay of global powers and politics since the end of the Cold War but neglect has 
been the bane of an important phenomenon being the incremental proliferation of 
parliamentary bodies, all types, all levels or to put it succinctly parliamentarisation of 
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regionalisation. This deserves the attention of the academic and research communities 
because these, parliaments and its affiliated institutions and parliamentarians are relevant 
to international politics (Malamud and de Sousa 2007). 
 
The Parliament, the most representative body of the new institutions created by the revised 
treaty has received no commendable attention from the academic community. Without 
exaggeration, one can even intimate that there is a general ignorance of the very existence 
of African regional parliaments (Salih 2005, Balch 2007, de Puig 2008, Navarro 2010). Thus 
what this research project seeks to address, is not an explanation of why ECOWAS as an 
institution intervenes in conflict situations, or why member states are engulfed in intra-
conflicts situations as pertains in some countries or what ECOWAS does to mitigate 
escalating conflicts. Rather, it is aimed at investigating the extent to which one of the 
institutions under the regional structure ECOWAS, the community parliament, has engaged 
the issues of conflict prevention in member states, and how effective this has been.  
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3. Chapter Three: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the conceptual and theoretical approach guiding this thesis in two 
parts. The first part introduces the Institutionalist approaches from which normative 
institutionalism is adopted to examine the processes and procedures of change, provide a 
greater basis for understanding the institutional dynamics in the ECOWAS-P and highlight 
the significant contribution of incremental changes made to its set up and activities. The 
second part demonstrates the development of a tool of effectiveness and its application as 
the measuring framework for effectiveness of the parliament. These two parts constitute the 
framework for analysis.  
 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 3.2 introduces the development of 
Institutionalism and discusses its main strands with provision made for a synthesised 
version of normative institutionalism, and why it is preferred in this thesis. Section 3.3 
defines institutions focusing on what they are and why they exist and endure. The definition 
of institutions adopted in this thesis is also discussed. Section 3.4 then discusses the 
approaches under normative institutions which are adopted and how they are applied to 
understanding the institution under study. The case studies in this research will be initially 
analysed from a normative institutionalist perspective thus, this section will clarify the 
incentives for employing this approach, expound on its premises, peculiarities and critique 
to enable the viability of the framework for analysis. Section 3.5 conceptualises the 
development of the tool, how to measure and the indicators employed and Section 3.6 
provides the conclusion. 
 
3.2  Development of Institutionalism  
Old Institutionalism 
Institutionalism was a dominant theory in political science (1880-1930) which according to 
Orren and Skowronek (1995:298) founded the pillars of order in politics and facilitated the 
routine operation of polity, remaining largely unchallenged until around the 1950s. The 
study of political institutions constituted the foundation of political science which 
transformed into a modern academic discipline in the late 19th and early 20th century 
(Rhodes 1995:43, Almond 1996:64, Rothstein 1996:137, Peters 2012:6-10). Thus 
according to Lowndes (2002:90) suitably, ‘institutionalism was political science’.  
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Institutionalism of this era was regarded as old or original institutionalism and concentrated 
on formal structures and government institutions. Rhodes (1997:68) echoes these as ‘the 
rules, procedures and formal organisations of government’. Additionally, Schmidt (2006:99) 
emphasises that it ‘defined the state in terms of its political, administrative, and legal 
arrangements’.  
 
According to Peters (1999), old institutionalism had five characteristics comprising legalism-
focusing on the centrality of law in governing; structuralism-stressing that political systems 
determined political behaviour; holism-which compared  total political systems instead of 
examining individual institutions; historicism-which examined how history influenced the 
development of contemporary political systems; and normative analysis which determined 
how political institutions produced good government.   
 
Nonetheless, it harboured four main critiques which according to Peters were being 
atheoretical and descriptive when explaining the relations among branches of government; 
being unscientific when its concern with norms and values failed to distinguish facts from 
values; being ethnocentric when it failed to function well in developing countries with less 
formalised institutional arrangements; and disregarding the influence of informal features of 
politics and the calculations of individual utility on political behaviour (Peters 1999:6-10). 
 
 
Behaviouralism and Rational Choice Theory 
Institutionalism was replaced predominantly during the 1950s-1970s when behaviouralism 
and rational choice theory arose, focusing on individuals and their behaviour (March and 
Olsen 1984, 2004, 2006). Both placed emphasis on creating a more scientific theory by 
using systematic and rigorous scientific methods to collect and analyse data (Peters 
1999:12-13, Hay 2002:8-13). Regarded as more likely to yield generalisation and enable 
comparison’ (Lecours 2005:3), the primacy of behaviouralism was to produce an inductive 
and predictive science based upon ‘extrapolation and generalisation from observed 
empirical regularities’ of political behaviour (Hay 2002:8).  
 
The reductionist tendency adopted by behaviouralism and rational choice theory to reduce 
the explanation of political processes to social and economic attributes (Rothstein 
1996:139) and its emphasis on input from society such as voting to explain political 
outcomes (Peters 1999:14) meant that political institutions played little or no roles in 
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influencing political behaviour (Rothstein 1996) but was depicted simply as arenas within 
which political behaviour transpired (March and Olsen 1984:734). 
 
The tendency of behaviouralism and rational choice theory to deny the central role played 
by political institutions to determine political outcomes provoked severe criticism from 
institutionalists because the society- and economy-centered analysis of political behaviour 
advocated by these two theories assumed that political science lost its original explanatory 
power. March and Olsen (1984) were the first to criticise behaviouralism and rational choice 
theory for five reasons as discussed under new institutionalism.  
 
In fact, the main problem of behaviouralism and rational choice theory was that their focus 
on the attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groups to explain political outcomes failed 
to answer the question of why individuals and groups with similar attitudes, preferences, 
and strength ‘could not always influence policy in the same way or to the same extent in 
different national contexts’ (Thelen 1999). Since behaviouralism and rational choice theory 
had theoretical limitation on explaining these cross-national differences, there was a 
renewed interest in reviving an institution-centered analysis of political behaviour (Windhoff-
Héritier, Knill et al. 1996:27). 
 
 
New Institutionalism 
On the basis of their criticisms of behaviouralism and rational choice theory, March and 
Olsen in (1984) became the initial advocates of new institutionalism; which was a theoretical 
framework in political science blending elements of old institutionalism into new theoretical 
and empirical directions (March and Olsen 1984:742-747). They gave it the name ‘new 
institutionalism’ in their seminal article ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in 
Political Life’ (in the American Political Science Review) heralding a revolution against the 
methodological individualism of both behaviouralism and rational choice approaches 
characterising the discussions at the time. 
 
This is because, within this new institutionalism, behaviourists examined what actors did 
and how their behaviour could be explained. For instance, behaviourists sought to explain 
voting behaviour, involvement in other forms of political participation such as 
demonstrations and strikes, and the behaviour of leaders and decision makers (Sanders 
2002:450) and exploring group behaviour in political parties, interest groups and nation 
states. Additionally, NI then sought to broaden understandings for the existence of 
institutions, their seemingly remarkable stability and their unique ability to endure.  
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New institutionalists argued that ‘theorising in political science must take into account that 
action does not occur in an institutional vacuum’  and political analysis was ‘best conducted 
through a focus on institutions’ (Lecours 2005:6). They rejected ‘the input-weighted political 
analysis of behaviouralism and rational choice theory’ (Hay 2002:11) and emphasised the 
relative autonomy of political institutions, the complexity of political processes and systems, 
historical inefficiency and the importance of symbolic action to understand politics (March 
and Olsen 1984:738). 
 
Therefore new institutionalism emerged as an approach aimed at redressing the imbalance 
between its institutionalist predecessors and the behaviouralists so that as eschewed by 
Blondel (1995:10) it 'takes into account both the importance of institutions and the way in 
which these institutions are shaped by the behaviour of actors’. 
 
On the other hand, March and Olsen (1984) criticised the behaviourists emphasising that 
contemporary political science ‘portray politics as a reflection of society, political 
phenomena as the aggregate consequences of individual behaviour, action as the result of 
choices based on calculated self-interest…and decision-making and the allocation of 
resources as the central foci of political life’.  
 
In responding to these developments, Lowndes (2002) asserted that both behaviourists and 
rational choice theorists had regarded institutions as ‘epiphenomenal or as the aggregation 
of individual actions’ whilst Shepsle (1989) concluded that institutions were first regarded 
as a result of individual roles, and second as an accumulation of individual choices based 
upon utility-maximising preferences. Maintaining a political science perspective, March and 
Olsen (1984), (1998) argued that ‘the organisation of political life makes a difference’ and 
asserted a more autonomous role for institutions in shaping political behaviour. 
 
According to March and Olsen (1984:734-737) political science forgot its roots and 
traditional political institutions 'have receded in importance from the position they held in the 
earlier theories of political scientists’. They went on to characterise political science since 
the 1950s succinctly in five key words; contextualism-emphasising the social context of 
political behaviour and downgrading the state as an independent cause; reductionism- 
explaining politics as the outcome of individual actions; utilitarianism-explaining individual 
actions as motivated by rational self-interest then instrumentalism and functionalism.  
 
In contrast to the descriptive and theoretical style of the earlier institutional theories, March 
and Olsen (1984:738) assert new institutionalism developed a more sophisticated definition 
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of their subject matter, operating through explicit theoretical frameworks and 'insists on a 
more autonomous role for political institutions'. This is such that the bureaucratic agency, 
the legislative committee, and the appellate court are arenas for contending social forces, 
but they are also collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define 
and defend interests are all ‘political actors in their own right'. Invariably, they attached 
importance to history by painting a more realistic picture of historical processes in history 
as less smooth and lacking the functionality claimed by behaviouralists (Peters 1999:17). 
 
New institutionalism explores the sets of rules associated with an organisation rather than 
focusing on the organisation itself and suggest that these rules can be flexible because 
institutions are dynamic structures; thus institutions are perceived as processes rather than 
permanent structures (Lowndes 2002:99). Old institutionalism had an implicit commitment 
to particular values and models of government, whilst new institutionalism adopts a more 
critical stance, considering the range of ways that institutions can embody and shape 
societal values.  New institutionalism is also less holistic, focusing on the constituent parts 
rather than entire political systems. New institutionalists also place the institutions in their 
wider context, highlighting how they are 'embedded' in a wider world (Granovetter 
1985:481-510). 
 
However in contrast, Rhodes (1997:64) suggested that critics had misrepresented it, and in 
fact institutionalism was more sophisticated than implied. For instance, many 
institutionalists did consider the impact of informal influences, such as procedural norms 
(Rhodes 1995:49). Rhodes also argued that traditional institutionalism offered genuine 
insights into political systems, and described the approach as 'part of the toolkit of every 
political scientist' (Rhodes 1997:64). However, acceptably 'implicit assumptions must give 
way to an explicit theory within which to locate the study of institutions' (Rhodes 1995:50) 
Additionally where there is a creation of new type of institutions, new institutionalism can 
provide powerful tools for understanding change inside local government bureaucracies 
and for conceptualising ‘the strength of weak ties’(Granovetter 1973). 
 
Lowndes (2002:97)  identifies six ways in which new institutionalism has developed from 
old institutionalism: 
 
1) A focus on organisations to a focus on rules 
2) A formal to an informal conception of institutions 
3) A static to a dynamic conception of institutions 
4) Submerged values to a value-critical stance 
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5) A holistic to a disaggregated conception of institutions, and 
6) Independence to embeddedness 
 
According to Lowndes (2001:1953): 
‘The new institutionalists concern themselves with informal conventions as well as 
formal rules and structures; they pay attention to the way in which institutions 
embody values and power relationships; and they study not just the impact of 
institutions upon behaviour, but interaction between individuals and institutions’. 
 
However, new institutionalism is not a single approach but rather encompasses approaches 
which advocate different readings in content and discipline into the theory. Yet, all the 
approaches have one common theme which according to Peters (1999:150) is represented 
by the fact that institutions are the 'central component of political life’. Meanwhile Hall and 
Taylor (1996:939), Ersson and Lane (2002:1) and Rhodes (1995:46) assert that this affect 
the behaviour of individuals. Although the various approaches of new institutionalism 
adhere to these two basic principles, Hall and Taylor (1996:936) reiterate that they are not 
a ‘unified body of thought'. This is because as new institutionalists come from backgrounds 
including economics, history, international relations and sociology, they all have their 
assumptions so 'approaches to institutions rooted in such different soils cannot be expected 
to converge' (Powell and DiMaggio 1991:3) and these have resulted in a legion of 
institutionalist approaches.  
 
These approaches include, democratic institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, holistic institutionalism, international institutionalism, network 
institutionalism, normative institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism (Weingast and Marshall 1988, Peters 1999:19-20); (March and Olsen 1984, 
North 1990, Hall and Taylor 1996, Jönsson and Tallberg 2001, Ersson and Lane 2002). 
Additionally, ongoing debates and discussions have progressed on supplementary 
approaches to institutional analysis, remarkably on political and historical institutionalism as 
well as research with economic historians.  
 
First, there is the ‘varieties of capitalism tradition’ of Streeck and Thelen (2005); and  
second, Pierson (2004) undertakes a re-assessment of path dependent debates and 
contributes with the analysis of sources of positive feedback. Third, Greif (2006) promote 
arguments about the endogenous nature of norms, beliefs, and law in consonance with 
research on organisational legitimation processes by Colyvas and Powell (2006).  Finally, 
are those promoted by Brunsson and Olsen (1997) and Olsen and Peters (1996).  Whilst 
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North’s(1990), Alston, Eggertsson et al. (1996) and Khalil’s (1995) were in economics;  
Powell and DiMaggio (1991),Scott (1995), and  Zucker (1988) in sociology  and a 
continuous interest  and ‘rebirth’ of institutional approaches in question in different 
disciplines. However, these developments according to North (1990) has brought about a 
conceptual disarray in the field arising from the divergent notions of what constitutes an 
institution. 
 
Using the NI approach, this exploratory study will attempt to provide an understanding of 
how far institutionalism both conceptualises the regional parliament based upon its 
functions, processes and inherent structures, and existing patterns of implementing conflict 
prevention initiatives in West Africa. 
 
Here the crux of the problem is the capability of institutions to penetrate society, regulate 
social relationships, extract, appropriate or use resources in determined ways because of 
the existence of ‘strong’ societies.  
 
The significance of NI for the central query arises not only from the lack of research on the 
functioning of regional legislatures or on their role as effective policy making institutions; but 
more fundamentally, because most explanations by scholars of change, development or 
legislature at the regional level, have been almost entirely related to the executive arm. 
 
NI also argues that more effective functioning of legislative institutions based upon the 
development of rules, procedures and norms leads to better policy making, more stability 
and continuity and greater legitimacy.  
 
NI could enhance our understanding of the ways in which legislatures in the context of a 
region developing undergo rapid social change and how differential patterns of governance 
at that level can be examined through the internal functioning of the institution. As reiterated 
by Nelson Polsby on the importance of the legislature, it is as ‘a highly specialised political 
institution’ and ‘for a political system to be free and democratic it was essential to 
‘institutionalise representativeness’ with all the diversity that this implies, and legitimise and 
‘contain political opposition’ within the legislature (Polsby 1970).  
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3.2.1 Forms of New Institutionalism 
 
According to Peters (1999), there are seven forms of new institutionalism and the first is 
‘normative institutionalism’ advanced by March and Olsen (1984)(see Table 3.1). It places 
strong emphasis on norms of institutions as means of understanding how they function and 
determine individual behaviour. They put an accent on a ‘logic of appropriateness’ as a tool 
for shaping the behaviour of the members of institutions.  
 
The most different to Normative Institutionalism (NMI) is Rational Choice Institutionalism 
(RCI) where the latter instead of values and norms, argue that behaviours are functions of 
rules and incentives. Here, institutions are systems of rules and inducements to behaviour 
in which individuals attempt to maximise their own utilities (Shepsle and Weingast 1994).  
 
The third approach is Historical Institutionalism (HI) which, represents the view that choices 
which are made early in the history of any policy are path dependant and ‘once launched 
on that path they continue along until some sufficiently strong political force deflects them 
from it’ (Peters and Richards 1998).  
 
Empirical institutionalism is the closest to old institutionalism and argues that that the 
structure of government makes a difference in the way in which policies are processed and 
the choices made by governments.  
 
Further, Peters (1999) puts scholars into two groups; those who use conventional 
categories such as the difference between presidential and parliamentary government like  
Weaver and Rockman (1993) and those who use more analytic categories such as decision 
points  (Immergut 1997). Also included as varieties of institutionalism but with more 
connections, are International Institutionalism, of which the most clear example is 
international regime theory as represented by Krasner (1984) and Societal Institutionalism 
that describes the structuring of the relationship between state and society (Peters and 
Richards 1998). 
 
This diversity within the approaches can be enriching since it comprises a multiplicity of 
areas and have contributed to an increasing understanding of the field. However, as a 
consequence, the reflected research diversity has also garnered a phenomena of chaotic 
propositions in the literature when it comes to definitions and ensuring consensus on 
specific set of terminology on the study of institutionalism. 
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Table 3.1 Forms of New Institutionalism 
Source: Compiled by author using data from (March and Olsen 2006, March and Olsen 2010, Peters 
2012). 
 
Notably, all these developed independently of each other in the 1970s with unique positions 
on how institutions are established and function overtime. Though some scholars argue 
from particular positions, this study will not attempt an impossible synthesis of positions nor 
argue for one category to be employed over another. Rather as discussed by Hall and 
Taylor (1996), after developing in relative isolation, the time has come for a more open and 
extensive interchange among them. Thus for this study, the advantage for developing a 
framework lies in the fact that, the parliament is in a distinct context of a post-colonial 
democracy and post-Cold War reality where rapid social change is taking place, and the 
institutions is recognisably, a young legislature that is still establishing and legitimising. 
 
Each has its own point of view and position regarding how institutions establish themselves, 
function and change over time. Many scholars argue for wholeheartedly embracing one of 
them. This study does not argue for a rudimentary synthesis of positions, which is neither 
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possible nor desirable, but it definitely agrees with Hall and Taylor (1996)  that after 
developing in relative isolation, the time has come for a more open and extensive 
interchange among them. This idea is mooted in order to carry forward the theory of 
institutional behaviour. The advantage in this research is that it may lead to a framework 
best suited to studying institutions in the distinct context of a regional parliamentary 
development witnessing rapid institutionalising social change as the ECOWAS-P. 
 
New institutionalism, Gamble (1990:405) claimed is best understood as an 'organising 
perspective', and is not so much a theory about causality as a framework which raises 
questions and provides insights. The main reason why normative institutionalism is 
preferred is because, even though new institutionalism’s expressions are in many guises, 
one approach that is particularly suitable for the analysis of regional parliaments and issues 
related to their institutional characteristics is normative institutionalism.  
 
 
Therefore in this thesis, I employ the less ‘traditional’ approach of normative institutionalism 
as advanced by March and Olsen (1989). It is akin to the three main strands, rational choice 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism in that they all 
agree on the notion that ‘institutions do matter’. Although they may differ considerably in 
approach, they all have a common thread, being scepticism towards blanket or general 
accounts of social and political change and a conviction that institutions have become more 
complex as they grapple with social, economic and political issues. It is thus prudent to 
blend theoretical elements from the older into a contemporary style to emphasise the 
relative autonomy of institutions, and at the same time establishing the ‘possibilities for 
inefficiency in history’ and the importance of symbolic, ‘uncalculated action to an 
understanding of politics’ (March and Olsen 1984:734). 
 
3.3 Defining Institutions 
 
Virtually, every author appears to propose a different definition of institutions, why they are 
created, as well as different reasons for their continuance. To take one example, the degree 
of inclusiveness of the term 'institutions' also varies in the literature. A particularly 
comprehensive usage has however been discussed by Hall (1986). 
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An institution, argues Peters (1999) must be 'a structured feature of the society and/or 
polity', that it needs to have some stability over time, and must affect individual behaviour. 
Additionally, 'there should be some sense of shared values and meaning among the 
members of the institution’ (Peters 1999:18-19). The basic understanding of an institution 
offered by Peters is widely accepted by new institutionalists, but disagreement emerges 
when it comes to defining institutions in greater depth. 
 
Fundamentally, Peters states that the word institution loosely used in political science 
means everything from a formal structure like a parliament to very amorphous entities like 
social class. Other components include law and markets, also defined as being institutions. 
In sociology it is often used interchangeably with the term ‘organisation’ (Peters 1999). 
 
Therefore it is crucial to see what criteria should be used for defining whether an approach 
is really institutional or not. Peters (1999) attempted to define a common core that binds all 
approaches together and presented the most important element of institutionalism as a 
structural feature of a society and/or polity. 
 
That structure may be formal like a legislature, an agency in the public bureaucracy, or a 
legal framework, or may be informal like the set of shared norms or a network of interacting 
organisations. Another feature is the existence of stability over time. A third feature is that 
it must affect individual behaviour or in some way constrain the behaviour of its members. 
There should be some sense of shared values and meaning among the members of 
institutions. Those constraints may be formal or informal but they must be constraints if 
there is to be an institution in place (Peters and Richards 1998).  
 
According to Lane and Ersson (2000:4) the definitions of institutions in new institutionalism 
fall broadly into two categories. Firstly, there is a 'thin' conception of institutions where 
institutions are perceived as 'analytically distinct from other factors that shape behaviour, 
such as interests, preferences and information', this tends to be associated with rational 
choice theories. Second and in contrast, a 'thick' conception of institutions defines 
institutions as more than a set of rules or norms. Here institutions are considered to also 
include behaviour patterns, interests and belief systems. Thus March and Olsen (1984), 
(1998) promote this thick conception of institutions, arguing that institutions comprise of, 
'routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, technologies, 
beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge' March and Olsen (1989:22). Lane and 
Ersson (2000:6) explain that the different conceptions of institutions can be likened to 
seeing the game of chess either as 'a game governed by institutions in the form of rules', 
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as in the 'thin' notion, or as an 'institution in itself', whereby the strategies and interests of 
the players form part of the institution, as in the 'thick' conception. 
 
Despite the range of institutionalist models, there is common agreement amongst 
institutionalists, both old and new, that institutions shape policy outcomes; that institutions 
matter, even if there is no agreement on what constitutes an institution. According to 
Steinmo and Tolbert (1998) 'it has become nearly passe to argue that ‘institutions matter’ 
since Arrow (1951) and virtually all political scientists readily agree to this rather innocuous 
statement' (Steinmo and Tolbert 1998:183). By saying that institutions matter, the argument 
is that a distinction can be drawn between policies that an actor might choose as a member 
of a system's institutions, and 'the policies they might select, in equilibrium, in the absence 
of that particular system's institutions' (Hammond and Butler 2003:147). To reach a deeper 
understanding of institutions, therefore, it is worth considering how and under what 
conditions they shape behaviour. In order to attempt this, this research takes a novel 
approach to examine an institutional design through NIs which can affect political outcomes 
which regional parliamentary actors and the dynamics of its relations with the executive 
bodies and national parliaments. 
 
Additionally, scholars have sought to draw parallels between the three major strands of new 
institutionalism; Historical, Rational Choice and Sociological as each of these make different 
assumptions about these questions. Authors focus their analyses on the nature of 
institutions, the role institutions play and different conceptions of human behaviour. But 
rather than being contentious and parallel to each other, the approaches each explain 
different aspects of institutions and as such, have a lot in common. Institutions must not be 
unidimensional; at various points a particular approach may better explain institutional 
change or existence, and at others, a different one may present the best description. This 
demonstrates that an institution’s purpose may change overtime similar to how the 
pressures it tackles changes and synthesising the different theories allows for a greater 
understanding of institutional change and the contribution by each approach. Overall, 
employing new institutionalism as a theoretical framework means focusing on two themes; 
rules in organisations and informal links. 
 
While the concept of institution is central to much political analysis, there is wide diversity 
within and across disciplines in what kinds of rules and relations are construed as 
‘institutions’ (Goodin 1996, Goodin and Klingemann 1996). Moreover, approaches to 
political institutions differ when it comes to understanding the nature of institutions, as the 
organised setting within which modern political actors most typically act, its processes and 
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rules that translate human behaviour into structures can establish, sustain, transform or 
eliminate institutions. 
 
3.3.1 What are institutions? 
 
According to March and Olsen (1998):  
 
An ‘institution’ can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and 
rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific 
situations. Such practices and rules are embedded in structures of meanings 
and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimise particular identities 
and the practices and rules associated with them. Practices and rules are also 
embedded in resources and the principles of their allocation that make it 
possible for individuals to enact roles in an appropriate way for a collectively to 
socialise individuals and sanction those who wander from proper behaviour’. 
 
Huntington (1968) defines institutions as ‘stable, valued recurring patterns of behaviour’. 
Institutionalisation according to him is the process by which organisations and procedures 
acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalisation could then be defined by the 
adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organisations and procedures. On 
another level, North (1990:4) states that ‘Institutions include any form of constraint that 
human beings devise to shape human interaction. Are institutions formal or informal? They 
can be either, and this research comprehensively evaluates both in formal constraints-such 
as rules that human beings devise-and informal constraints-such as conventions and codes 
of behaviour’.  
 
Technically regarded as normative institutionalists due to the role that norms and values 
play in their ideas, March and Olsen additionally define political institutions as: 
 
‘…collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions 
in terms of relations between roles and situations. The process involves 
determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what 
obligations of the role in that situation is…’ (March and Olsen 1989:21). 
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Meanwhile a classic parsimonious definition provided by North states ‘Institutions are the 
rules of the game in a society or, more formally are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interactions. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, 
whether political, social or economic’ (North 1990:3). 
 
When institutions are viewed as formal organisations, they can also be defined thus:  ‘a 
political institution is defined by the existence of a statute, the targeting of a social need, the 
public area as the place for all activities and the decision-making process as the key for 
answering that aforementioned social need’ (Varga 2001:28). 
 
Lowndes (2001) also distinguishes organisations from institutions and Ersson and Lane 
(2002) employing definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary, highlight that remarkably 
these two definitions are contained in the dictionary which views an institution as ‘an 
established law, custom, usage, practice, organisation, or other element in the political or 
social life of a people’. Whereas ‘institution’ as a law points towards the norm interpretation, 
‘institution’ as an organization or organ is a behavioural interpretation. Here the dictionary 
definition of an institution is ‘a regulative principle or convention subservient to the needs of 
an organised community of the general rules of civilisation’. There is therefore a difference 
from the definition in the dictionary as ‘an establishment, organization, or association, 
instituted for promotion of some object, especially one of public or general utility…’ This is 
the organisational interpretation of institutions. Ersson and Lane (2002:25) further reiterates 
that institutions ‘may stand for practices that are more or less codified into a set of rules’. 
 
In separating institutions from organisations, Zucker (1988) and North (1990:4-5) describes 
the latter as the ‘players’ effectively crating a distinction between ‘agency’-organisations 
and ‘structure’-institutions. This vital distinction however is principally conflated by 
propositions advanced by scholars including Clemens and Cook (1999:454) and Hodgson 
(2006:9). Part of the disagreements stem from the role organisations play, that is, viewing 
organisations as actors. However, Hodgson (2006:20) maintains that at the same time, 
existing structures can sometimes make it difficult to differentiate from institutions. 
 
Additionally, the three main strands define institutions reflecting their underlying principles 
and ideas. However as this thesis employs a normative approach the definition will be 
focused on normative institutionalism. In working towards a definition, suffice it to state that, 
Douglas North’s definition is inadequate in addressing a test of NI and as such requires 
more detail.  
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Institutions can enforce rules by either defining the expected behaviours or by banning other 
behaviours. Inadvertently, most institutions employ a combination of these methods. For 
instance, focusing on the role of institutions as enforcers, Clemens and Cook (1999) map 
out two general patterns, one is that of the ‘constraining, prescriptive’  institution and the 
other is the ‘constituting, proscriptive’ institution (Clemens and Cook 1999:446). On another 
level, Stacey and Rittberger (2003:861) perceive institutions to be ‘conscious creations of 
political actors and strictly enforceable’. 
 
There are constitutive rules and practices prescribing appropriate behaviour for specific 
actors in specific situations. There are structures of meaning, embedded in identities and 
belongings: common purposes and accounts that give direction and meaning to behaviour, 
and explain, justify and legitimate behavioural codes. There are structures of resources that 
create capabilities for acting. Institutions empower and constrain actors differently and 
make them more or less capable of acting according to prescriptive rules of 
appropriateness. Institutions are also reinforced by third parties in enforcing rules and 
sanctioning non-compliance (March and Olsen 2006). 
 
Furthermore, they define institutions also in terms of the characteristics that they represent 
and that their members demonstrate. They also define institutions by their durability and 
their capability to influence the behaviour of individuals for generations (March and Olsen 
1996:99). They argue that institutions possess an inherent legitimacy that obligates their 
members to behave in ways that may even violate their own self-interest (March and Olsen 
1996:23). 
 
This research classifies the ECOWAS Parliament as an institution so the foremost logical 
step was to first prove that this is an accurate classification by discussing contending 
definitions. Thus, against the background of the differences discussed above, this is not a 
simple exercise. Succinctly put, defining an institutions also means not only identifying what 
it is, but also why it exists and its basic characteristics and functions. Reminiscent of the 
number of competing approaches and divisions, the definitions of institutions also range 
from the very concise to the very elaborate. 
 
Drawing inferences from these aspects of New Institutionalism discussed above, the 
working definition of institutions in this thesis is sets of rules that exist to provide structure, 
guide human exchange and behaviour, reduce insecurity, and establish an incentive 
structure to encourage compliance with the rules. This means institutions are rules, moral 
norms, codes, behaviour regularities, and organisations. 
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 Applying this definition it is possible to categorise the ECOWAS-P as an institution; the 
parliament sets out rules that determine actors’ access to conflict prevention. These rules 
guide human interaction by establishing the rights, roles and responsibilities of the 
organisations functioning within the institutional framework, in this case, the regional level, 
national level, and also the individual level. These rules also determine the people to whom 
responsibility should be for and those that are accorded benefits and access to privileges.  
 
The ECOWAS-P reduces insecurity and structures behaviour by guaranteeing within the 
standards of the regional treaty laws as well as international treaties and norms protection 
of the member states in the region. Thus it establishes an incentive structure through a 
system of commitment to good governance, peace and stability as opposed to alienation 
and sanctions as deterrence for member states that will flout these rules. Therefore the 
ECOWAS-P clearly fits the definition of an institution and NI provides the framework from 
which to examine and explain its processes and procedures of institutional change 
necessary from which the measurement tool will be applied. 
 
Although the definition of institution has been developed to guide this research, before 
exploring normative institutionalism some caveats need to be established. For instance, in 
as much as the main strands of new institutionalism discussed differ in their definitions and 
conceptions of institutionalist theory from normative theory does not imply that there is no 
common ground on which all the approaches can converge. Thus they are viewed as 
assimilating on some topics and issues with synthesised ideas in some cases Hall and 
Taylor (1996) affirm this point of view in section 3.4 on normative institutionalism.   
 
At the same time historically this is not a linear development, reversals do take place. The 
internal processes and functioning of legislatures become gradually insulated over time 
against sudden and de-stabilising changes taking place in society. Finally, increasing 
institutionalisation has an impact on the functioning of the political system as a whole and 
can help explain differing levels of regional legislative governance in West Africa. 
 
New Institutionalism argues that political institutions are more than mere mirrors of social 
forces, that they have institutional autonomy, which gives them a life force of their own and 
makes them agents of change. The basic argument is that institutions can be treated as 
‘political actors’ leading to institutional coherence and autonomy (Keman 1997). 
Institutionalization of action through rules reduces ambiguity and chaos and introduces 
order and meaning. Programmes adopted through a simple compromise by a legislature 
become endowed with separate meaning and force by having an agency established to 
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deal with them. In short, institutions ‘define the framework within which politics takes place’ 
(March and Olsen 2010:18). 
 
In this approach institutions are seen as having an inner life, logic of action and morality of 
their own that determines their success, politics and the flow of history. Contextually 
constrained and socially shaped they are viewed as the engines that drive social and 
political life. Institutions such as bureaucracies, courts and legislatures are undoubtedly 
arenas for contending social forces, but they are also collections of standard operating 
procedures and structures that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities and 
beliefs.  
 
In this thesis institutions are defined as the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms 
and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy. 
Institutionalisation means the long and complex historical process by which legislatures 
gradually establish boundaries, create and observe norms, rules and procedures and deal 
with increasing complexity leading to disciplined, stable and predictable behaviour and 
ability to perform their functions in an efficient and effective manner. 
 
3.3.2 Why do institutions exist? 
Expounding on the reasons why institutions exist serve to consolidate the understanding 
on what institutions are. There must be a reason why they exist, be it out of necessity or 
tradition if they are to thrive. The RCI, HI and normative strands perceive different reasons 
as RCI focuses on rational decisions, HI on historical elements, and normative on ideas and 
norms.    
 
According to Rational Choice Institutionalists (RCIs) institutions exist for a purpose (Stacey 
and Rittberger 2003:867) and play a coordinating role (Thelen 1999:371) which helps to 
solve problems of collective action (Shepsle and Weingast 1994, Clemens and Cook 
1999:445). RCIs focus on the role of institutions as coordinators or facilitators of exchange, 
which generally works to maintain equilibrium rather than being open to large-scale change.  
 
In contrast, Historical Institutionalists (HIs) regard institutions as ‘enduring legacies of 
political struggles (Thelen 1999:388) with a major role in encouraging actors to conform to 
the rules agreed upon and punish deviation. HI is much less clear on the emergence of 
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institutions in the first place, providing stronger explanations for the endurance of institutions 
that have become unnecessary, inefficient, or even dysfunctional.  
 
Finally, normative focuses on an angle the other two institutionalisms largely ignore: culture, 
identity and human behaviour, identifying the rise and persistence of institutions in social 
rules and norms, but also include the formal aspects (Stacey and Rittberger 2003:866-867). 
SI researches the diffusion of institutional norms through society, tracking institutional 
change through the dissemination of symbols, procedures and institutional structures (Hall 
and Taylor 1996:947).  
 
Institutions are perceived as important for providing a set of behavioural norms and creating 
an incentive structure for the enforcement of these norms. SI’s treatment of norms and 
ideas is critical for understanding the less ‘rational’ decisions humans sometimes take, but 
its explanations of the emergence and formalisation of these norms and discursive scripts 
remains as unclear as HI’s explanation of institutional emergence. 
 
All of these support different reasons for institutional existence. But just as institutions can 
serve different purposes, cannot they also have different reasons for emergence and 
existence? A summary of all the above attributes reveals the following reasons for 
institutional existence: Institutions exist to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs, 
enable greater efficiency and/or cooperation, and provide a system of incentives and 
punishments to encourage the desired behaviours. They establish certain structures of 
incentives and the methods of interaction (North 1990:7- 9). 
 
 
3.3.3 Why do institutions endure? 
Institutions may have been created for a purpose, but that does not ensure their 
continuation. Again, the three NIs offer different explanations for institutional endurance. 
For RCI, institutions have a functional existence (Stacey and Rittberger 2003:867). The 
institutions will only continue as long as they serve a purpose especially as regards the 
conception function on a cost-benefit basis (Stacey and Rittberger 2003). According to HI, 
however, their existence is less efficient; they are the products of a combination of 
circumstances set in a specific historical context but tend to continue beyond their 
functionality because of their embeddedness and the incentive system they create 
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(Steinmo, Thelen et al. 1992, Clemens and Cook 1999:445, Thelen 1999:371-381, Lindner 
2003:916).  
 
However for normative Institutionalists (NMIs), institutions are not simply a formal reflection 
of the rules and norms governing society. Institutions ‘are collective outcomes…socially 
constructed…embody shared cultural understandings…of the way the world works’ (Thelen 
1999). In this case, institutions exist to enforce the accepted rules and norms of the time, 
rewarding positive behaviour and punishing negative behaviour.  
 
They serve to tighten social networks, lowering transaction costs and uncertainty, to borrow 
the language of the other theories. NMI recognises that informal change may, and often 
does, take place long before the institutions reflect these changes in their formal rules. Thus, 
there is often a gap between informally accepted change and its formal recognition. Just as 
institutions might emerge for different reasons, it is equally plausible that they might endure 
for a variety of reasons. Certainly actors tend to add to the institutional stickiness of 
institutions in modern democracies as a method of guarding against radical, negative 
change (Pierson 2004). 
 
Here, the answer to the above question is a definitive, ‘yes and no’. This is because, 
institutions can be recognised as existing within a wide range of political settings, and 
performing a wide range of public tasks. Also, institutions appear volte face to be associated 
with differences in behaviour of individuals and differences in decision-making outcomes. 
Institutions also help in reducing variance in political behaviour and therefore help to 
improve the possibilities of prediction. Likewise, institutions are more readily identifiable 
(under most definitions of the term) so they comprise a useful point at which to begin the 
analysis. 
 
The critics would however argue that, even if institutional theory does constitute a good 
place at which to begin the analysis, they are not such a good place to end it. There are a 
number of problems in the theory itself, and in its ability to provide coherent explanations of 
political phenomena, that limit its utility as a central framework for the discipline. One of the 
more important problems is the difficulty of measuring institutions because we know they 
exist but not how they vary. 
 
 Further, such explanations as may be available from institutional theory may be excessively 
static, and be incapable of coping with the dynamism and complexity of the contemporary 
political world. 
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3.3.4 Structure and Agency 
 
An important facet is the mechanisms through which the institutions shape the behaviour of 
individuals and reform institutions. In this respect, Giddens (1984) argue that there is a ‘dual’ 
relationship because of reciprocal causation of ‘agent and structure’ and an implicit 
dynamism of such a relationship.  
 
Relatively, there exists a classic tension between structure and agency; because though 
existing institutional structure certainly constrains the behaviour of the actors, nevertheless 
they do possess some power to effect change. Therefore it is important to understand the 
actors’ decision-making process. 
 
 In this vein, theorists make various assumptions when attempting to explain human 
behaviour, and for normative institutionalists the salient point is that role of socialisation and 
behavioural expectations in actors’ decisions and reminds us that decisions are not always 
purely rational or cost-benefit calculations: sometimes the actors’ preferences will make 
their behaviour appear irrational; or they may think they are making rational decisions, but 
they are based upon incomplete information.  
 
Consequently, actors’ behaviours are greatly correlated to interpretations of the situation, 
and as such, the actors cannot reach entirely rational decisions because their 
understanding of the environment is always subjective and incomplete. Additionally, actors’ 
worldview determines the set of choices they perceive (Hall and Taylor 1996:949, Thelen 
1999) as opposed to the calculus-based models of RCI and HI, actors in normative 
institutionalism follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’(as discussed in section 3.4.1) which is 
greatly determined by scripts (discursive or behavioural) (Stacey and Rittberger 2003:866).  
 
Indeed, distinguishing between a condition (something negative about which one can do 
nothing) and a problem (something negative to be addressed) is contingent upon one’s 
worldview (Birkland 2005:125). In these circumstances, it becomes irrelevant whether an 
inherent truth or correct solution actually exists because it is beyond the individual’s ability 
to recognise it. The ability to ‘know’ things is contingent upon sensory processing, 
perceptions and experience. This goes a great way to explaining how something society 
deems right and justifiable at one time becomes something wrong and abhorrent at another, 
for example colonialism. Furthermore, actors do not always behave in a manner that would 
be interpreted as rational in hindsight and more complete information. At times, people will 
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go to great effort to avoid known losses, instead risking the unknown by keeping to the 
current path. This means that humans will sometimes wait ‘unreasonable’ lengths of time 
to address a problem then ‘overshoot’ and implement sweeping changes (Weyland 2008). 
 
In analysing agency and its relation with rules, power and change, Ostrom (1990:36) argues 
that ‘institutions themselves are invisible’ because institutions are more than organisations 
since they are composed by the rules-in-use and the agents’ actions in relation to rules. But 
‘if institutionalism is to develop to its full potential, it must consider the relationship between 
structure and agency’. Though the normative institutionalism adopted by this research has 
not comprehensively conceptualised the relationship between institution and agency (Hay 
and Wincott 1998:6) it clearly posits that, institutions can shape the behaviour of individuals 
whilst noting that the ‘reciprocal process is not nearly as clear’ (Peters 1999).  
 
First, agency is deeply embedded in routine institutional elements, whilst institutions can be 
considered as contained bodies of action. Succinctly put by Jessop (2001:8), ‘institutions 
never exist outside of specific action contexts’. In this respect, in studying institutions, this 
research also examines partnerships and networks which cooperate or not, in processes of 
negotiation and mediation towards achieving specific outcomes. As stated by Streeck and 
Thelen (2005), the enactment of a role is never perfect and there is always a gap between 
‘the ideal patterns of a rule’ and how that pattern is played out ‘in situ’.  
 
Second, the implication of the purposive agent’s independent action separate of their 
intentions, and the inherent unintended consequences. Despite the fact that, the 
consequences are unintended, they could change beliefs and attitudes and influence the 
political context. Therefore ‘Agents’ conduct, rarely if ever, is independent of the social or 
political context in which it is situated (Hay 2009:268).  
 
The question of the structure and agency relationship however is central because, it offers 
explanation about the power balance of the constituent parts of social life, though this is 
one of the long-standing issues of controversy.  
 
The classic criticism of new institutionalism, including normative institutionalism is that there 
is no role for agency.  This is because the whole point of new institutionalism was to focus 
on the institution and not the actor. However, this does not matter significantly for this thesis 
because this thesis is an evaluation of ECOWAS-P as an institution rather than as an actor. 
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3.4  Applying Normative Institutionalism 
The classical means of normative institutionalism as promulgated by March and Olsen 
(1984) sometimes regarded as the ‘original’ new institutionalism, offer one of the possible 
frameworks for the basis of institutional analysis. Recognising the influence of both formal 
and informal institutions March and Olsen (1984) emphasise the relevance of norms, 
viewing institutions as tools that form the basic framework for individual action in the social 
processes; and stress the role of norms and values in determining any change.  
 
Under normative institutionalism, March and Olsen (1984), (2004) argue that, the best 
approach to employ in order to understand political behaviour individually and collectively, 
is through a ‘logic of appropriateness’ individuals acquire through their membership in 
institutions. This is contrasted with the ‘logic of consequentiality’ essential to rational choice. 
Thus, actors functioning within institutions conduct themselves because of normative 
standards rather than a desire to maximise individual utilities. Furthermore, these standards 
of behaviour are acquired through involvement with one or more institutions and the 
institutions are the major social repositories of values.  
 
Developing inclusive meanings of institutions guarantees normative institutionalism a valid 
foundational logic because human interactions are unquestionably influenced by both 
written and unwritten rules governing forms of appropriate behaviour. Arguably, this is 
evidenced by profound normative and routine differences between cultures, signifying an 
almost general internalisation of institutional norms within cultures. According to Peters 
(2000:26) human as social beings, must not be considered as ‘atomistic, hyper-rational, 
utility-maximising constructs – as in rational choice theory – or as automatically reacting to 
socialisation – as in behaviouralism’. This is because individuals are shaped by institutions 
but are still able to construe and select among influences when making a decision.  
 
3.4.1 Logic of appropriateness 
Therefore March and Olsen (2004), (2006) hold that the ‘logic of appropriateness’ guides 
and shapes the behaviour of actors within an institution, where they are inclined to act in 
ways conducive to their institutional commitments. Accordingly, it also means that actions 
are ‘matched to situations by means of rules organised into identities’ (March 1994:57-58). 
Thus much of the behaviour of institutional actors is based on the recognised situation the 
actors encounter, the identity of the actors in the situation, and the analysis by the actor of 
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the rules that generally govern behaviour for that actor in that particular situation (Meyer 
and Scott 1983, March and Olsen 1989, Peters 1999). Thus, political outcomes are the 
result of actors’ constrained choices and political institutions constrain these choices by 
making some unfeasible, while social institutions make some choices more obvious. 
 
Further, Peters views an added angle of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ concept as a version 
of role theory. Here, the institution defines a set of behavioural expectations for individuals 
in positions within the institution and then reinforces behaviour that is appropriate for the 
role and sanctions behaviour that is inappropriate. Some aspects of the role may apply to 
all members of the institution, while other expectations may be specific to the position held 
by an individual. Also, like organisational culture, there may be several versions of the role 
among which a role occupant can pick and choose. ‘Despite the somewhat amorphous 
nature of a role, the concept does provide a means of connecting individual behaviour and 
the institution’ (Peters 1999:30). 
 
Critiques 
The major critique of March and Olsen’s work (1984)  is related to making a distinction 
between rules and routines. They defined routines as a stable pattern of behaviour, without 
the sense of it being unchangeable or dysfunctional. Routines are assumed to make the 
behaviour of organisation more predictable and more rational, although it is difficult to 
determine when predictability ends and inertia begins (Peters 1999). 
 
Although not considering rules to be central to their research as most of the new 
institutionalists, March and Olsen do address rules as a part of the control of behaviour 
within institutions and organisations. They consider rules as constitutive and to some extent 
as the formalisation of the logic of appropriateness. Rules serve as guides for newcomers 
to an organisation for example. Institutions derive a good deal of their structure of meaning, 
and their logic of appropriateness from the society in which they are formed (March and 
Olsen 1984, 2004). Routines appear to arise naturally once people begin to interact in 
institutional setting (Peters 1999). 
 
Another question that March and Olsen have not answered according to Peters, is the 
difference between an institution and an organisation. He adds that it is easier to make the 
distinction if the adjective ‘formal’ is added in front of ‘organisation’ thus applying a very 
strict definition of organisations, and a loose, more culturally based, definition of institutions 
(Peters 1999). 
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One of the strongest and most persuasive components of March and Olsen’s argument is 
the change of institutions based on their ‘garbage can’ approach to decision-making means 
that institutions have a repertoire of solutions as responses to problems when there is a 
need to adjust policies (Cohen, March et al. 1972). Routinised responses are thus used 
before searching for alternatives that are further away from core values. Therefore, 
institutional changes that are implemented conform to the logic of appropriateness, and 
those institutional values have the function of limiting the range of extending policy 
alternatives for the institution. Institutional change is thus rarely a planned event, but rather 
a product of the confluence of several different activities, and opportunities for action, within 
the institution (Cohen, March et al. 1972). 
 
 ‘... to portray political institutions simply as an equilibrium solution to the 
conflicting interests of current actors is probably a mistake. Institutions are not 
simple reflections of current exogenous forces of micro-behaviour and motives. 
They embed historical experience into rules, routines, and forms that persist 
beyond the historical moment and condition’ (March and Olsen 1989:167-168).  
 
It has been argued that normative institutionalism, like its predecessors fail to include the 
role of human agency in political activity, contrary to rational choice. However, this critique 
has principally been addressed because, the nature of Institutions as human creations 
adjustable by human actions, has led institutionalists to consider, rather than simply the 
impact of institutions on only individuals thereby showcasing interaction between the two 
(Lowndes 2002:102).  
 
As North (1990:5) enunciates, institutions are a creation of human beings; they evolve and 
are altered by human beings. At the same time, the constraints that institutions impose on 
individual preferences are pervasive. Thus consideration of both human agency and 
collective institutional norms is a clean break from the hitherto binary nature of political 
science theories tending to regard either agency or structure as exclusive determinants of 
political behaviour. 
 
Nonetheless, normative institutionalism can be positioned above other institutionalisms in 
that it has adopted the middle ground, rejecting both an over-emphasis on institutional 
development and path dependency, as in historical institutionalism and an over-rationalised 
conception of human nature, as in rational choice institutionalism (Jönsson and Tallberg 
2008:4-5). At the same time, its broadest institutional definitions reflect the complexity of 
political activity. Though it has been argued that it fails to prove how institutions emerge, 
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(Lowndes 2002:105), one can presume institutions develop organically as individual 
patterns of behaviour gradually merge in order to logically advance collective efficiency. For 
instance, the ECOWAS Parliament’s creation has been guided by universal norms of 
human rights, democracy and rule of law and all these impact its behaviour. At the same 
time, it harbours normative uniqueness in its historical context, hybrid polity and its political-
legal constitution which al serve to make it act normatively in the regional politics. 
 
 This study emphasises that a key aspect which helps make the institution effective through 
normative practices and therefore build the logic of appropriateness, is the establishment 
of the ‘Bureau of parliament’ which is the leadership of the parliament comprised of a core 
group of experienced MPs. This core group institutionally is responsible for creating rules, 
norms and procedures, setting high standards of not only exemplary behaviour but of 
effective debate and functioning all of which contributes to better legislative governance. Its 
existence enables the building of boundaries, development of a sense of purpose, 
ownership and direction.  
 
As discussed in the analysis chapter, this thesis suggests this is particularly important in 
regional parliamentary systems, because unlike national parliaments subject to greater 
political instability arising out of the imperatives of party politics, different dynamics as 
discussed in chapter four prevail. 
 
Ultimately, normative institutionalism is not simply the capability of an institution to endure 
but also to provide correctives to negative features, where there is a possibility of reversal 
of decline and a return to improved standards and functioning methods. To this will be 
democratically developed rules and procedures which are an important feature on which 
effective functioning of a legislature rests. The extent to which rules, conventions, routines 
and structures have been internalised and are adhered to, allows the development of 
internal coherence and trust among members and an interpretative order which provides 
continuity and stability. This unfortunately, cannot be said to be a feature of the regional 
legislature. Thus, this study also empirically examines what corrective measures are 
introduced to ensure adherence and whether there are established ethics committees or a 
code of conduct.  
 
These variables are distinctive and reflective enough to provide a sufficient basis for 
developing the argument raised by the central question of this research, explicitly, how 
effective is the ECOWAS Parliament in conflict prevention in West Africa, and whether 
relationships with other bodies, or lack of mandate affect its progress.  
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3.4.2 Formal and Informal rules 
In normative institutionalism recognition is made that institutional rules could be formal 
and/or informal. Rules are written, for instance the legal frameworks which are formal ones 
and directly identifiable on paper. However, there are other rules that are developed during 
human interactions. These rules therefore are informal because they are not written and 
could take the form of conventions, practices and customs (Lowndes 2005). Yet, these 
contain the same power as the formal do in ordering and regulating the behaviour and 
interactions of actors it defines the ‘must, must not and may’ (Ostrom 1990:200).  
 
The difference between formal and informal rules is that the former are enforceable by 
official sanctions, whilst the latter are self-enforced because they are deep-rooted in culture, 
tradition or unofficially by other institutions or actors. Empirically, North (1990:3,36-45) 
contends that though informal institutions function outside officially sanctioned networks, 
they are often as important as the formal institutions in structuring the ‘rules of the game’.  
 
To this end, rules are internalised from experience and encoded by actors drawing 
inferences from their experiences, or by differential survival or reproduction rates (March, 
Schulz et al. 2000) they become critical to the pragmatic day-to-day functioning of the 
political actors. Thus this thesis, by investigating the informal and formal practices that make 
up the ECOWAS parliament’s conflict policy making processes, addresses grey areas of 
interaction not strictly defined by the treaties nor protocols but viewed as an integral part of 
policy implementation by the parliament.  
 
3.4.3 Learning from Policy Implementation 
Policy implementation sits within the ‘policy cycle’, which involves policy design followed by 
policy delivery and then policy review. Some authors have a five stage model of ‘Agenda 
setting, Policy Formulation, decision-making, Policy implementation and Policy Evaluation’ 
as presented in Figure 3.2 (Araral, Fritzen et al. 2012). In practice, however, the lines 
between these stages in the policy cycle can be blurred because they interrelate in providing 
a framework for explaining the policy development process. However, the stagist approach 
does little to answer questions on specific sectors (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1989) such as 
conflict prevention issues, which must be applied in context to elicit the appropriate results. 
Thus with regard to effectiveness, the policy implementation stage is the crux of this 
research.  
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Here, the research concurs with authors who establish that the implementation stage in the 
policy cycle is a process that takes time and occurs in incremental stages, each requiring 
different conditions and activities. Through the literature, a synthesis undertaken of the 
different labels, meanings and categories scholars ascribe to the process as discussed are 
shown in Figure 3.2 Stages of Implementation. 
 
The four stages of implementation involve an exploratory, planning, operationalizing and 
evaluation stage. The two initial stages are also the preparatory and resource gathering 
phases after which action is undertaken by carrying out the activities and then leading up 
to the final stage of streamlining and evaluation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984, Fixsen, 
Blase et al. 2009).  
 
An important assumption here is that sustainability is fully embedded and though each stage 
should not be skipped there may be cross-processes in which earlier stages can be visited 
at latter stages, thus essentially this is not a typical distinct process by process approach.  
 
Defining implementation in conclusive terms has not been achieved in the field, and there 
is wide consensus that implementation is a complex process. However, a brief outline of 
narratives and debates in the literature prominently feature the work of Pressman, 
Wildavsky et al. (1973) which systematically explores the policy implementation deficit; the 
1980s ‘top-down or bottom-up debate led by Bardach (1977), Barrett and Fudge (1981), 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989), Lipsky (2010).  In the 1990s, Goggin (1990) articulated 
the ‘communications model’ approach, whilst Anderson and Looney (2002), Meier, Jr et al. 
(2004), O'Toole Jr (2004) argued for the ‘high or low levels of ambiguity and conflict’, 
focusing on implementing policy in network settings. 
 
Emerging body of research define the key components and processes involved in effective 
and successful implementation. In particular, the research indicates that the implementation 
process is accompanied by distinct stages of development and particular activities. Studies 
indicate that there are intervention processes and outcomes and there are implementation 
processes and outcomes.  
 
When implementing evidence-based practices and programs, discuss the need to 
discriminate implementation outcomes (Are they doing the program as intended?) from 
effectiveness outcomes (Yes, they are, and it is/is not resulting in good outcomes). Only 
when effective practices and programs are fully implemented should we expect positive 
outcomes (Fixsen, Naoom et al. 2005). 
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According to this definition, implementation processes are purposeful and are described in 
sufficient detail such that independent observers can detect the presence and strength of 
the ‘specific set of activities’ related to implementation. In addition, the activity or program 
being implemented is described in sufficient detail so that independent observers can detect 
its presence and strength. Notably, are two sets of activities (intervention-level activity and 
implementation-level activity) and two sets of outcomes (intervention outcomes and 
implementation outcomes). 
 
Additionally, implementation components and outcomes exist quite independently of the 
quality of the program or practice being implemented. Ineffective programs can be 
implemented well or vice versa (Fixsen, Naoom et al. 2005, 2013). Desirable outcomes are 
achieved only when effective programs are implemented well. Whereas a test of evidence-
based practice or program effectiveness at implementation sites should occur only after 
they are fully operational, that is, at the point where the interventions and the systems 
supporting those interventions within an agency are well integrated and have a chance to 
be fully implemented. 
 
 After analysing the apparent failure of a program, Gilliam, Ripple et al. (2000) concluded 
that, ‘Outcome evaluations should not be attempted until well after quality and participation 
have been maximised and documented in a process evaluation. Although outcome data 
can determine the effectiveness of a program, process data determine whether a program 
exists in the first place’. 
 
Agreeing widely with developing policy as a series of step-by-step systematic process in 
decision-making; envisioning this as a staged, sequential, and iterative process is a useful 
analytical and methodological device to be used in this research. It reduces the complexity 
of the policy process by breaking it down into stages, each of which can be individually 
investigated and applied to specific research issues, whilst at the same time significantly 
relating to other stages of the cycle (Sabatier 2007).  
 
Thus employing implementation will allow an identification of variables independent enough 
for the study; whilst at the same time will help in tackling the issues at bay (Freeman and 
Lewis 1998, Howlett 2010). Mismatches, often caused by inappropriate policy transfers 
from other regions, may result not only in low efficiency and effectiveness, but also 
legitimacy deficits. Thus to elicit empirical findings; the implementation stage of the policy 
cycle will be applied (Best 2005). 
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This research however develops a different approach by further unpacking the 
implementation stage into variables that will work towards evaluating the performance of 
the parliament by developing indicators to measure its effectiveness as demonstrated in  
Effectiveness Assessment Tool. 
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Figure 3.1 Effectiveness Assessment Tool 
Source: Tool developed by author with data from (Wilson 1955, Rweyemamu 1983, O'Toole Jr 2004) 
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1984)
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3.5 Developing a viable measuring tool 
According to Rhodes (1995:56): 
 
'No theory is ever true, it is only more or less instructive. You can learn from the 
critical assessment of one theory; you can learn much more from a comparative 
critical assessment of several theories brought to bear on a single topic. The 
study of political institutions will benefit greatly from such multi-theoretic 
research’.  
 
NIs posit that, there are inherent challenges in employing only theoretical approaches to 
policy research because of the range of actors involved in policy making (Scharpf 1997:37). 
Moreover, Scharpf suggests that empirical data, which must be collected for each case, 
should form the basis of research on the interfaces of policy actors. In turn, empirical data 
can then be structured and examined through a categorising framework which draws from 
a range of theoretical approaches. In this way, the aim of new institutionalism, to reach a 
deeper understanding rather than to establish a new theory holding all the answers is 
accomplished. In agreement Rhodes (1995) claims that the multi-theory character of new 
institutionalism was one of its greatest strengths. 
 
New Institutionalism suffers from the opposite problem to studies on regional legislatures; 
there is an abundance of theoretical literature. But despite the presence of some ground-
breaking applications of theories to individual studies (Collier and Collier 1991, Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991, Streeck and Thelen 2005), it is frequently difficult to operationalise and 
apply the theoretical frameworks from individual studies to other research projects.  
 
Institutionalist empirical studies are dominated by studies of organisations (March and 
Olsen 1989, 1996, 1998), regime change (Collier and Collier 1991, Pierson and Skocpol 
2002), economics and economic systems (Arthur 1988, North 1990, Alston, Eggertsson et 
93 
 
al. 1996), and especially capitalism (Hall and Taylor 1996, Hall and Soskice 2001, Morgan, 
Whitley et al. 2006, Schmidt 2006, Hall and Thelen 2009). 
Figure 3.2 Stages of Implementation 
Source: Adapted from (Fixsen, Naoom et al. 2005, Hill and Hupe 2008, Araral, Fritzen et al. 2012) 
 
Furthermore, Peters (2000) emphasises this by asserting that there are lingering difficulties 
in measuring institutional variables in other than simplistic, nominal categories, thus in this 
research the utility of the institution as an explanatory concept, is utilised rather than 
dwelling on the debates about whether it has sufficient analytic power, or can develop viable 
indicators for a measuring framework. Thus the tool is added on to take advantage of 
institutionalism’s greater capacity to be a measurement of institutions, as variations in their 
characteristics alone will pose great challenges. The normative approach therefore suitably 
views West African ideas behind established patterns of conflict prevention ideas as 
reflected in the ECPF.  
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3.5.1 How to Measure? 
The research question requires an assessment of the effectiveness of ECOWAS’s 
institutions in reducing conflict.  To do this, a clear framework is needed. 
 
The ability of an organisation to be effective at achieving expected outcomes is used by 
organizational theorists to interrogate how it will impact the people it works for, in what 
manner, the time and with which resources. 
 
The study of organisational effectiveness has evolved over the past fifty years and 
continues to confront new complexities as organisations respond to fast changing and 
dynamic external and internal environments. Whilst business organisations have had to 
adapt more quickly to such dynamic environments, largely in view of intense competition 
spurred by globalisation, public sector organisations, which include intergovernmental 
institutions like the ECOWAS-P, have not been equally adaptive or responsive (Cameron 
and Whetten 1983, Lewin and Minton 1986). 
 
Democratization and trade liberalisation schemes have inured citizens to demand greater 
accountability from governments across West Africa. There are arguments that public 
institutions must be business smart, entrepreneurial inclined and include innovation if it is 
achieve the objectives for which it was established. Ultimately because, it must strive to 
keep pace with technology and be abreast of the rapid dips and turns of the economy 
(Drucker 2012). Public sector institutions therefore, must habitually use their resources in 
new ways to heighten their effectiveness (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). 
 
 Assessments have been made detailing how the design and implementation procedures 
of RECs effectively constrain rather than promote their regional integration objectives. The 
counter-intuitive results are found to be emanating from vital organisational variables like 
consensual decision-making arrangements, overlapping and conflicting memberships, 
minimal or absent regional level monitoring and implementation of decisions, political 
unwillingness of governments of member countries to cede authority to the regional 
institutions, challenges with sovereignty issues, harmonising regional and national laws, 
and resource deficit and power by the regional secretariats to take initiative and promote 
regional perspectives. This therefore posit that, the institutional set up of the Parliament as 
an organ of ECOWAS has direct bearing on its ability to be effective (Oyejide 2000, De 
Lombaerde 2006, Genna and Lombaerde 2010, Lombaerde, Soderbaum et al. 2010).  
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Various theoretical frameworks are used by organisational theorists to discuss the ability of 
an organisation to be effective at achieving its expected outcomes. 
The closed rational organization or bureaucratic control-oriented model argues that 
organizational effectiveness can be achieved by institutions having clarity of purpose, 
formalization of rules and roles, and monitoring conformance to those expectations. Further, 
it argues that organisations are fairly generic and hence management faces basic generic 
tasks which if carried out diligently will result in effectiveness(Drucker 2012). 
 
The natural systems or human relations models, argues that, an organization is effective, if 
it harnesses the minds and hearts of its participants. An emphasis is placed on informal 
social relations over formal structures resulting from an organization engaging the hearts 
and minds of participants. It also includes efforts to engage hearts and minds of an 
organization’s customers and external stakeholders (Podolny and Page 1998, Porter 2008). 
 
An argument that the effectiveness of an organisations depends on its interaction with the 
external environment is the thesis of the open systems model. Here, an organization is 
viewed as an open system that performs a learning and exchange of ideas, and self-
maintains on the basis of throughputs taken from and given back to the environment. 
Effectiveness here is also underpinned by the organization’s ability to be flexible and adapt 
to a complex, varied and rapidly changing environment. A critical ingredient is also 
transformational leadership (Bass and Riggio 2012) to provide vision, direction and add real 
value to what all stakeholders expect, and increase the commitment of 
employees(Hesselbein and Goldsmith 2011). 
 
The absence of internal strain on the internal processes and operations of an organization 
is imperative if it is to be effective. This model argues that the members must be fully 
integrated into the system, with smooth internal functions complete with a high level of trust 
and benevolence, whilst vertical and horizontal information is ensured (Cameron and 
Whetten 1983). 
 
Models that are prefabricated and tailored to specific requirements and objectives of a 
particular organization, is labelled the contingency model(Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, 
Donaldson 2001). The argument here is that, different environmental contexts place 
different requirements on organisations and RECs work in a unique environment because 
they are institutions set up countries with sovereignty to promote, safeguard and harmonize 
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issues of common interest in [policy formation and implementation. Thus, political will is 
crucial as member states will have to cede some sovereignty to these supranational bodies 
to ensure effectiveness.  
  
The theoretical frameworks of organizational effectiveness discussed above, though not 
exhaustive, basically help to determine how organisations are best able to realise their set 
objectives more effectively when examined in the specific context of current supranational 
organisations. They dominantly point out that organizational effectiveness stems from a 
number of generic factors including; clarity of purpose, facilitative organizational values, 
simplified and rational organizational structure and processes, availability of adequate 
resources, satisfaction of an organization’s strategic constituencies, the organization’s 
agility to adjust and respond to dynamic changes and requirements of and in the 
environment and existence of transformational leadership.  
 
As the ECOWAS Parliament, is still in the process of achieving its objective effectively, there 
are indications that the theories that underpin its effectiveness are not only weakly 
embedded in its structures and operations, but are probably non-existent. 
 
3.5.2 Indicators 
An indicator is defined as ‘a measure that is employed to refer to a concept when no direct 
measure is available’ (Bryman 2012:540). Thus as values of normative institutionalism are 
not possible to measure directly, there is need to abstract indirect indicators as utilised in 
the tool. These indicators are deduced from the policy implementation cycle to assist in 
ascertaining whether the ECOWAS Parliament is effective in conflict prevention. 
 
 The indicators are divided into six groups according to six spheres in which the institution 
presumably will go through ‘a cycle’ covering all its processes and procedures in estimating 
the effectiveness of a policy.  The focus is not specifically on any of the phases and the idea 
is to be able to utilise each indicator at particular policy stages or employ all levels to 
determine the outcome of an issue depending on the circumstances. As demonstrated in 
Error! Reference source not found. the developed indicators can proceed chronologically 
though they can be employed independently of each other. Additionally, Interviews 
undertaken guided by questionnaires validate these indicators. 
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In arriving at the indicators, the research is also guided by what effectiveness means in 
context. Conceptually it has many meanings and for Young (2011) ‘effectiveness is a matter 
of contribution that institutions make to solve the problems that motivate actors to invest the 
time and energy needed to create them’ whilst Wimbush and Watson (2000) consider it as 
intended and unintended effects of policies, projects and programmes. 
 
At the impact assessment level, Sadler (1935:37) defines effectiveness as ‘how well 
something works to whether it works as intended and meets the purposes for which it is 
designed’. Thus an effectiveness tool is considered to bear influence on decision-making in 
selecting optimum options for development and sustainability  subject to the context in 
which it is applied (van Buuren and Nooteboom 2009). Furthermore, effectiveness 
components as proposed by Baker and McLelland (2003) when considering policy 
implementation, are to be based on the policy application (practice), the meeting of 
objectives (performance), the proficiency with which the objectives are met, and the 
achievement of goals (purpose). Therefore with guidance from effectiveness literature of 
four categories, procedural; substantive; transactive; and normative (Baker and McLelland 
2003, Theophilou, Bond et al. 2010) this research is also guided by the latter approach. 
 
Normative effectiveness correlates to the achievement of normative goals (Baker and 
McLelland 2003) which could be incremental changes in institutions, organisations, 
philosophy, science and culture bringing about changing consent and decision-making. 
Normative changes could also be observed based on the perceptions of those who were 
involved as stakeholders to the process or in the implementation of the tool. 
 
Consequently, six variables are employed in the tool for the empirical measurement as 
demonstrated in Error! Reference source not found. are those identified as potentially 
influencing effectiveness and were reviewed according to discussions emanating from all 
the normative discussions. 
 
Need-the main questions are how stakeholders needs were identified. Importantly is 
foremost identifying who these stakeholders are in the regional context as pertains to 
conflict prevention activities and how they are identified; Fit-this seeks to evaluate the 
preferred implemented and whether this was more effectiveness that the alternatives that 
were not utilised, and what processes were undertaken to arrive at the choice; Resources-
reminiscent of burgeoning institutions, resources are always scarce thus, there is need to 
understand what kind of resources exist, and are used in decision-making and 
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implementation; Evidence-this seeks to examine what activities have been undertaken on 
conflict prevention and the main beneficiaries and how these are identified at the output 
level; Innovation-an evaluation of program plans, strategies or type of activities undertaken 
and; Capacity-seeking to identify the expertise and champions of these processes and 
whether external support was sought. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the nature of institutions, the reasons for their emergence and 
continuation, and the sources and types of institutional change present in institutionalist 
literature. It has defined institutions as employed in this research and examines normative 
institutionalism’s logic of appropriateness and its explanatory and analytical utility for 
effectiveness of the ECOWAS-P. Additionally, the tool of effectiveness is examined and its 
indicators outlined as viable measurement units for the framework.  
 
Emphatically, the general assumption here is, institutions are dependent and independent 
variables and differences in institutions do make a difference in policy linked with the 
question of institutional development and institutionalization. The following chapters will 
present analyses of empirical data to evaluate the validity of the approaches of institutional 
change presented in this chapter. 
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4. Chapter Four: Research Design, Methodology and Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
 
According to  Sayer (1992:86): 
 
 ‘To be practically adequate, knowledge must grasp the differentiations of the 
world; we need a way of individuating objects, and of characterising their 
attributes and relationships. To be adequate for a specific purpose it 
[knowledge] must abstract from particular conditions, excluding those which 
have no significant effect in order to focus on those which do. Even where we 
are interested in wholes, we must select and abstract their constituents’. 
 
The literature reviewed serves to situate, illuminate and unpack various ways of 
understanding the ECOWAS-P’s work in conflict prevention within the broader context of 
legislative studies and how effectiveness can be measured through implementation. 
 
Motivated by the opening quotation, this section will try to address the context. It begins 
with an appreciation of both academic and practitioners’ perspectives in understanding how 
effectiveness is being undertaken in the sub-region if any. The methodological choices 
made are backed by reasons to justify their preference over alternative approaches. In this 
regard, the study draws from secondary academic publications on the role of ECOWAS-P 
and other key in-depth analysis of primary sources by actors within and on behalf of the 
parliament will form the main research methodology.  
 
The nature of this research, which requires a detailed investigation of the effectiveness of 
conflict prevention of the ECOWAS-P with a view to providing a critical analysis of the 
practices, procedures, practices and processes involved, a qualitative design was deemed 
most appropriate. This is due to the fact that the nature of the questions and issues being 
investigated are complex, elusive and require in-depth penetration in a natural setting using 
explorative and explanatory approaches. 
 
In order to understand and critically examine conflict prevention implementation by the 
ECOWAS-P, examination of EMPs, Staff and other stakeholders activities in relation to their 
perceptions and experiences require a variety of qualitative tools and methods including in-
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depth interviews and observation of activities in the parliament. Moreover, relying on 
theoretical approaches, and methods combining observation and interviewing with 
approaches fostering conversation and reflections are central to exploring effectiveness. 
 
This section will present the methodology employed in this study; the justification for the 
approaches employed, and appraisal of the case studies, the criteria for case studies 
selection are given including the strengths and limitations of the strategy. Additionally, 
issues surrounding data sources, collection, timing and data analysis are addressed 
followed by ethical considerations of the research and finally, practical related issues of the 
research linking the central question. 
 
4.2  Case Study Methodology 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in-depth 
and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon 
and the context are not clearly evident (Yin 2009:18). 
 
In considering optimum research methods, the case study presented itself as the method 
of choice for the thesis. In particular, this research is suitable to the case study methods 
based on Yin’s (1994) recommendations as below: 
 
‘In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, 
and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context. Such “explanatory” case studies also can be complemented by two 
other types -“exploratory” and “descriptive” case studies’ (Yin 1994:1).  
 
The purpose of this PhD is to examine how effective the ECOWAS Parliament has been in 
conflict prevention, and to an extent why this could be the case or maybe not the case.  In 
answering the ‘how’ part of the question, one could have just instituted a survey technique 
to reach a much more representative audience; however, the ‘why’ part necessitates a 
methodology that can reach into institutional recesses enough to study motivation. 
Certainly, a survey technique would not have answered the ‘why’ question adequately, and 
this is one of the strengths of the case study. A key advantage of a case study is that it 
allows both actors and institutions to be considered in context. Thus, the case study allows 
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the opportunity of examining attitudes and motivation and how these affect behaviour, 
contrasting what could have resulted from working with large datasets, and official statistics 
which can lead to establishing unproven assumptions about behaviour’ (Hakim 2000:36).  
 
This research focuses on a new institution in parliamentary development undertaking 
events over which the researcher exerts no control over the effectiveness of the ECOWAS-
P in conflict prevention.  Thus as espoused by Lincoln and Guba (2000:31), ‘it is difficult to 
imagine a human activity that is context-free’ therefore the case study is optimal in order to 
capture all the nuances that enriches the originality of the thesis. Context will also ‘stress 
the holistic examination of a phenomenon, and they seek to avoid the separation of 
components from the larger context to which these matters may be related' (Jorgensen 
1989:19).  
 
Retrospectively, an aspect prescribed by Yin (1994) matches this research’s aim to also be 
explanatory through the demonstration of how a political institution, such as the ECOWAS-
P, has become a viable political entity in the debates around parliaments as peacebuilders.  
 
Moreover, this research involves parliamentarians consisting a unique interest group thus 
the case study is fitting as according to Hakim (2000) ‘case studies have advantages for 
research on social groups’, including ‘larger groups with a shared identity, common activities 
or interests like occupational groups or national pressure groups’ (Hakim 2000:66). Thus as 
emphasised by Hakim (2000:34) it allows the study of ‘perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, views 
and feelings, the meanings and interpretations given to events and things, as well as their 
behaviour’. In the same vein, Kane and Brún (2001:215) lend credence to this assertion by 
emphasising that attitudes and behaviours should be examined in ‘a natural setting’, which 
is perceptibly a vital imperative in establishing a true picture. 
 
Scholars including May (2001:33) posit that ‘our findings on the social world are devoid of 
meaning until situated within a theoretical framework, thus consciously harbouring the 
awareness that ‘the ultimate goal is theoretical insight’ (Gerson and Horowitz 2002:220) the 
study categorically follows Yin’s (1994:31) endorsement that the case study ought to use a 
‘previously developed theory...as a template with which to compare the empirical results of 
the case study’. In this research, new institutionalism is employed as it seeks to probe how 
the parliament as a political institution affects the behaviour of those working within it. 
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Assertively, Eckstein (2000:119) agrees that the case study is: ‘valuable at all stages of the 
theory building process, but most valuable at that stage of theory building where least value 
is generally attached to them: the stage at which candidate theories are ‘tested’’. But 
scholars such as Babbie (1995:296) rather acknowledge that in as much as  field research 
may be deductive, ‘you seldom if ever merely test a theory and let it go at that. Rather, you 
develop theories...’ though ‘most qualitative research is oriented towards the inductive 
rather than the deductive approach’ (Babbie 2015:50). Additionally, developing theories is 
very important work, but until they have been proven they are worth less.   
 
To this end, Baker (1994:300) opines, the ‘aim of science is to establish theories and then 
to prove (or disprove) them’ and it is the work of science to ‘test existing theories with new 
evidence’. Therefore, every case will be what Stake (1998:88) conceptualises as 
‘instrumental case study’, meaning ‘a particular case is examined to provide insight into an 
issue or refinement of theory’. Stake (2005) goes further to demonstrate that ‘the case study 
is not a methodological choice, but a choice of object to be studied’. The researcher in this 
case is ‘more interested in a process, or a population of cases not an individual per se’.  
 
Meanwhile, Flyvbjerg (2011:301-316) posits five misunderstandings of case study as a 
method including the fallacy that ‘general theoretical knowledge’ is regarded as ‘more 
valuable than ‘concrete case knowledge’, and as such some researchers feel the case study 
is not suited to theory building. 
 
A major and frequent criticism levelled against the case study method is that it does not 
permit statistical generalisation in a manner that surveys do because it cannot claim to be 
representative. However, Yin (1994:10) neutralises this criticism by asserting that case 
studies are actually ‘generalizable to theoretical propositions’.  Supporting this view Gomm, 
Hammersley et al. (2000:4) offer an explanation stating that the case study ‘is designed to 
test or illustrate a theoretical point, then it will deal with the case as an instance of a type, 
describing it in terms of a particular theoretical framework’. 
 
 Thus, the case studies can make generalisations about the theory (rather than about the 
ECOWAS Parliament) and if the findings of ‘two or more cases are shown to support the 
same theory, replication can be claimed’ (Yin 1994:31). In agreement, Baker (1994:300) 
discusses ‘external validity’ that ‘addresses whether the findings of a study can be 
generalised to another sample’ states that this can only be done through replication.  
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Therefore, this research explicitly states that its focus is not to seek a statistical 
generalisation as the case may be with surveys based on representative samples. This 
research is rather focused to make a generalisation about the applicability of the theory, as 
will be examined through empirical evidence, rather than making claims of the 
representativeness of the parliamentarians. This outlook is termed ‘analytic generalisation’ 
by Yin (1994:10). This however does not also preclude the fact as noted by (Stake 1995:7) 
that ‘certain activities or problems or responses will come up again and again’ amongst the 
cases.  
 
This cogent criticism on generalisation, is on the grounds that case study research findings 
are generalizable especially when compared with others like survey research. This however 
is subject of great debates amongst scholars. However, as case study is being employed, 
it is imperative for this issue to be addressed in this research. However, a salient caveat to 
be noted is that, generalisation is not the prime purpose of case study (Yin 2009, Bryman 
2008) research, but these concerns cannot be closed out of the debate as case study is 
central to the methodology of this study. 
 
The researcher argues that, generalisation from this distinctive case should not be regarded 
in ‘statistical’ terms (Turner 1953), Gobo (2004:405) but rather the flexibility and ‘fit’ (Lincoln 
and Guba 2000) it potentially has with other situations. Research findings on how effective 
conflict prevention is implemented by the ECOWAS-P as traced through two member states 
could positively illuminate the nature and state of the situation in other member states. 
However, based on this case study alone it wold be highly inappropriate and erroneous to 
make claims such as, ‘therefore the whole of West Africa is like this or that ‘… or all conflict 
prevention programmes are like this….’ 
 
For scholars like Miller (2003) the key to making generalisations from qualitative comparison 
lies in the effective sampling of cases. Thus the researcher hopes that the entire process of 
sampling/selection and verification including the other methods adopted have all been 
effective and rigorous enough to guarantee a potential within the study to generalise, albeit 
cautiously. 
 
This potential for application in a wider context is vital if case study is to be significant in the 
wider quest for theory and knowledge on phenomena. Thus though this study is unique and 
an isolated area it is still very useful and more is expected if it is to have any impact, improve 
effectiveness and subsequently support regional legislatures’ evolving role and initiatives. 
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Undoubtedly, this case study can be applied to other contexts and cases sharing 
similarities, characteristics and circumstances. Potentially, it is also not only limited to 
transferability as Lincoln and Guba (2000) even argue that this is just  one frame within 
which we can discuss applicability of a case study, and rather advocate three other ways 
through which applying a case study to dissimilar cases can be essentially undertaken. 
 
According to Lincoln and Guba (2000) in the first place, a case can be used to provide 
‘vicarious experience’. In this scenario there is learning from the experiences received in 
the case and universals and concepts drawn which can even be applied to dissimilar 
circumstances. In this study, focusing on the potential of vicarious experience, will enable 
lessons learned about effectiveness of conflict prevention in the ECOWAS parliament to be 
applied to member countries in both latent and post-conflict affected areas.  
 
Secondly, applicability can be achieved by using the case in a ‘metaphoric sense’. Either 
as a starting point for thinking about ways in which the two situations are similar, or, to look 
for differences. Extending applicability in the context of this research, it is vital to interrogate 
the ways in which the cases are similar or different from others originally considered, or 
those that they could be applied to. These help establish and extract patterns and universal 
elements and help to reveal what Hammersley (Gomm, Hammersley et al. 2000:234) 
describes as ‘the causal process linking inputs and outputs within a system’. 
 
 Thirdly, using the case as a basis for ‘re-examining’ and ‘reconstructing’ personal 
evaluation of given phenomena. This is made possible by using the case to provide better, 
improved or new information, raising one’s own level of sophistication or to provide an 
interpretation critical to erasing falsity or divided consciousness.  
 
This research attempts to provide new information and critical interpretation and analysis 
which can in turn help to extend the applicability of the case through reconstruction of such 
phenomenon in other settings. In all, if the built-in selection, verification, generalisation and 
application potential ensure sufficient rigor, as it is hoped, validity will be much improved.  
 
The lack of rigor and validity are also a key critique; that in comparison to other research 
methods, a case study is subjected to utmost criticism, mistrust and bias in many respect 
including reliability, validity in its different forms, replicability and generalisability (Bryman 
2012).  This therefore imposes challenges on the case study in proving trustworthiness in 
value of claimed contributions. 
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With respect to these criticisms however, Yin (1994) and Flyvbjerg (2004) emphasise that 
some are based on ‘misunderstandings’ of the meaning, contribution and the very true 
nature of the method. Yet, these at the same time cannot be ignored if the case study is to 
become relevant and gain prominence in the world of social research scholars and 
academics. The following sections demonstrate how rigor and validity have been built into 
this research. 
 
4.2.1 Appraisal of selected cases  
 
Yin (2014:17) posits that ‘a case study inquiry’: 
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be 
many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge 
in a triangulation fashion, and as another result 
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide 
data collection and analyses. 
 
In determining the number of case studies that will guarantee or allow for replication, the 
initial idea was to employ multiple case studies as necessary and appropriate, but then the 
challenge was then actual selection of these cases. Also, the initial thoughts at the 
beginning of the design process placed unguided emphasis on conflict prevention rather 
than the ECOWAS Parliament.   
 
The case selection was therefore undertaken through a number of levels. First by 
establishing ‘what exactly to look for’ with recourse to the stated research aims and 
questions; and secondly the need to address ‘where to look for’. This then precipitated the 
all-important issue of defining the boundaries of the case. This is because according to Yin 
(2014) and Stake (1995) boundaries to cases are complex issues and need to be decided 
on properly and cautiously as this lack of a proper ‘bounded context’ will be an amorphous 
challenge as essentially the entire World could be classified as a case of the universe, 
prompting an unmanageable, impossible strategy which could also be unreasonable 
research. 
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The context of this study, required a difficult but cautious decision with respect to what could 
be considered as case units for the research. Was it most appropriate to take the ECOWAS-
P as an institution administratively, all the fifteen member states on the issue of conflict 
prevention at only the institutional level? There were no easy answers’ but with due 
consideration to the nature of the subject matter none of the areas could be explored in 
isolation as a case unit but rather as contribution to the formation of the critical, unique and 
exemplifying case units. Additionally, conflict prevention is operationalised in all member 
states thus it was appropriate that the case(s) cover the countries in such a manner as 
would be comprehensive cover and paint a complete picture of the effectiveness issues. 
 
Therefore, this study is a case study of one entity, the ECOWAS-P and effectiveness in 
conflict prevention. The two countries (Guinea and Sierra Leone) were developed as case 
units on the themes of latent and post-conflict as part of the single case. In a region of rife 
conflict, all the 15 member states have experienced one form, of post-conflict or latent 
conflict at a point in their political trajectory. Thus to be able to generalise, these two themes 
serve a critical purpose as the results can then be replicated in other member states. 
 
Therefore, to be able to maintain a high level of reliability, rigor and validity, the country 
cases were also sources for data gathering and thus qualify to be case studies in 
themselves. Thus the cases covers the national to regional level nesting of conflict 
prevention and is thus considered the most appropriate way because this could enable the 
investigation on both levels of governance needed for analysis. 
 
Additionally, the selection of ‘who to ask’ was developed by purposive sampling. This 
offered an opportunity for respondents to share myriad of experiences and opinions through 
semi-structured interviews which encourages speaking beyond the scope of the questions. 
 
4.2.2 Research population and sampling 
The target population was defined by specific sampling and not random as the multilevel 
nature of the study was aimed at the multi-actors at the sub-regional level. Thus though 
these level can confound this task, it was not confusing because these actors are the 
members of parliament (law makers), policy makers and regulators, researchers and non-
governmental organisations at the supranational level focused on legislative and conflict 
prevention initiatives in West Africa. 
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These multiple data sources will be covered by the research because these different levels 
have an impact on the main question but the primary sources will be the MPs and staff of 
the parliament working on both core and allied issues, including documents and processes, 
national level stakeholders, other regional institutions, policy analysts will all be engaged as 
a way of triangulating issues and widen the discussion and policy issues to be covered. But 
the main respondents to issues on direct policy and decision-making will be the Members 
of Parliament. 
 
An attempt will be made to frame the sample that is an effective listing of all the research 
population elements and thus probability sampling might not be used. Instead, two non-
probability sampling techniques will be combined; comprising chain-referral (snowball 
effect) and convenience sampling (Flyvbjerg 2004:427). 
 
The convenient samples will be developed by the generation of an available list of 
individuals’ core to the research purposes in conjunction with discussions with the 
secretariat of the ECOWAS Parliament plus familiarity with the research context and content 
will facilitate the process. After developing the list in consultation with the secretariat, 
individuals contacted and interviewed will be asked for suggestions which will lead to the 
snowball effect where those suggested will also be contacted and interviewed, and in turn 
asked for others. These processes can become cyclical until a satisfactory representative 
sample is achieved in terms of the key issues. In the long run, these approaches will be 
prudent in the construction of actor clustering and building linkages with stakeholders which 
are all reflective aspects of gathering important information and managing knowledge flow 
around the central research question. 
 
Throughout all these processes, efforts will be made to outline inherent limitations and 
challenges the research had to endure. 
 
The next hurdle was how to select a sample of parliamentarians, staff and other groups 
defined to be interviewed.  As Kane and Brún (2001:95) states, a sample is ‘when you study 
the characteristics of only some of the people, situations, or items within the group’ thus the 
decision was the option of non-probability sampling because in agreement with (Sarantakos 
2012) it is ‘less strict and makes no claim for representativeness’.  
 
This contrasts with probability sampling because rules are non-existent for sample selection 
meaning a researcher can choose the sample unit based on personal judgement. According 
108 
 
to  Kane and Brún (2001) this is because if there are no claims to representativeness, then 
statistical rules applied to probability sampling to calculate sample size are irrelevant. 
Therefore non-probability sampling is more appropriate in research looking at cultural 
patterns or rules: 
 
‘…because some ideas and patterns are culturally shared, you can reach the 
point of diminishing returns, in terms of information, fairly quickly: 10 people 
may be able to tell you what 10,000 would’ (Kane and Brún 2001:201).  
 
Furthermore, the non-probability sampling method can be narrowly demarcated into 
purposive sampling. Scholars including Babbie (1995), (2015) posits that in carrying out 
field research, if one is intending to ‘consciously sample at all’ is most likely to use purposive 
sampling and this research keeps with this tradition.  
 According to Babbie (1995:287) purposive sampling occurs when: 
 
‘you select a sample of observations you believe will yield the most 
comprehensive understanding of your subject of study, based on the intuitive 
feel for the subject that comes from extended observation and reflection’.  
 
Meanwhile Flick (2014) urges that ‘step-by-step selection is not merely the original principle 
of sampling in various traditional approaches in qualitative research’. He goes further to 
state that, ‘current discussions on strategies on how to proceed with this ‘purposive 
sampling by selecting cases and empirical material, continue to employ the principle’. Thus 
these are key points should be considered: 
 
• In qualitative research, sampling is a very important step. 
• Sampling decisions (who or which group next?) are often taken during 
and as a result of data collection and analysis. 
• Sampling decisions in qualitative research are often taken on substantive 
level rather than on a formal level; they may be based on purposeful 
decisions for a specific case rather than random sampling. 
• In sampling, you will construct the cases you study in your research (Flick 
2014:175-180). 
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This research’s purposive sampling  included the leadership of the Parliament, EMPs 
representing Sierra Leone, Clerks of relevant Parliamentary Committees, Head of 
Administration and Bureau Manager of Parliament, Head of Documentation Centre-
Parliament; Legal Counsel of the Parliament, Vice President of the ECOWAS Commission, 
the Head of the Early Warning Department, Country Managers of the Early Warning 
Department for Guinea and Sierra Leone; Programmes Director, West Africa Network for 
Peacebuilding, representatives of research think-tanks in the sub-region, other policy 
makers and key stakeholders on the ECOWAS project and related institutions. 
 
The committees selected was on the basis of their relation to conflict prevention issues; 
thus the Committee on PAPS is the default committee however, adhoc committees set up 
to investigate issues, as well as the parliaments processes yield influential aspects of 
conflict prevention. 
 
The aim was to select committees with a mix of representations for aspects not necessarily 
country related keeping in mind the need for a balance of opinions and experiences. Since 
this thesis does not seek to establish generalisations about EMPs in West Africa in total, 
the selection is not purposively seeking to choose the most representative as ‘’case study 
research is not sampling research’ in any case (Stake 1995:4-5). Instead, the selection was 
based on criteria that would test new institutionalism. To this end questions asked included 
‘to what extent are the conflict prevention initiatives of the parliament helping situations in 
your country; what is the role of your committee on conflict prevention? Mandate? If your 
mandate does not indicate a role for you why are you undertaking conflict prevention 
activities? (See Appendix 9: Interview Questions).  
 
These questions and others had responses from specific committees that deal specifically 
with conflict prevention issues, as well as the general EMPs who had opportunity in the 
plenaries to contribute to these discussion and all these were primarily absorbed into the 
research ‘because it is believed that understanding them will lead to better understanding, 
perhaps better theorizing, about a still larger collection of cases' (Stake 1998:8).  
 
Although the case studies  also looked at individual people within the categories the 
research is not targeting ‘particular individuals per se’ but rather focuses on various patterns 
or clusters of attitudes and related behaviour that emerge’ (Hakim 2000:34). Importantly, it 
is noted that though particular individuals within the categories were interviewed the ultimate 
focus is on the group they represent rather than the individuals themselves. Therefore, with 
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the case study as methodology with defined parameters making the cases, collection of 
evidence in the field then ensued.   
 
According to  Hakim (2000:61)  the veracity of a case study also lies in the fact that it ‘…may 
incorporate the analysis of administrative records and other documents, depth interviews, 
larger-scale structured surveys (either personal interview or postal surveys), participant and 
non-participant observation and collecting virtually any type of evidence that is relevant and 
available’. 
 
4.2.3 Triangulation 
Exhausting as many sources of evidence as possible is necessary in an effort to attain 
triangulation. According to Sarantakos (1993), there are a number of reasons why 
triangulation is valued but most importantly, it first allows for ‘a higher degree of validity and 
reliability’ and secondly, it employs ‘the strength of each method to overcome the 
deficiencies of the other’ (Sarantakos 1993:155).  
 
Triangulation (or now called convergent (Creswell 2011:278)) is defined as ‘the combination 
of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon’ with the aim of overcoming 
deficiencies inherent in a specific method and increasing validity of the research findings 
(Denzin 1970:297). To this end, Jick (1979) advocates that a basic assumption underlying 
triangulation is that, it is assumed that multiple independent methods will compensate for 
each other’s weaknesses and not exacerbate. Also, Lamnek (2005) posits that the 
researcher applying triangulation is thought to be methodologically open and should not 
place more importance on one specific method over another. 
 
According to Denzin (1978) and Patton (1999) there are four main categories:  
 
First, methods triangulation aimed at checking out the consistency of findings generated by 
different data collection methods. This category commonly encapsulates both qualitative 
and quantitative data; elucidate complementary aspects of the same phenomenon; and the 
points where data diverges provides the most insights and is of utmost interest to the 
qualitative researcher. 
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Second, triangulation of sources aimed at examining the consistency of different data 
sources from within the same method. These could be at different points in time; in public 
vis-à-vis private settings or comparing people with different viewpoints. 
Third, analyst triangulation by using multiple analysts to review findings or using multiple 
observers. A check can be provided on selective perception and highlight blind spots in 
interpretive analysis the goal being not to seek consensus, but to rather understand multiple 
ways of seeing the data. 
 
 Fourth, theory/perspective triangulation uses multiple theoretical perspectives to examine 
and interpret the data and achieve validity. This category can activate adaptations of 
existing theories, or even the creation of new ones because different perspectives often 
reveal aspects not in accordance with a theory (Jick 1979). Practically, only a few 
researchers use this approach as it is time consuming and due to lack of feasibility as mostly 
studies focus on a small number of hypotheses (Denzin 1970).  
 
Numerous critiques are however raised against triangulation by several authors despite its 
wide acceptance in social science research. According to Flick (2004) and Thurmond (2001) 
the greater amount of time, effort and resources needed when compared to single-method 
approaches indicates that triangulation may not be suitable for all researchers or research 
projects. As well, the complexities involving mixed methods research which often contains 
a form of qualitative data can make replication almost unattainable (Jick 1979).  
 
Additionally, there are no independent measures to decide which methods are suitable and 
how to grade them. In some circumstances, a particular method may be more appropriate 
for certain issues than others, but, there is no existing scientific foundation upon which a 
researcher can base this choice. Therefore according to Jick (1979) a researcher must 
clearly state and describe in detail reasoning behind the choice and weighting of methods 
preferred, in the absence of that then it is only interpreted as the personal preference of the 
researcher thereby clashing with the assumption of methodological openness as espoused 
by (Lamnek 2005). For others including Flick (2004), triangulation does not necessarily 
provide any additional benefit compared to a single-method approach; thus researchers 
need to plan the process carefully and be mindful of the fact that even multiple methods 
cannot compensate for theoretically or conceptually flawed research questions. 
 
Additionally, in a bid to establish accuracy and truth of respondents’ statements, or to 
substantiate, confirm or validate claims made, various strategies were employed. At the end 
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of interview sessions the researcher discussed key summary understandings and 
interpreted responses with the interviewee to confirm that these were what the interviewee 
meant. Though in itself this does not constitute the truth nor clarify true or false responses, 
at the minimum it is an assured approach to bar distortions and misunderstandings of the 
respondent’s views. 
 
 This strategy is also recommended by Bell (2014) and (Bryman 2012) as a way of verifying 
responses.  Mindful of the sensitive nature of the parliament’s role, status and perception 
about its work, the researcher was attentive during interviews because particular 
respondents could try to bolster the image of the parliament by all means, probably at the 
expense of other ECOWAS bodies by exaggerating the role of the parliament, or 
discrediting the input of others on conflict prevention. Thus, the researcher did not just 
accept responses at face value but endeavoured to cross check in other interviewees with 
their colleague EMPs to ascertain the reliability and truth of these submissions. This was 
therefore an attempt that benefitted from the sampling used by including a variety of 
backgrounds and categories thereby ensuring opportunities for cross checking. 
 
 In this research however, the rationale is that, by combining these multiple approaches 
triangulation will help to increase validity and reliability of the findings. 
Therefore, in the case of the parliament for instance, a resolution passed on a particular 
subject and a mission report can corroborate a respondent or interviewee’s response. This 
makes it beneficial to take advantage of particular data collection techniques offered by the 
case study such as participant observation, direct observation, interviews, documents and 
archival information. These will enhance ‘rigor, breadth, and depth to any investigation’ 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998:5) and advance the aim of understanding the case studies (Stake 
1995:9). According to Kane and Brún (2001) the advantages of employing both case studies 
and participant observation is that they ‘have in-built triangulation’ as ‘each involves using 
a variety of approaches’ (Kane and Brún 2001:215). 
 
Six methods were used to gather data; individual interviews (recordings), participant 
observation, non-participant observation, document analysis (including Archival) focus 
group interviews and field notes/diary. These methods were used to complement each other 
in an effort to triangulate and monitor for differences, similarities and convergence of data 
outcomes. Additionally, this triangulation of methodology makes provision for stronger 
substantiation of constructs and hypotheses (Mason 2002).  
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4.3 Participant Observation 
 
According to Harrison (2001:80): 
 
 ‘If we wish to learn anything about political behaviour in a particular context, 
we must also engage with that context and undertake what is referred to as 
participant observation’.  
 
Participant observation according to Jorgensen (1989:12) facilitates access to the everyday 
world of groups to evaluate the perspectives of those working within them, how these things 
happen and most importantly why these things happen. Therefore, prior to the arrival of a 
researcher equipped with a tape recorder and questions, people have already applied 
meanings to processes within which they function and their surroundings.   
 
The onus thus rests on the researcher to ably interpret what these surroundings and 
processes are (May 2001:38) and this is where participant observation offers the most 
opportunity. It affords the researcher prospects to experience issues from the viewpoint of 
those within the setting, making it less likely that the researcher will impose personal reality 
on what needs to be understood, invariably this is a potential problem for those using other 
techniques (May 2001;149; 153).  
 
In agreement, Jorgensen (1989:56) emphasises that ‘accurate (objective and truthful) 
findings are more rather than less likely as the researcher becomes involved directly, 
personally, and existentially with people in daily life’; whilst Babbie (1995:281) reiterates the 
usefulness of participant observation in identifying ‘nuances of attitude and behaviour that 
might escape researchers using other methods’.  
 
Additionally, there is some consensus in the literature suggesting that participant 
observation ‘is more likely to proceed inductively’ (Gerson and Horowitz 2002:200). 
However, this research perceptibly departs from the norm because the prior inputs made 
possible by a theoretical framework provided a focus to the observation. Thus data was not 
collected and analysed to fit theory; because this research purposively applies an 
institutionalist perspective to the research findings to evaluate whether the parliament has 
been effective in conflict prevention or not. Thereby ensuring that, all data is valid whether 
it supports the theory or not.    
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4.3.1 Participant observation applied to this research 
When the research design of the thesis was being developed, it became obvious that 
interviews alone would be insufficient in collecting information essential for measuring 
effectiveness. This is because two aspects of the institutionalist approach involves the study 
of norms, culture and beliefs of the subjects under scrutiny. Therefore to guarantee rigor, it 
was deemed imperative to employ participant observation. This is emphasised by Babbie 
(1995:280) as a vital strength of participant observation in that it gives ‘comprehensiveness 
of perspective’ sanctioning ‘a deeper and fuller understanding’ of the problem under study.  
 
However, a key challenge about participant observation is the issue of time consumption, 
and thus the researcher had to be innovative in how to utilise it to maximise data gathering 
in the field. Importantly, as the ECOWAS Parliament holds two Ordinary Sessions a 
decision was made to undertake a feasible six week period comprising four weeks of 
participant observation, and then two weeks for other interviews which might not be covered 
during the initial period. Additionally, if after the initial analysis the data gathered was 
deemed inadequate, then a second field trip would have been undertaken.  
 
The participant observation took three main forms. First, the researcher was part of the 
Sittings of the ‘Parliament-of-the-whole’, which is when all EMPs convene from the 
beginning of the ECOWAS-P proceedings and also the end. At this level, there are 
proceedings, county reports, Addresses by the Commission Chair, Adoption of Committee 
Reports, Passing Resolutions and Decisions, and finalising the report that will be forwarded 
to the Authority. Second, the researcher participated in specific committee sittings and these 
were specifically in the case of the Committee on PAPS, NEPAD/Children as well as the 
ECOFEPA Platform. Third, the researcher worked from the parliament’s documentation 
centre, which houses an archive on all documents pertaining to the parliament. 
 
 Six weeks of interacting with EMPs and other officials full-time allowed for sufficient time to 
observe stakeholders behaviour and attitudes, and also get to know them. Additionally, the 
researcher’s prior background of working with EMPs in a career position for an international 
non-governmental organisation also made it possible for some EMPs and officials to be 
receptive and collaborative in helping with documents and other related submissions for this 
thesis. The importance of physically immersing yourself in a study cannot be 
underestimated. As agreed by Harrison (2001), it is important that researchers ‘place’ 
themselves - that is, admit who they are and why the study is being conducted (Harrison 
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2001:82-83). This option was considered viable and for ethical reasons the parliament was 
informed of the research and the purpose for the research thus, together with a consent 
form, most respondents were confident that their responses were going to be utilised 
responsibly in the thesis. 
 
As a ‘participant-as observer’, which consisted of participating in the programme of the 
parliament but with the full permission and knowledge that this was for research purposes 
was very advantageous whereas researching another phenomenon might have been a 
challenge. EMPs and other stakeholder the researcher interacted with expressed various 
perceptions about this method and whilst some felt obligated to share as much information 
as possible, others stated categorically that this was the first time any researcher had come 
to the parliament for information of this kind, and were also excited at the prospects of the 
research. Thus in most cases the researcher was granted unfettered access to meetings, 
helped out with sourcing information and most interviewees even scheduled interviews with 
other people hitherto not identified as central to the fieldwork. The parliament also operates 
an effective simultaneous translation and interpretation services so listening in, 
communicating and all related documents was simply compiled and gathered in the English 
language.  
 
4.3.2 Critique of participant observation 
A main disadvantage usually associated with participant observation is that because of 
proximity of the researcher to the subjects or respondents, it introduces familiarity into the 
relationship enabling the researcher to ‘know’ the subjects and this can affect the level of 
objectivity in the study. This scenario according to Harrison (2001:80) can cause the 
researcher to go ‘native’ and lose the initial detachment in the process with which the 
researcher begun; that the researcher may become selective and produce inaccurate 
findings so the validity of the research is undermined. In emphasising the viability of 
objectivity, Jorgensen (1989:56) reiterates that: 
‘The potential for misunderstanding and inaccurate observation increases when 
the researcher remains aloof and distanced physically and socially from the 
subject of study. Participation reduces the possibility of inaccurate observation, 
because the researcher gains through subjective involvement direct access to 
what people think, do, and feel from multiple perspectives’.  
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Moreover, the participant observation undertaken lasted only for six weeks; - adequately 
lengthy to gain insights into the EMPs and processes, but also short enough a period to 
prevent the researcher from going ‘native’. As this research is focused on institutional 
effectiveness of the ECOWAS Parliament in conflict prevention, the researcher was 
attentive to issues bordering on the how and why activities and processes to these are 
specifically undertaken than the general discussions. Relatedly, case studies permit the 
addition of different research techniques thus documents, including semi-structured 
interviews (all recorded verbatim) and Hansards and other primary documents pertaining to 
the Parliament can all be used to support any observations. Therefore, the researcher is 
certain that any such loss of objectivity was compensated by the benefits of trying ‘to 
understand how the actors, the people being studied, see things’ (Stake 1995:12) and how 
they approached issues, activities and processes. 
 
A related disadvantage of participant observation is that access is not always granted but 
in this case, that problem did not arise. Even though access to parliaments is wrought with 
bureaucratic requirements and is particularly known as difficult, the request to participate 
was accepted by the Parliament, and the researcher even received support when the 
parliament scheduled other interviews and meeting on the researcher’s behalf. 
 
Detrimental to participant observation is the criticism that it has ‘a potential problem with 
reliability’ and generalisability (Babbie 1995:301-2, Harrison 2001:82). For Babbie reliability 
means dependability, that if ‘you made the same measurement again and again, would you 
get the same result?’ (Babbie 1995:300), it for reason that triangulation is principally 
important. At the same time, the entire contents of this research are not made from the 
researcher’s personal opinions, and emphasis is placed on the interviews that were 
undertaken; recorded with verbatim transcription which maximises accurateness.  
 
This also holds true for the wide range of documents gathered; verbatim Committee and 
Plenary minutes/reports, Committee and Plenary Reports, Hansards, Mission reports, 
Strategic Plan and Work plans amongst others. These were scanned, photocopied or 
copied by hand to ensure accuracy than relying on the researcher’s interpretation or 
memory. Further, the parliament granted access to the researcher to gather verbatim 
reports which is particularly useful as some reports are summary and leave out some oral 
discussions. Thus, utilising a myriad of data sources ensures that as emphasised by  
Jorgensen (1989:53) ‘more information you have about something from multiple standpoints 
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and sources, the less likely you are to misconstrue it’ and this makes the research more 
reliable.  
 
In providing the reader with the opportunity of assessing the evidence utilised, the findings 
presented in the thesis often contain frequent and sometimes lengthy quotations from 
document excerpts, parliamentary committees and interviews to demonstrate that reliability 
was only a ‘potential’ problem as agreed by Babbie (1995). Criticisms against 
generalisability is one of the salient challenges for participant research as the researcher 
cannot guarantee whether what is being observed is ‘typical’ or not.  
 
This is because what is typical in the country cases for the regional parliament being studied 
may not be representative of the case in another countries. However as reiterated by 
Babbie, ‘the potentials for biased sampling are endless’ (Babbie 1995), but as outlined in 
this chapter, this research lays no claims for statistical generalisation or the 
representativeness of cases selected. Alternatively, the research is in sync with Yin’s term 
of analytic generalisation in this research. This research’s generalisability therefore 
emanates from the institutionalists approach. 
 
4.3.3 Benefits of participant observation 
 
The researcher spending six weeks observing the interviewees, listening in sessions and 
other meetings, over meals and coffee breaks and in building a degree of trust it was difficult 
for EMPs to ‘offer responses that they perceive to be desirable’ (Devine 1995:143) or 
appropriate. Relative to the interviews, another vital benefit arises at the latter stage when 
these ‘observations facilitate the interpretation of the material’ (Devine 1995:138). Similar 
to documents, these interviews represent a specific perspective in a particular context, and 
can be best understood if premised on existing data of specific individuals, settings and 
context. 
 
Finally, as emphasised by DeWalt and DeWalt (2011) participant observation involves 
entering the research setting and observing oneself as well as others in that setting. Thus 
by virtue of this the researcher was also able to observe non-verbal expressions of the 
EMPs when it came to debates and committee meetings. 
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4.4 Interviews 
 
Data collection methods were a questionnaire used in semi-structured interviews, document 
reviews and archival research. A critical discussion was how to gain access for observation 
and interaction with the policy makers to gain an effective way of understanding how 
processes, decisions and parliamentary procedures are arrived at or made at the sub-
regional level as well as how the parliament interacts with other institutions under ECOWAS. 
 
As the researcher observed the context and the day-to-day activities of the parliament and 
the EMPs individuals within it, interviews then offered ‘a systematic way to uncover people’s 
experiences over time as well as their perceptions, motives and accounts of these 
experiences and actions’(Gerson and Horowitz 2002:221). Interviews are a very important 
source of information for the case study (Yin 1994). They offer the opportunity to understand 
how people see their world and why they act the way they do according to themselves. 
 
There are different types of interview; structured, semi-structured and unstructured and all 
interviews conducted for this thesis were semi-structured where as stated by May 
(2001:123) ‘questions are normally specified, but the interviewer is freer to probe beyond 
the answers’. The categories defined to be interviewed were all asked same set of questions 
as attached in Appendix 9. This allowed for a greater degree of comparability between given 
answers unlike a structured interview it could allow respondents to elongate their answers 
in ways more in their interests. These set questions therefore ensured that salient and key 
issues were included, but at the same time it also granted flexibility. 
 
Interviews were carried out/used because of the need to lay emphasis on the complexities, 
depths, nuances and roundedness in data, rather than employing the kind of broad surveys 
of surface patterns which for instance, a questionnaire may achieve. They were also used 
to explore activities, structure, processes, implementation and perceived effectiveness from 
understanding the complexity and depths in people’s contextual accounts and experiences. 
This is important because, superficial analysis of apparent comparability between accounts 
of large numbers of people may not yield these results.  
 
Therefore semi-structured (face-to-face) interviews were important methods of data 
collection in this research. Only a few telephone interviews were held to mainly bridge the 
gap of those that could not travel to the Session(in the case of Guinea as they were 
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suspended); and also when the researcher needed to bridge some gaps found during 
analysis on emerging areas. 
 
Interviews were utilised as a preference over questionnaires for three reasons. First, the 
nature of this research requires depth of discussion (Bryman 2012) on issues and an 
understanding of principles, context, implementation and effectiveness from the ‘other’ point 
of view. This can be undertaken by interviews in person offering a possibility of modifying 
lines of inquiry, follow up on salient responses whilst investigating underlying motives 
(Mason 2002) in a manner that a postal, self-administered, or email answered questionnaire 
may not achieve. As emphasised by Patton (2002) interviewing enabled the researcher to 
understand how people in the institution, view the institution and its activities, learn their 
terminology and judgements and to capture the complexities for their individual perceptions 
and experiences. 
 
Thus the semi-structured interviews were conducted based on the interview guide (see 
Appendix 9) developed to encompass what Robson (2002) and Bryman (2012) promote as 
the following: 
 Long questions which the interviewee might remember in part and answer 
partially; 
 Double-barrelled or multi-barrelled questions which might not be fully answered 
by the respondent 
 Questions involving jargon which might be unfamiliar and disturbing to the 
respondent; 
 Leading questions that could confine the respondent to think in only the direction 
the interviewer had given  
 Biased questions reflecting the researcher’s prejudice. 
 
Interview error in this researched was minimised by designing the interview questions to be 
at the very least, neutral, open-ended, sensitive and clear as advised by Patton (2002) to 
help limit what Weiss (1972) states in Clarke and Dawson (1999) as ‘right answer’ 
responses; which are characteristic responses to outcomes evaluation as well as to 
questions on programme effectiveness. As this study is inherently looking at an outcome 
evaluation, understanding the perceived impact of their role from the EMPs point of view 
may elicit such responses if attention is not paid to avoid it as a trend. 
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Interviews with the EMPs were generally conducted on the margins of the formal Session 
throughout its 21-days Session usually after Sittings, or during the lunch breaks. The place 
and setting for conducting the interviews was determined by the respondent’s choice. Thus 
in the specific case of the Speaker of the ECOWA Parliament, the researcher together with 
other officials from CSOs, politicians and government officials seeking to meet with him 
were transported to the Speaker’s official residence, in the evening after one of the sittings 
and met with him one after the other in designated meeting rooms in the residence. This 
according to the Speaker made it possible to speak without interruption and thus responses 
and time to attend to official business in other ways more effectively was used. As observed 
by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) different settings are likely to induce and constrain talk 
of particular kinds. Thus the interviews were conducted wherever the respondents preferred 
to have them; in canteens, restaurants, offices, Libraries, over lunch in quiet corners of 
restaurants or cafes. 
 
Interviews provided closed accounts and were also recorded to maintain a high level of 
accuracy and richness of data. Interviews are important for revealing cultural meanings and 
therefore allows an identification of the cultural practices and informal institutions within the 
parliament. 
 
4.4.1 Recording 
All interviews were recorded with including note taking. The researcher had a good rapport 
with interviewees and in some instances had to cajole them to sign the consent form as 
most of them would insist that they had no reservations and as such the interview should 
commence. However, the researcher explained the need for consent and all signed and 
agreed to their responses being used with their names, and in one instance a request was 
made to be anonymised. 
 
The decision to record the interviews was made for several reasons. First, this will ensure 
accuracy; respondents can be quoted precisely, ensuring that the researcher does not 
substitute respondent’s words with personal phrases (May 2001:138). Second, recording 
interviews made it possible for the researcher to be attentive, concentrating on the 
interviewees responses, and eliciting follow up questions rather than be faced with the 
distraction inherent in the tendency to scribble, interview and discuss at the same time as 
the case would have been.  When the all the interviews were conducted the researcher was 
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persuaded that a lot of valuable information would have been omitted if this was conducted 
by only note taking. For example, a respondent could have revealed an issue which seemed 
unimportant at the time, however as the research progressed overtime it assumed great 
significance.  
 
This approach also gave an opportunity to the researcher in terms of composure and 
appearing better organised as eye contact, acknowledgement of discussions, rephrasing 
and re-stating agreed points gave the impression that the researcher was also participating 
actively in the interview. 
 
In literature, tape recordings are pointed out as sometimes being a distraction with modern 
Dictaphones being preferred because of long battery life. To circumvent all these 
inconveniences the researcher used an iPad which has a battery life longer than 48 hours 
and employs several applications for recording interviews but this study utilised the 
‘QuickVoice’ application which records a high clarity level and enables easy pausing and 
continuation. 
 
However, the main shortcoming to recording interviews is being loaded with materials to 
transcribe thereby it becomes a time consuming tedious task. For example, a two hour long 
interview can take up to a whole day’s effort of work to transcribe accurately; but on another 
level it becomes advantageous since it ‘assists the important analytic stage of becoming 
familiar with the data’ (May 2001:139).   
 
4.4.2 Focus groups 
Focus group as a technique has been on the ascendancy as a social science research tool 
since the 1980s (Morgan 1997, Madriz 2003). As contextual interactive group discussions, 
they are employed to explore specific set of issues (Barbour and Kitzinger 1998) and if 
undertaken on consistently can actually become a social and political forum in their own 
right (Baker and Hinton 1998).  
 
Focus groups therefore offer a social context for meaning-making and shifting the balance 
of power from the researcher towards the participants  (Wilkinson 1999).  The focus group 
interviews were used to make an opportunity for the EMPs (ECOFEPA) and Staff 
perceptions, lived experiences and perspectives on the effectiveness of the parliament on 
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conflict prevention. Focus groups achieved several aims including, triangulating interviews 
responses regarding effectiveness in whether there were any changes in responses 
indicated by EMPs as different from Staff. 
 
Two focus group discussions were held for this research each lasting up to ninety minutes 
in the ECOWAS-P, these were to elicit empirical perspectives and evidence on EMPs and 
staff roles, activities and participation in the parliament’s efforts at preventing conflict. 
 
The two sessions begin with warm up process of seemingly mundane and factual questions 
relating to the Committee or Staff profile; for example, roles and responsibilities, countries 
they represent, who is the oldest/youngest amongst others. Then followed their activities on 
conflict prevention either as part of the parliament’s activities in general or specifically to the 
committee or staff. These individual set of interview questions were especially designed to 
determine from the participants how they thought the Parliament was performing in conflict 
prevention, what caused conflicts in their communities by giving ‘tangible’ examples. 
 
This encouraged participation and through guided questions which were used flexibly, 
open-ended communication and interactions made the discussions logical. An emerged 
challenge was the tendency for some participants who are more vocal to be dominant thus, 
the researcher encouraged participation by also making it country responses, and in 
agreement with the participants a contributor who had already spoken forfeits a second 
chance until all have spoken. In the case of the Staff this was a manageable process, but 
with the EMPs the agreement was not adhered to and in any case, most spoke willingly. 
 
4.5 Documentation 
Documents are regarded as unbiased and self-determining but according to  May 
(2001:184) ‘a text must be approached in terms of the intentions of its author and the social 
context in which it was produced’. This then underpins the importance of participant 
observation once more; giving the researcher an opportunity to understand the context, and 
build a knowledge base of the stakeholders for which the documents are intended, and what 
the authors are communicating. In this vein, Jorgensen (1989) reiterates that ‘participant 
observation improves comprehension and analysis of documents’ (Jorgensen 1989:93). 
Suffice it to state that, a major advantage of participant observation is access to a myriad 
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of documentation and archival records as mentioned in the paragraphs following (Bowen 
2009). 
The need for valuable sources of information about the formal aims and goals, principles 
and procedures of the parliament necessitated the undertaking of document analysis such 
as Hansards, verbatim reports, session reports, mission reports amongst others to ascertain 
the effectiveness of the parliament in conflict prevention. Importantly, these documents 
were not taken as absolute facts as they do not constitute independent objective records of 
events, activities and circumstances. However, these studies were socially situated 
products as there was need to understand both the process by which a document is 
produced and the social and political context in which it is embedded (Scott and Davis 
2007). 
 
Notably, (May 2001) reiterates that documents do not reflect a straight forward, objective 
description of social reality, but by presenting a particular interpretation of events, they help 
to construct a version of social reality. Therefore what is recorded is influenced by social, 
political and ideological factors; a researcher will have to be mindful that ‘documents might 
then be interesting for what they leave out, as well as what they contain’.  
 
4.5.1 Parliamentary documentation 
 
Documents utilised in this thesis include specific review of protocols, resolutions, motions, 
statements and reports from monitoring and investigations missions undertaken by the 
parliament to Guinea and Sierra Leone on conflict prevention. These also include study 
missions, discussions, mediations or negotiations. A review of the Hansards compiled 
through the three terms of the legislatures as pertains to issues of conflict prevention 
involving the two countries. 
 
Documents employed as part of evidence in this research are comprehensive records from 
2001-2013 and include: 
 
 Annual strategies 
 Annual objectives and aims 
 Objectives to achieve from meetings with politicians 
 Post mortems on meetings/events 
124 
 
 Action plans drawn up with public affairs companies 
 Policy papers 
 Communications to members 
 Letters and e-mails to and from politicians/civil servants/clerks 
 Notes taken from telephone conversations 
 Reports 
 Briefing papers 
 Survey results 
 Copies of papers presented to political actors at meetings 
 Written submissions to the Parliament/Executive 
 Copies of speeches 
 Pamphlets/leaflets 
 Newsletters 
 Notes of advice/opinion to other colleagues 
 
4.5.2 Archival records 
This yielded valuable information which the researcher hitherto could not have had 
knowledge of nor be able to acquire from other sources. According to Yin (1994) archival 
records in (contrast to documentation) can be classified as service records, organisational 
records, maps and charts, lists, survey data and personal records (Yin 1994:83). For the 
EMPs, Hansards and verbatim reports and minutes were very useful. These detailed 
meetings held with cohorts of political actors on different conflict prevention initiatives over-
time. 
 
Additionally, this granted the researcher access to founding documents of the institution 
including original treaties (1975, 1993, Constitutive Act of the AU 2000) establishing the 
ECOWAS-P and other policy documents amending its mandates, structure and its 
operationalisation. Others include Session reports, Mission Statements, Protocols, 
Decisions, Regulations, Conference Proceedings, Progress reports and Press releases on 
various conflict prevention activities, Newsletters, Research papers, and other academic 
works as were available.  
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4.6 Non-participant observation 
In this approach, the observer studies the subject ‘from outside the group without being 
involved in the life of the observed’ (Sarantakos 1993:222). This was the situation for 
studying the Plenary Sessions and the Committees. This is because only EMPs and 
parliamentary clerks can participate in the committees; they can host officials from the 
mission, or researchers tasked on a particular issue giving a report. Apart from these 
temporary guests only the two categories may sit in the committee meeting.  Though being 
neither an EMP nor a Clerk, I was granted the opportunity of non-participant observation to 
sit in, listen and observe specific Committee. This was complementary as it shored up and 
validated information garnered from the sources including from EMPs, Clerks, other Staff 
and what was gleaned from verbatim reports of debates and committee and the archive. As 
Yin (1994:87) states non-participant observation ‘is often useful in providing additional 
information about the topic being studied’.  
 
Therefore, in as much as the researcher had access to verbatim reports and other reports 
these do not signpost informal activities that sometimes happen relevant to an issue on 
conflict which could influence the outcome, or what pertains during the recommended 
breaks usually scheduled at regular intervals. In observing a committee/plenary meeting 
this grey area was highlighted. 
 
Non-participant observation carried out during the Plenary observed particular debates on 
the Country reports and passing of Resolutions. This was very useful for the research as it 
was obvious EMPs stuck to country allegiances in responding to issues and had bloc 
attitudes in articulating preferences on specific issues.  
 
A repeated pattern observed over the entire Session of the parliament was the scenario 
where in the mornings before the parliament commences there is usually a high turnout of 
EMPs most especially as a Roll Call is undertaken before each day’s proceedings. However 
by the time parliament is adjourning in the evenings there usually are less EMPs in 
attendance. In interrogating this pattern, it emerged that, attendance is tied to how much 
sitting allowance and stipend EMPs receive when Sessions end. These are in turn validated 
by the attendance records made by an EMP through Roll Call signed in the mornings. Thus 
mornings are populated and after the first break EMPs depart. 
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Another issue that was highlighted was the frequency and fluidity with which EMPs 
participated in Committees, which are also easily combined to be Joint Committees on cross 
cutting issues. Additionally, in plenaries and committees all documents have to be 
distributed in the three official languages and in the case where one of the translation of 
language(s) is delayed at the Secretariat press, EMPs will wait till they are ready, preferring 
to adjourn than to continue without the full complement of colleagues participation. In a few 
cases, progress was made but slowly till all the documents arrives. A similar scenario 
ensues in the case of headphones for simultaneous interpretation. 
 
4.7 Analysis 
After information is gathered, it is expedient to break it down into manageable categories to 
give it meaning, a process Schwandt (2007) identifies as ‘coding’. Before the field research 
commenced, certain categories were already developed into which the information will be 
processed. These were developed in advance because to fulfil particular requirements of 
the research, it was important to examine the countries of the ECOWAS-P under which the 
themes of latent and post-conflict will be applied, as well as the institutional set up of the 
parliament itself. Thus these components became category headings, and ultimately 
transformed into titles of chapters. During the research, these categories and others were 
continually refined into specific subtitles and sections to reflect the data collected, and 
comprise section headings in each chapter of the thesis.  
 
The completion of field work was the period when the researcher had the opportunity to 
review all documents, recordings, observations, interviews, observations, and mapped and 
allocated significant information to relevant categories.  
In analysing the coded data to give it meanings and structure, comparisons was made with 
the information under each category and arriving at conclusions about how the parliament 
undertakes conflict prevention activities; first as an institution, and secondly as relates to 
the country case studies. These conclusions were then applied through new institutionalism 
and the tool for effectiveness. Additionally, field notes were also used which consisted of 
reflections, experiences and observations made during and after the interviews. This was 
necessitated because even though the interviews were recorded, observations could not 
be inputted into the same recordings and as such rather than risking the reliability of 
memory, the researcher rather detailed these in the field notes as reiterated by Clarke and 
Dawson (1999).  
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 This strategy was also a key instrument for data collection of informal discussions, 
experiences and sharing with stakeholders and particular informal unstructured interviews. 
By employing different qualitative research methods, including semi-structured interviews, 
focus group interviews, document analysis, field notes and observation, the study therefore 
utilise a multidimensional analysis format to explore effectiveness. 
 
4.7.1 Ethical considerations 
The fieldwork involved access to, and interview of a wide range of bureaucrats comprising 
EMPs and other officials of the parliament, the Commission and CSOs. Thus, some of the 
respondents felt obligated not to reveal issues that might be regarded as intelligence, 
especially in security issues, however most of them were receptive and quite open about 
their perceptions. As Bryman (2012) reiterates ethical issues should not be ignored in 
research because they ‘relate directly to the integrity of a piece of research and of the 
disciplines that are involved’. Therefore, to curb the tendency of respondents being reluctant 
or suspicious the researcher was guided by three ethical issues; voluntary participation, 
confidentiality and identity disclosure.  
 
Even though access to participants and respondents was negotiated on the researcher’s 
behalf by the institution there was need to seek their consent and apprise them of the 
research’s aims and objectives; and assure them of confidentiality and non-disclosure of 
their identities unless this was consented to. Respondents are initially presented with an 
information sheet detailing the research objectives and then a consent form. Some of them 
tried waiving off the consent form by indicating that it serves no purpose as they could be 
quoted in the research, but after an explanation on how important this was they signed. 
Others also insisted that the researcher reads out the information sheet out loud to them, 
and a few respondents pointedly requested to be anonymous. 
 
Additionally, it was imperative to take cognisance of procedures bordering on how to 
comport oneself around bureaucrats and EMPs, and other stakeholders. Thus the 
researcher employed what Kovats-Bernat (2002) calls localised ethic which involved 
including the local population’s recommendation and advice in decision- making on the 
types of conversations and silences that were important. For example, officials from the 
Commission who were dismissive about the parliament’s role, in responding to the question 
on whether the parliament had a role to play in conflict prevention, said they could not be 
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explicit because it might be interpreted as insubordination thus they were assured of 
anonymity before they were forthcoming and cooperative.  
 
4.7.2 Limitations of the Study 
This thesis has its own shortcomings. Fieldwork was carried out in Abuja, Nigeria where the 
offices of the ECOWAS Parliament are located during the First ordinary session in May 
2013. At the time, Guinea was suspended from the Parliament because of delay in holding 
legislative elections. Thus the researcher could only interview EMPs from Sierra Leone and 
no sitting EMPs from Guinea but rather former EMPs who were present in Abuja for other 
business, and also contacted some others by telephone and email. This was a challenge 
as the Guinean perspective was also only emphasised by other EMPs, the leadership and 
the Commission officials. Additionally, as the Parliament’s attrition rate is high, there were 
only few EMPs who had been members from the inauguration of the Parliament.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This thesis selected two country case studies and the parliament, on which this research is 
based. Participant observation, documentation, interviews, and archival records were the 
methods used for data collection from the case studies. In order to gain an understanding 
into the ECOWAS-P, the methods employed were documentation, interviews and 
participant and non-participant observation. Ultimately, all data is being utilised in 
investigating to what extent the parliament is effective in conflict prevention, and how 
applicable new institutionalism is in explaining this phenomena.  The researcher identifies 
these qualitative methods as most appropriate as they ‘capture meaning, process and 
context’ (Devine 1995:138) and the research methodologies used in accumulating the data 
supporting the key arguments in the study were explored.  Additionally, the researcher 
believes ‘qualitative research, even when theoretically informed, is the most open-ended 
and hence least biased type of study’ (Hakim 2000:6).  
 
There are neither well known existing publications, nor significant pieces of research 
dedicated to the ECOWAS Parliament’s role in conflict prevention. To this end, this study 
has had to employ approaches and strategies which promises to be among the first set of 
inquiry to conduct in-depth analysis and investigate the effectiveness of the ECOWAS-P in 
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conflict prevention. In view of the above, the study draws on the methods as discussed in 
this chapter. 
 
In concluding, worthy of mention is that this research is the first to interrogate the conflict 
prevention role of the parliament, if not even the first to research at the PhD level and 
seeking to proffer practical recommendations and detail opportunities for research. 
Additionally, key relevance is also rested on the objective of signalling an enhanced role for 
the regional legislature as a viable decision maker and implementer of conflict prevention 
policies in West Africa. 
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5. Chapter Five: ‘An ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of People’? Assessing 
institutional effectiveness in conflict prevention 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The ECOWAS region has been persistently embroiled in spates of socio-political instability 
for several years earning it the status of a theatre of recurrent violent conflicts. Cumulatively, 
these have impacted negatively on the rule of law, democratic and parliamentary 
development, as well as the social cohesion of communities, which are prerequisite for 
promoting and consolidating peace. 
 
The ECOWAS-P as the institution representing the people of the region professes that there 
is an argument to be made for its role in conflict prevention. Many EMPs assert that as a 
parliament ‘it must make and in fact, does make significant contributions to conflict 
prevention1.  
 
It has an inherent mandate to defend the interests of West Africa’s citizenry, so ‘we do not 
subscribe to the counter argument that it is not in our mandate to work on conflict 
prevention’. The EMPs helped the research to catalogue oversight tools that are being 
utilised in their bid to provide oversight at this regional level. 
 
First, these are being examined by this study as procedural aspects of the individual tools 
that are commonly used or supplemented at the country levels. They insist that this 
highlights how they have established original ways of using the national tools at the regional 
level, and also how adapting to the context and tools are peculiar to member countries.   
 
Examining the effective performance of the different tools in a theoretical sense can help 
make some judgement on whether a particular tool, or set of tools are more effective than 
others. For instance, whether the absence of a particular tool in parliament will necessarily 
mean that it has ‘weaker’ oversight in strategy in a specific context than others, or whether 
simply employing a wider range of tools guarantee effectiveness. 
                                            
1 Interview with Simon Osei-Mensah (MP, Ghana), Deputy Speaker of the ECOWAS-P, May 2013 
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According to Malamud and De Sousa (2007) regional parliaments in African ‘are too young 
to be evaluated’ but this chapter undertakes an exploration of the ECOWAS-P in contrast 
to this stance. There is a summary of its evolution and structure, an assessment of its 
competences and performance in light of the classical parliamentary functions of 
representation, legislation/decision-making (output legitimacy), Oversight (monitoring of the 
executive and the bureaucracy (implementation, control legitimacy), and leadership 
selection and formation which are essential to democracy (Weber 1994).  
 
The ECOWAS Parliament (ECOWAS-P): An Overview 
 
There is hereby established a Parliament of the Community’.  
(ECOWAS 1993:Article 13(1)) 
Source: ECOWAS Parliament (reproduced with permission) 
 
Figure 5.1 Map of ECOWAS 
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The inspiration for the creation of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) on May 28, 1975, came from the original divisions by the AU and UNECA 
regions for purposes of economic development. Thus ECOWAS was a strategy to promote 
economic development and prosperity for the respective countries in the sub-region 
(Abangwu 1975, Asante 1986, ECOWAS 1993, Kabia 2009, ECOWAS Commission 2010, 
Adedeji 2004) as presented in Figure 5.1. 
ECOWAS has recorded several achievements in as far as regional integration is concerned; 
the abolition of visas and entry permits, introduction of the  ECOWAS passport; the Brown 
Card Motor Vehicle Insurance scheme facilitating road transport; harmonized customs 
documents and the establishment of institutions such as the Commission, the Parliament, 
and Court of Justice.  
 
 As well, there are a host of other financial and specialised institutions such as the ECOWAS 
Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), the West African Health Organization 
(WAHO), the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) and the West African Monetary 
Institute (WAMI). 
 
Despite its achievements, ECOWAS has also experienced several shortcomings. For 
example, though formed primarily as a regional trade pact, it has taken on an increasing 
regional security role with the emergence of failed states in West Africa and the strengths 
of institutions are yet to be realised in the sub-region(Bach 1999, Adebajo and Rashid 
2004). It also has the challenge of harmonising policies of other regional initiatives like Union 
Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (West African Economic and Monetary 
Union(UEMOA) and Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Central Bank of 
West African States (BCEAO) formed by the francophone countries (Kaplan 2006, Kufuor 
2006).   
 
Even though the original 1975 ECOWAS treaty provided no security role for the sub-
regional body, the challenges of ‘African solutions to African problems’ (Kasaija 2013) led 
to deliberate steps to securitise issues in ECOWAS and work on security and conflict 
prevention frameworks. The assumption of a latter security role by ECOWAS it is argued is 
not unique. Several other regional organisations as for example the European Union, all 
gradually assumes security and foreign policy functions by default (Kufuor 2006, Kabia 
2009). However, overtime ECOWAS increasingly developed protocols, and carried out 
amendments which culminated in the establishment of the Protocol Relating to the 
133 
 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Peacekeeping and Security, hereafter 
‘the Mechanism’ (Adebajo and Rashid 2004, ECOWAS Commission 2010).  
 
Several reasons have been attributed for this preoccupation with an increased security role. 
These are often linked to the challenges of endemic protracted social conflicts from the 
1990s-2000s in the region. Invariably making the leaders to re-evaluate the notion of an 
economic union and expanded these ideals to include peace, security and good governance 
which were regarded as sine qua non for development.  
 
ECOWAS currently has a membership of fifteen countries and population of some 230 
million people.  The most populous country is Nigeria. ECOWAS countries’ have three main 
official languages with French spoken in former French colonies of Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. English is the official language used 
in Liberia and the former English colonies of Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, 
whilst Portuguese is spoken in the former Portuguese colonies of Cape Verde and Guinea-
Bissau. 
 
In the 1975 Treaty, the main tenets of ECOWAS related to promotion of cooperation and 
integration and establishment of an economic union in West Africa. The aim simply was to: 
 
 ‘…to raise the living standards of its people, ensure economic growth, foster 
relations among member states and contribute to the progress and 
development of the African Continent’(ECOWAS 1975). 
 
In 1993, the Revised Treaty was aimed at accelerating the process of integration in West 
Africa, ensuring peace and security as espoused in Article 4(Fundamental principles) and 
promoting supranational institutions and thus established the following new institutions 
(Article 6 Institutions): 
 
The executive consisting of the Conference of Heads of State and Government, Council of 
Ministers, with administrative support from the Executive Secretariat. The legislative arm is 
the Community Parliament; trade policy issues are spearheaded by the Economic and 
Social Council whilst for the judiciary it is the Community Court of Justice. The financial 
institutions are ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, ECOWAS Regional 
Investment Bank, ECOWAS Regional Development Fund and specialised agencies.  
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Following from the above, one can impute a graphical analysis showcasing a 
comprehensive approach of ECOWAS’ transition (ECOWAS 1975- ECOWAS 1993) to its 
current strategy in Error! Reference source not found.:  
 
Figure 5.2 Graphical analysis: Transformation of ECOWAS from 1975-1993 
Source: Compiled by author using data from original and revised treaties 
 
 
There were five main innovations in the revised treaty; the introduction of the principle of 
supranationality in the application of decisions; extension of scope of community 
programmes to other areas such as harmonization of economic and fiscal policies; self-
financing budgets for the institutions (introduction of the community levy) and cooperation 
in political matters. 
 
In recognition of the importance of the legislature to the society, the ECOWA-P was created 
under the 1993 Revised Treaty and the protocol signed on August 6, 1994. The Parliament 
held its first session from January 21-26, 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria2 . It is currently in the Third 
Legislature (2011-2015) and unlike national parliaments the functions of the ECOWAS 
Parliament are much diminished. 
 
                                            
2 First Session of the ECOWAS Parliament, Abuja, 21-26 January, 2001, Outcome of Proceedings, 
ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, January 2001 
 
1975 1993 
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The Parliament was initially set up as a forum for dialogue, consultation and consensus for 
representatives in order to promote integration(ECOWAS-P 2006) in accordance with 
Article 6 and 13 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty (ECOWAS 1993).  
 
For clarity, the ECOWAS-P under the current mandate has no specific decision-making 
powers; rather it plays an advisory role in the Community. Therefore, it makes 
recommendation to the relevant cum appropriate Community institutions/ organs. This 
entails that until a resolution passed by the Community’s Parliament has been adopted by 
the relevant Community organs, the provisions of the resolution is not binding on any 
national government. Also, ECOWAS parliamentarians are not directly elected, but are 
selected by the national parliaments of member states. 
 
The ECOWAS Parliament consists of 115 seats. Each of the 15 Member State has five 
seats at least. The remaining seats are shared in proportion to the population. As a result, 
Nigeria has 35 seats, Ghana 8, Côte d'Ivoire 7, while Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and 
Senegal have 6 seats each. Other countries: Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo have 5 seats each(ECOWAS Parliament 2006).   
 
The parliament consultative role is on a broad range of issues, including human rights, 
telecommunications, health, education and treaty revisions. The functioning of the 
parliament is governed by a 2006 decision defining how executives make referrals to the 
parliament, and the time frame for the submission of recommendations and opinions.  
The parliament has a General Secretariat, under the Speaker’s authority, which is 
responsible for administering the institution. From its inception member states have been 
keen to transform the parliament into a fully-fledged legislative body, so it is initiated a 
transition that may lead to the direct universal election of its members (Gasiokwu 1997). 
 
This institutional arrangement makes the Parliament much more of a deliberative body than 
a legislature and also means that its members are not directly accountable to West Africans. 
However, its permanence and regional focus make for an institution that is able to bring 
continuity to the political dialogue and contribute to technical analysis on issues relating to 
the social dimension of regional Integration (RI). Four out of the thirteen parliamentary 
standing committees are in fact charged with mandates that would make them appropriate 
venues for addressing ECOWAS social policy, including human rights and the free 
movement of persons, social affairs, employment, and women’s and children’s rights. 
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As the parliament was set up after all the framework for conflict prevention were initiated, it 
has had to work in a post-facto environment of continuing/employing legal frameworks, laws 
and protocols of which it was not part in initiating. However, by virtue of the fact that it is the 
regional parliament, it has a duty to work within the all-encompassing regional framework 
laid down for it, and this is an area in which this study will look at in terms of its 
effectiveness(ECOWAS-P 2012). But in August 2012, it initiated procedures to assume the 
status of a fully-fledged parliament with a supplementary draft protocol submitted to the 
Authority of Heads and States and Governments(Gasiokwu 1997, ECOWAS-P 2012). 
  
5.2 Formal functions of the parliament (ECOWAS-P 2006) 
In as much as the provisions of Article 6 Paragraph 1 and Article 13 of the Revised Treaty 
relates to how the parliament was established, it has had its original protocol. 
 
 At the end of the First 5-year tenure of the parliament, a Supplementary Protocol 
A/SP.3/06/06 Amending Protocol A/P.2/8/94 Relating to the Community Parliament, served 
to re-evaluate some of these competences amongst others to help make the Parliament 
work in an efficient manner. 
 
Article 3 has been amended thus, ‘the House of Representatives of the Peoples of the 
Community shall be designated’: ECOWAS Parliament 
 
Article 6 of the Protocol A/P2/8/94 relating the Parliament of the Community is reformulated 
as follows: 
1. The Parliament may consider any matter concerning the Community in 
particular issues relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and make 
recommendations to the Institutions and Organs of the Community 
2. The powers of the ECOWAS Parliament shall be progressively enhanced 
from advisory to Co-decision making and subsequently to a law making role in areas 
to be defined by the Authority 
3. Pending the election of the Parliamentarians by direct universal suffrage, the 
Parliament may be consulted for its opinion on matters concerning the Community. 
The areas in which the opinions of the Parliament will be sought remain as espoused 
in the 1994 amendments. 
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During interviews, EMPs maintained that they play a pivotal role, and as such they are 
informed and kept abreast of significant and relevant regional and international frameworks, 
mechanisms and instruments of conflict prevention. This thus encouraged them to 
accelerate and improve on dialogue-based prevention initiatives which will play a crucial 
part in ensuring social cohesion right from the community, national up to the regional level. 
They insisted on this role being acknowledged as an effective contribution to the 
maintenance of peace and security within the sub-region. A summary of these strategies 
include but are not limited to the following strategies: 
  
 Joint committees of MPs to monitor intelligence and or security issues  
 Harmonization of security laws to respond to the threat of drug trafficking and small 
arms in particular (such as the legislation to ban small arms and light weapons)  
 Parliamentary Diplomacy. 
 
Essentially ‘our role is effective because through “parliamentary diplomacy” 
within the framework of the levels of capacity in the House, we act as mediators, 
provide avenues and alternatives for dialogue and interactions with national 
parliaments, rebel leaders, factions and other stakeholders to monitor crises 
and also engage in negotiations, as for instance in the cases of Niger and 
Guinea’ (Brima Kamanda, EMP, Sierra Leone, former Chair, Committee on 
PAPS’3. 
 
However, EMPs were quick to point out that they have pervading existing challenges that 
impact on their effectiveness. That, on a practical level, as the ECOWAS-P entered its third 
Legislature, they are witnessing a paradigm shift in the integration focus of strategically 
moving from an ‘ECOWAS of States’ to an ‘ECOWAS of the People’. This mantra totally 
epitomises the critical role the parliament is envisaged to play as it is summed up as the 
main institution in the quest of ‘an ECOWAS of People’, because they are the 
representatives of the region’s citizens.  
 
However, impediments includes issues such as lack of direct elections, no real legislative 
power, lack of administrative and financial autonomy vis-à-vis the Commission in particular, 
                                            
3 Interview May 2013, also led the parliamentary fact-finding mission to Mali  
 
138 
 
and high turnover of MPs. On how these can be surmounted, the EMPs and Staff were in 
unison on the best way forward. 
 
Succinctly, is to get the draft supplementary at enhancement of powers passed.  The main 
stressor needed to do this, is to enforce the parliament institutionally by granting it a co-
decision mandate with the Council of Ministers. Full law-making powers to be functional and 
truly effective through capacity building and provision of resources. 
 
The above will then ensure a plethora of efficient modes of working including: 
 
i) Opportunity to strengthen the ECOWAS-P as a first responder in conflict intervention 
and prevention initiatives, including planning to deploy, implementing outcomes and 
monitoring in emerging crises situations 
ii) An improved working relationship and liaisons with national parliaments to foster 
effective collaboration in information sharing and provision of the necessary expertise 
to compliment and support the efforts of national parliaments 
iii) Increased autonomy for ECOWAS-P will enable it to focus concretely on political crises, 
peace and security issues as well as strengthening its strategies of meditation and 
dialogue activities  
iv) Strengthen the capacity of the ECOWAS-P to enable it sanction intransigent member 
states for non-compliance on treaty ratifications as well as protocols and conventions.  
 
Thus the scope is constrained to matters relating to specific regional policy and certain fields 
outlined in founding documents. The protocol details that the parliament is to be consulted 
in specific areas, and propose resolutions, and on their own initiative make recommendation 
to the executive bodies of ECOWAS. 
 
However, the outstanding issue is whether these de facto decision-making bodies, Council 
of Ministers and Conference of Heads of State and Government observes and implements 
the propositions from the parliament.  
 
As there is no legal framework obliging them to pay attention to advice received from the 
parliament, evidently it puts the parliament in a very subordinate position on decision-
making. Thus in the pursuance of enhancing their powers contained in the supplementary 
draft act initiated since 2002(ECOWAS-P 2002), it has persistently requested for the 
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broadening of its power to reflect the role of a viable effective parliament. These were 
eventually approved in December 2014 by the Authority and are scheduled to take effect 
from the legislature beginning January 2016.   
The parliament is regarded as competent to ‘regard any matter concerning the Community’ 
and make recommendations to the appropriate organ. However, how these 
recommendations should be made, and how the organs should act upon them is missing in 
these founding documents. At best, the parliament just reflects or mimics the integration 
agenda as the democratic organ without much powers. 
 
The Parliament’s mandate entitles it to consider matters concerning the Community 
particularly related to Human Rights and fundamental freedoms, and to make 
recommendations to other institutions and organs of the Community. The Parliament may 
also be consulted for its opinion on matters in the following areas: Communication links 
between Member States; Telecommunication systems; Energy networks; Cooperation in 
the area of radio, television and other media; Public health policies; Common educational 
policy; Youth and Sports; Scientific and technological research; Community policy on 
environment; Treaty review; Community citizenship; Social integration; and Peace and 
security. 
 
Suffice it to say that, these competences for the parliament are only valid in as far as the 
parliament keeps to them and these are a re-echo of the areas of cooperation of the whole 
integration scheme ECOWAS. So the key issue emanating here is the use of the word 
‘consult’ positively indicating that the parliament works at the behest of the Authority, and 
only in an advisory position or role. 
 
5.2.1 Passing effective legislation  
ECOWAS-P does not possess explicit law-making powers. It can put forward motions, and 
pass resolutions to be forwarded to the Executive organs of the region especially if these 
have no financial obligations. These advisory and consultative powers at best are heavily 
constrained and the Authority, and Council of Ministers are the de facto decision-making 
and law-making institutions in ECOWAS and as such can override or veto proposals from 
the parliament. 
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Pertaining to conflict prevention, the parliament asserts its own role but the Commission 
and other departments refute this ‘self-professed’ role and insist that the treaty does not 
guarantee such a mandate and does not give it enough credibility and legitimacy to even 
undertake such initiatives. 
To this end, the ECOWAS-P commenced a review and revision process since 2002 to 
amend the Revised Treaty of 1993 to strengthen its mandate to carry out effective legislative 
function. However for the first two terms of its four-year tenure sessions (2002-2006, 2006-
2011) and the 2011-2015, it was able to get these passed but to be implemented from the 
Fourth Legislature beginning 2016. 
 
This is because the two community documents pertinent to peace and security in the region 
have no designated roles for the parliament. These are the Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 
(hereafter referred to simply as ‘the Mechanism) and; the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention 
Framework (ECPF). 
 
The Mechanism is the first attempt at encapsulating all the ideals of regional security into a 
codified document. Thus, the Preamble outlines these from international and regional 
perspectives; for instance, it makes it clear that Article 58 of the Revised Treaty espousing 
regional security; relevant provisions of the OAU (now AU); United Nations Charter, 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in particular; with the ultimate concern about proliferation of conflicts in 
West Africa as constituting threat to peace amongst others strengthens their resolve to push 
for these decisions. 
 
Article 4 lists the institutions of the Mechanism as ‘The Authority’; ‘The Mediation and 
Security Council’; ‘The Commission’ and ‘any other institutions’; as may be established by 
the Authority of the Heads of State and Government. Thus officials at the Commission subtly 
insinuated that indirectly the Parliament exist at the behest of the Authority and as such is 
a democratic entity in as far as it conducts its business complementary to the Commission 
and Authority, and does not work in any way deem adverse by these two institutions. At the 
same time, as these bodies including the Council of Ministers are responsible for the 
financial obligations of the Parliament, any adverse initiatives, or activities regarded adverse 
to the interests of these bodies or counterproductive to regional progress might incur the 
‘wrath’ of these bodies as they will cut funding. 
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The ‘authority to initiate’ the Mechanism are outlined as; upon the decision of the Authority; 
upon the decision of the Mediation and Security Council; at the request of a Member State; 
on the initiative of the Executive Secretary; and at request of the AU or the United 
Nations(Article 26).  
 
However, when reminded of the statutory documents prescriptions, it evoked a lot of 
discussions, arguments and counterarguments between, and amongst both MPs and staff 
of the parliament and Commission. 
 
In an interview with Brima Kamanda,4 he argued that, the parliament is established by the 
Revised Treaty and as such even supersedes the issue of it being established by the 
Authority. That EMPs have an ‘inalienable right’ to embark on conflict prevention initiatives 
and have indeed done so several times over, and effectively. 
 
In contrast Dr. Gueye, Director of the  Early Warning Department(EWD) at the Commission5 
maintains that, ‘unless the EMPs want to usurp the role of the Authority, the community 
documents does not give them a mandate to “interfere” in conflict prevention initiatives as 
they may end up escalating tensions. He goes on to echo thus ‘it is not an area in which 
they have technical expertise, or indeed, even any expertise, it is not in their mandate and 
neither do they have any political clout to enable them undertake, mediations for example’. 
 
Further, Dr. Gueye insisted that a practical case might reflect why he thinks EMPs are not 
up to the task and must also be guided by community documents. According to him, a 
salient component of the strategies of prevention lies in the composition of the Defence 
Commission of the region which comprises of Defence Chiefs from all the member states. 
These Defence Chiefs ‘are in a league beyond what the parliament can offer’ in terms of 
expertise and knowledge on dealing with conflict situations. Also, he insists, ‘ECOWAS has 
had a ‘winning formula’ and there is no need to fix something that is working well.  At best, 
the EMPs can play a ‘good role’ by feeding into the early warning observation system, 
contained in the community documents. In these documents, there is a role for people to 
pass on information at the national level, and they can even send it to us at the Commission 
since they insist that they are the representatives of the people, but to discuss the issues 
and implement resolutions and lead missions is not their job’. 
                                            
4 Interview, May 2013 
5 Dr. M. Abdou Lat Gueye, interview, June 2013 
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The careers EMPs had before taking up their mandates as regional parliamentarians have 
a wide spread ranging from teachers, accountants, doctors, bankers, sociologists and in 
fact covers most professional bases as confirmed by the Head of Administration at the 
parliament but Dr Gueye insists that these ‘MPs cannot speak the language of security, and 
do not have the tactical know how to lead missions’ and so might have to only contribute to 
the Early Warning System. 
 
However, the Early Warning System (EWS) in accordance with Article 58 of the Revised 
Treaty consist of ‘an observation and monitoring centre located at the Commission; and 
observation and monitoring zones within the sub-region6. Even though Article 24 discusses 
how these zones work, there is no specific role made in respect of the parliament. 
 
EMPs and staff underscored the challenge of lack of explicit designated roles in documents, 
but reiterated that, at the same time, there were still windows of opportunity as the issues 
were subject to debates and revision.  
 
It is asserted that the parliament continues to draw inspiration from the spirit, letter and 
founding texts of the community documents and they are an ‘authority themselves’ so they 
can initiate and take lead on issues. Also, ‘at the request of a member state’ is a good entry 
point for them as they can recommend or pass a resolution on the need for a country that 
needs support in a conflict situation to have the Mechanism activated.  
 
The Chair of the Committee on Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Alfred Kwame 
Agbesi, however stated that: 
 
‘… although a case can be made for the Commission as the institution which 
coordinates regional policies as required by Article 47, the parliament constitute 
“the boots on the ground” as they work on harmonisation of domestic policies 
and during sessions then evaluate the status of ratified community documents 
and countries that are holding back community progress by not ratifying are 
encouraged to nudge their respective countries to honour these obligations so 
that collectively the region makes progress’ (Interview, June 2013). 
 
                                            
6 Chapter four, pages 15-17, protocol document 1999 
143 
 
Second, the ECPF7 comprehensively gives meaning, interpretation and implementation 
modalities to the Mechanism as drawn from the tenets of the Protocol. Notwithstanding the 
Mechanism’s ‘good intentions’ it is characterised as lacking a strategic focus, weak internal 
coordination, misdirecting and underutilising limited existing human and material resources 
amongst others8. This then adequately supports the claims for promoting the ECPF as ‘a 
comprehensive operational prevention and peacebuilding strategy that enables the 
ECOWAS system and Member States to draw upon human and financial resources at the 
regional (including civil society and the private sector) and international levels in their efforts 
to creatively transform conflict(Aning, Birikorang et al. 2010). 
 
Thus it is regarded as the effective guide for ensuring synergy and cohesion between the 
relevant ECOWAS departments on conflict prevention initiatives aimed at maximising 
outcomes.  However, in no section is the parliament mentioned as one of those institutions 
that should be collaborated or consulted with on conflict prevention in particular. When this 
was pointed out to the PAPS Chair, he intimated that, the ECOWAS documents are 
amorphous, are now being implemented and most are dynamic and since it is about people, 
it keeps mutating and they adapt and adopt what works as they move along: 
  
 
 ‘…the documents are like the bible; a person can always find arguments and 
counter arguments for activities outlined for sub-regional institutions. My 
defence is that, we are mainstreaming…’ (Alfred Kwame Agbesi, Interview, 
June 2013).  
 
To this end, the parliament insists that, the true spirit and letter of what conflict prevention 
means in the region, is in itself indicative of the need for their role. Conflict prevention is 
conceptualised in the ECPF as ‘non-violent (or creative) conflict transformation and 
encompasses activities designed to defuse tensions and prevent the outbreak, escalation, 
spread or recurrence of violence. 
 
The distinguishing variables in terms of strategic approach is classifying ‘measures 
applicable in the face of imminent crisis’ as ‘operational prevention’ whilst ‘measures 
ensuring crises do not arise in the first place, or if they do, they do not re-occur are deemed 
                                            
7 Regulation MSC/REG.1.01/08 
8 Section II, ECPF, 2008 
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‘structural prevention’. The elements of ‘operational prevention’ include early warning; 
mediation, conciliation, preventive disarmament and preventive deployment. ‘Structural 
prevention on the other has elements often enumerated under peacebuilding and comprises 
governance, political and development focus reforms, improved capacity, and advocating a 
culture of peace. Following, peacebuilding is in turn conceptualised to involve multi-actor 
approaches to ensuring long-term peace.  
 
Thus, aiming to give meaning to Chapter IX of the Mechanism the approaches needed span 
‘humanitarian assistance; restoration and reform of governance institutions (political, 
economic, socio-cultural and security); justice; rule of law; reconciliation and reintegration; 
and conflict-sensitive development (ECOWAS 2008:12-17). 
 
5.2.2 Representation of the people 
 
  Membership 
 The selected delegations from the national parliaments are composed of a reflection of the 
political composition of the national parliament with both men and women to ensure a 
gender balance. The current legislature is graphically presented in Figure 5.3: 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Membership distribution of EMPs (2011-2015) 
Source: Compiled by author using data from attendance records at the ECOWAS-P 
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Article 5 of the Protocol establishes the composition of the parliament; parliamentarians are 
not directly elected, but are selected by the national parliaments of member states. 
Parliament consists of 115 seats. Each of the 15 Member States has at least five 
guaranteed seats with the remaining 40 shared on the basis of population. An overwhelming 
insistence on how inspirational the founding documents are, and most especially ‘even from’ 
the anthem for the sub-region was a preoccupation in the discussions with MPs. This elicited 
varied responses and in one instance, a parliamentarian actually asked ‘do you know the 
ECOWAS Anthem? Can you sing it? I think you can see the vision from it better and realise 
that, we as MPs cannot sit on the fence and wait for amendments or follow texts strictly 
whilst the people we represent perish through conflicts’.  
 
The texts so touted proudly are: 
 
Peace and unity and social justice everywhere, 
Cultural integration and liberty we declare! 
Women and youth, all shall maintain our future bright in health; 
 
Human and natural resources shall sustain our wealth. 
West Africa our Region State: 
Steadfast shall our union great! 
It’s no mystery, 
We’ve made history 
 
From the sea shores to the desert, through the Savannah: 
Each and every land, 
All will, hand in hand, 
 
Ever progress happily in ECOWAS! 
(ECOWAS Anthem Lyrics, 2nd Stanza) 
 
Coincidentally, officials at both the Parliament and the Commission had the propensity to 
refer to founding documents as well as the anthem when reiterating the commitment of their 
respective institution’s to effectively prevent conflict and other related issues. All maintained, 
this invokes their regional patriotic spirit and is the inspiration guiding their work, albeit 
ascribed by different reasons. 
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The remaining seats are shared in proportion to the population(UN 2014): 
 
Table 5.1: EMP representation per capita of citizen population 
Sources: UN Population data, ECOWAS-P 
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For the EMPs, this strengthens their resolve as partners in conflict prevention and some 
legitimacy for initiatives undertaken whilst for officials at the Commission, it portrays that the 
documents are full of emotion and sentiments without adequately addressing specific 
institutions and what they should do, or even how it should be done. ECOWAS institutions 
provided for under the Revised Treaty are disadvantaged by this. 
 
Elections 
The founding document of the ECOWAS-P contains the viability of direct general elections 
for membership into the parliament. Much as this is laudable because compared with other 
regional parliaments in the region, it is the only one with such a forward-looking approach, 
it has yet to undertake this venture. Thus it continues to hold ‘indirect elections’ by national 
parliaments with these particular criteria as a guide: 
 
 The EMPs and the secretariat discuss the advantages of this formula whilst agreeing that 
these are just pragmatic ways of going around the challenges as universal suffrage will itself 
be a trigger for conflict in West Africa. 
 
These include, zoning, resources, credibility, and perception of citizenry in the sub-region. 
In addition, they claim that these then ensure that the cost is kept low as indirect elections 
do not cost more, but then the other argument is what implications these have for legitimacy, 
credibility and the democratic deficit. 
 
Preferably, it should be by universal suffrage, as it will enhance democratic participation, 
legitimacy, credibility and a greater awareness of making the parliament popular, even if 
they cannot afford the financial implications. Thus the MPs continue to be nominated, 
appointed and elected from the ranks of their national parliaments. This issue plagues most 
regional parliaments as discussed by Erthal and Albarracín (2009) in the case of the Andean 
Parliament.  
 
On the question of whether this does not impinge on their legitimacy, they respond that, the 
above scenario will be complicated of they had to let MPs already elected at the national 
level stand for the regional level elections, whilst other complications are inherent with 
letting non-MPs and just other citizens stand as well.  
 
Also, if MPs are excluded from candidacy, it might broaden the space for political 
participation and enable them to focus more on governance and democratic progress in the 
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region. But if this is bound to be a subject of a lack of relationship between the regional and 
national parliaments, it will make it more tedious to consolidate gains for parliamentary 
development in a region with nascent and evolving parliamentary development.  This 
disconnect might push an integration agenda at the expense of parliamentary development. 
 
Appropriately, as the representatives of the citizenry, their role for conflict prevention is even 
more effective in times of transitional leadership because they become the concrete vehicle 
for popular participation and a platform for discussions.  
 
Although their members are not elected, they represent all the socio-economic entities of a 
nation and can contribute to the establishment of consensual constitutional, organic and 
electoral laws; the setting up of political institutions to manage and monitor the transition 
process such as independent electoral commissions or crisis management committees; the 
implementation of national reconciliation mechanisms and promotion of national unity and 
social dialogue  which all pave the way to peaceful and stable transitional societies. 
 
5.2.3 Implementation sans Parliament 
ECOWAS-P does have areas it is competent to work in yet it is not equipped with the 
necessary powers to carry these out. It cannot enforce and implement decisions taken, nor 
mandate compliance by regional executives or member states. Thus the parliament cannot 
impose sanctions on member states. Even though, there also exist a Court of Justice, this 
deficit is complicated by the lack of seeming cooperation at a practical level between the 
two institutions under ECOWAS on the issue of reviewing undertakings according to the 
basic tenets and laws of the region. If any at all, it is at the level of the executive. 
 
As a legislative body, parliament evaluates the implementation of laws that it has enacted. 
This is usually accomplished as parliament deliberates legislative proposals, but it can also 
be done through the non-legislative activities of committees, and at the regional level it is 
these non-legislative streams it can utilise as it does not yet enact laws guiding the sub-
region. 
 
In practical terms, the ability of parliamentary committees to demand the attendance of 
members of the executive branch is a key condition of effective fulfilment of their oversight 
role. If a committee member deems the presence of ministers necessary, he/she expresses 
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that opinion to the committee chair and the committee chair passes the request to the 
minister concerned. The ministers so requested will either appear in person or dispatch a 
representative, unless they have good reason to refuse. In some instances, committees 
make informal requests to the responsible executive officials to appear before particular 
committees, and brief them on salient issues. 
 
At other times, a committee’s exchanges with corresponding executive official, or indeed 
officials of other regional organs do take place in informal settings which the MPs refer to 
as ‘Courtesy calls’ or ‘Consultations’. These names indicate the lack of an ‘official report’ as 
for example verbatim reports of the meetings, but the associated committee clerks make 
summaries reflecting the record of proceedings from such meetings. 
 
Parliamentary Committees  
(Inquiry, Delocalised Meetings, Ad hoc, Select/Standing)  
Committees are universally found in parliaments across the world. A parliamentary 
committee is a group of parliamentarians appointed by one chamber (or both chambers, in 
the case of joint committees in a bicameral parliament) to undertake certain specified tasks. 
Committees offer a setting, which facilitates detailed scrutiny of draft legislation, oversight 
of government activities and interaction with the public and external actors. A significant 
part of parliamentary work is now conducted in committees rather than in the parent 
chamber (Norton 1990:249-265).  
 
Increasingly, attention is being focused on the roles of parliamentary committees, and 
notably their oversight role, whereas formerly discussion tended to focus on the legislative 
output of committees. While committee systems are found extensively across the 
parliaments of the world, they are not all the same.  
 
Some parliaments have standing committees, which are involved in both law making and 
oversight; others do not. The powers of parliamentary committees also differ and some 
make more use of ad hoc committees of inquiry.  
 
In many parliaments, permanent committees oversee the programmes of the corresponding 
government departments, including from the budget and gender perspectives; whilst 
committees of inquiry can be established to examine the positive and negative aspects of 
particular policies and to pursue the responsibility of the officials in charge. Four out of the 
thirteen parliamentary standing committees are mandated with addressing ECOWAS social 
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policy, including human rights and the free movement of persons, social affairs, 
employment, and women’s and children’s rights. 
 
Specifically, the Committee on Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is the main 
convenor of security issues in the region and embarks upon activities during recess called 
delocalised meetings. They engage in parliamentary diplomacy to promote peace and 
democratic principles and feed reports into the Committee report. 
 
During the May 2013 Session, officials from the ECOWAS Commission presented reports 
on the security situation in the region including special cases as for instance, the reports 
and findings from specific missions to Mali9 and Niger. Against the background of no explicit 
mandate on conflict prevention, this is significant as it demonstrates the parliament’s 
initiative to work proactively in maintaining peace and stability.  
 
Committees are also an entry point for citizens’ involvement in parliamentary business. 
Experts can be heard in or become advisers to parliamentary committees. Committees can 
invite interested parties to hearings or invite of the public to give evidence. Public hearings 
held by parliamentary committees have the potential to be a vehicle for informing the public 
on policy issues and the parliament’s work on those issues. 
 
At the ECOWAS-P, the Plenary as a parent chamber is also referred to as the ‘Committee 
of the Whole’. It either refers matters to committees on particular pending or new 
challenges confronting the sub-region, or empowers select committees to select specific 
issues to examine. Not all committees play an oversight role. The main distinction is 
between permanent committees (also known as standing committees) and ad hoc 
committees that are set up to address a specific question on a time-limited basis. 
  
Initiative for the establishment of a Committee of Inquiry  
In most cases, a motion to establish a committee of inquiry is either decided by a majority 
in the plenary and not according to how many signatures are collected or; referred to one 
of the existing committees whose jurisdiction covers the issue. The committee then 
examines the proposal and reports back to the plenary, and the plenary decides on the 
establishment of the committee of enquiry on the basis of that report. 
                                            
9 Report of the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee in the crisis in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, Confidential 
Report, May 2013, First Ordinary Session, Abuja, 6-21 May 2013 
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In West Africa, national parliaments have established procedures for setting up committees 
of inquiries and these in more ways than one have been subsumed into the regional 
process. Thus, these may be established in the form of either permanent or ad hoc 
committees and a parliamentary inquiry is the reflection of the parliament’s mandate in 
overseeing the executive organs. 
 
Committees of inquiry may conduct fairly intensive investigations over a relatively short 
period of time, and have the potential to reveal facts that may be unbearable for security 
governance of the region. Unlike permanent committees, ad hoc committees of inquiry 
usually establishes a fixed duration of the committee. 
 
 
Parliamentary inquiries  
When the committee of inquiry is then set up, its jurisdiction generally mirrors the main 
development threshold issues confronting the region and covers the whole of an area or 
aspect of policies. Correspondingly, specific problems are then investigated in the realms 
of security, gender, education, and climate change just to mention but few.  
 
The procedures to set up committees of inquiry are straight forward; as these can be either 
functioning permanent committees just given an added mandate covering a specific period 
to hold investigative powers or; or ad hoc committees that are specially created to conduct 
parliamentary inquiries for a limited period and then disband as per their terms of reference.  
 
A committee of inquiry can be smaller than ordinary committees, although the principle of 
equitable representation of parliamentary political groups is maintained, usually a ‘Terms of 
Reference’. 
 
Ad hoc committees of inquiry 
Ad hoc committees are usually established following members’ motions. As an exception 
though, a main standing committee has the power to move for the setting up of a committee 
of inquiry, or the Bureau can also issue this kind of directive. Additionally, the Commission 
can move a request recommending an issue to the parliament to investigate through a 
committee of enquiry (but this is yet to happen). 
Ad hoc committees’ mandates are limited to matters specified in the terms of reference of 
the plenary’s resolution, and can be focused on one salient issue with the nature of the 
inquiry being specifically tied to resolution. 
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Committee reports  
When a committee finishes deliberations on referred issues, it produces a report 
summarising the study or investigation and expresses its conclusions. Reports of the 
parliamentary committees then become the primary vehicle for formulating resolutions and 
recommendations to the Authority and other regional organs.  
 
Generally, a simple majority of members is required to approve a committee report and then 
one can usually hear echoes of MPs in choruses of adopté (French for adopted) when 
prompted by the Chairs of their respective committees making the rounds in committee 
meetings as well as plenary.  
 
When such a report is submitted to the parent chamber (the Plenary), it forms the basis of 
discussion and debates in the plenary and becomes the basis of future activities of the 
committee/parliament on the same issue or related issues.  
 
Similarly, these reports get passed into resolutions, recommendations and decisions to be 
forwarded to the Commission, or to be consulted by other parliamentary committees and 
parliamentarians who are not members of that specific committee. These committees’ study 
(in the case of a mission report) reports can also be to national governments and the 
community citizens as information on the committee’s work and to promote and provoke 
action.  
 
Oversight and accountability 
There can be no democratic system of governance without transparency and accountability 
as a primary responsibility by parliament. Ideally, through its core oversight function, 
parliament holds the government to account on behalf of the people, ensuring that 
government policy and action are both efficient and commensurate with the needs of the 
public. Parliamentary oversight is also crucial in checking excesses on the part of the 
government. 
 
Nowadays, parliamentary oversight extends to every field of endeavour. The security sector 
and by extension conflict prevention, for instance, is no longer a taboo area for parliament. 
Governance, both nationally and international decision-making, can only stand to gain from 
its growing prominence and scope.  
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As the body that represents the people, parliament is called upon to see to it that the 
administration of public policy reflects and meets the people’s needs. Parliament is also 
called upon to ensure that agreed policy is properly implemented and delivered to target 
citizens; in short, this is the role of parliamentary oversight.  
 
However, as the regional level is different from national levels, it will not be viable to guide 
its role by the traditional definition of oversight generally understood in the context of 
legislatures. The working definition of parliamentary oversight employed here is ‘the review, 
monitoring and supervision of implementation of policy and legislation’. This definition 
focuses on the purpose and nature of the oversight activities and also the procedural stages 
in which they take place. It covers the work of parliamentary committees and plenary 
sittings, motions, delocalised meetings and Ad hoc committees. 
 
From this definition, the key functions of parliamentary oversight on conflict prevention can 
be summarised as ‘to detect and prevent conflict; arbitrary behaviour, or illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct on the part of the regional, national governments and institutions; 
public agencies and civil society’. 
  
At the core of this function is the protection of the rights and liberties of citizens; to hold the 
governments to account in respect of how the regional purse is utilised. It detects waste 
within the machinery of governance and public agencies. Thus it can improve the efficiency, 
economy and effectiveness of government operations. 
 
Oversight of the programmes of the regional bodies should include the assessment of the 
effectiveness of service delivery especially when this depends on the contribution of 
citizens, committees’ activities at the national levels can help enhance people’s awareness 
about the role of the parliament and contribute to better policy delivery. But, it is only when 
missions are organised, or delocalised meetings are undertaken that EMPs and citizens 
can have unfettered access to each other. There is an emphasis on unfettered because, it 
was clear from the bureaucratic security hurdles one has to go through during the Session 
that, this will be albeit rather restricted, and also depends on the country being visited. But 
EMPs argue that, during these meetings they are able to interact informally with citizens 
and this helps raise awareness about their role and work to communities, and they also gain 
knowledge of local challenges in communities. As to it being different countries, a member 
of the Education and Gender Committee retorted ‘everywhere you go in West Africa, the 
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conflict challenges are similar, so listening to people in Burkina Faso can mirror the 
challenges of those in Senegal, for instance’. 
 
However, while executive ministerial statements and periodic reports are an essential 
source of information, the parliamentary committees often need to obtain first-hand 
knowledge from people who are engaged in the implementation of specific programmes 
and/or directly responsible for service delivery.  
 
Moreover, in order to evaluate the work of the parliament from a broader perspective, as for 
instance experts from outside offices of the regional grouping like TUCs, CSOs, NGOs, 
Donor community amongst others to provide background knowledge and analysis. When 
EMPs are in the field on missions, they can sometimes even meet with victims wanting to 
hear the opinions of those who are either positively or negatively affected by an issue or 
crisis. 
 
Citizens’ involvement in committee procedures such as public hearings and public forums 
can also help parliamentary committees to obtain valuable information. Opening plenaries 
to the public is a good opportunity for parliament as a whole to inform people about its work. 
 
At the regional level however, the citizen is in a sense ‘twice removed’ from the opportunity 
to access EMPs and make input into democratic processes through citizen participation.  
 
a) Investigative powers  
The ECOWAS-P in a practical sense has no explicit oversight role to set up investigation 
committees or missions of inquiry, hold the executive to account, nor be consulted actively 
during conflict prevention intervention initiatives.  
 
However, in principle, the parliament can invite officials from the Commission and ECOWAS 
institution to address the plenary sessions and pose parliamentary questions to them. 
Additionally, officials on particular policy areas like the peace and security department can 
be invited to table mission reports and give a status of conflict for the sub-region, or to 
produce documents.  It can also request the President of the Commission, or its officials to 
attend plenaries or attend sessions or produce documents on specific issues. There have 
even been times when a Head of State opened the Ordinary Sessions in Abuja, Nigeria. 
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b)  Budget Oversight 
Budgetary oversight is not a core function of any of the committees, though programmes 
entail a budget for their execution. Issues of the budget are provided for in an accounting 
department and most decisions relegated to an administrator complete with a Director of 
Administration and Finance popularly called ‘DAF’ who then collaborates with the Bureau 
on financial obligations.  
 
There is also no budget law authorized by parliament or documents annexed to this law to 
confirm how much money is allocated to each of the policy goals which are to be achieved 
by one or more regional programmes.  
Budgetary oversight is a key tool with which the parliament could scrutinise and assess 
related regional programmes. Whilst committee scrutiny is usually based on the budget law 
and the statement of accounts with the scope of inquiries going further into the question of 
the appropriateness of a policy implementation. These are areas where there is a missed 
opportunity for improving effectiveness as the parliament is not in the scheme of governing 
regional financial obligations. 
 
At the regional parliament, no particular committee is designated for implementation of 
budgets because the budget process and allocations are undertaken at the Commission, 
by the Council of Ministers including finance directors. 
 
Traditionally, some parliamentary committees are mandated with scrutinising the 
implementation of budgets across government departments, and most cases, these are 
permanent committees. 
 
At the national level, parliaments view their ability to provide the checks and balances on 
the executive’s revenue accumulation, expenditure and allocating funding for development 
as a sine qua non. But this is not so at the ECOWAS level. The parliament does not have 
the mandate to scrutinise nor make recommendations on the community budget, the 
Commission’s annual budget or even review the audited accounts.  
 
The budget core to the activities of the parliament is a component of the total budget for the 
region. Thus apart from the fact that the parliament does not have the mandate to input into 
the community budget, its own budget is also given out of the total, making it a dicey process 
of even inputting into their own budget.  
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However EMPs argue that, they have found a way around this by insisting on controlling 
their own budget as a minimum. Therefore, administering this sub-budgetary category 
indirectly makes them highly dependent on regional executives and to an extent national 
executives.  
 
This potentially arbitrarily threatens the existence of the parliament and affects its 
effectiveness. Though the funding is raised from member states contributions, sometimes 
the member states are in arrears and this then jeopardises the self-reliance strategy as it 
halts progress in activities, and does not necessarily provide it with a greater deal of 
autonomy. 
 
It is also not entitled to draw up or revise budgets, thus in September 2002 called this into 
question by issuing a resolution to make consultation on the budget obligatory to the 
Commission. This is also contained in the Draft Supplementary Act on the Enhancement of 
powers.  
 
EMPs during interactions confidently indicated how easy it was to adopt resolutions and 
pass on to the executive arm for action, however there exists procedures on how to refer 
issues to the parliament, as well as communication, timeframes for consultations and how 
decisions are implemented. 
 
5.2.4 Rules of Procedures 
To perform these functions, parliaments use various tools. Some of these are stipulated in 
the text of their founding documents, but more commonly they are part of the rules that 
govern the parliamentary procedures (often called Standing Orders).  
 
However, in this research the term ‘rules of procedure’ will be used in line with how the 
parliament itself guides its work and more so because these are different and the former is 
much more accurate in a national setting. As well, empirically, the latter is more 
representative of the kind of oversight undertaken by the regional parliament. 
 
Thus Parliament can simply ask the Executive organ for information; ask for clarification of 
policy; obtain information from outside sources; express its views on particular issues to the 
Executive organ, as well as to national parliaments and citizenry. However, as this is not a 
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typical parliament it cannot remove any office holders in the executive branch even if it 
seems the latter is no longer performing its proper function. 
 
Article 2 of Decision A/DEC.6/01/06 Relating to the Modalities for the Effective 
Implementation deals specifically with the ‘procedure for referral to the Community 
parliament’. It reiterates that, in accordance with the protocol, where the parliament deems 
it necessary to consider community issues then it must follow these procedures. 
 
The recommended regulations on decisions made are to be forwarded to the executive 
commission, including the report of the specific Committee that deliberated on the matter10. 
The Executive Secretariat then consults the institutions or member states concerned on the 
proposal(s) and submit them including the parliamentary committee report to a technical 
commission. These are then communicated as proposed amendments advanced by the 
technical commission, and then the parliament communicates back to the executive 
secretariat their observations on the Amendments11.  
 
Also crucial is the end result of all these procedures and consultations that establishes the 
effectiveness or otherwise of the impact the parliament makes. Emphatically, Article 2(1e) 
states that, ‘on the basis of the observations by the Parliament, the Institutions and Organs 
concerned and the Executive Secretariat shall, where they deem it necessary, amend the 
proposal before submitting it for adoption. They shall inform the Parliament if necessary. In 
all cases, the Executive Secretariat shall inform the Community Parliament of the proposal 
submitted for adoption’. 
 
However, ‘where the Institutions and Organs choose to consult the Parliament for its opinion 
or in cases where the Parliament must be consulted for its opinion’ there are outlined 
procedures for the institutions and organs to employ12. Almost a mimic in reverse order of 
the earlier procedure outlined above, here, the institutions and organs prepare the 
recommendations, regulations or decisions submit to the appropriate authorities that in turn 
pass this to specific technical commissions for consideration13. 
 
                                            
10 (Article 2(1a). 
11 (Article 2(1a-d P.33) 
12 (Article 2:2) 
13 (Article 2:2a-b) 
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Even though the Parliament is neither the de facto nor de jure decision-making institution 
of the community, it has opportunity to make decisions through some of its bodies. Article 
16 explicitly establishes the political wings of the parliament, The Plenary, Bureau of 
Parliament and the Conference of Bureaux as the structures through which the parliament 
can make decisions. 
 
The Plenary, guided and governed by treaty provisions and other community institutions is 
the highest body of the parliament and makes binding decisions for the parliament. 
Additionally, it forwards all adopted resolutions to the decision-making bodies of the 
Community in the capacity of its advisory role14.  
 
Then the Bureau which is the governing body comprising the leadership works with other 
officials to determine the agenda of all programmes including fact-finding, study tours, 
meetings, hearings as well as composition of committees amongst others15.  
 
The Conference of Committees’ Bureaux collectively represents the committees and works 
with the Bureau in preparing agenda for all programmes; including work plans of Standing 
Committees, collaborations with national and other regional parliaments16. 
 
5.2.5 Activities and Processes  
a) Sessions  
The plenary is the key chamber and forum for oversight of the other ECOWAS organs and 
it has a wide range of tools it can employ. The plenary can ‘listen’ to officials of the executive 
organs address parliament at the opening and discuss the whole package of regional 
progress and status of conflict as well as policy impact and implementation. Regular and 
effective use of the classic tools such as parliamentary questions and debates should be 
able to hold the organs to account but this is not the prevailing situation at the parliament. 
 
                                            
14 (Article 16:3, P.24) 
15 (Article 16:4-8, P.25) 
16 (Article 16:9-10. P. 26-27). 
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The plenary enables the dissemination of information and the ensuing debates and 
discussions can serve this purpose perfectly, especially if the sitting is broadcast or the 
minutes are made public. 
As parliamentary oversight is activated in the parliament devoid of political parties but with 
other dynamics it is therefore normal for the rules of procedure to allow EMPs to initiate the 
use of the different procedural tools, such as parliamentary questions and short debates.  
 
These tools may be criticised as inefficient, but it is prudent to reflect on the manner in which 
they are utilised rather than the tools themselves. While some questions may focus on 
narrow country level interests, they also represent an opportunity to raise issues of regional 
interest. Thus information obtained becomes available to all parliamentarians, and can lead 
to the performance of the parliaments on regional security issues. 
 
b) Country reports 
Article 26 of the Rules of Procedure spells out the nature of relations with ‘National 
Parliaments’. Under these terms, the regional and national parliaments should exchange 
information on a regular basis, with the EMPs serving as the main channel for information 
exchange. At the end of each parliamentary session, each EMP has the responsibility of 
informing their national parliament and constituents on the activities of the ECOWAS-P. 
 
To give a compulsory character to the exchange of information, Parliament adopted the 
principle requiring each national delegation of EMPs to present a report on the situation in 
their country containing information on all major issues of interest including: Status of 
ratification of protocols and conventions; Level of payment of contributions to community 
institutions; Status of application of community levy; Security situation; Elections and any 
other matters the country puts forward. 
 
The reporting format is attuned to how the ECPF can help identify/track issues of early 
warning and how the ECOWAS-P can help resolve these. The matters arising are referred 
to the appropriate Committee after deliberations in the plenary.  
 
After the committee sittings the report is adopted, with resolutions and recommendations to 
rationalise the decisions undertaken either directly by the Parliament or referred/deferred to 
the Commission and other ECOWAS organs for action. 
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c) Debates 
At the formal opening of the Sessions, there are usually official speeches made including a 
vital one by the President of the Commission and these are followed by debates on the 
addresses, and the matters arising are incorporated into a finalised agenda. 
 
EMPs formulate questions and engage in debates emanating from the submissions 
especially if it is in relation to their countries, where conflict challenges in the sub-region are 
also tackled. These discussions often receive intensive media coverage and participation 
by CSOs and members of the diplomatic corps as guests and observers. They can discuss 
issues informally during the breaks and scheduled meetings, and give focus for EMPs to 
articulate strategies to ensure peace. These spaces and discussion are a valuable 
opportunity for parliamentarians and representatives of institutions to examine the regional 
policy and share ideas on clarifications and emphasis needed on positions of broad security 
policy areas and contrast these policies with the implementation of national efforts. 
 
Generally, the debates are oral exchanges of opinions and help facilitate the plenary’s 
collective decision-making on specific issues. These can be in relation to the opening 
speeches, or in the drawn agenda reflecting the different stages of how the Session is 
scheduled and how the examination of draft legislation is undertaken. Here, the schedule 
of resolutions, recommendations and decisions are made.  
 
Additionally, these target and address issues put forward by parliamentarians themselves, 
and also within the focus of the work from committees. Rules on debates are akin to national 
level floor debates and enable EMPs express their varied opinions and at the same time, 
ensure collective and individual highlights on particular issues of concern.  
 
In the parliaments, committees have the right to launch a debate based on a report, although 
in most cases reports can only be debated when the body in charge of the chamber’s 
agenda so decides, or during regular debating periods.  
 
Taking committee reports to debate in the plenary can be valuable from the committee’s 
viewpoint; when a committee report is adopted by the full chamber it then represents the 
will of parliament as a whole and as such becomes politically more persuasive. Moreover, 
debate in the plenary gives publicity to the committee’s activities and allow issues to be 
aired in a context of focused deliberation. The content of the reports enables informed 
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discussion, giving the parliament an opportunity to agree on crucial conflict prevention 
decisions. 
 
5.3  Informal functions 
In the ECOWAS-P, for the issues bordering on conflict prevention that it does not have a 
mandate or explicit rights, it still pursues numerous practical activities that promote 
democracy, good governance and integration and above all those that impact directly on 
conflict prevention. 
 
 In this regard, the parliament deems itself a capacity building forum for ‘new’ 
parliamentarians as they are offered the opportunity to undertake parliamentary diplomatic 
missions, election observation, mediation and negotiation missions and establishes gender 
standard platforms and help set an active regional agenda for parliaments in the member 
states. 
 
For instance, the Speaker has led delegations of EMPs and other stakeholders in 
undertaking and conducting consultative peace missions in conflict areas, and in election 
observation and monitoring.  
 
5.3.1 Relationship with the Commission 
Functionally, the perspective is to de facto monitor the activities of the Commission but this 
role is not a formalised relationship as such the parliament has very little powers to hold the 
executive accountable, if any at all. 
 
Officials of the Commission act as gatekeepers of decisions emanating from the Authority 
as well as the Council of Ministers, and between the legislature and Commission. 
Reflectively it is agreed that, their relationship with the decision makers is not clear, and 
one even referred to it as ‘fuzzy’ because, EMPs feel they should be the decision makers, 
whilst the defacto institution feel the EMPs are trying to take away their jobs and erode their 
powers. Additionally, they also lack appropriate powers to help them provide effective 
checks and balances on regional organs. 
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Similarly, their relationship with the de facto decision-making organs, the Authority and 
Council of Ministers is also not formalised. The lack of clearly defined guidelines makes the 
parliament overly dependent on the executive organs which directly hinder effective 
parliamentary work and how they perform. This thus makes the rights and privileges they 
possess insufficient to effect accountability.  
 
Prominently, this is visible in the area of passing legislation. The Council of Ministers and 
Authority during Summits, possess legislative functions, in addition to executive powers. At 
Summits, protocols and treaties endorsed by these two bodies are passed into international 
law, and are thus exclusive legislative functions keeping out the parliament thereby 
effectively undermining a separation of powers. 
 
This limitation of powers is also characteristic of the national parliamentary trends where 
very strong executives dominate governance, and how they gravitate towards political 
integration. The reflections clearly demonstrate that most of these organisations of 
integration remain at best mainly primarily inter-governmental rather than supranational, 
though they tend to advocate the latter.  
 
At another end of the spectrum, is the reluctance of national governments to give up national 
sovereignty rights to regional level, whether it is to the Commission or the parliament. Thus 
for most, integration is just an institutionalised form of inter-governmental cooperation, 
hardly compatible with the idea of strong independent parliaments. 
 
5.3.2 Parliamentary Delegation and Missions  
Discussions elicited various responses about different tools and mechanisms at the 
disposal of parliaments to carry out their mediation role. These include promoting dialogue, 
negotiations through plenary debates, reconciliation commissions, committee work and 
cooperation with national parliaments and helping with cross-party caucuses’ stand-offs in 
parliaments. 
 
Parliament can also establish different kinds of missions to gather information on conflict 
prevention issues. Missions of this kind can be established in a permanent committee or 
set up directly by the plenary. In both cases, missions are expected to work to meet the 
needs of the plenary/committee as a whole. Information missions of parliament can be 
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dispatched outside the country. Among such missions are delegations to international 
meetings and inter-parliamentary bodies. 
 
i) Arbitration/ Fact-finding/ Mediation/Negotiation 
When it comes to mediation, the EMPs identified multiple areas where they can/do play an 
active role in conflict prevention which includes; electoral disputes; post-
conflict/peacebuilding initiatives; chieftaincy disputes; land and border disputes, and gender 
based violence. All the EMPs insist on mediation as the best strategy they have for conflict 
prevention because, through all the processes in-House, it is at the heart of the work done 
in parliament through debating, discussing and building consensus, thus a more formalised 
role, capacity building and enhancing parliamentary mediation should be a priority for all 
incoming EMPs and existing members. 
 
The tools and mechanisms at the disposal of parliament to carry this out include; providing 
a venue for dialogue between various belligerent groups; promoting interactions and 
negotiations through plenary debates, forums, reconciliation commissions, through 
representational and oversight functions as well as aptitude to interface between 
governments and civil society. 
 
The parliament however has no specific mandate on mediation as there is no formal support 
mechanism in place. That being said, at each Ordinary Session of Parliament, Country 
Reports are presented providing an opportunity for the plenary to assess events, political 
situation, and security issues in individual countries. The Activity Report of the President of 
the ECOWAS Commission also provides additional information to Members on issues 
around the sub-region. 
 
The ECOWAS-P’s leeway is impeded by a number of constraints (no direct elections, no 
legislative power, lack of administrative and financial autonomy vis-à-vis the Commission in 
particular, high turnover of EMPs).  
 
In order to surpass these obstacles, there is need to enforce the Parliament institutionally 
and enhance its co-decision and law-making powers as a full, functional and effective 
regional Parliament through capacity building and provision of resources.  
 
164 
 
A cross section of EMPs indicated what they considered as key steps to follow in order to 
promote mediation as presented in Table 5.2. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Key Steps to promote Mediation for EMPs 
Source: Compiled by author using data from interviews 
 
 
Therefore EMPs have carved out niche roles in negotiations and work on how to get 
involved in decisions which shape outcomes. At this rate, they are seeking to establish their 
role individually, parliamentary/legislatively and institutionally. 
 
The next step is to work towards how the international community will involve them directly 
on issues of conflict prevention in the sub-region. This they insist, will guarantee their impact 
on prevention of conflict in settlements enhancing the long-term functioning of parliament. 
As a parliament these will help in making decisions on sequencing of transitional processes 
and how these impact on prevention initiatives.  
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ii) Relationship with Civil Society 
Through these strategies EMPs will be able to interface with governments and CSOs in the 
member states. This is crucial because, EMPs recognise the undeniable role played by 
CSOs as ‘democracy supporting institutions’ in terms of assistance, facilitation and 
complementarity. Yet, EMPs allege that the role of parliaments is being eclipsed, 
overlooked and minimised by the proliferation of CSOs and many donors choosing to 
support CSOs rather than strengthen the parliamentary institution directly, which in many 
aspects is very frustrating in their bid to consolidate gains. 
 
For EMPs, much as the CSOs question the legitimacy of the parliament, they in turn also 
question the legitimacy especially of particular CSOs who are overtly affiliated to political 
parties. To circumvent this issue, the best way forward they said when questioned on viable 
solutions and options is to work on a code of conduct or engagement with CSOs importantly 
to better organize, define, and regulate the relation and division of work between the 
parliament and CSOs. This by extension could even be adopted or adapted to by national 
parliaments. 
 
In response to CSOs, the notion promoted by the Second Deputy Speaker, was that: 
 
‘…they are a double-edged sword, you cannot do without them, and you cannot 
do with them. But more importantly, it is better to organise, define, and put in a 
regulating relationship between the parliament and CSOs in conflict prevention, 
especially mediation…’ (Simon Osei-Mensah, First Deputy Speaker, 
ECOWAS-P, Interview, May 2013, Abuja) 
 
He also maintained that working with CSOs has its advantages especially:  
 
‘…when we go into countries, they know the local content issues and possess 
knowledge to help bring a different focus of approaching the mediation. 
Undoubtedly, they represent national society and therefore provide substantial 
assistance, facilitation and complementarity’ (Interview, May 2013). 
 
Furthermore, the relevance and legitimacy of the regional parliaments was more critical 
especially when sometimes in conflict situations, the transitional organs in terms of crisis 
prevention and recovery sometimes compound prevention efforts. This is because, 
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sometimes even the CSOs and national parliaments though diverse, imbibe local social 
identities, which if not well managed to be used positively, can rather end up contributing to 
escalation instead of prevention.  
 
iii) Parliamentary delegations to intergovernmental meetings  
Information gathering missions established by the Plenary can, if necessary, carry out 
research and investigations in the sub-region. These may include parliamentary delegations 
sent to intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary meetings such as EALA, EU Parliament 
or IPU meetings, and also the United Nations General Assembly meetings, and others on 
issues of collective global concern like climate change, women, children and small arms 
and weapons. These networking events afford parliamentarians the opportunity to monitor 
trends in policy directions and develop expertise and individual capacity in those areas. 
 
Pertinent to the participation is the support of the regional parliament with respect to logistics 
for travel and the formal power to ‘speak’ on behalf of the parliament and be a 
‘representative’. This is because the parliament can decide whether or not to send its own 
delegation to intergovernmental meetings. The emanating reports submitted by these 
parliamentary delegations to intergovernmental meetings provide a basis for common 
oversight tools to be used, including debates in the plenary and at the committee level. 
 
iv) Agenda setting   
First, a committee’s TORs is usually drawn up after extensive debates over issues including, 
but not precluded to, how they will trace process to outcome; personnel best placed to steer 
the implementation; which activities to undertake/have been undertaken; how did these 
happen and what strategies and resources were/are employed. 
 
Issues: Prevention/Resolution 
 Parliamentary engagement in conflict resolution: 
- Is parliament involved? 
- Is such involvement individualized or institutionalised? 
- Do external actors engage parliaments in their efforts? 
 Regional or international parliamentary associations’ role in conflict 
prevention/resolution 
167 
 
 Parliaments law-making and budget oversight functions as a means to address 
causes of social tension or socio-economic exclusion 
 Parliamentary tools of public hearings, investigations, etc. to address matters of 
national concern 
 Parliamentarians and political parties as messengers of peace and resolution – to 
what extent are they engaged? 
 Electoral, political, and constitutional reforms – what is parliament’s role? 
 
The leadership/Bureau determines the order of business on the agenda for the duration of 
the session. It is then presented to the House on the opening day for input and changes if 
need be, as well, it is also adjusted as they go along. There is also a standing guide for how 
the agenda should be drawn up but it is the variables under each heading which can be 
varied at each Session. 
 
5.3.3 The ECOWAS Female Parliamentarians Association (ECOFEPA)  
Female EMPs as tools conflict prevention is another opportunity to further engage on 
gender equality and gender-based violence issues in the region. This is because, as the 
EMPs indicated, women in the African traditional setting are regarded as ‘nurturers, 
peacebuilders and natural born mediators’ which are skills innate to them. Thus, in most 
cases, delegations have had to accord a number to women because communities might not 
even grant them entry if an all-male delegation suddenly surfaces. 
 
These will be very relevant in the areas of research on post-conflict, and during conflict 
challenges that face women and what kind of policies can be implemented to help alleviate 
the situation. As well, there has always been this overriding perception in Africa about the 
‘inherent nurturing ability of women’ to being about conflict prevention in feuding parties and 
it will be particularly strategic if ECOFEPA could support research into such assertions and 
use the learning in the sub-region. 
 
Currently, the priorities of the ECOWAS Parliaments have been developed into a strategic 
plan for the third parliament (2011 -2015), which was submitted and adopted by the 
members of the Parliament at the beginning of their tenure in 2011.  
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There was tacit agreements and explicit notions of a direct correlation between the role of 
women and conflict prevention. The indications were that, in Africa, women possess ‘natural 
conflict prevention’ skills thus the percentage of women represented in parliament and the 
efficiency of parliamentary mechanisms for mediation and dialogue is very important. That 
even if they are not a lot, their representation on missions is more ‘credible’ when women 
are part of the committees set up. 
 
5.3.4 Relationship with National Parliaments 
There are multiple areas where the regional parliament has worked with the national 
parliaments in effective conflict prevention by adopting conflict-sensitive laws and providing 
a venue for dialogue and negotiations between various belligerent groups. Thus, apart from 
the fact that there are areas of effective collaboration, there also exist tools/strategies 
employed to undertake these. The discussions around these yield the following as areas of 
collaboration as presented in Table 5.3: 
 
 
Table 5.3 Areas of collaboration with National Parliaments 
Source: Compiled by author using data from interviews and focus groups 
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There are different opportunities, tools and mechanisms at the disposal of parliaments to 
carry out their mediation role in terms of promoting dialogue, interactions, and negotiations 
including; Eminent Persons; Women; Committee work; Cross party caucuses; plenary 
debates; National/International initiatives and processes, MDGs, PRSPs; Oversight role; 
Reconciliation commissions and Constituency/field visits; interaction/communication with 
constituents. 
 
To illustrate, it came to the fore that, the ECOWAS-P collaborated with the Parliament of 
Côte d’Ivoire in three critical ways; first, emanating from the laws adopted in the ECOWAS 
Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2008, a national Committee against the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons was set up to help monitor and alleviate the 
situation as well as a law on rural land, which was also adopted in 2004 to deal with armed 
violence generated by rural land disputes as per challenges posed by these traditional 
hunters, blacksmiths and other remnants. 
 
Second, support with the work of parliamentary fact-finding missions and committees of 
inquiry on armed violence which included the following:  
i) Committee of inquiry on the events of March 25 and 26, 2004  
ii) ii) Committee of inquiry on the events of November 2004(held in Hotel Ivoire)  
iii) Committee of inquiry on racketeering in 2003 and 2006  
iv) Committee of inquiry on armed violence between indigenous populations in 
Daloa in 2002. 
Third, there were the parliamentary information and briefing sessions held to discuss the 
range of challenges, share ideas and agree on strategies and stakeholders appropriately 
placed to and tackle the causes and issues related to armed violence, increase availability 
of database, statistics, and rates, amongst others. 
 
Currently, as a result of all these consultations, recommendations taken on the back of 
these are being implemented at the national level with input from the ECOWAS-P. These 
include laws adopted to restrict the production and carrying of weapons; increasing the 
police force and policing to deter criminals /reduce crime in neighbourhoods, communities 
and at the border; laws adopted to strict and impose sanctions on illegally possessed 
weapons; developing viable partnerships between police and communities to collectively 
address violence and eradicate the phenomenon of organized crime/racketeering; job 
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creation opportunities for better youth employment; undertaking measures aimed at 
identifying and tracing arms and curbing the culture of violence from spreading. 
 
5.4 Effectiveness in context-Respondents Perspective(s) 
‘For every member of a given political community, that is, in any collective 
where people participate in decisions, some kind of story is told about the role 
of actors and of collective action in shaping how important things get done’ 
(Considine, 2005: 10). 
 
The reasons why effectiveness was an imperative were highlighted in the same realm as 
reasons why the broader ECOWAS integration agenda was imperative. There is an 
overriding belief in the strength of similar regulations under ECOWAS being the panacea to 
improving cooperation and enhancing development of their national economies across all 
sectors (UNECA 2007). 
 
Interviewees reiterated that some member states had small economies and had been 
ravaged by conflicts to the extent that in their recovery efforts they cannot afford existing 
without the maximum support of ECOWAS as can be seen in Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 
Thus cooperating on conflict prevention had enabled responsibility sharing but also 
enhanced effectiveness because of access to resources and knowledge. Similarly, some 
EMPs opined that, in view of the geographical characteristics among some member states 
it is feasible for measures in one country to be replicated or applied to another and this 
enhances technology transfer and cuts out wastage. 
 
‘Intently, effectiveness in conflict prevention at the regional level is also about 
getting the best systems from the member states as well as all collaborators 
and partners. It is a team effort and at the end of the day the benefits will be 
visible for all to see and feel...peace and stability…within which we can all thrive 
democratically…’ (Ike Ekweremadu, Speaker, ECOWAS-P (2011-2015), 
Interview, May 2013). 
 
A salient observation comprises of the inconsistencies and various emphasis on issues of 
conflict prevention discussed at the ECOWAS-P. Three scenarios emerged; those that 
related challenges emphasising shared histories; either due to Anglophone, francophone 
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or Lusophone interferences; then those emphasising cultural dimensions in this case, either 
Hausa, Wolof, religion or creole as can be traced along all the member states whilst others 
looked to purely political consolidation as would benefit the region as a whole. Yet, all these 
were lumped together and debated in the same fora and this sometimes ended up affecting 
the resolutions.  
 
Succinctly put: 
‘…we are in a sort of catch-22 situation, to discuss with the limited time we 
have, or not to discuss... that is why we have extraordinary sessions…‘Conflict 
prevention is an agenda that unites all member states especially with regard to 
it being a sine qua non for development. What then becomes a challenge is the 
notion of some of the items in the ECPF being important to some countries than 
others. This makes a particular country pay more attention to issues to the 
detriment…in my opinion…of the larger framework from which we aim to 
succeed’ (Augustine Bockarie Torto, EMP, Sierra Leone, Interview, May 2013) 
 
In as much as there was shared optimism some were more buoyant than others. Some 
EMPs shared their scepticism and insisted that ‘talking’ about effectiveness is another policy 
fad that will fade with time.  
 
‘That at first it was performance appraisals, then performance management and 
not to talk of monitoring and evaluation, now effectiveness…but then if we know 
how to measure it we will do it just not the way how people come here and say 
we want to measure your work..We by ourselves also want to measure it. It is 
a good strategy at assessing even integration progress generally…’ (Nkechi J. 
Nwaogu, 2nd Rapporteur, Committee on PAPS, Interview, June 2013). 
 
The majority of respondents to the semi-structured questionnaire-led interviews were 
ECOWAS-P MPs, then Staff of both the Parliament and Commission (and relevant other 
regional bodies), and CSOs operating at the regional level but with national offices, Figure 
5.4 shows the distribution. 
 
To this end, there were more or less distribution with respect to responses on varied 
questions echoing the group/organization with which they are affiliated. However, there was 
a deliberate effort to fairly represent sample views on the collective issues around conflict 
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prevention facing the parliament. Thus an approximate proportion of respondents though 
working within the realms of regional governance are not directly linked to the parliament.  
 
Further, the questions had three different ranking propositions of 1,2 or 3 being indicators 
for whether respondents regarded a particular institution has having more responsibility or 
less responsibility, with ‘1’ being the first and ‘3’ being the third most responsible according 
to how a respondent perceives three bodies; the ECOWAS-P, the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers. The respondents are detailed in Appendix 2 to Appendix 7. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Distribution of Interview Respondents 
 
5.4.1 Understanding effectiveness in conflict prevention of ECOWAS-P 
 
‘One can endeavour to show whether definitions ‘homogenise’ a 
problem, that is to say make the problem understandable within a 
reified perception of the wider problem field, or whether definitions 
suggest a ‘heterogenisation’ that requires an opening up of established 
discursive categories’ (Hajer 1995:54).   
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In developing appropriate responses to collective action problems, it is important to 
establish common definitions or understandings of a problem (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). 
Thus in keeping with the overarching question for this research, a discussion in this sphere 
was necessary to ascertain the levels of understandings that underpin a common regional 
understanding of the conflict prevention environment. 
 
Equally, the different opinions in themselves will reiterate the need for why effectiveness is 
important and the level to which this is being achieved. Thus employing discussions and 
interview observations and results from stakeholder interactions, various understandings 
and meanings of effectiveness in conflict prevention have been categorised according to 
factors as illustrated in Table 5.4 below: 
 
These different representations of the issues around effectiveness and conflict prevention 
include configurations of what effectiveness is and should be focused on, who should be 
involved in processes aimed at achieving effectiveness, where effectiveness should occur, 
how and why it should be undertaken. 
 
The level of focus, characterises a broad or narrow view based on perceptions of 
respondents to questions discussed.  The narrow focus responses are understandings 
which only define effectiveness of regulations or the practices within conflict prevention, 
whereas the wider ambit of effectiveness in conflict prevention which cover other aspects 
apart from core prevention issues define the broad focus. The narrow responses also reflect 
time and geographical scopes on the feasibility of effectiveness. Output and process based 
narratives reflect on different ways of achieving effectiveness and the resultant conflict 
prevention regulatory outputs.  The emerging issues from these discussions are analysed 
in the paragraphs following. 
  
Unclear terminology 
In several instances EMPs did not seem to fully understand what the terminologies they 
used meant and kept using overlapping terms and related terms in the same meaning as 
effectiveness. 
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Table 5.4 Stakeholder understanding(s) of effectiveness in conflict prevention 
Source: Compiled by author using data from interviews and focus groups 
 
For instance in an interview with the President of ECOFEPA, Haddy Nyang, she admitted 
that the terms ‘effectiveness, impact, performance, relevance’ all emphasise effectiveness 
and as such these could be used interchangeably. ‘…these could be the same terms; as an 
MP,  it is just a matter of semantics for me…what is important is how to introduce MPs to 
the conflict prevention framework in a way that will help equip them with skills…’17.  
 
                                            
17 Interview, June 2013, Abuja, Nigeria 
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Other similar sentiments echoed were the lack of support to deal innovatively with conflict 
prevention. A reason for this could be what Salih (2013:161) observes as parliamentarians 
being undermined in their role, which directly correlates  to a lack of legitimacy. 
Thus the diverse views from respondents reflected the reality of their context and help 
situate the research on evidence-based decision-making and implementation from within 
the regional reality. The main interest however was to explore how viable effectiveness was 
as an agenda through their understandings under the guise of the institution pressuring the 
policy framework and pushing for more mandates and responsibilities, and pertinently, what 
the ECOWAS-P does in navigating these spaces around the different perspectives. 
 
Additionally, EMPs reiterated that critical challenges also revolve around being policy 
developers and then becoming policy implementers without training, support or even 
mandates. This is particularly so in the context of very strong executives and weak 
parliaments at the national level. 
 
Yet, others were adamant about certain understandings and framings purely for legitimacy 
reasons. This was specifically in the case of process based narratives; for example CSOs 
were particular about participatory/ decision-making processes, and there were questions 
about multi-stakeholder and whether this promoted effectiveness in ECOWAS-P-CSO 
collaborations. These are characterised by Considine (2005:67)  as ‘accepted rhetoric…or 
ideas in good currency’  whilst the following observation typifies this dilemma: 
 
‘We have to agree that there are four issues here; working with CSOs, how to 
be effective policy implementer and the facts that, even though MPs are the 
ones faced with the problems, these conflict prevention issues are sometimes 
identified somewhere else, and the agenda to address them also set and 
undertaken elsewhere all within the structure of ECOWAS or amongst 
CSOs…So sometimes, MPs have to go along with packaged problems and 
packed solutions…’ (Georges Bada, EMP, Benin, Interview, June 2013) 
 
 
ii. Alliances, Competing interests and Rivalries 
 
Institutional clusters and some of the individual respondents also based their framings and 
understandings on issues of contested power, legitimacy and competence amongst the 
ECOWAS institutions. In some instance, they identified with practices of another institution, 
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and even indicated the plausibility of adopting similar practices or processes. For instance, 
there was an overriding response of the ECOWAS Commission being the institution to 
emulate because it is resource endowed and holds the necessary political power and wields 
clout; ‘the Commission ensures action where it matters…on the ground’18. 
 
5.4.2 Where is the mandate(s) for conflict prevention located in ECOWAS? 
 
‘Instead of thinking about policy as a routine engagement between certain 
public officials and a settled retinue of established interests, we are now forced 
to consider how a single system is constructed from semi-independent 
institutions and actors linked by resource agreements, joint agreements, joint 
projects and cross-border engagements … it is really composed of pads of 
unequal size, each contributing to a characteristic policy ‘footprint’ (Considine 
2005:127). 
 
In discussing how the mandate for conflict prevention limits or enhances effectiveness of 
the parliament’s work, it was prudent to first of all establish if respondents had a knowledge 
of institutional policy, arrangements and where responsibility is located amongst the 
institutions. 
 
The question setting the discussion was ‘where is the mandate of conflict prevention 
located; the ECOWAS-P, the Council of Ministers, or the Authority? Further ‘how will you 
rank this scenario with ‘0’ being no mandate, 1 being the institution with the most 
responsibility/mandate and 3 being the one with the least.  
 
                                            
18 Interview with Dr. Toga Gayewea McIntosh, Interview, May 2012, Abuja, Nigeria 
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Figure 5.5: Responses to which institution has the mandate(s) on conflict prevention 
 
 
While this question was aimed at eliciting responses ranking the parliament it also confirmed 
that respondents affiliated directly with the parliament were more informed about the 
parliament’s work and as such related some level of responsibility to the parliament, 
whereas those not so closely linked were largely cynical and dismissive.  
 
For instance as shown in Figure 5.5, the respondents within the ECOWAS-P (EMPs, Staff, 
Donors) all ranked the Parliament as the ‘third level’ with a mandate and level of 
responsibility after the Authority and Council. However, predictably, the Staff of the 
Commission, CSOs and Auxiliary staff ranked them as ‘0’ emphasising that they do not 
have any mandate. Further, Dr. Gueye, underscored the need for the parliament to keep 
within its own mandate of being an advisory institution and leave the legitimate conflict 
prevention bodies in ECOWAS to function: 
 
‘…They have no mandate in conflict prevention and should work as an advisory 
body as established in the protocol establishing them. Amongst the ECOWAS 
bodies, it is recognised that Defence Ministers from the countries, the Council 
of Ministers, and the Authority…and even the Council of Elders are all 
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institutions with defined roles but not the parliament…’ Dr. Abdou Lat Gueye, 
Director Early Warning Directorate19 
 
In response to this assertion, EMPs reiterated that, the provisions made for which 
institutions participated were open and subject to interpretation and they normatively 
ascribed a role for themselves hence, they are the third level. The legal officer20 of the 
parliament supported these assertions and opined that: 
 
‘It is true that the law explicitly does not carve out a role for the parliament but 
there is a clause which makes it possible for them to play an effective role, so 
they have been doing this and it is very legitimate. If I may add that these 
references are to the clauses….and any other institutions as may be 
established by ECOWAS …’ 
 
Further, some of the respondents indicated that though they rank the parliament as the third 
level, there is a lot of confusion with regards to the functions of the bodies and this needed 
to be clarified if the parliament is to contribute to conflict prevention at an optimum level. 
 
5.4.3 Preferably, which institution(s) should have mandates? 
 
Similarly, the following cluster of questions on the same theme of mandate(s) solicited 
respondents views on which institutions they preferred to have the mandate on conflict 
prevention if at all, ranking them on the first, second and third levels as the previous 
question. There was also the leeway to ascribe reasons for the ranking of what level of 
authority they should have and Figure 5.6 below presents an overview of the responses. 
 
 
                                            
19 Interview with Dr. Abdou Lat Gueye, May 2013, Abuja, Nigeria 
20 Interview in June 2013, Abuja, Nigeria. The official preferred that his position rather than his name 
be used in the research 
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Figure 5.6: Which institution should have the mandate(s)? 
 
Emanating views stressed the importance of locating institutions primarily responsible with 
the mandate as this helps to ensure accountability and measure effectiveness of particular 
institutions and their role in the peacebuilding efforts in the region. This they insisted will 
also let officials responsible own a part of the jigsaw and work accordingly.  
 
This also ensured legitimacy and preserved credibility of the whole regional approach to 
conflict prevention, thus, if the parliament for instance is weakened by the status quo then 
this bemoans the gaps deemed inherent in policy and research in developing countries as 
established by the work of Court and Maxwell (2005). 
 
The greater number of respondents in the categories ECOWAS-P staff, MPs, CSOs and 
Donor all ranked the parliament as the second level of authority with the Commission in first 
place, and the Council of Ministers as the third level. 
 
 The reasons ascribed included the fact that as the Council was already one of the 
institutions in the Commission there is no need to let it have any significant mandate, 
especially not one greater than the parliament which is a ‘stand-alone’ institution established 
as that democratic wing of the integration body. 
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According to Dr. Gueye, if the parliament should possess any mandate at all, then it should 
be at the third level: 
 
‘Conflict prevention in ECOWAS is a critical time bound issue. When there is 
need to undertake activities the parliament will slow down processes. As you 
know, the turnaround time in parliament involves too much talking and less 
action, they never agree on anything or by the time they agree it is always too 
late to act…Plus they do not disburse funds for activities…so at a third level it 
is to demonstrate they are part of the framework, but I think the first two levels 
will always solve the problem before it even gets to the third’ Dr. Lat Abdou 
Gueye, Director, Early Warning Directorate21. 
 
The Second Deputy Speaker of the parliament, Simon Osei-Mensah however reiterated 
that: 
‘The regional institutions embodying the mandate includes the parliament 
because ‘we are working according to the spirit and the letter of the Revised 
Treaty. We as a parliament are expected to implement policy provisions and 
protocols guarding the peace of the region and we are well placed to steer the 
process…in fact…we have been steering with many innovative strategies 
hitherto not utilised…’Simon Osei-Mensah22. 
 
5.4.4 Is the ECOWAS Parliament effective in conflict prevention? 
 
By far, the question which triggered specific responses with varying reasons had to do with 
respondents ranking of which institution they thought was effective in conflict prevention. 
As shown Figure 5.7, there is an indication that respondents reiterated the effectiveness of 
the parliament with the distribution skewed to more EMPs and Staff of the parliament than 
others and this explains the ranking as the bias is effectively reflected. This is not to say 
that, the parliament is not effective but just to clarify how the responses were coordinated.   
 
                                            
21 Interview in June 2013, Abuja, Nigeria 
22 Interview in June 2013, Abuja, Nigeria 
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Figure 5.7: Summary of responses on whether the parliament is effective in conflict prevention? 
 
In any case, up to 53% which is the combined efforts of all the other responses indicates a 
scepticism or an outright lack of knowledge or an emphatic ‘No’ on the parliament’s work. 
In response to these perceptions, Nkechi Nwaogu emphasised that: 
 
‘When we talk about effectiveness in conflict prevention for MPs, people should 
understand that we are not talking of deployment and hard security that is 
where they are wrong, we are talking about proactiveness, prevention and 
making sure war does not arise. As for the Heads, all they do is deploy 
ECOMOG; since the creation of ECOWAS Parliament have you heard of, or 
seen a war the scale of Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is because we are 
mainstreaming all these ideals into the frameworks at the national 
level…Ghana for instance has even established a National Peace Council and 
gradually such institutions will collaborate with the parliament across the sub-
region’. (Nkechi Nwaogu, Interview May 2013). 
 
The discussions above ultimately demonstrated that the Authority and by implication the 
ECOWAS Commission is rated highly on all accounts as the most responsible to embody 
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a higher mandate, or as some opined the only mandate in the region when it comes to 
conflict prevention. Many respondents alluded to the extent of the ‘influence and power’ of 
the Executive and this is unsurprising considering the history and political trajectory of 
ECOWAS. Whilst some attributed the currently challenges to the Commission’s lack of 
making clear the parliament’s role others claimed it was the poor resourcing and lack of 
access to technocrats that is crippling the parliament and hence some of the rating as the 
third level. The most positive outlook related, viewed the parliament a new institution in the 
integration set up and as set, it will wield grater power and assert its relevance overtime. 
There were two poignant reflections on this from CSO members: 
 
‘A regional parliament is relatively new in the midst of other ECOWAS bodies 
and considering the political legacy of most ECOWAS countries there will be 
resistance as Executives will view this as ceding a little sovereignty to them just 
as some of them feel in their home countries. The only difference is that, at the 
national level they manipulate them, but am not sure that will work, so maybe 
undercutting funding and obscuring their work might be a tack or what do you 
think?...’23  
 
In agreement, the other agreed and said, ‘I think it is rather bullying’, they starve them of 
funding and a slow process to enhance their powers by saying to them, these things take 
time. Just like in their countries…’ 
 
Conclusively, these discussions threw a number of perspectives worth examining. These 
related to the issue of the role of the Commission, whereas it was formerly called ‘ECOWAS 
Secretariat’ its transformation into a Commission has reflected greatly in the way it conducts 
its central role amongst the bodies. Thus, it is evident there is a lack of clarity on whether 
the Commission is playing a Secretariat role, a watch dog role, a complementary role or if 
it is regarded as parallel and at par with it peer institutions within the region. 
 
This realisation is validated by the aggregate responses garnered from the discussions and 
even the EMPs themselves to a large extent imbibe this: 
 
‘I think in the context of progress towards real political and democratic 
integration in the region all the three institutions are very significant, though am 
                                            
23 Chukuemeka Eze,  Interview, June 2013 
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sure others might want to see other bodies being in the hierarchy of 
things…But, the three are core and will work to ensure efforts are coordinated 
and not scattered about without any direction…’ (Stephen Balado Manu, 
Former EMP/Chair of PAPS, Ghana, Interview May 2013). 
 
There were calls by respondents for the need for evaluating and monitoring conflict 
prevention implementation activities for various reasons. A cross section indicated that this 
will first of all make it possible for all ECOWAS bodies to appreciate the unique contributions 
that are made in the region and help inform themselves of what each body undertakes. In 
this way, recognition and institutionalisation will be merited as it will be viewed as pooling 
of efforts and not one institution’s superiority or more aptly placed to undertake these 
activities than others. 
 
‘Under the provisions and mechanisms many other ECOWAS bodies are built 
into the framework provisions, however in my opinion, the issues have to do 
with how these are implemented at the national levels. This is because, the 
ECPF which is the main guide, is also developed from an eclectic mix of policy 
orientation the regional has amalgamated and ECOWAS is yet to benefit fully; 
so the parliament for instance could make monitoring harmonisation by member 
states an issue as this would ensure effectiveness, we all have a role to 
play…and we as a parliament, are right on top of our game..’ (Okey Uzoechina, 
Political Analyst, ECOWAS Commission, Interview, May 2013). 
 
In as much as this research is focused on the parliament it also find that contribution of 
other actors is a confounding factor and as such seeks to unearth these contributions. At 
the same time, abstracting and quantifying these contributions that were noted by 
respondents are important in helping to arrive at measuring the parliament’s effectiveness. 
Ultimately these perspectives help strengthen arguments for employing normative 
institutionalism as it emerges that to make progress, institutions innovatively will have to 
make themselves relevant and effective in their contexts. It helps situate nuances in the 
knowledge-sharing power and bargaining that is continually sought in the collective security 
initiatives that are implemented. 
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5.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an important description of the formal and informal functions of 
the ECOWAS-P. Additionally it demonstrates the actual difference between the institutions 
and how EMPs and other stakeholders think.  The knowledge of the different meanings and 
understandings of effectiveness is vital not only for eliminating differences in institutional 
understandings but also to make available evidence of the existing policy making realities. 
Ultimately, it informs the research on how effectiveness in conflict prevention prevails on 
various issues core to the parliament.  
 
Foremost, emerged perceptions of EMPs had to do with the benefits that accrue from their 
tenure; that the added role at the regional level bears a semblance to moonlighting for extra 
income. Specifically, the allowances and stipend paid out to MPs during Sessions and other 
official duties is deemed ‘payment’ or in lieu of ‘salary’ by some of the other colleagues not 
part of the ECOWAS-P.  
 
The EMPs themselves shared that sometimes their political opponents at the national level 
used this information in electioneering campaigns as tactics to win primaries within their 
own parties; or from the opposition parties. These statements emphasis how an EMP(s) 
have abandoned a national constituency to serve at the regional level to the detriment of 
the latter. Thus the constituents not possessing information about the dynamics involved at 
the ECOWAS-P are influenced, and unfortunately some MPs have lost both positions due 
to such propaganda. 
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6. Chapter Six: Case Study-Guinea and Latent Conflict prevention 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
For most of Guinea’s post-colonial history, at least one of its 
neighbours has been at war, but Guinea itself has never been at 
war (Arieff 2009). Guinea is thus deemed a bulwark of stability 
against the background of neighbourhood conflicts, which had a 
strong correlation of potentially crossing borders to plunge the 
country into civil conflict (Arieff 2009).  Yet, this did not happen all 
through the protracted conflict situations of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire, which 
all border Guinea (Gberie 2001).   
 
Guinea’s latent conflict status continues to be somewhat of an enigma confounding policy 
makers, theorists, and pundits alike (Arieff 2009) and thus presents any case study 
researcher the opportunity to explore these dynamics.  Four epochs defines its political 
landscape and the security strategies employed by Guinea’s leaders sheds light on its 
capacity to contain conflict from escalation. The Socialist style of Sekou Toure (1958-1984); 
liberal regime of Lansana Conte (1984-2008) are the only two governments Guinea had 
until the bloodless coup d’état in 2008 and subsequent military rule of Dadis Camara (2008-
2009). Alpha Conde was then elected President in 2010, after the coup d’état and transition 
period. All these dispensations underwent political transitions heralded by tensions which 
were both internal due to demonstrations and trades union protest, and external due to 
neighbourhood conflicts and these dynamics will be examined.   
 
This chapter presents Guinea in the context of its neighbours as relates to conflict; what 
exactly is the status of conflict in Guinea and why it can be referred to as latent.  The political, 
social and governance structures in Guinea and what formal and informal conflict prevention 
measures undertaken by the (ECOWAS 1975) Parliament to sustain the status quo, and 
finally to what extent these can be deemed effective.  
 
Figure 6.1: Flag of Guinea 
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6.2 Guinea in Context 
The region claimed by France in 1849 as a Protectorate was named ‘Rivière du Sud’ but in 
1891 it was renamed ‘French Guinea’ and became part of France’s West African Empire.  
In September 1958, under the leadership of the charismatic Trade Unionist Ahmed Sekou 
Touré Guinea had an acrimonious break from France when it rejected by referendum the 
‘Franco-African Community’ ideal proposed by General Charles de Gaulle24 and gained 
total independence (Gberie 2001:4-6, Yabi 2010:35)(Schmidt 2009). A prominent feature of 
Guinea’s independence history is epitomised by its decision to vote ‘No’ in the 1958 
referendum deciding whether to join the French Community or not; significantly Guinea was 
the only French colony to reject the offer and thus France considered this as an act of 
‘secession’ (Adamolekun:55). This tenuous situation is better epitomised by the emotionally 
charged defiant declaration:  
 
‘When President de Gaulle came to Conakry, the capital of Guinea, to 
campaign for a 'Yes" vote in the referendum, Toure announced in advance the 
Guinean option for independence with the following defiant sentence: 
 "We, for our part, have a first and indispensable need, that of our dignity. Now, 
there is no dignity without freedom ... We prefer freedom in poverty to riches in 
slavery." When the votes were counted after the referendum, 98 percent of 
Guineans joined Toure in saying "No" to the Franco-African Community. The 
significance of this "No" vote was underscored by the fact that all the other 
French territories voted "Yes." (Adamolekun 1988:98)(Including quotes from 
Sekou Toure). 
 
These dynamics resonates with Guinea and is a source of pride for the country (Carvalho) 
but these acts of defiance set in motion severe consequences and new limits, which have 
reconfigured the relationship of France and Guinea to this day (Yabi 2010:35). France 
withdrew its economic support, declined to enter into trade agreements and also ensured 
that Guinea’s trade with other countries was severely hindered.  
 
In the first instance, Wallerstein (1965:12) asserts that the ensuing economic retaliation was 
urged on by the other French West countries ‘who were unwilling to allow non-loyal 
structures’. Meanwhile, the withdrawal of France left in its wake an illiterate population 
                                            
24 This was a sort of half way standing between country and protectorate, whereas Sekou Toure 
preached ethnic integration. 
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reaching 90 percent, which is of epic proportions as there were actually only three university 
graduates (Adamolekun 1976:114).  The pillage was such that there were no resources and 
the immediate recourse was to fall on loans from sister newly independent nations like 
Ghana and countries from the Eastern Bloc.  Succinctly put, Gberie (2001) states that: 
 
‘In an extraordinary act of churlishness and vandalism, the retreating French 
took with them everything from colonial archives and development plans to light 
bulbs, dishes from the governor’s mansion and telephone receivers. They 
destroyed what they could not take along. They even emptied pharmacies and 
burned the medication. And subsequently they campaigned throughout the 
western world to isolate the new African nation’ 
 
However, the estimated situation was so dire that, it is agreed only sustained assistance 
could help Guinea survive its first anniversary as an independent nation, but contrary to all 
political forecasts and odds, Guinea survived. Thus from independence, Guinea has always 
managed to avoid implosion, chaos and all other forecasts made about it and continues to 
occupy the lenses of researchers with the question, ‘how did they do it’(Bangoura 2011:99-
115). However, in hindsight, the events that unfolded and continue to unfold in Guinea 
testifies to the fact that, Guinea held sway but at a great cost to freedom and wealth, with 
political institutions being the ones that have continued to suffer marginalisation and 
inclusion. 
 
First, Sékou Touré’s legitimacy was derived from his leadership style of the bold decision 
to defy French rule and demand ‘independence now’ because of being at the forefront of 
mobilising grassroots for political participation.  Ultimately, a civic movement emerged from 
these efforts and organised effectively to defeat France in a critical referendum that decided 
the political freedom of Guinea from colonial rule (Bangoura 2011:95-96).  
 
This movement was comprised of an eclectic mix including educated elites, women’s 
groups, religious organisations and in leadership Trade Unions that individually all had 
varying degrees of grievances against the colonial authorities and had expressed these in 
protests, demonstrations and other such civil disobedience avenues.  They were spurred 
on by Toure’s brand of African Socialism underpinned by rhetoric like ‘We prefer dignity in 
poverty to riches in slavery (Gberie 2001) which became the clarion call that galvanised the 
liberation struggles, and even including others in Africa into the late 150s and the 1960s, 
known as Africa’s year of independence. Having ridden this huge crest of popularity and 
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civil legitimacy as the ‘people’s leader’ Toure’s administration toughened and in due course 
turned into a dictatorship banning all forms of opposition which made his own party, the 
Democratic Party of Guinea the dominant factor in the national body politic.   
 
However, these repressive moves did not subdue all the opposition at home.  There 
continued to be power struggles especially between Toure and the educated elite 
(Wallerstein 1965, Johnson 1970:352) who labelled him ‘illiterate or a semi-illiterate with a 
sixth-grade education’. They posited that Toure had ‘neither the right nor the capacity to 
rule Guinea because of his level of education and lack of experience’ (Adamolekun 
1976:149-50, Gberie 2001, Elizabeth 2009).  Toure died in March 1984 still wielding a lot of 
power. 
 
At the death of Toure, Lansana Conté an Army Official ingrained himself into the political 
leadership of Guinea (Arieff 2009:338). In a bid to rule differently against the backdrop of 
an inherited bankrupt economy, Conte attempted a liberalisation of the economy and the 
political environment. These efforts yielded a new constitution in 1990 endorsed by a 
referendum. But against the growing threat of endemic corruption his style of governance 
gradually became only marginally less autocratic than that of his predecessor’s.  
 
‘In the towns, the population has developed the habit of living off the crumbs of 
society, pilfering and trafficking of all sorts.  Production is abandoned; the result 
is a parallel market, real or created shortages, and price increases.  The spirit 
of initiative is discouraged…Theft and corruption rule’ (President Lansana 
Conte, speech in 1997.25 
 
In agreement with the pervading nature of corruption in Guinea, Manning (1988:129) 
asserts that: In Guinea, ‘participants in the economy learned to avoid taxes when possible, 
to pay bribes whenever necessary, and to steal when the opportunity rose’ (Manning 
1988:127). Payments to local officials were made in food, beer, firewood, cigarettes and, of 
course, money. 
 
Meanwhile Conte had then begun instituting a quasi-democratic strategy which in effect will 
make him a benevolent dictator(Gberie 2001:9-10). Thus, the initial jubilation that followed 
this ascendancy to power and the expectation of the opportunity to set up viable democratic 
                                            
25 In Guineoscope: Guinea at the Dawn of the Third Millenium Conakry, 1998 
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institutions was short-lived. The quasi-democratic governance of Conte oversaw the 
conduct of presidential and parliamentary elections in 1993, 1996 and then 2003, in which 
he was re-elected.  However at each turn there were perceptions of mass rigging and flawed 
electoral processes and associated irregularities. One such area of contention was the 
constitutional amendment in 2001 which allowed the extension of term of office by the 
President. These were also manifested severally and in 1996 there was even an army 
mutiny(Nugent 2012:405) which was quashed as a result of such discontent (by then the 
President was old and ailing). 
 
Ultimately, Conté's 24 years in power was characterised by further poor governing and not 
building any institutions of democratic governance, whilst the impunity of human rights 
abuses by security almost forced the country to the precipice of disaster and anarchy. 
Consequently, Guinea became a paradox of abject poverty and acute misery in the midst 
of plenty; it embodies one of Africa’s richest natural resource supplies in fish and minerals 
but has continually ranked as one of the poorest in socio-economic indicators as per the 
UN Human Development Index indices and indicators overtime.  
 
Guinea is wealthy in large deposits of bauxite and diamonds but this has not also benefitted 
the population significantly it remains one of the poorest countries in West Africa with annual 
per capita incomes of just 370USD and life expe4xtancy averaging 54 years (World Bank 
2004, 2005, 2006). With a bankrupt and deficit in governance, systemic corruption earned 
it the status of the second most corrupt country in the world.  All other socio-economic 
indicators for progress fared no better(Gberie 2001, Camara, O'Toole et al. 2013). 
 
Meanwhile, non-governmental organisations and the international community had the 
media frantically depicting Guinea as a country with a leader unable to ‘to control the day-
to-day operations of government.  The issues of the factions, coupled with the fact that 
Conte did not appear in public after his re-election in 2003, and as such had not 
institutionalised his succession lend credence to rumours of him being terminally ill (Arieff 
2009): 
 
As anticipated by political analysts, Conte’s death in December 2008 led to a military coup. 
A junta, calling itself the Conseil national pour la démocratie et le développement (CNDD) 
(National Council for Democracy and Development) took over power led by an army captain 
Moussa Dadis Camara. He promptly suspended the Constitution, dissolved the legislature, 
appointed a Prime Minister and promised a swift transition to democratic rule by sharing a 
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timetable to hold presidential and legislative elections(Picard and Moudoud 2010).  (Camara 
2010).  But, when he resolved to run for presidency, Guineans had a déjà vu feeling of the 
authoritarian rule of Toure and the ‘legacy of the iron fist’ of Conté protests ensued with 
widespread opposition on may social fronts, whilst he was also steadily building on 
consolidating his power bases (Picard and Moudoud 2010, Yabi 2010, McGovern 2012). 
 
Within all these dynamics were the efforts of civic organisations and the Trades Unions in 
providing a wider platform for stakeholder dialogue.  The initiatives was aimed at ensuring 
space for civil society to determine and preserve peace, stability and promote democracy 
and social justice in Guinea in those turbulent times(IPA 2002). These notwithstanding, the 
civilian protests and unrests orchestrated by the opposition Forces Vives de Guinée 
continued undeterred. Ultimately, on September 28, 2009, opposition parties as well as 
Trades Unions and their respective leaderships organised a mammoth political rally in the 
National Stadium in Conakry, and it was here acts of violence tended to once again, define 
Guinea’s political trajectory.   
 
Guinean security personnel ostensibly acting on the directives of Dadis Camara opened fire 
on civilians demonstrating the CNDD and Dadis Camara’s implied intention to run for 
president. Thus, in trying to suppress the peaceful rally, they massacred over 150 people, 
with many disappeared, wounded and reportedly raped, this effectively served as a catalyst 
that set in motion the final political process leading to the current political dispensation in 
Guinea (Yabi 2010, McGovern 2012). 
 
This immediately attracted public indignation and international condemnation; including the 
Network of African Women’s Ministers and Parliamentarians of Guinea26 and the Mano 
River Women’s Network for Peace27 on October 20, 2009 (IPA 2002). ECOWAS initiated 
sanctions, whilst France, pronounced suspension of cooperation including with military 
support.  Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, stated that this particular Guinean 
regime was ‘vile’ and ‘criminal’ and called for “appropriate actions” against Camara’s junta, 
insisting that he ‘cannot remain in power’ (Arieff 2010). 
 
All these issues thus came to a head on December 3, 2009, when Dadis Camara was shot 
and wounded in the head by a member of his presidential guard. In the ensuing chaotic 
                                            
26 (Réseau des Femmes Africaines Ministres et Parlementaires de Guinée, REFAMP-GUINEE), 
27 (Réseau des Femmes du Fleuve Mano pour la Paix, REFMAP) 
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political environment, he was evacuated to Morocco for medical treatment, and the following 
month on January 12, 2010, he was in turn unexpectedly taken to Ouagadougou, the capital 
of Burkina Faso to recuperate.  Prior President Blaise Compaoré who had been appointed 
as the regional mediator in Guinea’s political crisis by (ECOWAS) instigated this 
strategy(Koko 2010). 
 
6.2.1 Guinea and its Neighbours in the Mano River Union 
 
Guinea covers an area of some 245,857km2 and borders Guinea-Bissau and Senegal to 
the northwest, Mali to the north and east, Côte d'Ivoire to the southeast, Liberia and Sierra 
to the south, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west as illustrated by Figure 6.2. The source of 
the River Niger also lies in the Guinea Highlands of southeast Guinea.  These complex 
overlays of borders consist of the Mano River Basin (Union) region within the ECOWAS 
region. 
 
The Mano River Union (MRU) was created in 1973 by an agreement between Liberia and 
Sierra Leone.  Guinea joined in 1980, and Côte d’Ivoire joined in 2009.  Its main aim is to 
improve the socio-economic conditions within the Union.  It has a permanent Secretariat 
based in Freetown, Sierra Leone, with affiliate country offices located in Guinea-Conakry, 
Monrovia-Liberia, and Abidjan-Côte d’Ivoire(Sawyer 2004, Silberfein and Conteh 2006).   
 
In 2000, the MRU adopted its 15th Protocol on Joint Cooperation on Defence, Security, 
Internal, and Foreign affairs.  The 15th Protocol calls for the creation of a joint security 
committee and other mechanisms to monitor border security and related issues.  
 
As noted with the civil wars of both Liberia and Sierra Leone, violence often spreads rapidly 
from one country to the other thus border security is crucial, as refugees induce 
humanitarian crises and  puts pressure on social services at the borders.    
 
There are extensive cross-border linkages and dynamics in the Mano River Union (MRU), 
based on ethnicity, and a complex web of shifting military and political alliances established 
over the years among the MRU governments.   
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 Source: Map No. 4164 Rev. 4 United Nations, Department of Field support, Cartographic Section, 
August 2014; http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/guinea.pdf 
 
The MRU countries share similar histories, heritage, cultures, and ethnic groups, with 
symbiotic relationships along artificial borders existing between Guinea and Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Liberia, and Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire(Arieff 2010). Cross-border Security issues 
in the MRU highlights the regionalisation of these domestic conflicts in the Mano River Basin 
where conflicts are intertwined and have shown the potential to spill-over and destabilise 
neighbouring countries(Williams and Haacke 2008, Ettang, Maina et al. 2011). 
 
 Inadvertently, though different dynamics are responsible for instability diffusing beyond the 
MRU into other parts of West Africa in contemporary times, all these conflicts further hinder 
regional peace, whilst mutating and complicating efforts aimed at finding lasting peace 
across the sub-region(Sawyer 2004). This view helps in assessing policy-making, and 
causal factors of intra-state conflicts in West Africa(Koko 2010, Ettang, Maina et al. 2011). 
 
Despite tensions in cross-border relations in the MRU, people and goods (both legal and 
illegal), move between the long and porous borders, albeit with lengthy delays at the border 
posts or the threat of bandits at the informal crossings.  Depending on the security situation, 
Figure 6.2: Political Map of Guinea 
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mass movement of populations between the MRU countries can tax the host country’s 
resources and create conflict with the local population.  Guinea, for example, has endured 
the most of the influx of refugees from war in Liberia, and then Sierra Leone, and in recent 
times Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
These large population movements have contributed to the political destabilisation of 
Guinea, affecting negatively on the fabric of society by building resentments among largely 
unemployed and through militants who arrived with the refugees (Danny 2011, Coffie 2013).  
 
Undoubtedly, the violence in neighbouring countries had an effect on the political stability 
and economic indicators of Guinea, though Gberie (2001) and  Francis (2009) insist Guinea 
took political and economic advantage of the refugee situation and also assert that the 
violence in Guinea has had little to do with politics, governance, or Lansana Conté.  It has 
much, if not everything to do with Taylor's quest for economic wealth and advantage. The 
conviction of former Liberian Charles Taylor for war crimes in Sierra Leone is a very visible 
indication of the role played by one head of state in the destabilisation and conflict of another 
country(Jörgel, Utas et al. 2007).   
 
There is an argument to be made for how domestic conflicts are also regional in perspective 
especially with respect to the MRU dynamics.  For instance, there is the argument that, the 
war that began in Liberia in 1989 relate to the outbreak of civil war in Sierra Leone in 1991, 
and to the fighting, that broke out in Guinea in 2000.  Cross-border attacks from Sierra 
Leone and Liberia into Guinea in 2000–01 and the involvement of Liberian and Sierra 
Leonean fighters in Côte d'Ivoire’s war in 2002 further shows the interlinked nature of peace 
and security in the four MRU countries.   
 
Whilst different dynamics are responsible for the instability today radiating beyond the MRU 
into other parts of West Africa, the conflicts in the MRU menace regional peace and 
complicate efforts to find a lasting peace across West Africa.  The potential spill-over of a 
conflict in any of the MRU countries is detrimental to peace in the others and in West Africa 
as a whole.  These conflicts have produced refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) across the whole of West Africa(Adedeji 2004). 
 
Noting the interconnectedness of conflicts in West Africa, policy makers have argued for a 
holistic approach to security policy in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea, also known as the 
Mano River states(Sawyer 2004). Meanwhile, apart from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote 
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d’Ivoire, less remarked on in recent years are the links between Guinea and its unstable 
neighbour to the northwest Guinea-Bissau.  Guinea-Bissau in addition to an insurgency 
against the Portuguese colonial government from the mid-1960s through to independence 
in 1974, experienced an army mutiny that spiralled into a wider conflict in 1998 and 1999 
(Yabi 2010, Hoffman 2013).  
 
Thus, any significant effort to appreciate the dynamics of individual conflicts must analyse 
both national and sub-regional dimensions.  Governance in Guinea has to improve if the 
fragile peace and stability in the MRU is to be sustained.  Rehabilitation and reconstruction 
(including livelihood support for productive economic activities) must be intensified and 
accelerated.  However, porous borders and extensive cross-border ethnic alliances make 
security an on-going priority, reasons why Guinea has always been in a state of war, but 
been in war. 
 
Guinea’s resilience against breaking out into full-scale conflict continues to attract varying 
reasons. According a Yaya Keita28, Guinea’s challenges should not be deemed as a conflict 
situation.  In an interview he said ‘What I want you to know is that, this seeming stability is 
just fragile peace, and remember the old cliché, lack of war does not mean there is peace 
and stability, but because we are always comparing ourselves to the chaos happening with 
our neighbours, we protected this seeming peace and gradually became ‘politically lazy’. 
 
In discussions with Guinean MPs, the overriding perception was that, the 2010 presidential 
elections are generally regarded as the first free and fair elections since independence in 
1958, and mark a decisive moment in the transition from military to civilian rule in Guinea. 
For others, Guinea will be unable to achieve stability and peace as long as its borders are 
not secure and the military has not been reined in.   
 
According to Guinean EMPS29, in contemporary times however, Guinea’s political relations 
with its neighbours have stabilised but the problems we still have with our neighbours are a 
wide range including: 
 An undisciplined military  
 Border demarcation and attendant land disputes  
 Civil strife  
                                            
28 Interview, June 2013 
29 Interviews with a cross section of Guinean MPs during fieldwork in May-June 2013, Abuja, Nigeria 
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 Small arms and light weapons 
 Harassment of women at the borders 
 Youth unemployment (economic migrants) 
 Child trafficking 
 Drug trafficking 
 Illiteracy/untrained border officers 
 
6.2.2  Status of Conflict  
Thus, Guinean confounds policy makers and pundits alike and most, especially in light of 
analyses which strongly suggest direct correlation of ‘neighbourhood effects’ with the onset 
of civil conflict as espoused by  Hegre and Sambanis (2006:529, 532-3). This assertion of 
a symbiotic relationship between the beginning of war within the framework of 
neighbourhood conflicts is one of pure intuition especially in sub-Saharan Africa where we 
can trace such links in West Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region, which 
have dominated research and have influenced policies on Africa’s many security 
challenges(Francis 2006, Francis 2009). 
 
Theoretically, regional armed conflict may contribute to the onset of civil war through a range 
of causal mechanisms.  Cross-border refugee movements may destabilise the host state 
by altering its ethnic composition, creating a burden on economic resources, spreading 
disease, and indirectly causing inflation due to aid flows (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006:335) 
Refugees may also become a target for cross-border rebel recruitment (Adepoju 2001). 
Transnational ethnic ties can lead actors in one state to act ‘ in solidarity with ethnic kin’ in 
another(Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006:336).  
 
If a country’s government backs anti-state rebels in a neighbouring civil war, the 
neighbouring government may retaliate by financing an insurgency across the border. 
Despite these events, overtime, Guinea’s latent conflict status is because, it has continually 
remained relatively stable as compared with its neighbours. Though, there is continuous 
debates about its complicity in some of these neighbouring conflicts (Koko 2010, McGovern 
2012). 
 
According to Madeleine Thea (former ECOWAS MP, Guinea), Guinea has essentially 
always been the ‘tranquil one in a bad neighbourhood; saddled with warring parties, north, 
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south and east’ everywhere is war’.  Several resultant factors lends credence to this 
assertion as for instance neighbourhood conflicts can inundate the sub-region with small 
arms and light weapons, mercenaries and decommissioned soldiers who may search for 
new work after the neighbouring conflict has ended.  In agreement, Ike Ekweremadu, 
Speaker of the ECOWAS-P intimated that ‘one can even begin to conceptualise how ex-
combatants have now graduated from mercenaries for hire into mercenaries for rent30. 
 
The Chair of the Committee on Political, Security Affairs of the Parliament emphasised 
these challenges thus.   
 
‘No sooner had the people of Africa, and especially Guineans let out a sigh of 
relief, for successfully sleep-walking their way out of a major bloodbath, than 
the leaders of Côte d’Ivoire, like in a 4×4 relay race, seized the baton to keep 
the continent’s perennial disease in season, as conflict was inherited from 
Liberia into Sierra Leone’ (Alfred Kwame Agbesi, Interview May 2013). 
 
6.2.3 Governance structures 
The governance structures of the MRU are severely fractured.  As well as beyond the loss 
of lives and livelihoods and the physical destruction of infrastructure, there persist issues of 
disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DRR) of ex-combatants, repatriation, 
resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced, reform of the military and security 
forces, and social reconciliation of militarised societies.  
 
These thus impact directly on Guinea and its efforts to establish a democratic functioning 
state (Picard and Moudoud 2010). According to Picard and Moudoud (2010) governance 
debates in Guinea are donor stimulated and sporadic and it was only from the mid-1990s 
that pressure from international donors ensured a much more engaged debate. 
 
Past governments did not develop surviving governance institutions. Thus after the 
assassination attempt of Dadis Camara, the CNDD replaced him with General Sékouba 
Konaté his vice president and prompted initiated transitional arrangements for elections. 
                                            
30 He explained that whereas in active conflict years these mercenaries’ sign up for specific incursions 
as for instance, plot and implement a coup d’état to either topple a government or cause confusion 
for any faction that paid the highest. These mercenaries have now aligned themselves to specific 
faction leaders and will sign for a tenure of about three months or a year at a time where they are 
treated like a kind of army (for lack of a better analogy.) 
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This resulted in the political agreement known as the Joint Declaration of Ouagadougou 
inaugurated on January 15, 2010. The main features of these transitional processes 
included; the political settlement of a government of national unity (GNU),security sector 
reform, appointment of a Prime Minister and the inauguration of a quasi-legislative body, to 
be known as the National Transitional Council (CNT)(Conseil National de la Transition 
(CNT); also, it agreed that presidential elections would take place within six months and set 
up reform of the defence and security forces (Arieff 2010).  
 
In tandem, ECOWAS established an International Contact Group for Guinea (ICG-G) and 
together with development partners helped to monitor and implement the new proposals. 
The ICG-G specifically played a prominent role in mediating the conflict between civil 
society groups and government (Carvalho). Thus after lengthy electoral processes 
President Alpha Conde, a long-standing opposition leader and head of the political party 
Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) won the ballot in December 2010. 
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Figure 6.3 .Major Political transitions/event in Guinea 1958-2014 
Sources:(Adamolekun 1976, Gberie 2001, Arieff 2009, Arieff and McGovern 2013, Camara, O'Toole 
et al. 2013, Bah 2015) BTI 2014 at http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-
reports/wca/gin/2014/index.nc; Inter-Parliamentary Union www.ipu.org; ECOWAS-P Resolution on 
Guinea 2011. 
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6.2.4 National Transitional Parliament (CNT) 
 
‘The CNT is not equivalent to a parliament in its jurisdiction. It written laws that 
state that they only have legislative functions until the election of the National 
Assembly, Thus they have no control no real oversight functions like a real 
parliament.  The Constitution has to grant you both legislative and oversight 
before you can be recognised as a parliament, and it is non-existent’. Dr 
Alhassane Makanera (Political Activist), Dean, Law School, University of 
Sonfonyah)31. 
 
The CNT was expected to revise Guinea’s electoral laws and the constitution, but it had no 
specific mandate and its authorities were not publicly detailed.  Nevertheless, it was 
generally tasked with creating conditions for an early return to constitutional rule based on 
the rule of law, individual freedom, and principles of good governance, through the 
establishment of consensual constitutional, organic, and electoral laws.  However, it was 
constrained in many aspects least not being the fact that contrary to the true nature of 
parliaments, the people do not directly elect its members and therefore lacked legitimacy.  
 
However, it gathered strength from the composition of its members who were a broad 
section of the social and political strata of the country. Rabiatou Sérah Diallo, a prominent 
trade union leader, was the head of the CNT, inaugurated with 155 members representing 
political parties, trade unions, civil society groups, and other socio-economic demographics. 
Members of the CNT were referred to as MPs and grouped into nine committees, 
reminiscent of a working Parliament, although “we have only advisory powers” stated an 
MP. 
 
Against this background the CNT became a benchmark for leading Guinea’s return to 
democratic rule as it was the main forum where consensus could be reached by people 
representing citizens, and with these limited powers it was able to achieve some policy 
goals.  
 
First in April 2011, the CNT adopted a new constitution for Guinea that included several 
provisions whose implementation will increase respect for human rights and promote good 
governance: establishment of an independent national human rights institution; requirement 
                                            
31 Phone Interview, June 2013, 
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of public asset declarations by the president and ministers; and the creation of a Court of 
Audit mandated to conduct yearly financial audits of public institutions, and strengthen the 
independence of the High Council of Judges, responsible for discipline, selecting and 
promotion of judges32.  
 
Second, on September 9, 2011, Guinea’s Transitional National Council (CNT) approved a 
new mining code, repealing the law of 1995 and establishing the legal framework 
comprehensively governing mining projects in Guinea. The new code significantly increases 
the share of state ownership in the mining industry, extending a 15 percent share of future 
mining projects to the GOG, without financial compensation. The GOG also has the option 
to purchase up to an additional 20% of each project. New tax breaks and other financial 
incentives encourage projects to include a processing facility such as an alumina refinery, 
aluminium smelter, or steel mill. The 2011 code also includes new measures designed to 
protect the environment, stimulate local development, fight corruption, and increase 
transparency in the sector. Although much of the code outlines the conditions under which 
future mining projects will be established, it also contains provisions that apply to companies 
already operating in Guinea.  
 
Third, Guinea’s long-delayed legislative polls33 were pushed to September 24, 2013. The 
observation mission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), made 
up of 100 observers led by former Togolese prime minister Edem Kodjo, Crisis has become 
a permanent condition in Guinea Over 2,000 local civil society observers will be deployed 
to observe the election, of which 980 are long-term observers.  
 
The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Mano River Union, 
the European Union and local Embassy and Consulate staff will also be sending 
international observers. The Independent National Electoral Commission’s Training and 
Accreditation Department is responsible for ac-crediting observers. The CNT is also aware 
of: the security difficulties at Guinea’s borders; widespread human rights violations, 
committed in particular by the security forces, and the impunity of their presumed 
perpetrators (aided by the unwieldy nature of the State’s administrative structure and the 
                                            
32 For more analysis see www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/guinea 
33 Also see IRIN Africa, ‘GUINEA: The missing parliament’; 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/96260/guinea-the-missing-parliament 
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army in particular); border demarcation; youth unemployment; the status of women; child 
trafficking to Liberia and Sierra Leone; and drug trafficking. 
 
In discussions for this study, the Chair of the Defence Committee foregrounded issues of 
cross-border security and the Committee’s relationship with the work in the MRU and the 
MRU Secretariat. 
 
The CNT is aware of the MRU and its work, but MPs do not know what role they can play, 
as they feel that procedures and processes are convoluted and unclear. Activities are 
centred on the Executive, leading MPs to feel they are being excluded from the governance 
processes. MPs have not had any formal presentation on the MRU or the 15th Protocol. 
Only a handful of MPs heard about it through a seminar held by the MRU shortly after it was 
created. MPs asserted that they have a potentially major role to play in mitigating cross-
border insecurity that has been a constant threat to stability in Guinea and greatly 
contributed to the nation’s political crises. MPs are just unclear on how to proceed and need 
guidance and support. 
 
The CNT can work with the MRU structures in helping to implement the 15th Protocol. They 
can provide information through seminars, conferences or a working session with MPs for 
them to understand the protocols and processes. This would be particularly beneficial 
during the orientation for new MPs and the new parliament. 
The CNT also needs skills training on conflict prevention and management to help Guinea 
regain peace and stability. 
 
Guinea remained34 suspended from the regional organisations until 2013 when the political 
transition ended with the parliamentary elections of September 34, 2013. The new 114-seat 
parliament was elected for a five-year term on 28 September, three years after the 2010 
presidential election, and included 19 women. 
 
 The ruling Rassemblement du peuple de Guinée (RPG) had 46.5% of the seats in the new 
parliament (inaugurated on 13 January 2014), the Union des forces démocratiques de 
Guinée (UFDG) 32.4%, the Union des forces républicaines (UFR) 8.8 % and 12 other 
                                            
34http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/6416/policy-statement-us-welcomes-ecowas-
suspension-of- 
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parties 12.3%. The two main opposition parties may form a counter-force to monitor 
government action. 
 
 The new parliament should also help calm the political scene and increase social cohesion. 
But lingering tensions include the refusal of the Parti de l’espoir pour le développement 
national (PEDN) to take up its two seats, disputes among the parties represented and the 
issue of local elections due in 2014. 
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Table 6.1 Guinea’s National Assembly trajectory 
Sources: IPU Parline Databases ( http://ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2131_E.htm);  (Gates, Akyeampong et al. 2012, Camara, O'Toole et al. 2013)
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6.3  Formal latent Conflict prevention initiatives 
 
6.3.1 Ordinary Sessions 
 
Deliberations on the situation in Guinea have always preoccupied discussions at the 
ECOWAS-P as far back as the initial Sessions since it was inaugurated.  During the First 
Session of the ECOWAS-P for instance, then Deputy Executive Secretary of Political 
Affairs, Defence and Security, General Cheick Oumar Diarra in presenting activities of the 
Executive Secretariat reiterated for the notice of parliamentarians ‘the civil wars ravaging 
certain countries of the Community’.1 
 
In reviewing the report the issues deliberated responded to ‘Regional Peace and Security-
conflicts in the Mano River Union Region (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea); Cote d’Ivoire, 
Guinea- Bissau and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; 
and the Moratorium on light arms’.2 There were however, no active discussions on what 
specific or general issues parliamentarians should employ to resolve the situation.  It was 
all at the Executive level who were mainly driving the process as the first session of the 
parliament. 
 
Suffice it to state that, this was a significant step in developing how the parliament will work 
going forward as these can be called information sessions by the Executive whenever 
parliament is to hold sessions, these have been instituted and continue until date.  But most 
importantly was that, at this time, the departments of the parliament itself were not 
established thus even the report generated at this session was by the Executive Secretariat 
and there were also no discussions on what role the parliament can play in resolving the 
Guinean challenges, though they were duly informed of the crises.  
 
Thus, at the Second Ordinary Session of 2001 then Executive Secretary of ECOWAS at the 
Official opening of the Session presented on the security situation in the MRU comprising 
                                            
1 Page 5; Report of the First Session of the ECOWAS Parliament for the year 2001, Abuja, 1-7 June 
2001, ECOWAS Parliament, Abuja, 2001 
2 Ibid. Page 6 
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Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone  and how efforts were being made to restore confidence 
amongst the three Heads of State to work together in resolving the situation.3 
 
Referred to Committee sittings as agenda item number 6 ‘conflicts in the sub-region’ the 
Parliament that …’its Bureau should dispatch a delegation immediately to the Heads of 
State of the Mano River Union to show the Parliament’s support of the reconciliation 
process’ .4 Here, the parliament was examining the sub-regional aspect of the crises and 
not singling out Guinea and as Liberia and Sierra Leone both had transitional justice 
processes, it was captured as essential to the discussions.   
 
Meanwhile at the First Ordinary Session of 2002 the Speaker explained away the inability 
of the Parliament to send a delegation as stated in the preceding session by stating that: 
 
‘Despite the Parliament’s stated wish to play a part in resolving this crisis, it was unable to 
undertake the planned parliamentary enlightenment and goodwill missions owing to the 
inadequate financial and material means at its disposal.  Nevertheless, Parliament sought 
to give support to on-going efforts and initiatives by writing letters to…President Lansana 
Conte…to commend…actions’.5 Following, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, 
Defence, and Security in consideration issues referred to it discussed amongst others the 
‘role of Parliament in conflict prevention, management, and resolution in West Africa’.6 
 
Meanwhile during the First Ordinary Session of 2003, deliberations referred to the Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security/Laws, Regulations, Legal and Judicial 
Affairs were preoccupied with the resurgence of fighting in Liberia and its impact on its 
neighbours especially Guinea7.  To this end, even Guinean MPs were more concerned 
about how this will affect them, and called for swift action to curb the situation.  Liberian 
MPs who at the Session were actually stranded, as they could not return home and Nigeria 
                                            
3 Page 6; Report of the Second Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Parliament for the year 2001, 
Abuja, 24 September-12 October, 2001, ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, Abuja, Oct, 2001  
4 notes from Committee Sittings on Thursday 27-Saturday 29 September 2001; Page 3-4; Page 10; 
Report of the Second Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Parliament for the year 2001, Abuja, 24 
September-12 October, 2001, ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, Abuja, Oct, 2001, Rev. 1 
5 Page 23; B.Peace and Security Issues 1. The Situation in the Mano River Union; Report of the 
Session, First Ordinary Session of the Parliament, 28 May-17 June, 2002, ECOWAS Parliament, 
Abuja 
6 Ibid. Page 65 
7 Pages 27-28, Report of the 2003 First Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Parliament, 28 May-13 
June 2003, Abuja 
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indicated their willingness to support them until they can return, though the fate of their 
families was going to be in a balance.8 
 
During the Second Ordinary Session in 2003, the country report for Guinea in an overview 
of the security situation indicated the borders were calm and existing good prospects for 
peace because of positive developments in the Mano River region, whilst at the same time, 
Liberia reported it was still at war with no Parliament working.  When the Executive 
Secretary presented the report on the security situation, there were instances non-
reconcilable to those reported.  These inaccuracies received debates with MPs calling for 
the country reports to be factually accurate to reflect the real situation on the ground.9 
 
By the time of the First Ordinary Session of 2004, Guinea was still reporting reduced 
tensions at its borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as hope for lasting peace.  The 
report reiterated ‘the positive turn of events in the other two States of the Mano River Union 
is very encouraging and contributes to the maintenance of security at the south and south-
west borders of Guinea.  Today, we commend the rebels’ disarmament process in Liberia 
and wish that it should continue and end in the integration of the rebels into other activities 
of national life’.10 
 
However, Guinea had ratified pertinent Protocols including A/SP.1/12/01 on Democracy and 
Good Governance supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security11, which was 
significant with respect to its own security challenges. 
 
During the First Ordinary Session of 2007, Guinea’s main report captured the postponement 
of legislative elections because of internal violence12 and for the first time, there was no 
mention of regional crisis.  It was therefore quite expected when the ECOWAS Commission 
reported to the Parliament during its Second Ordinary Session of 2007 about improvement 
in the region emanating from resolution of crisis in Guinea and supported Peacebuilding 
                                            
8 ibid. Pages 29-31 
9 Pages 18, 40-41, 55; ECOWAS Parliament Report of the Second Ordinary Session of the Year 
2003, 19-30 September, Abuja. Also transitional processes were being undertaken in Liberia which 
MPs were unaware of as contained in verbatim reports Pages 6-14, Official Report of Proceedings, 
Monday, 22 September 2003 
10 Page 3, ‘Security Situation’ in Country Report for Guinea, First Ordinary Session for 2004, 6-15 
May, ECOWAS Parliament, Abuja 
11 Pages 17-18; Report of the First Ordinary Session for 2004, 6-15 May, Abuja, 
ECW/PARL/1/2005/04 
12 Page 16, Report of the First Ordinary Session for 2007, 15-28, May, ECOWA Parliament, Abuja 
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initiatives in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone13 which all border 
Guinea. 
 
The Committee on Political Affairs, Peace, and Security in its sitting during the First Ordinary 
Session of 2008 took the initiative of developing a Terms of Reference and scheduled a 
delocalised meeting on the ‘Review of Guidelines for Election Observations Missions in 
West Africa’, with Conakry, the capital of Guinea as the venue.  This was also to evaluate 
existing practices, propose relevant criteria to conform to best practices and establish 
principles for the conduct of Election Observation Missions.  Critical to Guinea was the 
participation of the Transition Monitoring Group and the Guinea Electoral body.14 Meanwhile 
the Guinean MPs also reported calm and relative security along the Guinea’s borders but 
called for action on drug trafficking which was becoming a major obstacle and should be 
tackled through coordinated regional efforts.  In addition, its national parliament was yet to 
discuss the Convention on Light Weapons and Small Arms, associated materials, but this 
will be effected during its final sitting.15 
 
Following, the Chairman of Guinea’s Electoral Commission presented the challenges and 
prospects of conducting elections at delocalised meeting and reiterated the importance of 
Guinea ratifying the 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.  
Emphasis was placed on existing challenges, which include financial constraints; 
conducting elections deemed credible by the international community and prevailing socio-
economic crises, which have which have led to the undermining of state authority.16 
 
The challenges enumerated by Guinea in the preceding Session’s country report resounded 
positively with the address made by the President of the Commission at the opening of the 
Second Ordinary Session of 2008 with the statement of a regional conference to be 
organised to map out a strategy to combat drug trafficking and its impact in the region.17 At 
this Session however, Guinea reported challenges with domestic security opposite to 
tranquil border situation and the postponement of elections from 2008 to 2009 by the 
Independent Electoral Commission.  However, it was made clear that community spirit is 
                                            
13 Page 8, Report of the Second Ordinary Session for 2007, 19-29 September 2007, ECOWAS 
Parliament, Abuja, ECW/PARL/1/2008/04 
14 Page 29; First Ordinary Session 2008, Report of the Meeting of the Committee on PAPS, 13-23 
May, 2008, Abuja, 
15 ibid. Page 13 
16 Pages 10-11, Report of Delocalised Meeting of the Committee on PAPS, Conakry, guinea, 21-25 
July 2008 
17 Pages 9-10; Report of the Second 2008 Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Parliament, Abuja, 10-
26 September 2008 
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resurging after all the efforts in resolving the crisis by ECOWAS and the Speaker was urged 
to visit the country to further consolidate these gains.18 
 
Updating the ECOWAS-P during the First Ordinary Session of 2009, Guinean MPs stated 
how internal strife had finally given sway to chaos when following the death of President 
Conte there reported a ‘change in government which brought to power the National Council 
for Development and Democracy, led by Captain Moussa Camara’.19  
 
In discussing issues before they are referred to the relevant Committees, the occupation of 
Yenga a town in Sierra Leone by Guinean soldiers was raised,20 and the MPs in response 
reported that, they had already discussed this with relevant authorities in Guinea.  Also, 
meetings had already taken place between the Chiefs of Staff of the armies of Guinea and 
Sierra Leone and it was only because of upcoming elections that had hindered further 
pursuit of the issue.21 Meanwhile there was a Joint Commission of the committees on PAPS 
and NEPAD, African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Commission which recommended 
that with regards the ‘coup d’état in the Republic of Guinea; the Joint Commission through 
the draft resolution invites the military leaders to restore constitutional order and the rule of 
law’.22 There was also the recommendation that there should be dialogue between the 
different armies of both Guinea and Sierra Leone about the occupation of Yenga under the 
ambit of ECOWAS and the Mano River Union.23 
 
By the time the First Ordinary Session of the Parliament was taking place in 2010, the 
parliament had already passed two critical resolutions on Guinea24 and was looking to 
consolidate these gains with respect to the pervading challenges.  The efforts of the 
parliament even received commendation from the President of the ECOWAS Commission 
when he stated that ‘…deserves praise for the initiatives it had taken to manage poetical 
crises, most notably in Niger and Guinea’ and recalled the resolutions the Parliament had 
passed with respect to these countries’ situations.25 
 
                                            
18 ibid. Pages 25-26 
19 Page 18; Report of the First 2009 Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Parliament, Abuja, 12-27 May 
2009, ECW/PARL/11/2009/04 
20 Ibid. Page 26 
21 ibid. Page 27 
22 ibid. Page 39 
23 Ibid. Page 40 
24 Page 4(20); Report of the First Ordinary Session of the Parliament for the year 2010; Abuja, 19 
May-03 June, 2010; ECW/PARL/11/2010/04  
25 ibid. Page 43(437) 
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At the Session, Guinea’s country report essentially captured the situation in situ; that the 
political situation was much improved given that the Ouagadougou Agreements were being 
implemented and a government of national unity underpinned by a National Transition 
Council was established.  As well, a constitutional order had been restored and presidential 
elections were being scheduled for June 27, 2010, which was just the end of the same 
month as the Session.  Security was also touted as improved with a programme on 
reforming the security agencies being undertaken with the assistance of the AU and UN.26 
 
During debates, it emerged that people that went missing during the protests in Guinea had 
become a subject of investigations; launched by the county and another by the ICC.  
However, on the latter, the MPs reported that it had returned the issue to the Guinean 
government to undertake.  Thus, it was hoped that, these investigations would lay to rest 
the issues surrounding the women violated and the missing persons.27 
 
Following, the report of the Ad hoc inter-parliamentary committee set up to undertake the 
missions were considered and adopted without amendments as well as the Resolutions 
that were passed.28 But at the Second Ordinary Session of 2010, the Parliament from the 
recommendations of the Ad hoc Committee issued a Supplementary resolution on the 
political process in Guinea highlighting amongst other issues an urgent appeal to the 
Guinean political elite to demonstrate restraint and focus on dialogue and consensus 
building to resolve the crises.29 
 
The First Ordinary Session of the Parliament in 2013 also ushered in the beginning of the 
Parliament’s tenure as a third legislature and there was a specific on the political situation 
in the Republic of Guinea.  Suffice it to state that, Guinea was suspended at the time from 
the Parliament as it had still not carried out legislative elections, and the CNT had 
overstayed its legitimacy thus, it was only to be re-admitted after legitimate legislative 
elections. The main crux of the existing crises lay in the repeated postponement of 
legislative elections and the emanating dynamics as discussed above.30 In finding a viable 
                                            
26 Page 23; Report of the First Ordinary Session of the Parliament for the year 2010; Abuja, 19 May-
03 June, 2010; ECW/PARL/11/2010/04 
27 Ibid. Page 39 
28 ibid. Page 62 
29 Second 2010 Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Parliament, Abuja, 16-30 September 2010; 
Meeting of the Ad hoc Parliamentary Committee on the Political Situation in Niger and Guinea, Abuja, 
27 September; Supplementary resolution on the political process in the Republic of Guinea (See 
Appendix 6 for full Resolution) 
30 Meeting Report of the Joint Committee; PAPS/NEPAD and APRM, Abuja, 13 and 14 May, 2013, 
First Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Parliament, 6-21 May, 2013, Abuja 
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solution, the Director reported that, ECOWAS and the international community will have to 
convince stakeholders in agreeing a date for the elections and other procedures to ensure 
that the election are considered credible, and legitimate enough for the citizenry to have 
confidence in governance.  To do this, the plan is to send what the Director called a ‘high 
powered delegation to mediate so as to avert the outbreak of fresh crises.31 
 
In deliberating these challenges, the MPs articulated that in order to avert the political 
impasses from deteriorating into further crises, ECOWAS needed to provide a platform 
under which it can break the deadlock and the parliament could then support with 
parliamentary diplomacy.   
 
There was need to also be mindful of the sovereignty of Guinea and make sure to enforce 
the provisions of the Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 
Peacekeeping and Security, and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance relating to the statutory convergence criteria.   
 
The Joint Committee then recommended a parliamentary fact-finding mission in conformity 
with the Rules of Procedure establishing the functions of the standing committees of the 
Parliament.32 
 
6.3.2 Fact-finding/Peace/Negotiation/Mediation Missions 
 
On the recommendation of the First Ordinary Session 2002, the Parliament sent a 
delegation to the Mano River Union33, which then reported its findings at the Second 
Ordinary Session 2002.  The team led by the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Cooperation, Defence and Security, Mao Ohuabunwa34 were tasked with visiting the MRU 
with the terms of reference to undertake a fact-finding mission to the three MRU countries 
and to report findings to the Parliament with recommendations.  The guideline to help 
achieve this was drawn up as follows: 
 
                                            
31 Ibid. Pages  4-5 
32 Ibid. Page 5 
33 Only the delegation’s work in Guinea will be emphasised 
34 Other members included Deputy Speaker Oumarou Sidikou; ECOWAS MPs from Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone; Abdoulaye Bathily(MP); Gabriel Dumi(MP); Khairat Abdul-Razaq(MP); Mrs. 
Halima Ahmed(Secretary-General) and Chief Vincent Gbemudu, Political Adviser to the Speaker, 
Page 25; Report of the 2nd Ordinary Session, 3-13 September 2002; ECW/PARL/V/1/2003/04, Abuja 
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All MPs from the MRU in the ECOWAS-P hold a consultative meeting and develop 
programmes and plans of actions; consultations with major stakeholders comprised as 
Heads of State and Governments, Parliaments and National Assemblies, Opposition Party 
Leaderships, Civil Society Movements and traditional leaders.  Also, visit refugee/IDP 
camps and hold meetings, hold review meeting after each country visit and prepare a 
report.35 
 
The mission’s report was regarded as one of mixed results especially as regards the issue 
of easing tensions and establishing a climate of trust amongst the region’s leaders.36 
 
Substantively, the delegation’s visit to Guinea (July 21-25, 2002) helped to glean 
information crucial to understanding the challenges in the country.  Parliamentarians 
collected information after all their meetings pointing to the perception that the conflict was 
‘exacerbated by the personality and ego problems between Presidents Lansana Conte 
(Guinea) and Charles Taylor (Liberia).  Allegations were also made to the fact that Guinea 
was a territory used to grant passage and support to the LURD rebels who seek to 
overthrow the latter.37 There was also the all-pervading sense of Guinea never going to be 
at peace unless Liberia especially was also at peace.  For instance in meetings with 
stakeholders in Guinea38 several issues came to the fore from officials in government, 
women groups, MPs, and civil society organisations. 
 
It emerged that, there was perception of Liberia being the instigator of the crisis in the MRU 
and emphatically the Foreign Minister reiterated that this has even been reported to the UN 
in an independent report and sanctions on Liberia were because it was implicated as guilty 
and promoted by neither Guinea nor Sierra Leone.  Overwhelmingly, all stakeholders 
discussed the ‘Charles Taylor factor’ and when MPs enquired on best ways of resolving 
issues with him an array of views were tabled including bringing diplomatic pressure to bear 
on him as he was the ‘root’ of the problem.39 
                                            
35 Pages 1.2; Summary Report of the fact-finding mission of the MRU Parliamentarians of the 
ECOWAS Parliamentarians on the crisis in the MRU sub-region 
36 Page 26; Report of the 2nd Ordinary Session, 3-13 September 2002; ECW/PARL/V/1/2003/04, 
Abuja 
 
37 Page 5; Report of the Peace/Fact-finding mission to the Mano River Union States (Sierra Leone-
Liberia-Guinea), ECOWAS Parliament, August 2002 
38 ibid. Pages 27-45; meetings with Francois Fall(Minister of Foreign Affairs); Moussa 
Solano(Minister of Interior and Security); Leadership of the Mano River Women Network; Religious 
Councils; President of the National Assembly and MPs; Lamine Sidime (Prime Minister of Guinea) 
 
39 ibid. Page 33 
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Therefore in feeding back to the ECOWAS-P during the Second Ordinary Session 2002, 
the delegations indicated that they had secured a commitment from President Charles 
Taylor (Liberia) in principle to hold a meeting with ‘his elder brother’ General Lansana Conte 
of Guinea.40 In addition, MPs from the three MRU countries were to meet to discuss ways 
of achieving stability restoring cooperation amongst themselves as regards peace and 
security issues. 
 
At the same time, the Speaker intimated that following completion of the mission by the 
MPs, there would be report forwarded to the Heads of State; especially President 
Abdoulaye Wade as then serving Chairman of ECOWAS; President Amadou Toumani 
Toure(Mali) because it  was identified that the LURD rebels agreed to hold talks in the 
Malian capital, Dakar or Freetown; President Gnassingbe Eyadema as the longest serving 
ECOWAS Head of State and then President Olusegun Obasanjo as Head of State of the 
host country for the ECOWAS-P. 
 
 An initial step already taken was a meeting held with the Vice President of Nigeria, Alhaji 
Atiku Abubakr in the absence of the President and thus as soon all, the Heads of States 
were briefed then the Parliament will draw up plans for resolving these crises.41 
 
Findings and recommendations passed onto the parliament needing action were 
undertaken in a second mission to the Mano River Union in 2003 during which there were 
frank discussions held with President Charles Taylor, Prime Minister of Guinea, Foreign 
Minister of Guinea, Parliaments of Guinea and Liberia, Opposition party members and Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs).42 
 
With particular respect in the case of Guinea, were meetings with LURD; Parliament, 
Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, national chapter of Mano River Women’s Network 
(MARWOPNET) and representatives of opposition political parties all of Guinea. 
 
In opening statements, the Speaker of the ECOWAS-P briefed the meeting on activities 
held prior which had culminated in the present endeavour and emphasised the appreciation 
of the parliament to Presidents Charles Taylor and Lansana Conte for endorsing the efforts 
of the parliamentarians.  Also, he entreated the LURD delegation to make reasonable and 
realistic demands and to state their grievances honestly and sincerely so they could be 
                                            
40 ibid. Page 26 
41 ibid. Pages 27-28 
42 Report, Second Mission to the Mano River Region, February 5-8, 2003; and March 9-18, 2003 
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resolved amicably.43 Other Parliamentary officials, the Inter-Religious Councils, and the 
chair for the meeting Dr. Nana Pratt on behalf of MARWOPNET made similar appeals.  
 
The Speaker subsequently declared the negotiations open, and stated that these would 
take place in camera.  The following organisations/officials were part of the process; 
members of the ECOWAS-P; the Speaker’s entourage; Inter-Religious Council of Liberia 
(IRCL) four delegates; Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leona (IRCSL) four delegates; 
MARWOPNET four delegates; MRU Ambassadors; Civil Society Movement four delegates; 
LURD all members and six Observers. 
This closed-door session began with the LURD appreciating the opportunity to participate 
in what they described as an historic meeting.44 In addressing the meeting, LURD gave an 
overview of their interpretations of the crisis, which they stated were caused by President 
Charles Taylor. 
 
First, they claimed he launched the civil war in Liberia, which led to all the atrocities being 
witnessed in the MRU.  They insisted, that even when ECOWAS sponsored elections on 
July 19, 1997 under the Abuja Peace Accord Charles Taylor flouted the tenets of that 
Accord.  He did not see to restructuring the army and had declared that he ‘would not share 
power with anyone and would use guns to defend his democracy’.  Unfortunately, these 
utterances did not receive any condemnation from ECOWAS, AU, nor UN.  Most allegations 
were levelled against Charles Taylor and this then prompted the actions of LURD who aim 
to remove President Taylor by military and political means and create a friendly democratic 
environment and form a government of national unity.45 
 
LURD submitted two documents reflecting their position and a revised political agenda and 
these were to form the basis of a question and answer session between them and other 
participants in the closed session. 
 
In responses to twelve questions put forward to the LURD all reflected issues with Charles 
Taylor and why his ascendancy to the realms of power in Liberia dos not augur well for 
peace in the MRU.  For instance, in response to the first question ‘what does LURD require 
in order to bring an end to the conflict?’ elicited the following answers:  
 
                                            
43 ibid. Pages 9-10 
44 ibid. Page 13 
45 ibid. Page 15 
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‘Charles Taylor is the problem.  Taylor was not elected under the constitution of Liberia, but 
under special arrangements put together by ECOWAS under the Abuja Accord.  Charles 
Taylor reneged on the Abuja Accord by expelling the ECOMOG forces before they could 
complete their assignment.  In addition, Taylor, by carrying out an attack on innocent 
civilians on Sept 18, 1998, where several were killed or forced into exile, had sounded the 
drums of war’.46 
 
The address provoked pertinent discussions on two levels; first delegates appealed to 
LURD to be more realistic in their demands and consider the suffering masses whilst the 
other was pleas for them to lay down their arms and respect Taylor as the democratically 
elected President whilst negotiations ensued. They were commended for attending this 
meeting as it demonstrated their resolve to achieving peace.47 
 
Significantly, the main outputs from the meeting were LURD’s Position Statement, LURD’s 
Revised Political Agenda, Communiqué of the Freetown Meeting and LURD’s 9-point 
Agenda for Peace as presented in Appendix 13.  
 
The Communiqué served as an agreement on how the parliament and LURD will progress 
in future negotiations whilst the 9-point Agenda for Peace tabled their demands which made 
great progress in contributing to a situation which had hitherto been in stalemate. 
 
Following, there was a two-pronged approach to the way forward; the Communique was 
issued as a Press Release whilst the meeting resolved that the 9-point Agenda for Peace 
will be discussed with President Taylor, and then a comprehensive report forwarded to seek 
counsel of Presidents Conte of Guinea and Kufuor of Ghana (then ECOWAS Chairman).  
The meeting ended with much optimism for a solution to the crisis.48 
 
The second part of the mission was undertaken from March 9-18, 2003 covering meetings 
in Liberia and Guinea.  In Liberia were with the Inter-Religious Council of Liberia; Joint 
meeting with both Houses of Liberia’s Parliament; ECOWAS Citizens Union; Liberia chapter 
of MARWOPNET and Civil Society Movement.  In Guinea meeting were held with the 
Parliament; Director General of the Foreign Ministry; The Prime Minister; national chapter 
of MARWOPNET and opposition parties representatives. 
 
                                            
46 ibid.  See the full transcript of the Q & A, Pages 16-20 
47 ibid. Page 20 
48 ibid. Pages 21-22 
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Crucial to the outcomes of the process was the meeting with President Taylor where the 
Speaker summarised the efforts undertaken by the Parliament most especially the meeting 
with LURD.  The Speaker indicated this had been a request from President Taylor to find 
out ‘what they wanted’ and that they had obtained an eight point agenda49 and other 
documents containing the information, which had been forwarded prior to the meeting.  The 
Speaker also informed President Taylor of briefings with the ECOWAS Chair President 
Kufuor and indicated that, the parliamentarians after meeting with him will be in Guinea to 
hold meetings with President Conte and brief him too.  He also enquired if he was going to 
attend the peace conference being scheduled by the International Contact Group on Liberia 
(ICGL) on the issue. 
 
In response, President Taylor expressed thanks for the efforts of the parliament but added 
that as had already been briefed about the meeting with LURD in Freetown there was no 
need for further information.  However, on the meeting in Mali, the Liberian government was 
working with the ICGL and as such; he will be available for the meeting as well as hold talks 
with his Malian counterpart.  In addition, this will be a peace conference including the 
government, LURD and all other stakeholders50.  On the position of LURD and the solution 
to the crisis, President Taylor maintained that: 
 
‘…the Liberian problem is complicated and is not limited to problems between the 
Government and the LURD.  Had this been the case…the problem would have been long 
solved…there are larger interests behind the LURD that must be a part of the settlement 
before any meaningful peace could be achieved.  …should President Conte of Guinea, 
make up his  mind to disallow rebels from using Guinean territory to stage attacks on Liberia, 
the war would be over’.51  
 
Emphatically, President Taylor further stated that, if he and President Conte met one on 
one, in a candid manner the conflict will be over.  This is because, the seeming animosity 
between them stemmed from misleading information to President Conte indicating that he 
was supporting Guinean dissidents against the Government of Guinea.  He even went as 
far to declare that, Guinea could send troops to even ‘search the length and breadth of 
Liberia and arrest any dissident they find’.  Thus in his estimation, a meeting will put all 
rumours to rest.52 
                                            
49 ibid. Page 37, the original was 9-point it is not clear at this stage which of the demands has been 
relegated 
50 ibid. Page 38 
51 ibid. Page 38 
52 ibid. Pages 39-40 
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On the way forward, MPs put forward some issues for clarification from President Taylor on 
people who will be allowed to participate in the Mali conference and whether he will accept 
the outcome.  President Taylor intimated that, as long as the outcome does not contravene 
the Constitution or laws of Liberia he would accept them but would not be willing for an 
interventionist force unless such a force is a designated capacity building one aimed at 
enhancing the effectiveness of the armed forces.  Agreeably to him, was also the scope of 
Liberians welcome to attend, including those in self-exile as well as and political parties 
registered in Liberia.53 In closing remarks, the Speaker appealed to President Taylor to 
impartially study the demands of LURD with a view to objectively forming genuine 
opinions.54 
 
In Guinea, the delegation commenced their mission by first meeting with the Parliament of 
Guinea to brief them on progress so far and discuss innovative ways of approaching a 
meeting with President Conte.  Expressing the full support of the Guinean Parliament, it 
was agreed that MPs should be bold and candid with the President who was supportive of 
the efforts of the Parliament.55 
Ultimately, the mission gathered from various meetings in Guinea on the second leg of the 
complete programme, gathered critical perspectives vital to resolving the crisis.  It was 
recognised that Guinea is uniquely placed in several ways.   
 
Also, LURD rebels have an affinity with its border and thus it must play a role not just to be 
at peace as a country, but also to bring lasting peace to the region, and by extension to the 
whole of West Africa.  In addition, that dialogue was indispensable especially a bilateral 
meeting between Presidents Taylor and Conte,56 and a need for more openness and 
frankness at Peace Summits if the root cause of the conflicted are to identify and lasting 
peace established. 
 
                                            
53 ibid. Page 39 
54 ibid. Pages 41-42 
55 ibid. Pages 49-50 
56 ibid. Pages 49-Meetings with Parliament of Guinea; Foreign Minister (represented by the Director 
General, Thierno Habib Diallo); national chapter of Mano River Women’s Network; opposition parties 
who boycotted elections 
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6.3.3 Extraordinary Sessions 
The first mission’s report precipitated an Extraordinary Session in November 2002 (this is 
the first of its kind in the history of the ECOWAS-P), as the issues could not be exhausted 
during the Ordinary Session.57 
 
The main agenda included ‘latest development in the MRU Peace Process’.  To this, the 
Speaker stated that ‘one of the things that has motivated the Heads of State and 
Governments to establish a Parliamentary representation in the Community is; to enable 
the institution assist them in finding solutions to the problems in the sub-region, particularly, 
the peace and security problem’.58  The session was thus very important to ensure the 
optimal function of the parliament. 
 
The Speaker reported that, there was an emerging confidence from actors in the region on 
the capacity of the parliament to bring about lasting peace to the MRU. This was brought to 
the fore when he had the opportunity to meet with President Lansana Conte of Guinea 
during which he ‘observed the willingness and commitment of the latter to dialogue with his 
counterparts and even host in Guinea, an inter-parliamentary conference on Peace in the 
Mano River region’.59 Suffice it to state that, it is well established that Conte considers 
meetings of such nature anathema to Guinea’s sovereignty and will usually not meet 
anyone, nor agree to talks, this was therefore considered progress as it will indicate the 
parliament’s role as positive and vital. 
 
At this session, the issue was then referred to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Security laws, Regulations and Legal and Judicial Affairs to deliberate during 
its sitting and report with recommendations.  The report recognised the initial memorandum 
forwarded to the Heads of State on the issue and the feedback from the Chair of MRU 
parliamentarians, which indicates progress in the process as a main stakeholder President 
Lansana Conte, was now open to engagement.60 
 
Following, the ECOWAS-P passed a Resolution on the issue calling on all Heads of State 
in the region to help with the dialogue process between Liberia and LURD as this has direct 
impact on Guinea, and the MRU sub-region.  Then advised the Bureau of the Parliament to 
                                            
57 See Extraordinary Session Report, 11-15 November 2002, ECW/PARL/BUR.VI/1/2003/03, Abuja, 
Mars 2003 
58 ibid. Pages 3, 5-6 
59 ibid. Page 6 
60 ibid. Page 24 
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take advantage of the current acquiescence of the Guinean President to initiate processes 
that will lead to lasting solution61.  
 
However by 2009, Guinea was back in the discussions of the parliament as it was at the 
brink yet again and there was the need to help contain the situation.  Thus, after all other 
progressive initiatives to help with Guinea’s numerous transitions from slipping into full-
scale war, yet another initiative had to be advanced by the parliament.   
 
Another Resolution was passed at the First Extraordinary Session of the Parliament in 
October 2009 on the political situation in Guinea, which was exacerbated by the peaceful 
protests organised by Forces Vives on September 2009 in Conakry and the violent 
response meted out to civilians by the military junta.   
 
The parliament therefore resolved as presented in Table 6.2:  
 
 
6.1 Informal latent conflict prevention initiatives 
6.1.1 Networks 
 
Due to porous borders within the MRU there is evidence pointing to the importance of the 
control of people, rather than the control of territory as vital to politics.  Exploring this 
relationship, Jörgel, Utas et al. (2007) discuss exisiting mutual relationship between a 
patron ('Big Man') and his network as core to how the state functions. Therefore, to be able 
to achieve and maintain power is to control an extensive network, bringing politics, 
economics and hard security into a collective.  These informal structures underpin and 
correlate to the importance and real use of formal ones.  Whereas none of the formal 
transparent mechanisms at either state or regional level can function without the support or 
authorisation of informal networks, and external factors including peacekeepers, business 
interests and donors also function as 'Big Men' and connect to national and regional informal 
networks(Jörgel, Utas et al. 2007). 
 
                                            
61 ibid. Pages 25-26 
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Table 6.2 Resolution of the First Extraordinary Session on Guinea 2009 
Source: Compiled by author using data from ECOWAS-P Extraordinary Session Report 2009 
 
Thus legitimate brokers of peace inevitably deal with these in their bid to help form-to-form 
separate, 'clean' forms of governance yet continue to deny these alliances.  Thus in this 
area the ECOWAS-P can be said to be an outlined legitimate broker of peace and an 
important player for improving security in Guinea.  According to the Speaker of the 
ECOWAS-P: 
 
‘…this is because, to bring about real change, we have avoided using the 
lenses of donors who view these 'Big Men' only from a 'rational choice' as to 
secure their positions, these 'Big Men' only use networks to extend solidarity 
within a moral framework. We have effectively mapped out who the specific 
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players are and engage with them on pertinent issues as, and when the need 
arises’ (Ike Ekweremadu, May 2013). 
6.1.2 Initiatives in the MRU 
In its capacity as a parallel and collaborative sub-regional body, political fortunes of Guinea 
have improved somewhat under the ambit of the MRU.  Under the auspices of the Mano 
River Union Peace Forum (a permanent forum of 24 civil society representatives from 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea (6 from each country, representing youth, religious 
leaders, traditional rulers, women, human rights/democracy campaigners and the media), 
there are efforts to advocate for peace, monitor events, and make informed representations 
to governments and inter-governmental bodies.   
 
The MRU is also for the purposes of creating expertise of regional constituency for conflict 
prevention and resolution across physical, social, and ethnic barriers.  With a schedule of 
regular meetings in each country has been established in which members identify issues 
for advocacy and closely monitor the security situation.  They then feed this back to the 
Forum’s Secretariat, based in Freetown, Sierra Leone, so it has access to the most up-to-
date information and analysis, and can act as an early warning mechanism for the 
region(IPA 2002, CIVICUS 2011). 
 
Notable successes of the Forum of the MRU include the drafting of the Liberian Peace 
Agreement (2003) and a workshop for MRU parliamentarians and government officials, 
which resulted in the formation of the network of MRU Parliamentarians to foster peace.  
The MRU Peace Forum also works to create networks (with media, women, and young 
people) that include representatives from all over the region, to promote understanding and 
develop skills to address the conflicts within and between their countries.  Media 
practitioners also collaborate with the MRU and have now developed an informal network, 
which is used to exchange information, crosscheck facts and provide mutual moral support 
in a political climate that does not always welcome freedom of the press.  
 
In the year 2000, the MRU adopted its 15th Protocol on Joint Cooperation on Defence, 
Security, Internal and Foreign affairs aimed at working for the maintenance of peace, 
security and stability of the member states in that sub-region.  The 15th Protocol also calls 
for the creation of a joint security committee and other MRU mechanisms to monitor border 
security and related issues.  Thus with the establishment of a Joint Security Committee 
(JSC) in the 15th Protocol, security coordination is deemed the primary mission of the MRU.  
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According to Dr. Makanera62, the MRU complements the work of ECOWAS in the sub-
region and it is very important to the uniqueness of the four countries in that union.  That 
‘the relations between Liberia and Guinea are relations of compulsory complementarily 
because it is firstly; the Guinean territory encircles Liberia from the north-east to the South 
and more importantly because most of the ethnic groups in Liberia are found in Guinea.  
 
A salient challenge being the employment of youth as rebels and combatants in the MRU 
wars, an initiative called the Mano River Union Youth Parliament (MRUYP) is regarded as 
a viable institution that will help to transform the fortunes of young people in the sub-region.  
This sub-regional network is comprised of young peace builders, students, journalists, 
development practitioners, and human rights activists within the MRU countries advocating 
for peace, human rights, and the development of young men, women, and their 
communities.  The MRUYP is an initiative of the West African Youth Network (WAYN) in 
collaboration with the Open Society Initiative of West Africa (OSIWA) and the United 
Network of Young Peacebuilders Sierra Leone (UNOY) Sierra Leone). 
 
The idea of the youth parliament is deemed a direct reaction to the marginalised position of 
youth; they are hardly involved in the peacebuilding process and or not considered as 
positive actors.  In this conflict-torn region, efforts continues on support of peacebuilding 
initiatives of women and civil society, but no comparable efforts were made to invest and 
promote the role of youth leaders, who not only represent an enormous potential for change 
in post-conflict situations, but often also are the key actors in the community development 
and social transformation among their peers. 
 
6.2  Assessment of the Initiatives  
In interviews, CSOs, practitioners, academics and MPs, there was a tendency to 
concentrate on prospects for both the national and regional parliament, and the individual 
institutions building upon each other’s strengths and sharing experiences. In analysing 
these relationships several factors are crucial for assessing the initiatives undertaken. 
 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
Security sector reform in Guinea has been a major challenges due to several factors 
including, the size and mandate of the military, the existence of militias and ‘gendarmeries’ 
                                            
62 Phone Interview, June 2013, 
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who are an eclectic mix of former combatants, ex-rebels and activists loyal to serving 
presidents who get co-opted into the military with no commensurate levels of training.   
 
However, most initiatives of the parliament are not aimed at DDR though it is explicit from 
the responses of all the stakeholders that potential threat of violence from ex-combatants 
makes Guinea’s relative stability unsustainable. 
 
Thus to ensure a measure of SSR effectiveness, Guinea needs to undertake 
implementation of policies outlining civilian oversight of the defence sector through 
parliaments and other democratic institutions as well as the justice sector.  As these are 
resource dependant and time based, it requires acute coordination and support from multi-
donor funding to be committed by ECOWAS and the international community. 
 
‘…in societies experiencing democratic challenges like a lack of an elected 
parliament, you would expect CSOs to be the alternative or the institution that 
will help restructure and bring sanity into our politics... n’est pas? CSOs are the 
bane of Guinean society; first they pretend to be critiquing the government 
whilst they are secretly collecting money from them. Second they pretend they 
are not interested in politics yet they all contest our seats, unseat us and then 
get into governance, especially those from the President’s tribe...and most of 
them just support the President to sign dubious mining contracts from which 
they get kickbacks. All these are problems that makes Guinea unstable. 
Anything can happen at any time. We may have peace, but as you know, the 
absence of war does not mean there is peace...non?’ (Madeline Thea, Member 
of the CNT/Former member of ECOWAS-P, Guinea, Interview May 2013) 
 
Thus comprehensively, approaches must comprise of various stakeholders including so-
called 'Big Men' who wield unofficial authority for if formal arrangements are to be effective, 
then informal initiatives must be effectively integrated to yield positive results and make 
direct outcomes a certainty in the search for social stability and security(Mazov 2010) . 
 
Parliamentary Mandates 
The regional parliament apart from its missions and other interventions also sensitised 
members of the CNT on issues of working together with appointed MPs who may be former 
actors in the crises. This is aimed at helping transition parliaments and their members be 
able to work around negotiations and power-sharing arrangements when there is a 
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deadlock from democratic elections. As well, to make it possible for MPs of such 
backgrounds to submit themselves to transitions processes like reconciliation commissions 
of courts and not claim parliamentary immunity as it effectively establishes distrust between 
the parliaments and citizens. 
 
Finally, as these are temporary positions, how they work will receive deserved support even 
if the members are nominated from organized civil groups or appointed in as much as they 
work fairly; as they will be considered the broad based forum for national dialogue in 
returning the country to peace times. 
 
Elections and the Electoral Law 
Electoral systems and laws in Guinea have been subject of many crises thus to be able to 
effectively establish a regime of a legitimate election system, ensure election monitoring 
and deal with electoral fraud to command legitimate elections, parliament is critical in 
determining the representative framework that carves out how diverse groups can 
participate in decision-making.  
 
Diversity and ethnic proclivities have hindered democratic development in Guinea thus their 
inclusion through parliamentary advancements on electoral laws will help with conflict 
prevention and improve the success of sustainable initiatives for peace.  
 
The confusion of these terms is dangerous as countries, being afraid of outside interference, 
sometimes refuse election “observers” because they mistake them for “monitors”. 
Observation is a rather passive activity, even though it can be constructive in interference. 
A monitor, on the other hand, can give binding instructions and his role is interventionist 
and preventive. Finally, a supervisor administers elections de facto like an election official. 
 
Mediations/Negotiations 
 The question whether Elders could play the role of observers and of mediators at the same 
time and how far they can go in advising is a difficult one as the role of observers includes 
enhancing voters’ confidence in the process and calming voters and election officials 
through their presence. In the real world it may not be possible to be rigid about what an 
observer may do. Yet, in principle they should not interfere.  
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Relationships with CSOs 
Discussions with civil society members indicated that Guinea as a member of ECOWAS is 
more related with issues of governance at the Executive or parliamentary level and thus 
chooses when and how to involve CSOs in the implementation of the protocols. Most CSOs 
are on the side-lines until it is convenient for the government, or ECOWAS through the 
government to invite them for their input. 
 
Yet, as non-political actors they intimated that they know the full extent of the social 
challenges affecting the average Guinean, these include, the appalling situation human 
rights at the borders, security forces perpetuating abuses with impunity; common place of 
sexual and gender-based violence and harmful traditional practices such as female genital 
mutilation(FGM).  Additionally: 
 
‘…there is widespread coercion and corruption, no viable legislature yet, no 
independent judiciary…communities along the borders are unaware of their 
rights and are therefore unable to exercise them adequately, and CSOs lack 
the capacity, confidence, and funding to carry out programmes with robust 
strategies to promote human rights’ (Victoria Saidu Kamara, former Second 
Deputy Speaker, EMP, Sierra Leone, Interview, June 2013). 
 
Suffice it to state that, it was evident most CSOs envisage  a vital role in partnership with 
the legislature, but the challenge lies in the fact that the CNT is not regarded as 
representative or credible as a parliament, and only an elected National Assembly will have 
the legitimacy to lead on this issue.   
 
Additionally, it is clear that civil society’s tumultuous evolution and development in equal 
measure, mirrors the country’s political history. The foundation years were undefined with 
no strategic visions and missions delineating their focus, instead, they were fragmented and 
had mandates reflecting general issues.  Consequently some evolved into political parties, 
whilst others organised to defend a myriad of marginalised and vulnerable groups or 
became human rights organisations.  However, this was effective as it heralded a new legal 
regime providing guidelines63 for civil associations and NGOs in Guinea.  
 
Throughout the numerous transitions and regimes changes in Guinea, CSOs continue to 
help in maintaining stability on varied issues confronting the country’s borders.  These 
                                            
63 Guinea’s NGOs Law (L/2005/013/AN) of July 4, 2005 
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include human rights violations; ex-combatants; demarcation of borders; farmers versus 
pastoralists; proliferation of small arms and light weapons; youth unemployment; Youth 
employed as mercenaries and paid by rebels; ethnic manipulation by politicians; over 
centralisation of power in the capital resulting in a disconnect of the centre from the 
periphery on political development amongst others. 
  
However, CSOs continue to be fraught with logistical challenges hindering them from 
working to their full potential.  For instance, Guinea’s Independent National Human Rights 
Institution set up in 2008, remains largely understaffed, lacks financial resources, and has 
no powers to investigate human rights violations.  Thus, human rights actors have not yet 
found an appropriate space to advocate for the respect of human rights and bring human 
rights issues to the forefront of public debate. 
 
Political actors 
Distinctively, there are identifiable operational levels of interaction between the executive 
level of ECOWAS, the ECOWAS-P, the UN, France and civil society groups in the political 
dynamics of Guinea. However, these partnerships cannot be said to be enhanced or well-
coordinated and thus there are lots of overlaps, unilateral as well as complementary 
processes which attempts to unpack may yield less fulfilling results. 
 
Significantly, deciphering the impact of the ECOWAS-P may be quite complicated. A case 
in point is that, cumulatively, from deliberations with MPs and other stakeholders, the 
evidence of a confusion of the ECOWAS and MRU protocols, as well as the ECOWAS-P 
and what role it could play with the CNT.  Whilst some referred to them as playing similar 
roles, others viewed the MRU as a replacing body for ECOWAS, or at best a complementary 
body, whereas for the parliament, the notion was that until the National Assembly was 
reformed the ECOWAS-P probably cannot be playing any significant role.  
 
However, there was a pervading sense of knowledge of more of the ECOWAS text which 
was regarded as clearly communicated but not the MRU texts.  There clearly is evidence of 
the ECOWAS Parliament’s input for durable peace in Guinea, but the confusion of the role 
of the two organisations especially from the side of the MRU, is not helpful in attributing 
successes or failures or indeed different kinds of research one intends to undertake.  
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6.3  Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the political dynamics of Guinea against the backdrop of 
instability from its neighbours. The chapter has argued that the status of conflict in Guinea 
is latent though it has predominantly been recipient of numerous refugees and cross-border 
incursions. Given the security concerns and the declining political governing structures, the 
ECOWAS-P has had to sustain the debates and discussions on returning the transitional 
parliament to full status by engaging the main stakeholders and making decisions that are 
bold in the face of a very strong Guinean executive. 
 
The chapter also examine the historical dynamics of governance in Guinea, and how the 
parliament has had to use formal and informal initiatives to engage political actors in Guinea, 
and in this way reiterate how this significantly affects Guinea’s relative stability and finally 
gives an assessment of initiatives undertaken as well as inherent challenges. 
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7. Chapter Seven: Sierra Leone-Post-conflict Case Study 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Sierra Leone’s civil war (March 27, 1991- January 18, 
2002) effectively created a catastrophe of epic proportions 
in the body politic of the country in terms of the legacy it 
left behind. These include up to over 50,000 people (out of 
the six million population) dead, millions displaced (Black 
and Sessay 1997, Lawrie and Van Damme 2003, Gberie 
2005) and maimed whilst the refugee situation engulfed 
neighbouring countries, and the whole of West Africa (Francis 2012, Harris 2014). But 
ironically, Sierra Leone continues to be regarded as an international success in terms of 
conflict prevention. 
 
The conflict has attracted considerable research with different focuses; some examining 
how the conflict happened blurring the lines between war and peace transitions in the official 
period of 1991-2002; whilst others concentrate on the post-conflict period of the 
proceedings of the hydra headed transitional justice mechanism of the proceedings of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCLSL) with attendant analysis resulting in copious publications. 
 
Perceptively, though Sierra Leone has garnered academic scrutiny, with respect to its 
relationship with the UN, ECOWAS, America and British interests in the war years in 
selected research, including Danny Hoffman(2011), examining an integration of the conflict 
within the wider Mano River wars; Lansana Gberie’s (2005), ‘A Dirty War in West Africa: 
The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone’ and David Harris’s ‘Sierra Leone: A Political 
History’(2014). In addition, David Francis’s works on peace and security (2001, 2006, 2006) 
as well as the political economy of Sierra Leone’ amongst others.  However, it can be argued 
that research on Sierra Leone, is still incomparable with Rwanda and Somalia in Africa, and 
similar crises in other parts of the world in this post-cold war era. 
 
Additionally, in its post-conflict environment, Sierra Leone continually confronts a myriad of 
challenges comprising drug trafficking, armed robbery, corruption, economic 
mismanagement, poverty and exclusion in the political processes amongst others. 
Figure 7.1: Flag of Sierra Leone 
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However, though there have been attempts at establishing what the main integration body 
ECOWAS undertakes on these levels, with respect to what specific bodies such as the 
ECOWAS-P has engaged the country on with respect to democratic consolidation, the 
literature is silent.  
 
In contemporary times, Sierra Leone is to all intents and purposes increasingly stable. Thus 
this chapter examines how the ECOWAS-P has engaged Sierra Leone with respect to its 
conflict prevention agenda. The purpose is to attempt expanding areas of legislative 
research concerning effectiveness of implementation of post-conflict initiatives. Studies on 
Sierra Leone overtime examine the national parliament, or the UN impact on policy-making, 
are minimal and deficient on decision-making at the ECOWAS level. Substantively, the 
chapter examines decision-making with the, albeit limited mandate and other initiatives of 
the ECOWAS-P on consolidating democracy. The aim is to evaluate the exact work 
undertaken and to what extent these initiatives are effective for the post-conflict 
peacebuilding of Sierra Leone. 
 
7.2 Sierra Leone in Context 
Sierra Leone is bordered by Guinea to the north and east, Liberia to the southeast, and the 
Atlantic Ocean to the west and southwest (illustrated by Figure 7.2).  The country shares 
over 300 kilometres of densely forested border with Liberia, and its military and security 
forces are stretched thin to cover even the primary crossing points. 
 
Sierra Leone’s protracted civil war (1991–2002) began as a conflict on the border with 
Liberia.  With the outbreak of the Liberian Civil War (1989–1996), 80,000 refugees fled 
neighbouring Liberia for the Sierra Leone border.  This displaced population, mainly 
children, also doubled as a recruiting ground for Sierra’s Leone Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF).   
 
The RUF, supported by Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), 
attempted to overthrow the Sierra Leone government of Joseph Momoh.  The resulting 
decade long war claimed more than 50,000 lives, countless atrocities, and a terrible legacy 
of abuses of human rights.  Since the war, almost 72,500 former combatants have been 
disarmed and the country has re-established a functioning democracy(Gberie 2005). 
Ultimately, Sierra Leone was subjected to three coup d‘états (1967, 1992 and 1997) a 
counter-coup in 1968, and an attempted coup in 1971(Harris 2014). 
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Figure 7.2: Map of Sierra Leone 
Source: Map No.3902 Rev.5 United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic 
Section, January 2004 
 
The main protagonist of the war the RUF, justified their action by stating that, they had been 
contesting power following many years of repressive governance (Abdullah 1998, Cornwell 
1998). Inadvertently they ended up negatively impacting civilian populations (Richards 
1996), because by 1995 Sierra Leone was effectively a failed state by all development 
indicators(Park 2006, Betancourt, Borisova et al. 2010, Denov 2010). This was ironic since 
the same citizenry on whose behalf RUF pledged to be fighting were now in a political and 
economic quagmire (Abdullah and Muana 1998, Abdullah 2004, Bangura 2004).  
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Therefore for Fithen and Richards (2005:123) ‘the RUF represents a paradox. It claimed to 
have ambitions for a more just society, and yet ended up a random and arbitrary killing 
machine’.  
 
Scholars including Van Damme (1999) whilst noting the extensive human atrocities that 
were committed insist that these were characterised by differing intensity in phases and 
reflects in how human rights violations were documented. Thus Phase One comprised a 
conventional warfare; Phase two Guerrilla warfare, Phase three power struggles and peace 
efforts(Van Damme 1999). The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SLTRC 
(2004) also supports this position as it establishes that the later stages of Phase 2 and early 
part of Phase 3 were the most intense and violent part due to proliferation of conflict actors, 
which had engulfed the whole country (SLTRC 2004 3A:325).  
 
Additionally, even though the war is described in a decade long narrative, it had also 
benefitted from punctuated bouts of relative peace underpinned by signed peace accords.  
Collectively the five peace accords are; the Abidjan Peace Accord (1996), Conakry Peace 
Plan (1997), Lomé Peace Accords (LPA) (1999) and Abuja I and II Accords (2000 and 
2001). 
 
 
Relatively, these can be classified as ceasefire periods, which facilitated the repatriation of 
refugees back home when it was calm; to be subsequently displaced when conflict 
resumed.  For instance the Conakry Peace Plan and the Lomé Peace Accord recognised 
the scale of displacement and was specific on the return of Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) and refugees.  
 
At the same time, the Lomé Peace Accord stands out as an agreement aimed at 
ameliorating the conflicts and a tool introducing reconciliation in terms of its provisions on 
negotiated power-sharing arrangements.  Ultimately, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) and the efforts of ECOMOG a formal declaration of peace was made in January 
2002. 
 
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up in Sierra Leone to establish what 
happened in the civil war and give people the opportunity to speak about their pain and loss 
or confess their wrongdoings as means towards national reconciliation.  Alongside the TRC 
was the Special Court for Sierra Leone established to try those people who bear the 
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‘greatest responsibility’1.  These processes eventually led to the trial of Charles Taylor (at 
the ICC in The Hague), former President of Liberia for war crimes in Sierra Leone2. 
 
However, Sierra Leone’s on-going stabilisation and consolidation process is continually 
threatened by the many interwoven trans-boundary conflicts across the Mano River Union 
(MRU). Each of the MRU countries is also struggling to cope with difficult conflicts within 
their borders Serious cross-border problems remain to be solved in the MRU, including 
further stabilisation of war-ravaged, but now pacified Liberia, the political-military stalemate 
in Côte d’Ivoire as well as the uncertain outlook for the regime in Guinea.  
 
According to Solomon (2004) these conflicts are regional in nature and succinctly puts it 
thus: 
 
‘The conflict in the Basin has created fighters without borders.  LURD fighters 
from Liberia had been crossing into Sierra Leone over the southern border.  
They also crossed into Guinea using the northern axis.  Many are elements 
from Sierra Leone’s RUF who opted out of the disarmament process and went 
with Sam ‘General Maskita’ Bockarie to fight alongside Taylor.  Others are 
mercenaries for hire, and all these people are young and unemployed’. 
 
Sierra Leone continues to grapple with challenges emanating from porous borders, which 
harbour corrupt officials aiding and abetting smuggling and small arms proliferation.  These 
border personnel also lack basic equipment and logistics to enhance service delivery. 
 
The insecurity and vulnerability of women traders who ply the ‘unofficial’ border crossings 
is enhanced by arbitrary levies demanded by both official and unofficial personnel.  At the 
same time, there high unemployment among the youth generally and specifically in the 
border areas, many of whom are ex-combatants.  Most of them are quite engaged in 
informal or illicit trade such as drug peddling, small arms, smuggling of commodities and 
there are no initiatives from central of local government officials to address the situation.  In 
interviews with MPs to discuss if there were any targeted initiatives aimed at the youth, and 
perceptions on progress, one of them responded thus: 
 
                                            
1 This term has been subject of great debates among scholars 
2 His trial is still on-going 
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‘Agreed…we have a very young population in Sierra Leone. The interesting 
issue is that, we can look at two youth scenarios.  You have those that fought 
in the war and because of that became “adults” overnight’.  Then you have 
those who were born during or immediately after the war and have not had a 
good education because we are rebuilding; then you now have those who think 
they are adults and were victims of the war when they were young and so 
deserve more attention.  But the bitter truth is that, every Sierra Leonean is a 
victim of the war.  Even if you were a perpetrator, an ex-combatant, a child 
soldier, a rebel or whatever.  I believe we are all victims of the war, and we all 
deserve better.  So the youth are a special case but so is everyone else…’  
Augustine Bockarie Torto, Interview, May 2013). 
 
However, MPs also claimed that though the scenario maybe as described above there have 
been many initiatives and programmes by both the national, regional and donor partners 
aimed specifically on the youth, which has yielded positive results. 
 
7.2.1 Conflict years 
 
Causes of the Civil War 
Conflicts in the MRU region are rooted in history, territorial claims, and colonial legacies of 
dysfunctional states and authoritarian institutions. According to Sawyer (2004), Solomon 
(2004) and Silberfein and Conteh (2006) these were exacerbated by returning residents in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone from civil wars, while tensions between the countries over territory 
which go back to independence have resulted in a mutual air of mistrust amongst the three 
nations. Additionally, spill-over from situations in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, 
and The Gambia has made peace in the region extremely fragile. 
 
The consensus in the literature is that misrule under the All People’s Congress regime 
(1968-1992) is largely to blame for fostering the conditions that led to state failure and 
violent conflict in Sierra Leone (Richards 1996, Gberie 2005, Olonisakin 2008, Davies 2010, 
Kabba 2011, Cole 2012, Mahony 2012, Harris 2014). This begins with President Stevens 
(1968-1985) regime under policies that perpetuated his rule and generated wealth for 
himself and his clients (alluvial diamond resources), but ultimately weakened the state and 
made it vulnerable to the seditious external influences which catalyzed the war. 
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Political crises ensued when the opposition withdrew from the 1973 general elections, citing 
violence resulting in the absence of a parliamentary opposition. Then in 1978, Stevens 
established a one-party system of governance, and followed this up with establishment of 
a land policy regime anathema to the land tenure system(s) of the southern district of 
Pujehun3 (Richards 1996, Richards 1998:12-15, Keen 2005:39-47, Peters and Kitchen 
2011:11;241). Additionally, mistrust of the army made Stevens keep it ill-equipped and set 
up a parallel unit which was better trained made up largely of his ethnic Limba.  
 
 However, Kandeh (2004) and, Mustapha and Bangura (2010) emphasise fiscal crises due 
to fiscal profligacy, corruption and a non-strategic subsidy regime that enabled state 
collapse and promoted the conflict. 
 
 These were supported by several developments: 
 
First, Sierra Leone hosted 1980 Organisation of African Unity (AU-now African Union) 
Summit, which consumed up to a year’s national budget. This was further compounded 
when a conspiracy theory emerged alleging that the Central Bank governor who had 
subsequently died, was murdered for opposing these expenditures. Including fallouts with 
resources that were to revert to the State after the conference and sharp increase in the 
staple rice in 1986 (Davies 2010). 
 
Second, is the highlighted issue of isolation and marginalisation of rural youth as another 
cause of the war. Government policies are urban-biased and leave out the productive 
southeastern regions, which were coincidentally pro-opposition. In 1985, Stevens literally 
handpicked General Momoh to succeed him as President but by then, all the economic 
indicators had become unreliable.The challenges Momoh faced seem daunting and 
insurmountable. Momoh had to resuscitate a collapsed economy and rebuild democratic 
structures and institutions but scholars including Kpundeh and Riley (1992) contend that 
conditions worsened as  Momoh surrounded himself with ethnic Limbas, alienating other 
ethnic groups whilst continuing to implement policies which could not build back the 
economy nor promote social cohesion. The measures Momoh adopted included a failed 
Structural Adjustment Programme in 1989 and in 1991, just as President Joseph Momoh’s 
strategy was to diffuse the political tension by scheduling ‘free’ elections after years of one-
party governance, the country plunged into civil war.  
                                            
3 The campaign suppressed a rural uprising provoked by electoral violence. Later, and 
unsurprisingly, the RUF rebellion attracted voluntary enlistment from that region. 
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The main catalyst of the civil war, the group calling itself the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberia with the aim of ousting Momoh.  In the 
literature, the RUF’s ascendancy can be traced from 1980s Libya where they trained as 
revolutionaries, which included Charles Taylor of Liberia and Foday Sankoh, a former Sierra 
Leonean Army officer. According to Richards (1996), Abdullah (2004), Peters and Kitchen 
(2011) the war is also a retaliation by Charles Taylor's due to the Sierra Leonean All 
People's Congress (SLPC) government’s support to ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia. 
Thus in turn, Taylor helped Sankoh’s violent insurgency with the offensives dubbed 
‘Operation Pay Yourself” or ‘Operation No Living Thing’(Gberie 2005:118-132). 
 
Different armed factions were clandestinely recruiting the refugees as fighters for: Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), were all actors with varying and vested 
interests Richards (1996:2-4) and  Abdullah and Muana (1998:56-57) and (Peters and 
Kitchen 2011:217) .  
  
In addition, inflow and circulation of small arms and light weapons clearly contributed to the 
increased conflict and abuses against civilians by the governments and armed groups.  
These also facilitated the formation of new-armed groups and the use of ill-disciplined 
fighters, including mercenaries.  For example there were civilian rebellions, which 
materialised into the ‘Kamajor’ militancy movement ostensibly to complement the efforts of 
the country’s army further complicating the hypercritical relationships between the state, 
civilians, the militia and the standing army (Adebayo, Adesina et al. 2012).  
 
There was massive discontent associated with the lack of democratic institutional building 
and the citizens ultimately blamed the army as the main instigator of the war which set in 
motion a regime of coups, counter coups, negotiations, mediations, and many initiatives to 
mitigate the situation finally culminating in the deployment of ECOMOG by ECOWAS (Tuck 
2000, Kabia 2009, Arthur 2010). 
 
Conclusively, the literature on the causes are also varied and interpreted from various 
angles.  Some scholars ascribe the blame on ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia using bases 
in Sierra Leone to launch as the cause(s).  That invariably, this prevented Charles Taylor’s 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) from taking over the governance and served to 
infuriate him thus it was revenge that made him helped trigger the war in Sierra Leone.  For 
instance Zack‐Williams and Riley (1993)  reiterates that ‘the NPFL never forgave the 
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government of Sierra Leone for these raids. Taylor swore to avenge these interferences in 
Liberia’s internal affairs’.  Researchers including Abdullah (1998) Bundu ( 1997), and 
Abdullah and Muana (1998) however attribute other reasons of this invasion suggesting 
that this was inevitable whether Sierra Leone participated in the Liberian war or not as the 
main protagonists consisting of Foday Sankoh’s RUF and Charles Taylor’s NPFL had a 
pact committing support to each other in a bid to oust their governments respectively. 
 
7.2.2 Accords/Agreements as Forms of Peace 
 
The Lomé Peace Agreement (LPA) granted blanket amnesty to all the fighters on both sides 
of the conflict. The amnesty provision of the LPA stated: 
 
‘To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the 
Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is 
taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or the Civil 
Defence Force (CDF) in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their 
objectives as members of those organisations, since March 1991, up to the 
time of the signing of the present Agreement’. 4 
 
 Under the LPA, Foday Sankoh was given the mandate for the oversight and control of trade 
ministries and agencies responsible for the diamond trade, as well as elevated to a status 
commensurate with the vice president of Sierra Leone (Gberie 2005:143-153, Pham 
2006:122-123). 
 
After several unsuccessful peace negotiations and accords and nearly losing control of the 
capital to the rebels in early 1999, the war finally and slowly came to a close through the 
signing of a peace accord between the government and the RUF in Lomé, Togo, in July 
1999.5 It was accepted, at the time of the signing of the LPA, that the RUF would not have 
signed the agreement if there had been any prospect of legal action being taken against its 
members.6  
                                            
4 Article IX (3) of the Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999.  See www.sierra leone.orglomeaccord.html. 
5 Hayner, P. “The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Reviewing the First Year”, 
(ICTJ: Case Study Series January 2004) p. 1. 
6 See Solomon Berewa (former Attorney General, former Vice President of Sierra Leone); 
“Addressing Impunity using Divergent Approaches: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and 
the Special Court”, in Truth and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: A compilation of Articles on the Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, UNAMSIL, Freetown, 2001 (hereinafter “Berewa, 
 236 
  
The LPA also made provision for an immediate ceasefire, a stable democratically elected 
government, transforming the RUF into a political party, enabling members of the RUF to 
hold public office, enabling the RUF to join in a Government of National Unity through 
cabinet appointments, setting up a Special Fund for War Victims and creating a Commission 
for Consolidation of Peace that would ensure that all structures for national reconciliation 
agreed upon would be carried out and maintained in a timely manner7. 
 
The full amnesty granted in the LPA concomitant with the creation of the TRC made it clear 
that the truth and reconciliation process was deemed as restorative justice as an alternative 
mechanism to criminal prosecutions and punitive justice. 
 
The creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; Article XXVI of the LPA reads as 
follows: 
 
1. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to address 
impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims 
and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear 
picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation. 
2. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission shall deal with the 
question of human rights violations since the beginning of the Sierra 
Leonean conflict in 1991. 
This Commission shall, among other things, recommend measures to be 
taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations8.  
 
Despite the promise held by the LPA, there were major problems with the implementation 
of the peace agreement, with violations from both sides.  These manifested in April and 
May 2000, when the RUF fighters in the east and northern parts of the country refused to 
disarm and rather attacked UN peacekeepers and took about 500 hostage.  These 
prompted demonstrations on May 8, 2000 against Foday Sankoh at his residence where 
security personnel shot and killed approximately 20 demonstrators.  Civilians were incensed 
at this action and called for Sankoh and the RUF to be stopped and brought to justice.  This 
apparent non-cooperative attitude of Sankoh to the peace processes according to Tejan-
                                            
Addressing Impunity using Divergent Approaches”), at page 55.  See also Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan 
Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings 
held in Freetown, 5 August 2003, at paragraphs 34 and 35 of the transcript. 
7 See the Articles in the Lomé Peace Agreement.  See www.sierra-leone.orglomeaccord.html .  
8 Ibid. Article XXVI. 
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Cole (2003) and Zack‐Williams and Riley (1993) were deliberate attempts to destabilise the 
transitional arrangements because Sankoh was unsure of his electoral fortunes.  This 
prompted his arrest, whilst the RUF did not win a single electoral seat.  
 
Consequently, President Kabbah sent a letter of petition to the Secretary-General of the UN 
in which he requested that members of the RUF be tried:  
 
[W]ith regard to the magnitude and extent of the crimes committed, Sierra 
Leone does not have the resources or expertise to conduct trials for such 
crimes… [A special court is required] to try and bring to credible justice those 
members of the Revolutionary United Front and their accomplices responsible 
for committing crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of 
United Nations peacekeepers as hostages.9 
 
The Secretary-General’s report issued on October 4, 2000 called for the establishment of a 
court not by Security Council resolution, as had been implied in President Kabbah’s letter, 
but by agreement or treaty between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone.10  
 
Although the Government initially wanted a Court to prosecute one faction, the UN was of 
the view that the Court should prosecute all persons that bear the greatest responsibility.  
In November 2000, yet another ceasefire agreement was signed between the Government 
of Sierra Leone and the RUF, in which they reaffirmed their commitment to the LPA.11  
The impending establishment of the Special Court raised certain questions about the 
amnesty granted in the LPA.  When the LPA was adopted in 1999, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of the UN appended a hand written 
statement to his signature on the document, which read, “The United Nations holds the 
understanding that the amnesty provisions of the Agreement shall not apply to international 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.”12 This reservation by the SRSG, apparently meant that the 
                                            
9  Letter dated 12 June 2000 from President Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to the United Nations, 
addressed to the Secretary-General Kofi Annan.  See TRC Report Vol. 3B, Chapter.  6 p. 366. 
10 See the “Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone,” UN Doc. S/2000/915. 
11 See relevant articles of Ceasefire Agreement 10 November 2000.  See www.sierra-
leone.org/ceasefire1100.html.   
12The statement by the UN SRSG does not appear in the text of the Agreement as it was published 
by the United Nations (UN Doc. S/1999/777).  The Commission was however given sight of a copy 
of the Lomé Peace Agreement to which the statement was appended in handwriting.  See TRC 
Report Vol. 3B, Chapter.  6, p. 364. 
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“full amnesty” granted to all fighters was in fact not so “full.”  Indeed this was made clear 
after the signing of the agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone on 
16th January 2002, which stipulated that:  
 
‘There is hereby established a Special Court for Sierra Leone to prosecute 
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the 
territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996’.13 
 
The Statute of the Special Court actually went further in Article 10, to rescind the amnesty 
given, “an amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court 
in respect of the crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar 
to prosecution.”14 In effect by agreeing to be bound by the Statute, the Government of Sierra 
Leone had declined to be bound by the amnesty provision in the LPA. 
 
Following, critical UN, ECOWAS, and British involvement enabled a robust peacebuilding 
process whilst the LPA helped to end cessation of hostilities and initiated the formation of 
the new government of national unity, and requested, as planned, an expanded role for 
ECOMOG and UNAMSIL.  The World Bank, and other donors from the international 
community have also continually worked with the government(s) investing in long-term 
projects aimed at integrating ex-combatants and improving the economy. 
 
However, there have been arguments by some scholars that essentially the LPA was flawed 
right from its inception considering the concessions that were granted to the Foday Sankoh 
and the RUF and was also a poor agreement to which other parties should not have 
adhered.  Scholars argue that Kabbah was just interested in any deal, and as far the 
intentions of the RUF goes; ‘…they would sign just about anything’.  That Kabbah made it 
possible for Sankoh to gain amnesty and the control of diamonds, and become relevant in 
the governance of the country which was essentially what he was seeking in the first place.  
However, Hawley (1999) also agrees that, with the dynamics of the situation, it would also 
                                            
13 See Agreement Between The United Nations and The Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court For Sierra Leone, 16, January 2002.  See www.sierra-
leone.org/specialcourtagreement.html.   
14 Articles 2-4 refer to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of human 
rights law See Special Court Statute 16, January 2002.  See www.sierra-
leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html. 
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have been impossible to ignore the RUF, as that would have meant ignoring the reality on 
the ground. 
 
According to Stedman, Rothchild et al. (2002) the LPA should be deemed as a compromise 
document, which aimed to be inclusive, but was not. The TRC report echoes this when it 
reiterates that the LPA followed the power -sharing paradigm of peace negotiations 
because neither side had the military capacity to defeat the other (SLTRC 2004 3A). To this 
end, no party was apportioned any blame and there was no public nor explicit 
acknowledgement on the causes of the war, and the LPA focuses more on promises and 
manifest content.  Discussions in the literature are varied with some maintaining that to 
some extent, the interrogation of Lomé is inferred and interpretative and this is legitimised 
by the recommendations of the TRC.  
 
Subsequently, President Kabbah officially declared the country’s civil war over on 18th 
January 2002 and lifted the four-year state of emergency, ahead of the general elections in 
May.  The UN also enthusiastically announced that the disarmament of 45,000 fighters was 
complete.  In May, elections were held and overseen by NGOs to ensure that they were 
free and fair.  President Tejan Kabbah won an overwhelming 70% victory.  Sierra Leone’s 
transition from a brutal civil war to an ostensibly peaceful democracy was the result of a 
peaceful negotiated settlement.  At the time of Sierra Leone’s transition from a state of war 
to peace there were two transitional justice mechanisms that were to address the legacy of 
the past, to ensure accountability, justice and promote reconciliation amongst others- the 
TRC and the SCSL.  
 
7.3 Post-conflict environment 
Hitherto, the Liberia conflict precipitated the formation of ECOMOG as a peacekeeping 
force and up to this point had not been deployed in Sierra Leone.  But on June 27, 1997 
ECOWAS Foreign Ministers held a meeting in Guinea-Conakry and promulgated a three-
tier approach of consisting of sanctions, dialogue and ultimately the use of force to 
strategically countermand the coup d’état and its effects.  Following, a Summit of the 
Authority in Abuja from August 28-29, 1997 a Decision was taken to expand the mandate 
of ECOMOG’s action to cover Sierra Leone.  Finally, the UNSC Resolution 1132(1997) 
endorsed ECOMOG’s policies and thereby granted it more legitimacy in undertaking its 
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actions against the AFRC/RUF in the years following after brokered negotiations failed to 
be sustained. 
 
In a bid to provide a comprehensive framework, the Authority at their Summit in Lomé, Togo 
on December 10, 1999, established the ‘Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security’.  This has also been 
conceptualised into the 14 Components of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 
(2008) (ECPF). 
  
In total, Sierra Leone was brought back to the path of peace after a war spanning 10 years, 
two transitional justice mechanisms internally, one externally, and the intervention of 
ECOWAS in a myriad of ways.  There is an optimistic future for sustaining democracy in 
Sierra Leone and in an interview with Brima Kamanda he reiterated that ‘after three 
successful democratic elections we can say that ‘Never again will Sierra Leone be plunged 
into such decadence’15. 
 
The post-conflict peacebuilding commenced in 2002 but UN peacekeepers departed in 
2005 and Sierra Leone’s post-conflict environment has been sustained by several 
successful elections.  Beginning with the optimistic reforms initiated by President Kabbah 
when he won in May 2002 and finally told a relieved nation that ‘war don don16’ and 
democracy has returned to Sierra Leone.  As to whether the situation represented a stable 
foundation for the country’s future was to be evaluated into the immediate years following 
the conflict.  
 
To this end, continuous external support helped Sierra Leone make a seemingly successful 
political transition from conflict to its current state.  Successful elections conducted in 2002 
and 2007, 2012, which also saw the opposition win elections as rarely experienced in Africa 
convinced political pundits that indeed Sierra Leone is consolidating its democratic gains.  
Though, the government still relies heavily on foreign aid and finances half of the state 
budget. 
 
Post-conflict Sierra Leone is also wrought with difficulties; the UN’s Human Development 
Index continually ranks Sierra Leone at 176 out of the 177 countries surveyed or in the last 
four cases.  Arguably, there is political stability but this has been replaced by the endemic 
                                            
15 Interview, May, 2013, 
16 Literal translation from Creole is ‘the war is over’ 
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low-level insecurity associated with widespread-armed robbery, banditry, and corruption.  
For instance, in 2007, newly elected President Ernest Bai Koroma commissioned a 
presidential transition team to report on the state of the economy and corruption and 
mismanagement was reflected as permeating every level of society, from the minsters to 
schoolteachers.  Alternatively, this can be interpreted as the new normal for Sierra 
Leoneans. 
 
7.3.1 Prevailing governance structures 
Sierra Leone receives wide ranging donor aid and support from the international community 
aimed at rebuilding and strengthening state structures and institutions and promoting 
democracy, again.  These include bilateral and multilateral institutions and a variety of 
development oriented organisations. These organisations are present and active in the 
country, contributing to the post-conflict agenda and in most instances lead the processes. 
Many of the initiatives focus specifically on electoral and elections support and 
strengthening parliamentary development.  There is however the pervading issue of what 
happens ‘after they are gone’ and the state assumes complete responsibility for all these 
initiatives it would have inherited. 
 
The politics of peace in Sierra Leone is predominantly determined by the normative 
framework and practices of contemporary international peacebuilding missions.  The 
indicators used for these include liberalised reforms, democratising civil society support and 
core components of the state-building projects.  These were all in a bid to provide a viable 
post-conflict environment but some scholars view these as not necessarily connected to the 
realities of post-conflict Sierra Leone.  This is because, arguments have surfaced calling 
into question the relevance and complementarity of these with respect to the country’s 
complex political history, troubled national economy, deeply fractured society, and ruined 
environment.  
 
Many challenges anticipated and articulated include discussions centring on the aftermath 
of the UN withdrawal and when the international community whittles down its human 
resource base and the country has to take over all its institutions and lead on major 
development strategies.  In addition, there is the notion that local priorities and strategies 
were not employed in the peacebuilding programmes in the immediate post-conflict 
environment and the efficacy and appropriateness of the international support might leave 
a vacuum, which could itself become a source of conflict. 
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 ‘Local people were not consulted in most of these post-conflict peace processes.  I 
am a Chief, and as such I am an embodiment of the traditions of the paramountcy, 
however, though I am a law maker and a traditional ruler, I do not know any program 
aimed at community peacebuilding…I think something like that happened in 
Rwanda17?  Not Sierra Leone…I was in no position to initiate as I was not a chief 
by then and afterwards it all seem like the political elites had high-jacked the 
progress to peacebuilding plans, as a way...I think, of legitimising themselves as 
leaders.  May be not to appear before the people as servants’ (Brima Victor Sidi 
Kebbie, EMP, Sierra Leone, Interview, May 2013)18. 
 
7.4 Parliament of Sierra Leone 
The Sierra Leone Parliament (also called House of Representatives) is the country’s 
supreme law-making body.  It is a unicameral legislature comprising the Speaker, 112 
Ordinary Members and 12 Paramount Chiefs.  It was inaugurated as a Legislative Council, 
characteristic of other former British colonies (1863), but was renamed House of 
Representatives in 1954. 
 
Sierra Leone’s parliament of the first decade of independence (1961-70) is nominally 
referred to as the ‘golden age’.  This is because it symbolises a defining moment in the 
development of the parliament a prominent forum for promoting dialogue, active debates 
on the economy and building infrastructure in a nascent democracy and passing laws as a 
functioning legislature19 determined to structure and lead the country’s post-independence 
development plans. Contrary to norm, these active political debates became a source of 
conflict between the majority and minority caucuses in the House; cooperation between the 
parties was non-existent and their relationship(s) were severely fractured, tenuous and 
antagonistically partisan.  
 
Following, the elections of 1967 served as a watershed moment in the country’s 
parliamentary history. First, the results giving the All People’s Congress (APC) a slim 
                                            
17 Referring to the Gacaca System of Rwanda 
18 He is also a Paramount Chief and the younger brother of Kamanda 
19 Few women opted for elective parliamentary office due, in part, to the extreme violence that 
characterised elections.  However, the Sierra Leone Parliament had made history in 1957 when it 
welcomed its first elected female member, the 
Honourable Paramount Chief Madam Ella Koblo Gulama of Kaiyamba Chiefdom (Moyamba District).  
Six years later, Madam Ella Koblo Gulama set another record when she was appointed Minister 
without Portfolio.  She became the first female Cabinet Minister in West Africa in 1964. 
 
 243 
  
majority, over the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) were highly disputed; and secondly, 
whilst these post-elections tensions intensified the army took advantage and staged a coup 
d’état, and immediately dissolved parliament.  Though Parliament was reinstated and 
reconvened in 1968, the fractious political rifts widened and MPs became increasingly non-
cooperative and uncompromising. 
 
Subsequently, the Parliament’s development was significantly impacted on April 19, 1971, 
when the MPs declared Sierra Leone a Republic and promptly voted for an executive 
presidency system. Thus the serving Prime Minister Siaka Stevens, transformed into 
President Siaka Stevens, wielding very wide executive powers.  
 
According to Bangura (2004:13-40) and  Davies (2010:60-61) this paradigm shift set in 
motion a decline in the powers of the parliament almost mirroring the phenomenal rise in 
the authority of the President.  Consequently, the 1978 Constitution adopted by Parliament 
effectively established Sierra Leone as a one-party state with the APC as the only legitimate 
political party. It was only the wave of democratisation from the late 1980s and early 1990s 
which revived the ideals of multi-party democracy in Sierra Leone as was evident in many 
developing countries after the Cold War. 
 
Thus President Joseph Momoh creditably set up a constitutional review commission in 
October 1990, to review the tenets of one-party rule enshrined in the 1978 constitution with 
the aim to open up the political space and promote dialogue and good governance (Reno 
1998:121, Davies 2010:60). The Commission’s report (submitted January 1991) 
recommended amongst others; re-instituting multi-party system governance, and a viable 
separation of powers between the three branches of government (legislative, executive, 
and judiciary).  The Parliament approved this constitution in July 1991, however the course, 
conditions, and triggers for war were already in motion. 
 
Therefore, as a coup d’état was staged and the civil war began promptly afterwards, these 
events severely truncated the parliament’s development and activities.  For instance, in a 
bid to restore semblance of peace and a democratic environment it is argued Sierra Leone 
bowed to domestic and international pressure and prematurely held the 1996 February and 
March elections (Pham 2006:115, Olonisakin 2008). These elections were characterised by 
aggravated attacks by the RUF in a bid to stop these elections and this was the era of the 
notorious amputations dubbed ‘long sleeves’ or ‘short sleeves’ depicting the extent of forced 
and barbaric amputations carried out on civilians in response to the SLPP campaign slogan 
‘the future is in your hands’.  As many as fifteen political parties participated which was a 
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first in Sierra Leone and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s SLPP won and became President (Riley 
1996, Gberie 2005, Pham 2006). 
 
As this was a period in which a lot of Sierra Leoneans were still IDPs or refugees the 
electoral commission had to come up with ingenious ways to make the elections 
representative enough, and also legitimate.  Thus, MPs for instance were elected through 
a proportional representation (PR) system and this served as a catalyst for election of 
women into the House20.  
 
The year 1996 looked as though it could be ideal for stability in Sierra Leone but was also 
short-lived as another coup d’état on May 25, 1997 disrupted the democratic process.  In a 
rare move some MPs defied the dissolution of the Parliament and rather denounced the 
coup, calling it an illegitimate takeover and demanded the return of the ousted President 
Kabbah.  Finally constitutional rule was restored in March 1998. 
 
The formal conclusion of the war in 2002 is the turning point for returning long-term 
democracy sustaining efforts at consolidating peace.  This made it possible for general 
elections to be conducted in a relatively peaceful atmosphere, under a modified PR 
arrangement.  The SLPP again emerged as the majority party in Parliament and served in 
that capacity for five years.  
 
 The 2007 national elections were the first since the war for which the government was fully 
responsible (so-called ‘second generation’ elections) seen as a precursor to political, social, 
and economic recovery.  The new Parliament became Sierra Leone’s most diverse as it 
was also elected under a single-member constituency system of voting.  
 
‘The mistake in the past was to have this winner take all mentality; then 
following the early post-conflict elections, we had this mentality of ‘it is our turn 
to eat’ but now we recognise that, a parliament is about compromises and 
agreeing to disagree, especially as the whole of ECOWAS has invested social 
capital…into the country.  My optimism rest in the fact that, remarkably, the 
current parliament has a lot of young, budding and well-educated politicians…it 
is safe to say, our parliamentary development is coming full circle…? (Brima 
Victor Sidi Kebbie, Interview May 2013). 
                                            
20 Subsequently their numbers increased in 2002 when PR became expanded and has been steadily 
increasing up to the current parliament. 
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Table 7.1: Chronology of Sierra Leone’s Parliamentary Development 
Source: Compiled by author using data www.ipu.org; (Hills 2011, Harris 2012, Jalloh 2013) 
 
 
Thus the November 17, 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections were thus critical in 
the democratic and post-conflict peacebuilding development of Sierra Leone for several 
reasons. 
 
First, the 1991 constitution establishes that the election of the president and the legislature 
are to be held every five years, and this had been adhered to from the end of the war in 
2002 when the country returned to constitutional rule. Second, The National Provisional 
Ruling Council (NPRC) the junta which took power in April 1992, handed over to a 
democratically elected government of the (SLPP) in 1996; then SLPP in power for two 
consecutive five year terms (1996- 2007), handed over to President Ernest Bai Koroma and 
his (APC) party in 2007. Thus these two dominant parties had both been in power and 
opposition reflecting a democratic trend hitherto not experienced in pre-war times. 
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Third, the Sierra Leone National Electoral Commission (NEC), announced nine presidential 
candidates, 602 nominees from various parties for parliamentary elections, and 1,624 
nominees for municipal/local council elections as duly registered for the 2012 elections.  
 
Fourth, the NEC had however instituted measures with the help of ECOWAS and other 
partners in the build up to the elections, which were geared towards ensuring a free, fair 
campaigning period and credible and legitimate elections. These were aimed at pre, during 
and post-elections conflict management as well.  
 
These measures included the introduction of a Biometric Voter Registration System(BVRS) 
to help ensure the principle of ‘one vote per person’ as depicted by the voter distribution 
setting in Figure 7.3; establishment of an Electoral Offences Court; establishment of a 
special military force to be deployed on election day to work in partnership with civilians; 
the use of a ‘Situation Room’ by the National Elections Watch (NEW) as a coordinating and 
information Centre for all results and all election related news; as well as the development 
of an Integrated Elections Security Strategy. 
 
Additionally, a joint AU-ECOWAS assessment mission initiated a pre-election fact-finding 
mission to Sierra Leone in September 30-October 5, 201221 as a strategy to help ascertain 
anticipated challenges that might threaten the conduct of the November 2012 elections in 
a bid to act as an early warning try to neutralise these before the polls. Following, ECOWAS 
then dispatched 150 election observers comprising MPs, CSOs, NGOs, and donors 
Community to monitor, observe and report on the conduct of the polls.  
 
According to EW country manager, in spite of all these measures; 
 
‘The 2012 electioneering campaign still had all the ingredients of bickering, 
accusations and counter-accusations by supporters of various parties as well 
as candidates but the elections were successfully undertaken. The major 
challenges rested on polarization of the media along partisan lines; Electoral 
Violence; Ethnicity and Gender disparity; Fear and Intimidation; Lack of 
adequate voter/civic education by the NEC. Some parliamentary candidates of 
the main SLPP party were disenfranchised by delaying their cases in court until 
                                            
21 In conformity with Article 11 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) of the African Union and as part of the implementation of the Decision on the Report 
of the Panel of the Wise on Strengthening the Role of the African Union in the Prevention, 
Management and Resolution of Election Related Disputes and Violent Conflicts in Africa, adopted 
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU, held in Sirte, Libya, in July 2009, 
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the lapse of the deadline for nominations. This prevented them from being 
nominated and thus their political aspirations remain dormant. However 
ECOWAS played a vital role in supporting all the electoral aspects to their 
logical conclusion’ (Claude Kondor, country manager, EWD, Guinea and Sierra 
Leone, ECOWAS Commission, Interview, May 2013). 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Voter Distribution-November 2012 Elections 
Source: ECOWAS Early Warning Report (Confidential) for Sierra Leone, November 2013, 
reproduced with permission from the Early Warning Department, ECOWAS Commission, and 
Nigeria 
 
The Parliament elected from the November 2012 elections is the Fourth Parliament (2012 
– 2017) of the Second Republic of Sierra Leone, and the fourth since constitutional rule was 
restored in 1996 in compliance with section 74 (1) of the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone. 
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It comprises of only the two most prominent political parties representation, that is the SLPP 
(42 seats) and APC (67 seats), a total of 15 women and 12 Paramount Chiefs22. 
 
The Parliament has 32 constituted Committees made up of seven (7) House related 
Committees including those designated for specific tasks such as vetting of appointees by 
the Office of the President and a Legislative Committee to analyse draft Bills.  Three (3) are 
finance related committees (Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Finance Committee and 
the Transparency and Accountability Committee), whilst the remaining twenty-two (22) are 
subject related oversight committees covering different MDAs (Ministries, departments and 
Agencies) in the executive23, Committee Sittings are open to the general public, a strategy 
aimed at broadening the democratic space for participation. 
 
Sierra Leone’s Parliament against the background of the dynamics within which it exists 
cannot be said to be one that can perform its traditional as in its post-conflict context, it is 
an unusual political environment in which it has to operate. 
 
‘It would be easy to perceive parliament as being important in the post-conflict 
agenda, if it had a vibrant opposition, but parliament is not going to be 
significant over the next two years, if the MPs do not work harder towards 
citizens’ participation in conflict prevention activities.  Some Civil society 
members have been accused by MPs of overstepping their mandate in 
implementing programmes but we all know that it is because the MPs feel 
CSOs write wining proposals and that the resources were intended for 
parliament’s peace work, but this is not the case…We have formal and informal 
relationships with parliament, and we do our best, sometimes we succeed in 
collaborating with them, at other times, it falls apart and we go at it alone…but 
relationships have improved…for a while now….’ (Chukuemeka 
 
 
 
                                            
22 For more on Sierra Leone’s Parliaments over the years , see http://ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/2281_A.htm 
23 Each Committee is headed by a Chairman and a Deputy Chairman and generally has 16 members 
with certain exceptions.  The Committees in the Parliament are serviced by 14 Committee clerks, 
which imply that most of the clerks manage at least two committees.  One positive aspect is that 
generally Committee meetings are open to the public.  See more at 
http://www.parliament.gov.sl/AboutUs/History.aspx 
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However the MPs responded that indeed: 
 
‘Some CSOs overstep their mandate by trying to be an alternative government 
and dictate to MPs how to make decisions on specific bills.  Sometimes, it is 
evident some donors use CSOs to drive their agenda in parliament, while others 
are caught up in the political game’, and gradually discredit sitting MPs and 
contest incumbents, win and leave their CSO jobs and come to parliament on 
the pretext of, “we have been peace practitioners, so we do not only talk, we 
can do the work as well”; we know them, we can name them in parliament…’ 
(Brima Kamanda, Interview May 2013) 
 
Additionally, other MPs intimated in discussions that, the challenges emanates from the 
effect of truncated parliamentary development in the context of the conflicts the country has 
endured from independence.  That many laws have been passed by preceding Parliaments, 
whereas newer legislatures end up passing similar or same on issues without recourse to 
prior relevant legislation amendments.  Therefore, Sierra Leone's regulatory framework is 
in some cases contradictory, making access to justice difficult and the outcome of recourse 
unpredictable.  This has made the current parliament wary of passing legislation on regional 
or sub-regional treaties without thorough research, and as such the ECOWAS laws are well 
internalised.  
 
 
‘The Parliament of Sierra Leone recognises itself as having a formal and legal 
relationship with the ECOWAS Parliament because it is signatory to the 
Revised Treaty, the Protocol establishing the Parliament and also because the 
parliament has been able to work consistently with the parliament on several 
issues especially to consolidate it democratic gains in the post- conflict 
environment up to the present’ (Victoria Saidu Kamara, Interview, June 2013),  
 
7.5 Formal Conflict Prevention initiatives 
ECOWAS-P members in various discussions emphatically affirm how they help to 
guarantee conflict prevention by promoting conflict-sensitive legislation.  These include laws 
covering a range of issues which cause or trigger conflicts as has been experienced or 
through the MRU associated conflicts.  
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Table 7.2 ECPF Components and National benchmarks 
Source: Analysed and developed by author using data from the ECPF and enacted laws by the Parliament of Sierra 
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At every level is the ‘Democracy and Political governance’ sector whereas other 
mainstreamed themes include issue of equality and equity in the distribution of resources, 
access to education, and employment opportunities.  
 
In several discussions, Sierra Leonean EMPs variously reiterated how the ECOWAS-P’s 
emphasis on the tenets of the ECPF has helped the country to gradually focus on conflict 
prevention legislation at the national level. In discussing this correlation as represented in 
Table 7.2 within the context of the 14 components of the ECPF, it is evident that laws are 
attuned to the main ideals of the ECPF and indeed other international benchmarks. 
 
Clearly, some Acts make an explicit correlation while others are implicit and thus difficult to 
clearly determine. For instance, it is easy to impute a correlation between the regional guide 
employed at the national level in moving forward laws aimed at improving and strengthening 
elections, and overtly political components. However, for a critical component like ‘early 
warning’ is not easily determined under a particular framework as it comprises of multiple 
actors but needs to be located centrally.  It cuts across good governance and could also be 
translated as early warning for issues arising out of the other components like natural 
resource governance for example, indiscriminate felling of trees in an area, or sale of blood 
diamonds, or lack of equity in the educational sector which in this case are all triggers that 
can plunge the country back to war. Thus early warning is relevant beyond only ‘physical’ 
conflict.  
 
Additionally, the manager responsible for Sierra Leone’s Early Warning at the ECOWAS 
Commission Claude Kondor expressed scepticism at the capacity of the EMPs to 
adequately link these components, or deem it a role they play:  
 
‘I am not saying it is ambiguous, I am just saying it has multiple implications 
and this complicates the work of MPs, and their understanding of issues. This 
makes it cumbersome communicating with MPs at both the regional and the 
national level since you cannot determine who ‘you should give the information 
to.at the same time the information is usually technical and confidential…  MPs 
feel the need to share information easily and as such you are not sure if you 
should entrust sensitive information to them. Also, the reporting lines at the 
Commission are clear, and MPs are not in my line of reporting back… We only 
inform them, and early warning means more than just passing on information 
or being in the know.  Sometimes even in early warning situations it is still like 
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a war zone and there is not much an MP can do in those circumstances without 
an army unit support, or the executive…unfortunately, sometimes, the MPs 
themselves are even part of the problem’ (Claude Kondor, Interview, May 
2013). 
 
7.5.1 Ordinary Sessions  
Since its inauguration, challenges with peace and security in Sierra Leone has consistently 
been presented in the ECOWAS-P’s sessions as intricately linked to the whole of the MRU, 
especially with the notion of an instigating role by Liberia.  This is prominently reflected in 
activities and initiatives employed by the ECOWAS-P and at the national level there are 
also advanced country-led and specific initiative aimed at establishing a relationship with 
the parliament in an ‘individual’ capacity and not as an MRU sub-region. 
 
 
EMPs affirmed that by virtue of their representational function, their sphere of competence 
includes mediation enabling them to facilitate dialogue, carry out sensitisation and public 
outreach programmes aimed at promoting tolerance, social cohesion, and cultural 
partnerships in their countries and national constituencies.  However, in spite of their best 
efforts and willingness in these ventures, mediation gets impeded by lack of access to 
technical and financial resources, and sometimes misunderstanding on the exact role of the 
EMPs as they sometimes imbibe the role without the essential experience needed. 
 
 
As the main business of the ECOWAS-P commenced coincidentally with the era when 
Sierra Leone had just returned to democratic governance related reports are focused on 
consolidation of democratic ideals. Additionally, the formal declaration of the end of the war 
in January 2002 signalled a new beginning for Sierra Leone thus for instance the First 
(March 2009) and Second (September) Ordinary Sessions contained country reports with 
the following introduction: 
 
‘Sierra Leone is peaceful and continues to show an unflinching commitment to 
the ideals of ECOWAS and other international organisations to which she is 
party.  The Country has in this vein tabled a bill establishing a Youth 
Commission in the course of domesticating and implementing the ECOWAS 
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youth policy’1.  It goes on to relate that, the ‘political situation in the country is 
peaceful except for a few isolated cases, and then the outstanding issue of 
Yenga.  Mostly laws that were enacted or in the process, as well as institutions 
being established were also communicated.  These included the Environmental 
Protection Act, Chieftaincy Bill amongst others2. 
 
Sessions spanning 2010-2013 however, report processes centred on ensuring free, fair and 
credible elections thus these were focused on signing of Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOUs) by dominant political parties leading up to the elections, and other stakeholders on 
electoral preparedness to keep general security trending positively. 
 
 
7.5.2 Fact-finding missions 
Initiatives undertaken in the ECOWAS-P are subsumed under, and characterised by sub-
regional approaches in the MRU since its establishment. As early as 2002, the ECOWAS-
P undertook the first mission to the region (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) with regard 
to the issue of convincing the LURD to return to the efforts of mediation and negotiations 
that had stalled, and also to ascertain the grievances they had which led to their 
disengagement from the processes. 
 
This initiative had been supported because, CSOs, UN, AU, and national MPs raised 
concerns on the exacerbating situation, and this needed to be checked.  At the same time, 
it could also halt democratic integration ideals of ECOWAS in the region.  
 
Thus, against this background, the parliament mandated the MPs undertake the mission 
led by the Speaker at the time with specific terms of reference and a methodology on how 
to execute the mission.3.  Members of the mission4 were equipped with an approved seven 
day schedule to engage the following stakeholders:   
 
 
                                            
1 2nd Ordinary Session, Abuja, 07-22 September 2009, Sierra Leone Country Report 
2 Ibid. Country Report 
3 ECOWAS Parliament 2003 Annual Report themed ‘The Community Parliament: For Peace in the 
West African region; and democratisation of the integration process Pgs. 11-18 
4 Comprising twelve MPs (two women and ten men from Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia) 
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Sierra Leone (July 17-21 2002)5 
 President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (at the Presidential Lodge) 
 Deputy Foreign Minister 
 Members of Parliament 
 Staff of Ministry of Development and Economic Planning6 
 National Electoral Commission (NEC)  
 Civil Society Movement 
 
This was the preliminary mission that secured a commitment from the Inter-Religious 
Council of Liberia to participate in the LURD meetings in Freetown (February 5-8, 2003).  In 
the same meeting LURD then articulated their grievances, while the MPs discussed 
modalities for a peaceful resolution by convincing them to agree to dialogue.7  The 
association with the Inter-Religious Council was also very strategic as they were tasked 
with acting as the main contact with the LURD, and ended up ensuring that the negotiated 
safe passage was available till they arrived in Freetown.  Prior, then Speaker of Parliament, 
Ali Nouhoum Diallo requested free access for the LURD delegation through Guinean 
territory to which the government obliged, which then President of Sierra Leone, Ahmed 
Tejan Kabbah agreed as the venue for the meeting.8 
 
A critical recommendation emanating from the first mission discussed in parliament was to 
make imperative a meeting between the ‘two warring parties’ which are the government of 
Liberia and the LURD of Sierra Leone to negotiate their differences9.  This outcome is a 
credit to the parliament as the stalemate between LURD and the Heads of State had made 
progress to resolving these crises more protracted. This thus precipitated the need for the 
second mission to the MRU region. 
 
The parliamentary delegation embarked on the second mission by paying courtesy calls to 
the diplomatic missions of Ghana, Guinea, and Nigeria to discuss the nature of their 
mission. Specifically, expectations advanced by LURD, and also share updates on the 
parliament’s achievements. The respective ambassadors unanimously supported the 
                                            
5 Mission Report Pgs. 1.12-1.14 
6 Ministry responsible for integration 
7 Page 3 Mission Report: Second Mission to the MRU region; February 5-8, 2003; March 9-18, 2003 
8 Page 3; Mission Report: Second Mission to the MRU region; February 5-8, 2003; March 9-18, 2003 
9 Page 2; Mission Report: Second Mission to the MRU region; February 5-8, 2003 and March 9-18, 
2003 
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peaceful resolution initiatives of the parliament and were subsequently invited to participate 
in the meeting.10 
 
The delegation also called on then Vice President of Sierra Leone, Dr Solomon Barewa11 
to express the ECOWAS-P’s gratitude for the logistical support and use of facilities in 
hosting meetings.  In response, the Vice President reiterated the firm resolve of Sierra 
Leone in not only maintaining peace, but also ensuring other countries like Liberia become 
peaceful.  Once, again, the notion of Liberia being the instigator of conflicts was once again 
inherent in the speeches, as explicitly articulated by the Vice President:  
 
 ‘…despite the fact that the war in Sierra Leone was a direct result of Sierra 
Leone’s acceptance to allow ECOMOG to use its territory as a launching pad 
for its activities in Liberia, and for freely accepting Liberians refugees into their 
homes.  This time Sierra Leone would give its utmost support but would also 
do everything to guarantee its hard-earned peace and stability’.  Adding that, 
the issues should be resolved through dialogue’.12 
 
At the meeting including stakeholders from the ECOWAS-P, MRU MPs and LURD.  After 
deliberations yielded positive outcomes as Joe Gbala the LURD representative signed a 
Communiqué in the presence of Sheikh Kafumba Konneh (Liberia Inter-religious Council) 
and the Reverend Moses B. Khanu (Inter-religious Council of Sierra Leone) committing to 
re-engage discussions whilst communicating their grievances. This is celebrated as a major 
achievement for the ECOWAS-P because it was at a period that LURD reengaged with 
notions of seeking peaceful resolutions which they deemed had been complicated by 
meddling executives of the region creating a trust deficit.   
 
According to Bernadette Lahai13, current issues are that of consolidating democratic gains 
rather than reporting conflict within the MRU. This is because there are recognised political 
spots that act as triggers. For instance ‘Yenga is still an outstanding problem, especially as 
                                            
10 Page 5; Mission Report: Second Mission to the MRU region; February 5-8, 2003 and March 9-18, 
2003 
11 This was on behalf of the President Tejan Kabbah who was at that time performing the Hajj 
Pilgrimage in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; Page 5-6 Mission Report: Second Mission to the MRU region; 
February 5-8, 2003 and March 9-18, 2003 
12 Page 6; Mission Report: Second Mission to the MRU region; February 5-8, 2003 and March 9-18, 
2003 
 
13 Former member ECOWAS-P (2008-2011), Deputy Minority Leader, Parliament of Sierra Leone 
(2012-2017); Interview June 2013 
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elections are coming up, what happens in terms of registration and voting with such a 
porous border is bound to be a melting pot of great conflict’. 
 
7.5.3 Electoral governance 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Political Party Representation Elections 2012 
Source: reproduced with permission from the Early Warning Department ECOWAS Commission, 
Nigeria 
 
The area coded green is the political stronghold of the SLPP mostly populated by the Mende 
ethnic group of the opposition leader Julius Maada Bio. The red area also holds more 
political fortunes for the APC party populated by the three ethnic groups Temne, Limba, and 
Loko of President Ernest Bai Koroma who was then the Illustratively, this is indicative of the 
fact that both political parties relatively have equal voter support, though allegedly each 
party continue to make inroads across the political divides. It can however be illustrative of 
voting being done along regional and ethnic affiliations in Sierra Leone.   
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According to Claude Kondor:  
 
‘Also, some of the potential opposition candidates whose cases were delayed 
in court by the Judiciary quickly denounced their parties and joined the ruling 
party. Their cases were decided quickly and they got party symbols to run for 
the ruling party’. 
 
As presented in Table 7.2 ECPF Components and National benchmarks, it is evident that 
several national legislations and initiatives were undertaken to ensure elections and related 
activities do not become a trigger for disturbing the peaceful dispensation the country has 
enjoyed the end of the war. 
 
7.6 Informal Conflict Prevention initiatives 
7.6.1 Networks and CSOs 
Sierra Leone’s civil society traditions are not well developed but the prospects of 
democratisation especially in the post-conflict environment propelled many activists and 
organisations to establish a landscape and create opportunities all aimed at rebuilding the 
country (BTI 2010). 
 
However, EMPs indicated that collaboration with various CSOs ranged on issues including; 
training women as policy advocates; helping to create confidence in the government’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) agenda and communications strategies on 
citizen positive ownership of the national development processes. These were important 
because: 
 
‘…Poverty is crippling our potential and if Sierra Leone is to become relevant 
in the world’s economy, we need support and help to get back on our feet. We 
are continually at the bottom of all development indicators…These therefore 
puts us in a vulnerable position as everyone is ready to offer help, we are not 
complaining; help is good, but not all help is good help for the country, that is 
where the challenges are hidden’...’  (Bernadette Lahai, Interview, May 2013) 
 
The general consensus emphasised CSOs as a knowledge base and learning outcomes 
partner. This is because their mandate and areas of expertise vary from projects at the 
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country’s borders, within the MRU to thematic governance sectors locating them at the core 
of receiving first-hand information from grassroots. 
Additionally, they demonstrate commitment to the issues of conflict transformation and non-
violent communication by setting up parallel committees to work with local communities and 
security personnel on various issues to reduce tensions in border areas and on ethnic 
issues.  
 
However, CSOs continue to confront challenges in working to their full potential and these 
include access to resources, low political leverage with CSO leaders employing the strategy 
of ‘activism’ rather than process or dialogue. Also the political environment creates the 
impression of some CSOs as ‘favourites’ of the political leadership, when they are not 
political, and benefit from political patronage. This tends to hinder the integration of civil 
society’s differing views into political processes as its limited and lacks credibility. 
 
EMPs raised concerns on the challenges of collaborating with CSOs over time in Sierra 
Leone. The relationships after several elections steadily created an emerging pattern which 
questions CSOs neutrality and levels of mistrust persistently cloud these interactions, which 
is a setback in the nascent MP-CSOs relationship.  Conversely, CSOs harbour reservations 
on capacity of MPs to perform their duties creditably and relatedly MPs perceive CSO 
leaders as scheming to oust them, and take over their seats in parliaments. 
 
‘Most of these NGOs and CSO leaders come to Parliament under the pretext 
of collaboration only to exploit our weaknesses and use it to campaign for our 
seats.  If you like do the maths of how many CSO leaders were elected to 
Parliament in the 2007 elections, or even 2012, there are a lot of them so now 
we are wary of any initiatives they propose.  We prefer to propose and then 
they can join us, after all we are all working in the interest of Mama Salone’ 
(Brima Kamanda, Interview, May 2013). 
 
Additionally, a main challenge articulated by CSOs are their activities; uncoordinated and 
fragmented. Inherently these imply problems with accountability, with most having no 
clearly defined sphere with organisations working over any sector that attracts funding or 
deemed as the new area to explore. 
 
 259 
  
7.6.2 Early Warning 
The ECOWAS early warning system (ECOWARN) generated graph presented in Figure 7.5  
demonstrates the developments in the political and security situation in Sierra Leone 
(January - October 2012).  The months of March and April have an upward turn as this was 
the period when UN supported Sierra Leone war crimes court sitting at The Hague, 
completed proceedings and convicted  former Liberian leader Charles Taylor of aiding and 
abetting war crimes in Sierra Leone, and amassing millions of dollars in arms trade. A slight 
rise in May is interpreted as due to political tensions among the youth and the opposition 
parties impacted more by the visit of UN Security Council members to Sierra Leone to hold 
discussions with political stakeholders.  
 
 
Figure 7.5: Political and Security Situation Graph 
Source: EWS Department, ECOWAS Early Warning Report (Confidential) for Sierra Leone, 
November 2013 reproduced with permission   
 
Reflective of election year dynamics, an undulating trend emerged from June to August as 
the era was characterised by increases in nomination fees for political contestant 
announced by the Chairperson of NEC advancing agitation among political parties, as well 
reactions to the establishment of an Electoral Offences Court to cases of election related 
misconducts. The sharp rise in October (27 and 28) is registered because political violence 
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flared up between rival party supporters in the Kono district leaving ten people gravely 
injured. The movement of the graph into the pink zone portrays warning with a potential to 
touch the red which is the ‘danger zone’ and at this stage if there is delay in addressing the 
threats and challenges raised by the ECOWARN report then serious conflict can occur.  
 
7.7 Assessing effectiveness of these initiatives 
There is evident correlation on commitment to translate the regional level conflict prevention 
activities and strategies into national laws, and adapt to Sierra Leone’s context. This was 
more pronounced in all discussions as EMPs asserted that, as a post-conflict country, 
diligence in monitoring these laws was core to their duty to prevent reoccurrence of war. 
 
These efforts are also well reflected in sensitization missions undertaken at the country 
level to educate the populace about the ECOWAS-P as well as communicate the need for 
maintaining peace. Additionally, these opportunities are used to push for curricula 
improvements in the educational system on peace education beginning with basic levels. 
 
The outstanding estimated issue is how to measure the impact of various peace- building 
or conflict prevention programmes within which the national parliament has had to work. As 
against the backdrop of the atrocities that occurred, there are a myriad of actors, peace 
agreements, accords, then transition related agreements and then post-conflict frameworks 
as depicted in Table 7.3 all serving to put pressure on MPs at any given time on how to 
proceed and measure progress. The parliament with no set framework has to be subjected 
to existing evaluations usually undertaken from the CSOs, INGOs or donor with their own 
set indicators and areas of emphasis. 
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Table 7.3: Major Actors and Strategies on Post-conflict Peacebuilding 
Source: Compiled based on research and analysis undertaken on the respective institutions 
 
 
Progressively, the political landscape keeps improving and renewing itself; cronyism and 
the old patronage systems have unravelled with respect to urban versus rural politics and 
these hopefully will yield positive democratic results into the future.  Significantly, there is 
an outstanding question bordering on a cliché; ’what do we do after they are gone?’  This 
question borders on the consequences of what to expect with the impact of the withdrawal 
of development partners most especially the UN organisations and other western.  
Incredibly, by 2008 most of these international donors had scaled down or pulled out but 
still supported the country in the elections for 2012.  At the same time, some of the 
organisations have also reviewed their mandates to continue support in various 
development programmes. 
 
The elections of 2012 proved a bigger test for the fledgling democratic structures of Sierra 
Leone as it served to build on gains from the two previous elections.  Contrary to public 
opinion, it did not generate into electoral fall outs and crises that had been witnessed in 
Togo in a preceding election in the region and as such, the assumption is currently held, 
that the people and politicians of Sierra Leone, collectively recognise that, ultimately, the 
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peace and stability of Sierra Leone depends on their collective commitment and action to 
progress. 
 
As relates to SSR, Sierra Leone’s immediate past places advances difficulties with the 
development of a comprehensive security framework because of the role of the different 
players discussed above. Therefore, the ECPF presents the best approach as it merges all 
the experiences from the different sectors in context to West Africa. Sierra Leone’s 
immediate post-war era’s security was regarded as more important than any other political 
or economic indicator, but gradually the focus has shifted to a framework of a security-
development nexus (Duffield 2001, Duffield 2014) encapsulated in the ECPF. 
 
 This simultaneous nexus according to (Berdal 2009) acknowledges that security and 
development ‘are mutually reinforcing and need to be pursued in parallel’ (Berdal 2009:96). 
However, several challenges hinged on how to legislate on cultural practices, for inasmuch 
as there is a regional framework for governing prevention initiatives, cultural practices 
permeate all levels of the social life and as such are critical.  These include the practices of 
female genital mutilation and Secret Societies, which continually prevail despite several 
activities aimed at ending them.   
 
At the same time, Sierra Leone still grapples with its resource endowment challenges and 
the most sustainable approach currently being utilised by MPs is employing the regional 
framework together with traditional leaders and communities. Additionally, prevailing 
existing security threats include persistent of militia command structures, paramilitary some 
of which have coalesced into private security companies, outstanding Special Court 
indictments, pervading youth unemployment, unreformed cultural practices and traditions, 
entrenched chieftaincy structures and the re-emergence of the north-south political 
proclivities.  
 
Nevertheless, these threats have failed to materialise to the degree that has been 
forecasted by academics and political pundits and this could be an indication and testament 
to the will of the citizenry to make democratic strides into the future, and nor trigger a 
reoccurrence of the past. 
 
These are more in line with arguments presented by Graben and Fitz-Gerald (2013) to 
comprise the inclusive involvement of community members for development and 
construction projects; the use of culturally responsive practices in community building; 
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leadership that is directly connected with the community; and the combination of traditional 
and local development practices with western and governmental practices. 
  
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed Sierra Leone in its post-conflict context by giving a background of 
its conflict years and its prevailing structures. There was also an exegesis though formal 
and informal activities on how national legislation has benefitted from regional level 
framework. Additionally, there is an assessment on these initiatives and the inherent 
challenges that are predominant as the country continues to consolidate on democratic 
gains. 
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8. Chapter Eight: Analysis and Research Findings 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the analysis and findings from measuring the processes and 
practices of the parliament through the effectiveness tool. The previous chapters discussed 
the efforts of the ECOWAS-P towards conflict prevention at the institutional and country 
level determining the way policy has worked, and how these innovations are sometimes 
informal, and maximises normative strengths. Drawing on these inferences including 
respondent’s views, this chapter also focuses on other stakeholder accounts on different 
aspects of conflict prevention.  
 
Admittedly, utilising empirical evidence is challenging but in in this context, it is less limiting 
to operationalize the tool in this way by availing the evidence articulated by MPs and 
stakeholders leading to the core of what is practiced and experienced. Additionally, it 
evaluates the extent to which the parliament is effective or not, and assesses the implication 
of applying the tool. The chapter also discusses the questions raised in this research and 
factors affecting effectiveness. 
 
Therefore it discusses these in Section 8.2 Applying the tool for measuring effectiveness 
while Section 8.3 Assessment: A tool for measuring effectiveness? Discusses the viability 
of developing this kind of tool. Section 8.4 makes normative evaluations and Section 8.5 
evaluates the prospect of the parliament for conflict prevention within the context of its 
power, and new prospects for strengthening these and Section 8.6 presents the conclusion. 
 
8.2 Applying the tool for measuring effectiveness 
 
This tool does not claim to solve the practical problems of how to measure legislative 
effectiveness at the regional level. Thus it is necessary to delineate the parameters under 
this measurement is undertaken.  
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First, the effectiveness of the ECOWAS-P as an institution under total West African 
integration is not the focus here, nor is its institutional effectiveness on the content and 
quantum of ECOWAS legislation. 
 
Second, in keeping with the effects of its normative strategies institutionally, the focus is on 
how the Parliament’s derives content and effectively caries it out through procedure, 
implements, and measure outputs. 
 
Third, the intention here is not to proffer conclusions about the ECOWAS-P’s effectiveness 
in conflict prevention in comparison to the other collective ECOWAS institutions, but rather 
to develop the parliament’s relative effectiveness under its institutional framework and 
mandate as provided for under the Revised Treaty, and what it normatively practices. 
 
Finally, the main dependent variable for the analysis is thus the change resultant in the 
content of the intentional activities initiated by the parliament in their bid to prevent conflict, 
effectively. Therefore, this is envisaged as commencing from identifying the need until the 
final stage of capacity, though different parts can be applied separately depending on the 
nature of the issue at stake; the preferences and behaviour of the EMPs during each stage 
can be considered as the changes with the potential manifestations of making the issue 
effective or otherwise. 
 
There is no single formula for achieving effectiveness. Every context presents its own 
unique challenges, to each is brought an in-depth understanding of the key issues and 
considerations. Additionally, there is a readiness to adapt our approach and find a new way 
of working. This means a solution informed by the results of many different projects yet also 
entirely appropriate to the project in hand. 
 
To enable the measurement of effectiveness of conflict prevention, this research developed 
an effectiveness tool conceptualised as detailed in chapter four; and the findings were 
developed in its six category indicators of Need; Fit; Resources; Evidence, Innovation and 
Capacity. In this chapter, the effectiveness tool is applied to the ECOWAS-P, and case 
studies of latent and post-conflict scenarios in Guinea and Sierra Leone respectively as 
illustrated in   Figure 8.1: 
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  Figure 8.1 Applied Effectiveness Tool 
Source: Tool applied by author from the developed effectiveness tool in chapter three.  
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8.2.1 Need 
Were the needs of stakeholders identified through consultation and research? 
 
This norm can operate formally through processes of the parliament’s benchmarks which 
are natural tools; as for example the addresses of the ECOWAS Commission President at 
the opening of sessions; plenary and committees agenda; country reports; extraordinary 
sessions; delocalised meetings; fact-finding missions and verbatim and committee reports. 
An example of some of these initiatives are presented in    Table 8.1: Delocalised Meetings: 
Summary of normative conflict prevention initiatives. 
 
These executive addresses include updates of community progress, status of treaty 
obligations and achievements; emerging areas of challenges and what other bodies are 
working on to improve integration benefits to the region and the parliament’s own internal 
processes. Additionally, as there is no explicit procedure for referrals from the executive to 
the ECOWAS-P, sometimes these addresses may also contain explicit referrals on specific 
issues to the parliament for advice. Subsequently, these are adopted into the agenda and 
in turn referred to the appropriate Committee to deliberate and report back to the plenary in 
the form of either Resolutions, Recommendations, or Decisions. 
 
This strategy though opening spaces for participation by the EMPs however, misses the 
opportunity of engaging and consulting with citizens more broadly on specific needs and 
only benefit from the EMPs representation of ideas and thus the sources of change cannot 
be guaranteed as a true reflection of what is needed in the region, but rather what the EMPs 
deem as the appropriate approach for the region.  
 268 
  
 
   Table 8.1: Delocalised Meetings: Summary of normative conflict prevention initiatives 
Source: Compiled by author using data from various ECOWAS-P Reports 
 
8.2.2 Fit 
Assessment of the policy implemented-how viable it was vis-a-vis other initiatives 
 
This is a determination of the appropriate strategy agreed upon after deliberations on 
implications of that specific option, as against alternatives. Debates are typically vibrant and 
animated over options with MPs demonstrating skill and expertise in convincing the House 
on the plausibility of the strategy, and why a particular one is more amenable, in terms of 
cost and effectiveness. 
 
As resolutions and decisions of the Parliament passed to the Authority are not legally 
binding, there is an overriding need to be as strategic as possible within the ambit of the 
mandate of the parliament. The parliament thus employs strategies including, fact-finding, 
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mediation, negotiation, public forums and high level meetings. A specific tool re-echoed by 
EMPs is the opportunity to utilise parliamentary diplomacy through these strategies. 
Parliamentary diplomacy thus encompasses feasible approaches which ultimately help 
construct the real causes and challenges being experienced in the sub-region. It is also an 
opportunity for EMPs to learn directly at the sources and through parties to the conflict, 
stakeholders as well as CSOs which sometimes are bystanders in the conflict but are keen 
to have issues resolved and as such are able to dispassionately discuss solutions and other 
issues to help the situation. Ultimately, recommendations are based on knowledge of the 
right information devoid of partisan politics. 
 
8.2.3 Resources  
What were the necessary resources; IT, Staff, Training, data, technical support, finance, 
intelligence reports? 
 
‘At best, we just make the decision on what is needed to be done and leave the 
logistics aspects to the administration’. Thus, when a decision is made either at 
the plenary, by the Bureau or at the Committee meetings, the Clerk attached to 
the Committee or the Bureau Manager is then tasked to work out the 
budget(together with the DAF), and plan other logistics with the Head of 
Administration. For instance if there is travel involved they would have to make 
all the travel, accommodation, schedule the meetings and also advice on other 
departments or people to involve in mediation attempts in the field…’ (Brima 
Kamanda, Interview, May 2013). 
 
The secretariat of the ECOWAS-P generally supports all the activities of the parliament and 
when decisions are made on issues that involve budgeting and logistical support for travel, 
related budgeting is undertaken. The parliament does not determine its own budget but 
receives its funding from the Commission usually apportioned by the Council of Ministers.  
 
This is an area of contention between the parliament and the Commission, as ideally the 
norm is for the parliament to determine the budget of the organ, but rather it does not even 
have the mandate to determine its own budget. However, countries report on the status of 
the Community levy as part of their country reports presented at Sessions making it possible 
for those in arrears to be sanctioned, or encouraged to settle so as to enjoy the full benefits 
of membership. 
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Meanwhile, in the instance of a country Mission, the particular Clerks for a Committee(s), 
hold meetings and draw up a budget for logistics, which is reviewed by the Chair of the 
Committee(s) before it is forwarded to the Director, Administration and Finance (DAF), for 
clarifications before approval.  
 
The staff also prepare the individual itinerary of EMPs, as well as briefs and are responsible 
for ensuring that each participating member is scheduled to depart from their respective 
country of origin to the meeting venue; be available for the duration the programme and 
subsequently after the programme.   
 
Additionally, the Clerks and documentation centre personnel have the onus of acquiring 
documents from either the Commission or any such body within the ECOWAS set up from 
which it needs to update briefs. In such instances letters from the Speaker or other officials 
of the parliament or informal connections facilitated by senior staff are utilised. There are 
also processes to ensure that all documents are translated into the three official languages.   
 
8.2.4 Evidence 
Review of the evidence on what works or worked, with whom, where, and was it cost 
effective? Where/what are the outputs? 
 
The analysis for evidence was based on entire systems, policies, protocols, mechanisms 
and other related tenets of the institution covering conflict resolution. These included the 
approaches, strategies and initiatives undertaken by the parliament at the regional level as 
well as the two country case studies. Moreover, in all interactions EMPs reiterated that their 
role as ‘implements of peace in the sub-region’ is gradually being accepted and recognised 
by ordinary citizens. 
 
Importantly, reference was always made to the fact that: 
 
‘in view of what we have to work with, there is a lot of evidence to suggest we 
have even worked beyond what we were expected…or in this case not 
expected to achieve’…we had to improvise and the results is there for all to 
see’1. When we meet stakeholders and hold meetings we communicate a 
                                            
1 (Meeting 1, Committee, May 2013). 
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simple message…Coup d’états are no longer fashionable and you will not be 
having any friends in the international community to support such an initiative2, 
so the best is to cooperate so we negotiate some power-sharing or other 
issues…because it is only when you lead the country back to democracy that 
you can play a better role…’ (Brima Kamanda, Interview, May 2013). 
 
 Evidently, successfully political outcomes such as elections, and dialogues on critical 
political tensions have been resolved in Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, however, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Niger remain key challenges. Similarly, there is progress 
on areas including drug trafficking, electoral monitoring, trade disputes, the ECOWAS 
Caravan on monitoring joint border posts, peace education and monitoring the 
harmonisation of community laws. 
 
  
 
Table 8.2: Summary of conflict prevention Resolutions passed 
Source: Compiled by author using data from various ECOWAS-P Reports 
 
 
In summary, efforts that were reiterated by EMPs included; joint committees to monitor 
intelligence and security issues; harmonisation of security laws at the regional level; 
                                            
2 There is a widely held belief that Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and The Gambia were all funded and 
supported variously by Muammar Qaddafi (Libya) and his toppling brought turmoil to these countries 
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promotion of good governance; supporting regional legislation to ban small arms and light 
weapons; framework to monitor porous borders; information sharing on immigration; 
capacity building on intelligence gathering; and provision of direct support to national 
parliaments to monitor and prevent crises. 
 
‘The parliament also continues to play its advisory and consultative role 
diligently as this is what will ensure that we attain full powers in due course...’ 
(Victoria Saidu Kamara, Interview, June 2013).   
 
During the May 2013 Session for instance, there were referrals from the Commission to 
parliament on issues including; the ‘ECOWAS Security and its Administrative and General 
Conditions on Social Arrangement’; the ‘Supplementary Act on Social Dialogue Forum’; ‘the 
Regional Action Plan on Youth Employment; the Regional Action Plan against Child 
Labour’; and the ‘Draft Supplementary Act relating to the Establishment and Implementation 
of Joint border posts within Member States' which are all critical areas for preventing conflict 
in the region. 
 
8.2.5 Innovation 
How were the activities, events actioned? Was there a plan of activities? An implementation 
framework? 
 
The Parliament as a product of the revised treaty, is a new institution in the integration 
project which has had to play ‘catch up’ with respect to conflict prevention initiatives that are 
being implemented at national, regional and international levels. 
Thus its ‘in-house’ processes like country reports, and delocalised meetings are 
opportunities for follow ups in Committee meetings, as well as those scheduled for off 
Session sittings to enable in-depth discussions. Then, if there is need for further discussion 
it is referred to a delocalised meeting agenda which were in-depth discussions and 
decisions can be undertaken usually outside of Session and in a ‘neutral’ location. 
 
The second opportunity for innovation is contained in the 14 components of the ECPF 2008.  
As this codifies all aspects of security, both human and ‘hard’ security issues in the sub-
region, it widens the spectrum of actors and this gave impetus for a more effective way of 
undertaking conflict prevention activities. Thus EMPs are able to contribute by putting 
issues in perspectives at both national and regional levels. 
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The third innovative approach is the decision by the Parliament to develop strategic plans 
from 2010. An EMP echoed that, ‘before the plan we operated on an adhoc and flapping 
approach-blowing wherever the wind takes us’ (Singo Ayitou Bruno, EMP, Togo, Interview 
May, 2013).  
 
Thus the Bureau holds planning sessions with staff to develop long-term strategic plans 
guiding the work. These receive support from donors3 in terms of technical advice in making 
the document outcome based and result oriented. Although this document is usually 
encompassing all aspects of the parliament’s work, conflict prevention reflects prominently 
in activities envisaged as it is regarded as a sine qua non to development of the region. 
Thus apart from the Strategic Plan for 2010-2015 for instance, there is also a regional mid-
term work plan, whilst work plans for Sessions, Extraordinary Sessions and Delocalised 
meetings all emphasise various aspects of conflict prevention. 
 
As the parliament is mostly on recess when there are escalating conflicts it also plays catch 
up on advancing strategies. Thus other strategies employed include Communiques and 
Press Releases communicating the position of the parliament on particular issues on 
conflict. For instance, these strategies were employed immediately the crises in Mali 
escalated as the Executive handling of the situation was deemed unsuccessful fruitful 
results (Gowan 2012, Gowan 2013, Willis 2013). Thus the ECOWAS-P complemented 
efforts by initiating a fact-finding mission to decipher the scale of the problem. Their report 
thus gave an overview, the prevailing situation and opportunities for resolutions. 
 
The consensus was that, understanding the context of the Malian was central and strategic 
to dialogue. Thus identifying the main actors, sources and partners for all the stages will 
enable a comprehensive approach for a sustainable solution.   
 
According to the EMPs, the crises in Mali were serious as it was one of the few African 
democracies though the structural problems are compounded with the crisis emanating 
from the war in Libya in 2011. This led to subsequent rebellions of the Tuareq rebellion 
(2012), a coup d’état and an Islamist takeover of Northern Mali. Ultimately, intervened 
military which most EMPs deemed ‘premature’ and now Mali is even now variously referred 
to as ‘West Africa’s Afghanistan’ (Solomon 2013). 
                                            
3 DCAF, Freidrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), EU, Parliamentary Centre and also ECOWAS Commission 
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As a participant observer in the meeting of the Committee on PAPS, the report from the 
mission to Niger and Mali4 generated great debate. Indications were that, entry and access 
were facilitated and safe because the ECOWAS Commission officials and some troops 
were ‘already on the ground’ so they were able to schedule meetings.  
 
However, there was a stalemate in dialogue processes as the Tuareq faction from Niger 
had pulled out of the discussion. Thus the EMPs set about informally trying to negotiate with 
some of the factions for their return. This they reported led to some illuminating issues as 
they realised on arriving at the meeting with the Tuareq faction that one of the leaders 
ironically was a member of the ECOWAS Parliament5 who had taken arms and vacated his 
position. This was however regarded as a window of opportunity to appeal to him to 
convince the Tuareq to return to the negotiating table.  
 
Thus, as colleagues they were able to mediate, bringing his group back to the negotiating 
table, but this according to McGregor (2013) was also worrisome as it could be politicised 
as an EMP using position of power to create havoc. The findings so discussed resulted in 
draft recommendations, subsequently passed as resolutions during the final plenary to help 
address the impasse6.   
 
To reiterate, other spaces within which the parliament ensure it is being relevant in conflict 
prevention in the region include; parliamentary diplomacy, negotiation, mediation, 
sanctions, lobbying fact-finding missions, media engagement and a developed gender 
strategy. 
 
8.2.6 Capacity  
 
Who were the preceptors of the initiatives? What is the internal expertise used? 
To what extent were external sources used if any? And for what? 
 
‘We have participated in many experience sharing forums, workshops and 
study visits to the Canadian Parliament, EU Parliament and Pan-African 
                                            
4 Fact-finding Mission Report, Mali and Niger, 2013 
5 Alghabass Ag Intallah, (EMP Second Legislature) split from Ansar al-Din and formed Mouvement 
Islamique de l'Azawad. He is considered crucial in determining the outcome of the conflict in Northern 
Mali.  
6 (Meeting 1, Committee, May 2013). 
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Parliament(PAP) and this has helped us to focus on what exactly pertains in 
order to curb conflict. This has led us to the realisation that, we need to be 
proactive, thus every MP being sworned into this parliament quickly recognises 
that and keeps abreast of trends…anticipating challenges and adapting as we 
move along…At the same time we have had enviable partners who continue to 
collaborate significantly with us in this area of training…’ (Simon Osei-Mensah, 
Interview, May 2013) 
 
Reminiscent of parliaments, EMPs are from different professional backgrounds thus 
diversity is rich, yet, at the same time, there are existing challenges on issues of expertise 
like conflict. Thus, in as much as EMPs receive training and may have experience 
understanding regional issues bordering on peace and security, other criteria are used 
when designating delegations to undertake missions; including gender, 
nationalities/language, professions, years serving as an MP, are all considered. 
 
Following,  composed list is audited by the house leadership adding or subtracting EMPs 
they deem qualified according to the criteria; whilst the head of the delegation is determined 
including the added criteria of it being the oldest serving EMP on that list. 
 
Subsequently, a meeting is convened involving the agreed members and staff to discuss 
terms of reference and logistical arrangements, roles and responsibilities assigned and 
Clerks ensure follow up activities are implemented. Agreement is also secured on 
commitment of the EMPs on their availability for the period of the activities as it will be when 
their national parliaments may not be on recess, and as such backup may be needed to be 
envisaged in case some cannot keep to the agreed schedule. 
 
8.3 Assessment: A tool for measuring effectiveness? 
 
What this tool has proven to also be useful for, is the ability to measure at the national level, 
and also prove that variables that affect the regional level can be devolved to the national 
level. However, at the regional level, some of the indicators under for instance, need, 
capacity and innovation, present empirical findings that blur the responsibility between 
national and regional. 
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It was prudent to include a separate indicator for resources and be specific about finances 
because perceptively, the parliament does have budget concerns. It is recognised that this 
measurement is undertaken under the assumption that there is an inherent democratic 
deficit as well as the fact that this might not be appropriate for well-developed regional 
parliaments (as they do not normally harbour an issue of lack of resources in the sense that 
developing ones do). It also emerged that policy power is not definitive of legislative 
effectiveness as the parliament has innovatively circumvented this role of no mandate to 
institute informal processes as demonstrated in Chapter Five: ‘An ECOWAS of States to an 
ECOWAS of People’? Assessing institutional effectiveness in conflict prevention. 
 
Additionally, this tool and the cases it has been applied to cannot be representative for all 
regional legislative assemblies in Africa, but clearly demonstrates that such a model and its 
associated indicators can be applied and the kind of implications to be anticipated as 
results. The tool has ultimately made it possible to reveal both successful and unsuccessful 
benchmarks as it provides simultaneous information on several aspects of the parliaments 
work important for the measurement. 
 
The tool indicatively has advantages in its utility in several ways: 
 
 The tool is universal and can be applied as indicators for past activities or, to 
herald new activities 
 It provides information on all the six perspectives simultaneously thus it can 
combine the disparate elements of the parliament in a singular report; whilst 
maintain its efficacy as a tool which can be applied by individual perspectives 
 It helps to contextualise and limit the measures pertinent to the parliament and 
as such ensures visibility for the few factors of success 
 It is also a tool that necessitates teamwork and involvement of all the cross-
professional staff as well as the core EMPs 
 The tool ensures a logic and strategic approach in communication and 
information as relates to the parliament’s work 
 
According to Wahlke (1962) and Blomgren and Rozenberg (2012), legislatures of a regional 
nature would cease to exist as institutions without a minimum of consensus about norms.  
Thus continually the institutional framework of the ECOWAS-P has been bound by informal 
institutional rules as well following the tenets obliging them to the Revised Treaty and Rules 
of Procedures. In this way, the Authority and Commission will concentrate on issues with a 
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reflex responses and real time most especially in emergency periods; whilst the parliament 
works on long-term policy which can guide processes into the future. 
 
8.4  Normative evaluation: which factors affect Effectiveness 
 
‘Instead of thinking about policy as a routine engagement between certain 
public officials and a settled retinue of established interests, we are now forced 
to consider how a single system is constructed from semi-independent 
institutions and actors linked by resource agreements, joint agreements, joint 
projects and cross-border engagements … it is really composed of pads of 
unequal size, each contributing to a characteristic policy ‘footprint’ (Considine 
2005). 
 
Empirically this research confronts a multitude of normative challenges at both national and 
regional levels. The importance of national policy outputs becomes apparent as the country 
narratives include ECOWAS level activities, but sometimes these do not explicitly separate 
activities of ECOWAS-P, nor the executive body.  
 
Notably, this research did not set out to examine all the possible sources and causes of 
effectiveness, as it was more focused on the theme of conflict prevention and not 
institutional legislative performance, and also not all issues would have occurred in the 
period being studied. Thus, empirical evidence upholds both the extrapolations expected 
from the questions and those regarding the level of effectiveness as illustrated by the 
application of the effectiveness tool. 
 
A number of themes come to the fore in an effort to unearth different understandings and 
arguments around the issues and specifically how these impact the conflict prevention 
agenda7. It is also apparent that issues about effectiveness are framed in direct correlation 
to the fears and hopes of debates around the conflict prevention implementation agenda 
itself. There was a lot of prominence and increase in issues around the newness of conflict 
prevention and its attendant expectations for asserting peace and stability in the region, and 
how as a new phenomenon it is difficult to measure its effects. 
 
                                            
7 Apart from the themes discussed in this chapter, other issues bordered sovereignty, role of elections 
and drug trafficking. 
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CSOs were quick to point out identifiable ‘contradictory aspects of the ECPF’ as for instance 
aspects dealing with elections. For others the perception was that, some conflicts are 
caused by MPs. ‘EMPs who are also politicians first… sometimes are found doing the work 
of ‘conflict mongers’ ‘rather than peacebuilders’ was how it was stated8. However, positive 
impacts of the conflict prevention agenda were eulogised including promises about its 
prospects and potential to do more once regulation is much clearer with an improved 
mandate for the parliament. 
 
Evidently, most EMPs had a generic outlook on all the challenges that affect the parliament. 
But areas of consensus as problems to be expected because it is ‘new’ include; extent of 
the impact of work, awareness creation, information, communication and dissemination of 
the parliament’s work.   
 
The main influencers in the parliament is what the researcher calls ‘the Big Four’ Nigeria, 
Ghana, Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire. Their sphere of influence is reticent and present in all 
the negotiations, missions, configurations of Committees and debates in the Plenary, with 
Nigeria wielding some power of exceptionalism (Mazrui 2002).  
 
Legislative committees work within a complex framework and as such it is challenging to 
evaluate their effectiveness; but, committees are also the pulse and heartbeat of legislative 
effectiveness. As noted by Longley, Ágh et al. (1997) and Strøm (1998), legislative 
committees have become important centres of power in democracies around the world.   
 
Therefore, committees adopt reports in sittings before being tabled at the plenary level for 
the Committee of the Whole adoption. There are instances that members will be unclear 
about an issue or not be willing to have it passed but as witnessed by the researcher during 
participant observation the Speaker requested loudly ‘those in favour of, say aye’ and there 
was mostly no dissent and reports were adopted.  This same process is also undertaken 
for passing Resolutions and Decisions. However, observing, it was obvious there is need 
to vary this approach as some members were resolving their ‘ayes’ based on ‘en bloc’ by 
country,  lingua grouping, or cronyism(some countries are considered friends with others, 
as for example, Ghana and Guinea, or Ghana and Nigeria). 
 
Interactions and observations at the ECOWAS-P also highlighted some issues of political 
machinations amongst EMPs. Apparently, delocalised meetings scheduled in particular 
                                            
8 Chukuemeka Eze,  Interview, June 2013,    
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countries convey more meaning than just the intended objectives, therefore committee 
chairs are actually lobbied for these meetings to be held in their respective countries. This 
according to EMPs afforded them an opportunity to be recognised and acknowledged at the 
national level through the media by their peers, their constituents, CSOs, NGOs, central 
government, and the donor agencies.   
 
Thus EMPs put forward reasons why their countries should be selected as host. Arguments 
include ‘we have not hosted any delocalised meeting’ or we have never hosted any 
delocalised meeting of …’that (respective) committee’9  seeking to hold the meeting. 
Additionally, it is considered a means of revenue for businesses and EMPs as they will also 
receive allowances. But ultimately, is helps to communicate some of the work of the 
ECOWAS-P as members interact with the national MPs and citizens at these forums.  In 
several discussions EMPs cumulatively drew attention to areas they deemed as 
endorsement of their effectiveness, as well as factors hindering their capacity as presented 
in Table 8.3. 
 
These included the role of mediator (through parliamentary diplomacy) and provision of 
forums for dialogue and interactions with national parliaments to monitor crisis/engage in 
negotiations (as for example in the cases of Niger and Guinea). General reflections also 
reiterated the irresponsibility of some politicians in the sub-region who purposively incite 
conflicts and fan social tensions which ultimately generate armed violence, in several 
instances Nigerian politicians were indicted as culpable. 
 
‘In a bid to in order to serve their personal interest especially during 
electioneering campaigns, some politicians employ divisive and provocative 
expressions on campaigns platforms by deliberately and openly declaring 
support/arming certain militias, rebel groups or other components to best serve 
their interest or display affinity and conformity in terms of ethno-religious ties’ 
(Chukuemaka Eze Executive Director, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, 
Ghana, Interview, June 2013). 
 
Additionally, other EMPs alluded to the trend of politicians of neighbouring countries being 
culpable by disregarding existing territorial borders and national sovereignty, with the aim 
to either erode the legitimacy of the government in place, or promote conflict by destabilising 
                                            
9 Example of an argument made by Ivorian representatives, Plenary session, ECOWAS-P, Abuja, 
May 2013 
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especially on ethno-religious ties with certain groups. Thus enforcing of the rule of law is 
indispensable if the ECOWAS-P is to help stem the repercussions of armed violence in the 
sub-region.  For instance, the parliament can lead the way by emphasising the 
establishment of ‘fast-track’ style electoral courts set up following occurrences of electoral 
violence. At the same time, an effective implementation should complement efforts 
especially at the local level on laws concerning artisanal weapons production. 
  
A summary of the role of EMPs and challenges indicated as inherent obstacles to 
effectiveness more generally, and on conflict prevention are presented in a SWOT format 
in Table 8.3. 
 
In comparison with the EU Parliament, some EMPs pointed out that considering the 
developed level of its member states, and continuous progress in reforms it has acquired a 
high level of cooperation, working to make the integration scheme a success and that is 
why it is unique. Therefore, a high level of cooperation amongst members is deemed sine 
qua non, if an integration project to ensure all the policy competencies are beneficial to the 
region. Therefore, the parliament must be supported to realise its full potential rather than 
the Executive and other organs treating it ‘like an orphan’ or the ‘proverbial step-child’ 
usually unwanted and being an afterthought in the scheme of things.  
 
Therefore, the ECOWAS-P remains a contributory legislative actor able to initiate, advice 
and amendments on ECOWAS legislation through consultation in a manner politically 
substantive to the conflict prevention agenda. Second, the ECOWAS-P will be successful 
when it attains the status of full mandate and be able to offer technical amendments and 
clarify the wider ECOWAS integration project. Third, it is able to present a united front in 
terms of progress towards enhancement of its powers and this should remain so after that 
stager and that will consolidate its stance on actions initiated towards other institutions; the 
Commission, and Council will not be able to ‘bull doze’ their way through decisions. Finally 
as presented in Appendix 14: Compendium of conflict prevention initiative, the ECOWAS-
P has been effective within the confines of its mandate in leading processes with 
parliamentary diplomacy in the region in a way that gives it latitude and credibility to able to 
do so even though it accrued this status through its own norms and interpretation of the 
documents which gives it its power. 
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Table 
8.3: 
Summary role of EMPs in conflict prevention: SWOT Analysis 
Source: Compiled by author using data from Interviews and focus groups 
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8.4.1 Institutional structure for the ECOWAS Parliament and how it affects decision-
making 
 
Even though at independence, national parliaments were set up and judiciaries were 
supposed to be independent, these did not lead to the establishment of democratic 
governance in post-colonial Africa. Claude Ake (1996) sufficiently argues that after 
independence African leaders became preoccupied with a false sense of development 
which demanded a false sense of unity and the postponement of the quest for democracy. 
 
The parliament as a ‘new parliamentary institution’ formed by the revised treaty is inherently 
challenged as it has to operate within the hierarchy of authority in the general ECOWAS 
structure, already mandated with decision-making. However as discussed in preceding 
chapters, establishment of the ECOWAS-P increases the supranationality of the ECOWAS 
project. Thus overtime, its powers and mandate will increase. Though, there is resistance 
with respect to strong national Executives, the Authority has benefitted immensely from 
referrals passed on by the Commission which the parliament deliberates on, and forwards 
advice. The final decisions however, are made by the Authority and Council. 
 
8.4.2 Competing regional parliamentary bodies  
 
West Africa out of all the regions of Africa is a good example of Anglo-French rivalry, through 
institutional and competing regionalisms (Crowder 1964, Olonisakin 2000) (Aning 2004). As 
a region of experimental regionalism since the 1960s, the coming into force of the Mano 
River Union (MRU); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Union 
Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) with similar objectives (Lavergne 1997) into the 1990s. 
The sub-region is also the one crucially hampered as it has the highest number of 
International organisations (Mwamadzingo 2001:2-7) but in practical terms, the three 
organisations named above are the main actors tasked with developing regional policy on 
economic, political, peace and security issues. 
 
Thus ECOWAS was also created to among other things facilitate the relationship between 
the region’s Anglo- and Francophone countries by overcoming the language barrier and 
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incorporating previous initiatives such as UEMOA and BCEAO into one overarching 
organization; but this has not yet been achieved (Adebajo and Rashid 2004). 
 
 Unfortunately, ECOWAS has not managed to stem this rivalry of overlapping memberships 
as depicted in Figure 8.2, but only work in a compromising stance to the mutual benefit of 
each group. For instance, a cursory glance at the pattern of discussions held at the 
parliament, and sometimes how these groups pander to the ‘inner voices’ in their political 
development are reminiscent of positions akin to their former colonial paths. According to 
Adeniji (1999) and  Ibrahim (2003) language barriers shaped by the configuration of 
colonialism entrenched a vertical link with formers powers disadvantaging horizontal 
relationships with neighbouring states, across the Anglophone-Francophone division.  
 
Figure 8.2: Overlapping Membership of ECOWAS Parliamentarians 
Source: Developed by author using data from membership affiliations 
 
‘Whether these other bodies affect West Africa’s integration lies in the answers. 
The answer differs depending on which body you are questioning. First, when 
ECOWAS was created, it was done for everyone though there were other small 
groupings so when you look at it like the Venn diagram, ECOWAS is on top and 
the others MRU-four countries so they could opt for it as a cell within ECOWAS 
so it means they could create a bloc… so that things like electricity or something 
they could group themselves according to that kind of project implementation. 
But policy harmonisation is not for these groups but projects and programmes 
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they can harmonise as blocs within the sub-regional framework, and harmonise 
all of us into one policy areas…but when it comes to implementing then we say 
let us constitute ourselves into implementing blocs; marketing, production, and 
so on…’ (Dr. Toga McIntosh, Vice President, ECOWAS Commission, Interview, 
May 2013).  
 
These contending bodies occupy the integration space in West Africa as illustrated in Figure 
8.2. However in 1997, it was agreed that by 2004 ECOWAS should be the only REC for 
West Africa. UEMOA, was thus to operate primarily as a monetary zone within the statutes 
of limitation (Alabi, Alemazung et al. 2011). However, this has also not been achieved. 
 
The Vice president of the Commission in a discussion on whether these bodies were 
competition and how this impacts ECOWAS shared these reflections: 
 
‘Now, when we hold a meeting to discuss the common internal tariff and 
UEMOA goes to their meeting and say it is not in our interest to do so, they 
come back with different proposals. When we get to the place of contribution 
for ECOWAS, they come with something ‘crazy’. They say we UEMOA 
countries we pay 1% to UEMOA, 0.5% to ECOWAS and then GH or Liberia pay 
only 5% of their tariff income to ECOWAS so that is not fair. So they have come 
with the proposal that all the countries must pay 1.5% and they took the 
proposal to their UEMOA heads of State meeting, came back and now want to 
‘push it down the throat’ of ECOWAS. So we had a meeting 3 or 4 weeks ago 
on the subject matter. We had our management meeting and our Commissioner 
for trade met in Ghana and the Anglophone group disagreed.  
 
So at the management meeting when it was brought our President informed the 
President of UEMOA, then he said UEMOA will boycott the meetings of 
ECOWAS ministers unless there is joint recommendation to that 1.5% proposal 
for every country there will be not meeting. But this will be difficult because 
when it comes to the council of Ministers they will not take it. But the ECOWAS 
Commission President did not want a confrontation and they are both 
francophone so they have brought it to the Council of Ministers 1.5%. So when 
we get there the Ghanaian, Liberian, SL ministers and others better be clear in 
their minds themselves because if they insist on this, then there will be a caveat 
that the extra 1% that comes from a country X, must now finance the projects 
in that country, so it like taking your money and putting it in a pool to do your 
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projects/infrastructure but not to put it in a common pot where for instance 
Guinea can come and take, or another can come and utilise. 
If the Anglophone makes the point that they do agree but that extra 1% must 
be contextualised for the specific country’s projects, because looking a county 
sizes for instance, Nigeria and Ghana most definitely has a bigger 1% share 
than say Togo or Benin, so it should be for the respective countries and not in 
the pot for everyone’s spending. This approach might not yield the results the 
francophone want. So this is where we are…’ (Dr Toga McIntosh, Interview, 
May 2013).  
 
The scenario in Figure 8.2, results in conflicting political agenda as well duplication of efforts 
causing a drain on regional and national resources. Some EMPs rationalises the others as 
building blocs to a stronger ECOWAS-P, but when the question was put before them on the 
fact that the parliament itself is not yet with a full mandate, then the responses lacked 
aspiration. 
 
8.4.3 Resources 
The resource endowments needed for effective implementation were defined as a critical 
influence on how effectiveness was envisaged. EMPs emphasised this scarcity asserting 
that the institution contends with narrow implementation plans because of inadequate 
resources allocated by the Commission.  
 
Stakeholders understanding of issues was also dictated by this resource availability and it 
was explicitly stated by staff and CSOs that as the Commission ‘controls the purse’ it has 
more leverage and its effective rather than the parliament. However as stated by 
(McGhaughey and Cieri 1999) availability of resources could rather propel a common 
pattern of development despite differences in politics, ideology and culture. 
 
According to the Director of Administration and Finance(DAF), the practical financial 
challenges which makes it difficult for the parliament to attract parallel funding from partners, 
or undertake bilateral programmes hinges on a number of high cost of logistics. The fact 
that: 
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‘West Africa is a high risk flight region with expensive airfares this tends to affect 
the budget of the parliament immensely. The added challenge is the reluctance 
of the EMPs to fly economy and rather first or business class, which drains the 
coffers. The irony is that, the small aircrafts used by some airlines have just a 
thin curtain separating classes, yet they insist on this and it is even an informal 
rule of procedure which has been co-opted into their  conditions of service…’ 
(John Azumah, DAF, ECOWAS-P, June 2013). 
 
 
The other issues contending resources are viewed as development partners challenge with 
paying allowances when EMPs are invited for training especially in other countries out of 
Session, challenges with media and technology at the Secretariat and  Information and 
communication on work of parliament (awareness) from the centre (regional) to 
periphery(member states).  
 
8.4.4 Relationship with other ECOWAS bodies 
 
The ECOWAS Commission was the institution tasked to implement the 
project/ECPF and the parliament has been finding its way into it; thus 
sometimes they hold meetings and discuss/wondering why they are not for 
example in the negotiations and mediation missions set up by the Commission. 
But in my opinion what they fail to understand is that, being a member of a 
negotiation or mediation mission is not established by any Treaty; so they 
cannot dictate how these issues should be carried out. For example, if there is 
a problem in Guinea, is not everyone in the government of Guinea that is going 
to listen. The reason why in the protocol there is the Council of the Wise, is to 
pick up people who are known in member states to help undertake conflict 
prevention/resolutions missions…’.(Dr Lat Gueye, Interview, May 2013). 
 
These sentiments notwithstanding, suffice it to state that the ECOWAS-P’s mandate makes 
its sovereign in its power and actions, and it does not and cannot ‘usurp’ the Executive’s 
power. The protocol establishing the Parliament states that: 
 
‘…representatives shall enjoy Parliamentary immunity in all Member States of 
the Community. Therefore, no Representative may be prosecuted, summoned, 
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arrested, detained or sentenced on account of opinions expressed or vote case 
[sic] by him in the exercise of his duty…’ (ECOWAS 1994, Article 9 (1)). 
 
However, these concerns do not take cognisance of the Parliament’s supranationality or the 
ECOWAS Declaration of Constitutional Principles, which in principle binds all member 
states with respect to ‘separation of powers between the Executive, Legislature and 
Judiciary’ by the ‘empowering and strengthening of parliaments and the guarantee of 
parliamentary immunity’1. The Vice President of the Commission also emphasised how the 
Parliament is perceived in relation to some ECOWAS bodies thus: 
 
‘But have you noticed that over the years increasingly they have tried to carve 
out a mandate in conflict prevention for themselves?...fact-finding missions, 
debating issues and passing some resolutions and passing them onto the 
Commission?…Interestingly, what they think they want to do is sanction and 
endorse for the President not to go to war, or come to them for the mandate to 
do that or to deploy troops, or co-decision to establish that before we go to Mali, 
the parliament must sit and agree or disagree, that is what they are looking for 
but in the current dispensation and as the treaty stands that is not going to be 
possible…If the SC in New York, waits for the General Assembly to meet before 
they go to war in Syria, Egypt e… that will be tedious…’ (Dr Toga McIntosh, 
Interview, May 2013). 
 
8.4.5 Democratic deficit 
 
The ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 is what has set this process in motion 
and now it is left with national governments and parliaments to do a bit of 
national constitutional engineering to benefit from gains, as well, this will also 
trigger various procedural and normative changes at the national level which 
together will forge a bigger and stronger community’ (Ike Ekweremadu, May 
2013). 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of the ‘democratic deficit’.  These are as varied 
as the nationalities, academic and intellectual positions and preference of researchers, 
                                            
1 Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance 
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commentators or scholars contributing to the field. To this end, Weiler and Wessels (1988) 
observantly outlined what they called a ‘standard version of the democratic deficit’ in the 
mid-1990s. They argue for a set of widely-used arguments than a particular definition 
attributable to a single figure or group of scholars. However, this significant addition far from 
laying the debates to rest, have overtime been subject of more diverse arguments. 
Additionally, authors including Moravcsik (2003), Follesdal and Hix (2006) and Majone 
(1998) add valuable contributions to these debates. Cumulatively, these can categorised 
into five main claims to help define and discuss democratic deficit in the ECOWAS-P; 
representation, credibility, accountability, legitimacy, and elections. 
 
‘The Parliament is the Assembly of Peoples of the Community. Its members 
represent all the peoples of West Africa’ (Preamble of Protocol, ECOWAS-P). 
 
An important dimension of representation is the associated evolution of the ECOWAS 
parliament itself. This includes the mode of election, as members are indirectly elected 
since its inauguration. The current formulae developed and included as a clause in the 
Rules of Procedures of the parliament advises every national parliament to ‘appoint’ the 
MPs and make sure there is diversity and representation reflective of the composition of the 
national parliament. 
 
 Thus, members reflect gender, minority and majority political party representation2. 
Indicatively, the Parliament’s powers in decision-making have been increasing in the 
context of the extension of majority voting in the Council, as a means to enhance the 
democratic quality of the Union ECOWAS-P (2012). Article 7 of the Protocol provides 
that members be elected by universal suffrage, however as 2002 was its inaugural year,  
it was regarded as a take- off stage and was thus made up of MPs elected by their 
colleagues at the national parliaments to sit in the ECOWAS-P. 
 
Yet, up to its third tenure ending 2015, it is still a non-elected parliament continually making 
the parliament a subject of debate both in national parliaments, by civil society 
organisations, and in its own sessions. According to the Speaker of the Parliament, whilst 
this mode of election of MPs is contrary to the provisions of Article 7, it nevertheless should 
be considered as a temporary measure, pending the time when the statutory conditions 
                                            
2 See Rules of Procedure Protocol Page 7 (nature of mandate) and A/SP.3/06/06 amending Protocol 
A/P.2/8/94 relating to the Community Parliament 
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allowing for elections by universal suffrage are put in place by the competent authorities 
of the community.  
 
‘We have been working diligently towards this goal from the inception of the 
parliament and I will have you know that, in the Supplementary draft pertaining 
to the Enhancement of the powers of the parliament. We have advanced a 
different framework to effect this issue and consolidate our legitimacy’...’ (Ike 
Ekweremadu, Interview May 2013). 
 
The issue of representation is invariably interlinked with citizen participation in the 
democratic processes of the parliament and how information dissemination influences the 
sub-region. Here, the new approach may be more inclusive as it will give the opportunity to 
the citizenry to indirectly participate in choosing their MPs, but at least it will be one in which 
they participate. This will also help address the vital issue of the transition problem 
underpinned by the non-permanent nature of the parliament’s membership. The attrition 
rate raises issues of stability of the parliament, subordinating it to the pace of changes at 
national parliaments.  
 
‘This happens, every time there is a national parliament’s election somewhere 
in one of the 15 member states we lose members… sometimes these MPs are 
critical to ongoing negotiations, mediation or indeed leading some sort of 
progress on the development of the parliament. As soon they lose their national 
seat(s), we automatically lose them in the ECOWAS Parliament... sadly so… 
and believe you me, there is almost always an election every year in one of the 
parliament, after all, we are nous somme quinze’ (sic)’ (Bruce Ahli Komla 
Apenya, Former EMP, Republic of Benin3). 
 
In the first instance, as members representing the elected parliaments of their respective 
countries, it has a mandate to represent the entire population of ECOWAS on issues 
pertinent to human security (Longley 1996, Terlinden 2005, Magbagbeola and Onoja 
                                            
3 Interview with Bruce Ahli Komla Apenya Former MP representing Benin;(May 2013) Nous somme 
quinze (French)-translated as ‘We are fifteen’(English) is a popular phrase MPs use when there is 
need for consensus and some of them seem to be dragging the debate on voting on an issue. Komla 
Bruce was a also quite a lively character of the parliament as he would occasionally wind up the 
House by insisting on speaking English (though he is french) when he is addressing the Committee 
of the Whole because according to him, English is a more dignified and refined language than 
French, This was always subject of debates and arguments though good natured amongst MPs. 
Other language cohorts also argued from their perspective. At such a scenario during a session, the 
Speaker stated that ‘he was a former UN translator who clearly misses his job’.  
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2008, Draman 2009). Secondly, with its participation, there is a renewed assurance of a 
regional democratic and sustained effort at achieving peace and security in an otherwise 
conflict prone region. 
 
Even though one of the core functions of a Parliaments is law making, by virtue of the 
consultative and advisory nature of the ECOWAS-P it does not typically make laws. Rather, 
it passes resolutions and recommendations on to the Authority and Council of Ministers. 
Through this, it helps address and improve laws addressing armed violence. This also 
inevitably means that is not business as usual as in the case of a  typical parliaments’ where 
oversight responsibility(accountability and transparency)is on two levels; one to 
ensure that the implementation of governments’ policies and programmes are in 
consonance with state laws; or secondly, that budgetary allocations are distributed equitably 
and fairly. These instances maximise parliaments’ contribution in adjusting budgets and 
facilitation efficiency in conflict prevention. However as the ECOWAS-P is not a typical 
parliament it has had to develop of normatively to make its impact felt and be relevant in 
preventing conflict in a region that is otherwise synonymous with conflicts. 
 
Many CSOs continue to question the parliament’s democratic credentials and insists that 
as long as it is not an elected body then it is in deficit as its true ideals are not being adhered. 
However, the EMPs also insist that the creation of the parliament is in itself a democratic 
ideal and it not only some aspects of its work that makes deficient but that as an institution 
it must also evolve....’Rome was not built in one day…’ thus it is systematically reaching its 
potential. 
 
A transition problem also lies in the transient nature of the parliament’s membership with 
the attrition rate raising issues of stability of the parliament, which suffer as it is subordinated 
to the pace of changes at national parliaments. Thus its role should be seen as that of 
‘democratising’ a supranational decision-making process originally conceived as a 
‘dialogue’ between an independent Commission, promoting the common interest, and the 
Council, bringing together national interests. Passing resolutions, by which the Parliament 
and the Council must agree on the basis of a Commission proposal, is now to become the 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’ of the Union (ECOWAS).  
 
The ECOWAS integration project demonstrates increased executive power, reminiscent of 
strong national executives, but this neither correlates to a strong regional parliament, nor to 
a decrease or increase in national parliamentary power. At the regional level, there is a 
correlating deficit inherent in a ‘community-national-level’ relationship with the citizenry’s 
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perception of the lack of direct elections eliciting issues of legitimacy and credibility on the 
part of the MPs. 
 
Expectantly, as representatives of the regional electorate, EMPs awareness of the needs 
and hopes of their constituents are at the national and regional levels. Thus, there is the 
need of a fair representation of the population in terms of gender parity including minority 
groups. As regional representatives the MP channel top-bottom and bottom-up 
communication as well as facilitate centre-periphery issues. To this end, there are many 
partnerships with NGOs, INGOs and organisations dedicated to parliamentary development 
at both the regional and national levels.  Ownership issue-local/grassroots voices missing. 
 
8.4.6 Impact on national parliaments’ law making 
 
Even though the research was primarily on the regional level, respondents variously tended 
to examine the national level in some instances highlighting that, the national level were the 
building blocs for the regional so their development in terms of coherence on conflict 
prevention is as much important as the regional level in effective implementation. 
 
Some respondents also highlighted that, an even bigger threat to impact of their work, is 
the effect of uneven national parliamentary practices and development across the region. 
Insisting that though these national parliaments were not the direct inputs for the regional 
processes, and were underpinned by strong executives, partisan practices, it would have 
been impactful if these were streamlined as this would have been a good launch pad for a 
strong coherent emerging regional parliament, even if it lacks well-defined subsidiarity.  
 
Reflective, it is pertinent to note that there were varying dynamics the researcher gathered 
from these meetings. At the national level coherence is more difficult due to two reasons; in 
the first place parliaments are at different levels of development and reform of their conflict 
sensitive laws. For instance, each country views conflicts correlating with the level and 
gradient of violence experienced, so you will find that a country like Senegal might not be 
very committed to promulgating conflict prevention laws of a very high focus, whereas Cote 
d’Ivoire or Sierra Leone might.  
 
The second reason is that institutionally the parliaments are also at different levels and 
embody practices and norms reflecting their political history with norms adapted to as a 
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result so you will find the French speaking countries embodying familiar patterns of the 
French parliamentary system, the same for the English speaking and Lusophone countries. 
At the same time, they also contain attributes of some cultural elements thus these national 
practices inconsistency somewhat impacts on their work and outlook. In the final analysis 
these eventually become subservient to the regional scenario. For example, the ECOWAS 
framework, mechanisms and guidelines were developed through a pragmatically collective 
approach, so for the countries to harbour individualism bears direct effect on progress.  
 
Meanwhile, others opined that, given the circumstances under which the regional 
parliament was established it stands to benefit from the epistemic influence from the 
national level with respect to coherence in conflict prevention as the national nuances could 
help strengthen the regional level. However this assumption elected various responses with 
others disputing that ‘nothing follows a logical flow in ECOWAS’ and reiterated that this 
might be down to the complexity of the national policy arena.  
 
 ‘Executives have been afraid of strong parliaments in their countries for long, 
so naturally, they do not want to deal with strong parliaments, whether national 
or regional, a parliament is a parliament no matter the level…that is why we are 
facing the current challenges’ (Yaya Keita, former EMP, Guinea, May 2013)  
 
These do not ‘even operate like a vertical continuum from CSOs, national parliaments and 
other organisations in an upward strait to the regional level’ (Program Officer WACSOF, 
June 2013). This lack of coherence might also be due to lack of resources and limited 
access to the ECOWAS-P. Additionally, others argued that logically weak national 
parliaments are by implication translated into arguments for the weak and ‘non-law making’ 
nature of the regional parliament. 
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8.4.7 Principle of subsidiarity  
 
Figure 8.3: Principle of Subsidiarity 
Source: Developed by author using data from Treaties and Protocols 
 
 
The principle of subsidiarity lies at the heart of the debate on UN, AU, RECs relations, 
resurfacing at regular intervals. Two fundamental principles are in tension when dealing 
with conflicts on the African continent as well as globally. First, authority is drawn from the 
global to the local level, with the UN Security Council as the source of origin.  
 
The Pan-African Parliament provided for under the 1991 Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community was inaugurated in March 2004, by Article 17 of The Constitutive Act 
of the African Union, as one of the nine Organs provided for in the Treaty Establishing the 
African Economic Community signed in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1991. Thus the regional 
parliaments are as formed out of the RECs all maintain a direct relationship with the Pan-
African Parliament (PAP) on one level, and then national parliaments also maintain a direct 
relationship with the PAP on another as outlined in Figure 8.3.  
 
Thus the PAP has parallel relationships with both institutions. As of March 2008, there are 
forty-seven (47) African Union Member States, each represented by five (5) 
parliamentarians at the PAP. 
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Ultimately, ownership runs in the opposite direction from the local to the global level, where 
proximity is a decisive factor. These lines of authority, accountability and ownership follow 
each other closely, but are strengthened in opposite directions.  
 
8.5 Prospects  
Importantly, what parliament is doing, can do better and what it is capable of doing are all 
aspects central to the effectiveness theme because sustainability is important for ensuring 
effectiveness. To reiterate, the ECOWAS-P possesses consultative and advisory powers 
which range in competencies from debates, inquiries, recommendations, referrals, 
proposals and passage of resolution on specific policy issues. 
 
However it has an opportunity to occupy an explicit role in the Mechanism defining its role 
in complementing all the other collective peace and security bodies especially the Council 
of Ministers, Early warning system(ECOWARN), Mediation and Security Council, Office of 
the Special Representative, and Council of the Wise. This will effectively make it more 
strategic as a tool for preventing both intra and interstate conflicts because it will become 
as a nexus for all the processes, relaying information and ensuring action much quickly than 
the current bureaucratic processes. 
 
8.5.1 Contemporary issues in conflict prevention 
The ECOWAS region is continuously faced with challenges and sometimes in 
the bid to find solutions, other problems arise, conflict is very dynamic and fluid 
in these parts. However there are areas they could be leading as regional 
priorities apart from governance, such as climate change, human rights, 
counter-terrorism and drug trafficking. The latter has become a major challenge 
because the governance deficits emanating from within some of the ECOWAS 
countries’.  (Dr. Toga McIntosh, Interview, May 2013) 
 
In the ECOWAS sub-region, three endemic security issues which undermine peace and 
stability include drug trafficking, proliferation of small arms and light weapons(SALW) and 
the rise of terrorists groups like Boko Haram(Nigeria) and Al Qaeda(Mali and Niger). These 
are areas the ECOWAS-P is engaging stakeholders and effectively collaborating and 
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sharing information to compliment efforts of the executives of national governments to 
monitor borders.  
 
The advantage is to strengthen cooperation in conflict prevention and early warning, combat 
proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel weapons, formulate and implement anti-
corruption and money laundering policies. 
 
Also, EMPs asserted that, ‘some of the guns used in the sub-region can even be described 
as mercenaries in themselves’ in the sense that, these guns have been used from Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Nigeria and other conflict areas and get ‘recycled’ by bandits, rebels in 
guerrilla tactics and warfare across the sub-region. This was discovered as a result of a 
program to trace and register guns through a collaboration of some CSOs and ECOWAS 
and these findings were unearthed.  
 
There have however been some improvements with MPs collaborating with others on the 
platform of SALWs internationally and at the domestic levels to help mitigate this 
phenomenon.  
 
Additionally, there is a lack of parliamentary scrutiny of the defence budgets in national 
parliaments and as the mandate of the ECOWAS-P stands, it does not also oversee the 
defence expenditure at the regional level. This contains inherent challenges in the regional 
context. Meanwhile some EMPs actually articulate a danger in parliament scrutinising the 
defence budgets as defence is sacred’ thus briefings or information on spending patterns 
could suffice. 
 
 
8.5.2 Supplementary Draft on the Enhancement of Powers 
 
‘Convinced that the Community Parliament as a forum for dialogue, 
consultation and consensus for representatives of the people of the community, 
can effectively promote integration’ (Protocol A/P2/8/94). 
 
The ECOWAS-P is an environment for a different kind of politics and dynamics of 
governance in West Africa. Apart from dealing with myriad of issues plaguing the region, it 
also has to contend with issues of mandate, gender, language and ‘sub-regions’ like the 
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MRU and UEMOA subtle power relations. However, in the formal structure of ECOWAS 
one can appropriately say minimal supranationalism was built into it from the beginning.  
 
Suffice to say that, since 2002, the supplementary draft protocol on enhanced powers for 
the parliament advocates more astute powers (ECOWAS Parliament) which are still 
receiving reviews aiming for final certification by the end of the current legislature. But, as 
the Vice President of the ECOWAS Commission puts it, ‘treaty amendment is a long 
process and must be undertaken with caution, taking into consideration, finances and other 
resources needed, so that this does not suffer the fate of the revised treaty of 1993’. 
 
Since its inauguration, the Parliament’s powers in decision-making have been increasing 
in the context of the extension of majority voting in the Council, as a means to enhance the 
democratic quality of the Union. Its role has been seen as that of ‘democratising a 
supranational decision-making process originally conceived as a ‘dialogue’ between an 
independent Commission, promoting the common interest, and the Council, bringing 
together national interests. Passing resolutions, by which the Parliament and the Council 
must agree based on a Commission proposal, is now to become the ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’ of the Union (ECOWAS 1993, ECOWAS-P 2012).   
 
‘We want to be relevant in law making, and with a view to the new challenges 
emerging because of the nature of conflicts confronting us, as well as the 
existence of post-conflict countries’ we need to make policy more relevant to 
our context’ (Haddy Nyang Jagne, EMP, President of ECOFEPA, The Gambia). 
 
However, the supplementary draft protocol on enhanced powers for the parliament 
advocates more astute powers (ECOWAS Parliament) which are still receiving reviews 
aiming to be have final certification by the end of the current legislature. According to the 
EMPs a lot of progress has been made and the goal is to have it passed before the end of 
the tenure of the third legislature. 
 
‘The enhancement of the powers of the Community Parliament remains top of 
the agenda of this Third legislature and I am highly encouraged by the progress 
we are making on this matter…’ (Ike Ekweremadu, Opening Address, Ordinary 
Session of the ECOWAS-P, May 2013). 
 
A multidisciplinary Experts Meeting was held in April 2013 at which the Speaker presented 
a ‘Road Map’ adopted to guide the processes gradually till it culminates in the final 
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presentation of the final act for consideration by the Authority. In December 2014, the draft 
was finally approved by the Authority but will be implemented from the fourth legislature 
beginning in 2016. These are presented in  
,  
 
Table 8.5: Mandate on Referrals 
Source: Compiled by author using data from (ECOWAS-P 2002, 2006, Boré and Henkel 2015). 
 
 298 
  
 
Table 8.6 Procedure and Process on Referrals 
Source: Compiled by author using data from (ECOWAS-P 2002, 2006, Boré and Henkel 2015). 
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Table 8.4: Progression: Consultative/advisory to limited co-decision/legislation 
Source: Compiled by author using data from (ECOWAS-P 2002, 2006, Boré and Henkel 2015). 
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8.6 Conclusion 
Regarding policy objectives, EMPs are motivated to secure policy outcomes in the 
Parliament as close as possible to their personal, or sub-regional (language) preferences. 
Whereas with concerning incentives and benefits, and the role the EMPs play in the 
legislative trajectory of the region, one can identify major roles: 
a) Conduits for capacity building and enhancing their career in regional politics  
(b) Avenue for consolidating and strengthening conflict prevention initiatives 
c)  A strategy to gather impetus in the quest for greater achievements in development of 
the region 
d) As an opportunity to train for higher positions in national politics, especially if their party 
is in government, or, as a way of ‘getting rid of hard core’ opposition members if their 
government is in opposition and training ground for a career in national politics; as a reward 
after a career in national politics 
e) An opportunity to make long-term career in legislative politics relevant by forming 
networks, platforms and working together as former and service EMPs with national 
parliaments in sharing learning, experiences and helping build legislative democratic 
practices across the region, nationally and regionally. 
 
‘The role of an EMP is multi-layered; we are supposed to know all the tenets of 
treaties, protocols, resolutions, and decisions amongst others at the regional 
level. Meanwhile at the national level, a myriad of national, regional and district 
laws equally exist plus our obligations to constituents, and the country. We are 
expected to be well versed in all these…it gets to a point you tend to increase 
in your level of effort and commitment to one of these more than the other…we 
are only human’. (Ike Ekweremadu, Interview, May 2013) 
.  
As the parliament was set up after all the framework for conflict prevention was initiated, it 
has had to work in a post-facto environment of continuing/employing legal frameworks, laws 
and protocols which it was not part in initiating. Thus it works within a bureaucracy that is 
enabling, and disenabling at the same time. Thus it should be regarded as a normative 
force, tasked with the responsibility of steering interactions between states, the citizens 
within the states and the region, and more nominally, the state(s) and the external 
environment (international community). It thus, provides the cross cutting platforms and 
activate instruments viable for the prevention of armed violence and help negotiate critical 
spaces to mediate conflicts where they occur and avoid escalation. 
  
 303 
  
9. Chapter Nine: Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This research sought to explore the effectiveness of the regional legislature in conflict 
prevention and therefore emphasised the importance of employing empirical measurement 
tools in regional parliaments. These can serve as tools for legislatures to utilise in assessing 
effectiveness for policy areas, institutional level and thus enhance their legitimacy and 
improve performance. 
 
The first half of this research interrogated the phenomenon of regional parliaments as viable 
democratic institutions which are new and understudied especially in Africa, and as such 
are being undermined (Salih 2013). The research extended on the propositions of normative 
institutionalism insisting on a more autonomous role for political institutions, affecting and 
getting affected by society (March and Olsen 2006), and thus argues that, the parliament in 
recognizing its place in mediating conflicts is advancing alternative effective ways than the 
use of force.  
 
This has enabled it to develop a normative approach in the overall context of the conflict 
prevention environment by assuming a mandate on the framework. This thesis 
demonstrates normative institutionalism as an appropriate new intuitionalist approach the 
parliament employs and normative claims about groups’ democratic agency it makes. 
However, this relates to the behavioural dimension in bringing about change. The challenge 
is different for developed regional parliaments such as the EU Parliament, as it is for 
underdeveloped ones like the ECOWAS-P where there needs to be concerted efforts on 
building a strong interest in its work to enable it demand better performance from the political 
institutional set up of the main integration organ. 
 
Chapter five discussed the ECOWAS-P under formal and informal functions and 
demonstrated an inclination to focus on procedures and processes in determining 
outcomes. Since effectiveness is related to institutional capacity, and can be absolute or 
relative the analysis includes a contextual view of perceptions as an introspective 
assessment of how stakeholders perceives the parliament’s work. Notably, trust in political 
institutions closely correlates with public perception of the ethics and morality of the people 
leading it (Lipset and Schneider 1987) thus if there is high expectations then it might fall 
below the public’s expectation, however, in this context, there seem to be no high 
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expectation thus, modest achievements are still recognisable as opportunities upon which 
the institution can build. 
 
Chapters six and seven illustrated two dimensions of conflict prevention; latent and post-
conflict at the country level. This exhibits the regional-national level dynamics inherent in 
attempting to measure impact and in implementation. In chapter eight the causal 
relationships and indicators linking the parliament’s legislative performance to the policy 
area of conflict prevention is demonstrated using the effectiveness tool as a frame work of 
analysis. The framework suggests that any effectiveness tool for developing regional 
legislatures must focus on tracing processes, procedures to achieve responsive outcomes 
and at the same time maintain a contextual lens in evaluating these democratic processes. 
 
The framework also leads to conclusions about normative factors that impact effectiveness 
and could lead to either an increase or decrease in effectiveness as these emanate from 
the context within which the parliament works, and could harbour elements of legitimacy. 
These are discussed under normative evaluations coalesced as the questions raised in this 
research. 
 
Significantly, any evaluation seeking to relatively measure outputs, outcomes through 
procedures and processes undoubtedly raises questions about the reliability of the 
indicators. Utilising qualitative indicators alone cannot be indicative of success in a regional 
legislature’s implementation. Thus as presented in chapter three, the theoretical lens is 
boosted by the empirical tool developed. This  Effectiveness Assessment To offers a 
suggested framework for measuring effectiveness as it will be cost effectiveness, and 
covers a lot of the baseline and follow through issues required to ensure a coherent 
implementation that will achieve the intended outcomes.   
 
Appropriately, this research uses ‘suggested’ because the tool is a novel ideal which can 
be a potential framework for measuring effectiveness. The viability of its adoption by the 
parliament is not a question that can be answered in this study, as it will require decision-
making at the institutional level. However, this research advocates the idea that this can be 
promoted as a tool for measuring effectiveness at the regional parliamentary level. Though 
this could mean political discussions to agree by consensus, it could be adopted and 
adapted by other researchers, and indeed the parliaments and will become refined with use. 
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This chapter also presents a summary of policy implications and recommendations at both 
national and sub-regional levels in Section 9.2 with Section 9.3 comprising directions for 
future research and Section 9.4 presents the conclusion. 
 
9.2 Policy Implications 
9.2.1 National Level 
Evidently, in order to ensure community involvement, the ECOWAS-P will have to engage 
grassroots participation. This is a critical mass in its quest to achieve and positively wield 
full law-making powers. Citizens’ participation in decision-making processes, invariably 
leads to a better understanding of the parliament’s work, and articulate the efforts of the 
parliament beyond the corridors of policy makers into the domain of ordinary citizens. 
Ultimately, the ECOWAS-P can then play a major role in reshaping the influence of the 
community on conflict prevention as it becomes adequately equipped. 
 
Outreach programmes developed and implemented systematically will increase awareness 
on their activities within the member states. These can include radio programmes, 
workshops and seminars on various issues coordinated with the desk officers of the 
ECOWAS-P located in the national parliaments. This helps with visibility of the parliament’s 
work as its physical site in Abuja (Nigeria) means it is restricted in terms of reach 
geographically. Thus Desk Offices, as well as delocalised meetings when held in member 
states are strategies and activities utilised which brings the work of the parliament to the 
citizens. 
 
Additionally, sharing information on the ECOWAS-P’s position on particular policy areas in 
conflict prevention and how these can be mainstreamed into the law making processes of 
the national parliament are a clear strategy to impact effectiveness. Similarly, agreements 
made with feuding factions on referral from the Authority, or those undertaken on the 
initiative of the ECOWAS-P should be lodged with the Court of Justice to make it consent 
judgement in order to ensure it becomes legally binding. There is need for greater synergy 
with other organs to help it achieve visibility and recognition for its role. 
 
The ECOWAS Parliament and national parliaments need to develop mechanisms to 
strengthen their collaborations and foster the flow of information by establishing effective 
and functional ECOWAS country offices at the national level while ensuring the presence 
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of national parliamentary delegations within the ECOWAS headquarters at the regional 
level. Though these exist at a minimal level, it is their integration into the administration of 
the parliament in terms of reporting formats that is being bemoaned. 
 
9.2.2 Regional Level 
In this context Salih (2013) proposes that the emergence of regional parliaments as the 
legislative branches of AEC integration should only be explained against the backdrop of 
the challenges confronting African societies and states. This, he reiterates, should not come 
as a surprise that the founding of these RECs coincided with the democratic resurgence of 
the 1990s, under considerable internal and external pressures and development aid 
conditionality. Salih also explains that these parliaments are ill-equipped to fulfil their 
potential as viable parliamentary bodies and should be categorised as ‘legislatures without 
legislative powers’ with ‘over promised and under delivered mandates’. In discussing this 
position with a cross section of EMPs, the Chair of the PAPS Committee, succinctly stated: 
 
‘The wheels of a viable democratic and law-making parliament may be turning 
slowly, or slower…but at least they are turning and we look forward to the day 
when we will attain the status of a full law-making parliament with all the powers 
and mandate…’ (Brima Kamanda, Interview, May 2013) 
 
ECOWAS as an institution has a lot of questions regarding its supranational nature and 
democratic deficits. Thus establishing a parliament is not enough to guarantee that these 
ideals will be met, but the processes, mandates, decision-making and role played in policy 
implementation may well serve as a platform from which such issues will regain legitimacy 
and credibility in governance in West Africa. 
 
Inherently, the ECOWAS-P faces supranational challenges in executing its mandate within 
the framework of working with the fifteen countries. The mandate of the parliament in 
relation to the general set up of the sub-regional body; how it executes, implements and 
monitor policies; and its processes are crucial for ensuring that conflict does not erupt in the 
member states. Significantly, these processes ensure effectiveness because according to 
Wang (2005) and Wehner (2006) legislative capacity holds a direct causal relationship in 
the sense that effectiveness is a direct consequence of a legislature’s oversight capacity. 
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The main agenda for conflict prevention is as encapsulated in the ECPF and barring 
contradictory interpretation of the policies, opportunities for policy regulating conflicts would 
be greatly improved with minimised costs if all member states adhered to the regional 
approaches. Therefore, whilst cooperation has been key for decades in the region, the 
parliament is deemed as an injection of functional impetus to the whole integration agenda. 
This is because it expanded the credibility of ECOWAS as an institution, which worked for 
the people of the region, and not only at an elite level of executives. 
 
The need for new strategies underpinned by the increasing role of the parliament was 
echoed by many respondents throughout the research. These they maintained, will bring in 
dynamism on old security approaches to conflict prevention which have exceeded 
saturation and as such are not effective. However, the caveat was that, if EMPs are to be 
included in crucial conflict prevention, then the processes must be streamlined to be 
comprehensive so every institution knew where it should start and end so that collectively 
they will get the processes right.  Additionally, the need to continuously undertake research 
into the area of regional parliaments was emphasised and that as exemplified by this 
research, many such will be undertaken to establish the real essence of regional 
parliaments, not to be overshadowed by national parliaments. 
 
As this tool was the first of its kind to be applied to the parliament’s work the researcher 
also relied on the interviews, documents and participant observation notes to undertake the 
measurements. Thus it is still an early tool that will need to be applied several times before 
it may be adopted.  
 
The executive Presidents in West Africa are sometimes unwavering during dialogues and 
discussions on crises in their respective countries as this is sometimes classified as 
‘interfering’ in the internal affairs, or usurping the sovereignty of that country. Notably, the 
Guinean President, Alpha Conde due to his attitude towards Guinea’s political development 
from 2008 is considered inflexible on political negotiations as well as promoting spaces for 
political opponents or civil society. Thus, EMPs on missions are sometimes ‘not welcome’ 
in these countries as the Presidents make it known that their role is considered as 
‘meddling’. 
 
Considering how executives of governments in the ECOWAS region wield a lot of power, 
be it constitutional or unconstitutional, for parliaments to be effective in conflict resolution, 
its place as the institution central to law making and maintaining constitutional order must 
be recognised and entrenched. This will enable judicial independence, demanding 
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executive accountability, and carrying out its legislative role and oversight functions 
effectively. Unequivocally, this translates to gains in economic development and makes 
citizens positive about sustaining security and stability for their own safety and livelihoods. 
 
On the balance, EMPs can work creatively and be innovative about their role in conflict 
prevention by employing parliamentary diplomacy within the frameworks of their national 
constitutions or in their regional mandates. For instance with the CNT as the transition 
parliament of Guinea, the ECOWA-P and the CNT worked together to creatively occasion 
viable elections and help elect MPs who can best serve the country and sub-region. 
 
To a large extent the role and impact of the media as the ‘fourth arm’ of governance in West 
Africa’s body politic has become a budding free media has catapulted into being a voice for 
the vulnerable, and also a cause of strife in society. Thus in an instance like a mediation 
process, a lot rests on depends on the way it covers a conflict and the role of stakeholders. 
As the media is capable of distorting mediation efforts or supporting it, it always useful to 
agree on a ‘charter’ of sorts to guide their reportage. EMPs agree on the necessity to plan 
a communication strategy, collaborate closely with the media, and disseminate this 
information into the member states. In tandem, the challenges the parliament faces in terms 
of mediation roles are not limited to issues of partisanship at national levels, limited 
mandates, ‘aged/archaic constitution(s); political party dynamics as well as electoral 
processes being ‘high-jacked’ by elites. 
 
This is because, it is recognised that there is an interconnection between the success of the 
mediation process and the level of neutrality and objectivity of the parliament’s approach; 
favouring the interests of a particular conflicting party or group immediately jeopardises 
mediation processes, and this should not be the perception any particular media will 
communicate as this will be mischievous and can cause unrest and distrust thereby 
derailing the processes. West African parliaments tend to be out of reach and out of touch 
with many local and remote areas within the borders of their country. Parliaments should 
therefore implement a communication strategy at the constituency level to create closer 
relations with the people. 
 
One more area is in operationalising the EWS, through which the ECOWAS Peace 
Exchange could be promoted as an effective tool for regional parliaments because it has 
potential to become a dedicated platform to facilitate subsidiarity monitoring through the 
provision of advice and information gathering in member states. Moreover, to respond to 
the need for some role at the early warning level because of their proximity to the population, 
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this could help with coordinating information gathering within the different subsidiarity 
monitoring systems in each Member State, at both regional and national levels ensuring 
that ECOWAS main legislative proposals then ensures visibility of the results of these 
subsidiarity analyses.  
 
Additionally, the ECOWAS Peace Exchange platform could become an effective tool for 
cooperation between regional parliaments in Africa. Indeed, this is critical as these 
relationships are nascent and this tool could benefit from the need for closer cooperation 
on issues of shared concern across different parts of Africa. ARPs could therefore bring 
ECOWAS closer to the citizens through the EWS and peace exchange by conveying 
dynamic debates on the limits of the legislation with respect to the principle of subsidiarity 
from the regional to national.  
 
9.3 Directions for future research 
Regional parliaments are emerging as viable areas of research and thus there are windows 
of opportunities for scholars to expand into ARPs. The research terrain on African 
legislatures whether regional, national or municipal are scarce, far and in between on both 
specific aspects of parliaments and general within the political processes of the continent, 
region and nations. Therefore, as with any research projects, the findings highlight several 
avenues for further research. There are five clear paths for which this research could 
provide a baseline study. The first two relate to further testing of the theoretical framework 
to time ranges, policy areas and further or other cases. The third relates to the importance 
of the regional governmental structure of ECOWAS for the policy area; the fourth is building 
a knowledge base on the parliament by undertaking research on perception and 
disseminate findings widely, and the fifth envisions further exploration of some of the more 
surprising finds relating to the spread of new ideas and norms. 
 
Indicatively, some of these might take a lot of social engineering to achieve because the 
most logical approaches to studying any aspects relating to the ECOWAS-P would be to 
employ both theoretical and empirical techniques and apply to a particular policy area of 
parliament. 
 
The application of the theoretical framework to a different policy area or a wider time period 
would be one direction for further research. It would be a logical next step to expand to 
include study on climate change and terrorism policy in specific member states or at the 
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regional legislature’s level. This thesis covers the first three tenures of the legislature thus, 
further research after the parliament achieves six or more tenures would be very fruitful as 
it would be facing greater endogenous or even exogenous pressures on policy areas worth 
studying. In some ways, focus of this research on conflict prevention created an artificial 
barrier in examining other pertinent policy areas though this was necessary for the 
limitations of a doctoral thesis, expanding the policy remit would be quite a useful 
contribution to academic scholarship. 
 
Another area would be to examine the link between legislative performance and 
effectiveness, a more neglected field in several policy areas as reiterated through this study 
which has an undeniable influence on peace and stability on populations in the region and 
as shown in Figure 2.1 on the dynamics of parliamentary development and performance 
types of parliament, a study on what type of parliament the region has will also serve to 
impact its effectiveness as espoused on several discussions. 
 
As discussed in Chapter five, the parliament without a mandate on conflict prevention has 
demonstrated its uniqueness in helping to improve this policy area and thus constitute an 
alternative to the executive wing, thus a comparative approach on both the parliament and 
executive on conflict prevention since the former’s creation could be very fruitful as 
ECOWAS has faced greater pressures at the executive level while the parliament may have 
been largely immune to them because of its mandate, but has begun to gain attention on 
this role. 
 
This study also raises several important questions about the role of regional policy-making 
that merit further exploration. Particularly, this is important for disseminating new ideas and 
closing the gap between policy outcomes and policy outputs. As explored in Chapter eight, 
and to some extent Chapters six and seven, the regional legislative structure played an 
important role with peace processes and developing policies within the space of its 
existence. The involvement of EMPs is also crucial for the transfer of ideas from the regional 
to the central bodies and national bodies. Further, after the creation of central legislations 
even by the executive, the outcomes of the policies are strongly affected by the 
implementation for which governments of the member states bear the greatest 
responsibility. This continues to lead in difference in policy outcomes especially with regards 
to conflict prevention approaches from the regional to the national level. The role of the 
regional parliament in central policy making and in implementing centrally issues legislation 
in the area of conflict prevention would lead to a much greater understanding of processes 
of policy change in ECOWAS and provide contrast to the executive body. 
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Varying debates have continuously occupied the arguments around issues of national 
parliaments’ participation in the political systems of integration schemes. Thus it will be 
prudent for these questions to be asked by researchers on two levels; what is the role of 
national parliaments in the political process of the ECOWAS integration scheme and the 
role of national parliament in the ECOWAS Parliament. These would help widen the debates 
whilst aiming to objectively situate supranationality and sovereignty on a level beneficial to 
researchers and political processes under integration schemes in Africa. On another level 
the performance of the legislature in totality can be undertaken as per the guidelines of 
Mezey’s (1979) ‘how much policy power’ question to include a much more recent question 
proposed by  Arter (2006) as to the ‘how’ with an emphasis on process and overall structure 
of legislative influence. These could be in comparative nature on African regional 
parliaments, or comparatively on national parliaments of the respective regional parliaments 
to their contexts. 
 
There are also debates about whether we observe declines in ‘parliamentarisation’ (Benz 
2005). Significantly, the arguments abounds and Norton (1993) observes that this challenge 
is on two levels; in as much as parliaments of this nature have come to the political 
processes on integration late, they can also be in effect losers in the processes (Maurer 
and Wessels 2001:17-19). Despite these debates, normatively the role of these parliaments 
ae now formally acknowledges and research will thus boost their role and relevance for 
politics, democracies and in understanding legislative ideals at the regional level. 
 
Finally, the ideas and discursive scripts explored in the country case study chapters and 
also chapter 8 merit much greater treatment. The empirical findings indicated a clear pattern 
of this being elite actors demonstrating their commitment and awareness of established 
scripts when employing phrases equivalent to ‘we are effective’… ‘because’… ‘but’…’ and 
continue to propose ideas they are aware are unacceptable go goes beyond their mandate. 
These findings merit further documentation and research especially for such a sensitive 
policy area as conflict prevention. This is linked to the finding of the disproportionate effect 
of the parliament’s action who entered the policy arena with new ideas and agenda for 
change as deviation from the accepted ideas and scripts and as such cause rippling effects 
and changing norms. Distinctly, this can be seen on the international level with the spread 
of the script asserting that ‘prevention is better’ and there must be alternative actors which 
are not studies in detail in this thesis. 
 
Thus, there is need for improved and increase research in various areas but this should 
also be explored in a way that will be appropriate and relevant to parliamentary development 
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and not just to fill the void or gap. Additionally, appearing related to conflict prevention is 
the need for changing perceptions of the parliament’s role and this could have huge 
ramifications for regional efforts regarding how the regional citizens view the impact of their 
input and this deserves significant attention. 
 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
 
‘We are effective in conflict prevention if we are being judged by the extent of 
our mandate, and with respect to how innovative we have been in carving out 
a niche for ourselves. Give us a few more years and we shall perfect what we 
have now’. Ike (Ekweremadu, Interview, May 2013). 
 
Evaluating any aspect of an institution nested within a regional integration scheme is an 
inherent complex and difficult task. This is because of the multi-layered nature of its 
functions and the aggregate regional variables to which it subscribes, further complicates 
any attempted assessment. The theoretical landscape on regional parliaments is also scant 
and thus compounds the difficulties especially for ARPs as the literature does not widely 
encapsulate their activities. 
 
 However, normative assumptions that can be applied to ARPs as part of regional 
integrations schemes include the ideals of ‘cooperation, interdependence, wealth creation, 
peace and security’ and as such helps to validate the application of a normative framework 
in the discussions. This lends credence to the idea that employing a single theory cannot 
possibly adequately explain the phenomenon hence the utility of developing the 
effectiveness tool. Similarly, there is no specific agreement on what constitutes the definition 
of regional parliaments, and this thesis does not prescribe a homogenous approach either; 
rather it discusses the characteristics and approximates a contextual definition. It however, 
posits that the ECOWAS-P example, presents significant highlights into ARPs and other 
regional parliaments globally. 
 
In comparison, the remarkable evolution and development of the EU Parliament as solitary 
directly elected supranational assembly in the world, serves as an inspiration for the EMPs 
in thinking on the possibilities the parliament can offer democracy and peace in West Africa. 
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There is general consensus amongst EMPs, staff and CSOs working on ECOWAS related 
issues in the region on the challenges posed by the limited mandate of the parliament. Thus, 
there are attempts to continuously work towards the attainment of full powers whilst working 
in a way that ensures bests practice for such processes. Evidently, the parliamentary 
diplomacy deployed by the ECOWAS-P was also backed by the use of force in attaining 
peace for Sierra Leone. It will be premature to conclude that the ECOWAS-P is the 
institution within the integration set up that is most competent, or has undertaken the 
activities in the region to prevent conflict. However, it is fair to state that it has set precedents 
which are positive developments for ensuring a new agenda for security. Ultimately, the 
parliament provides another avenue to articulate security concerns, dialogue and undertake 
alternative and complementary action to help consolidate peace and security.  
 
In this respect, EMPs noted that, developing along the lines of the functioning model of the 
East Africa Regional Parliament (EALA) is not suitable for the West African context. Rather, 
forging ahead with the experiences of West Africa and increasingly demanding changes to 
the founding protocols will ensure much more prudent results. 
 
There have also been sessions organised with the PAP at the African Union and the third 
ECOWAS Legislature from 2011 echoes that is it poised as the best opportunity going 
forward as it will utilise the strategic plan developed to further consolidate gains and 
increasingly maintain a visionary agenda. 
 
The more central and recurring theme in all the discussions was the clarion emphasis by 
EMPs that, relational power dynamics between the parliament and the ECOWAS 
Commission more specifically was an endemic and systemic challenge. In this regard, the 
notion that the Commission sees the parliament as an institution aiming to usurp its powers 
of decision-making, implementation and more critically the distribution of regional 
resources. 
 
There is a relational power structure relationship between the three-lingua groupings of 
francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone. These sometimes creep in when some 
resolutions need to be passed or motions are brought to the House and affects the effective 
consideration of the parliament’s work. In contrast to the EU Parliament for instance, there 
are no political party bandwagon approaches possible, but rather a matter configuration of 
different kinds of power that can often determine the relation between parliament and other 
ECOWAS organs, as well as also between it as an institutional and national parliaments 
and executives. 
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 In the framework of these dynamics where the parliament is in de facto controlled by the 
Commission, Council and the Authority it has made its oversight typically non-rigorous and 
this makes all MPs feel strongly about posing and remaining a united front when it comes 
to issues concerning the parliament with respect to the other ECOWAS organs. 
 
But a notable contradiction in all this is the undertones of competition of the duplicating 
legislator roles that some ECOWAS-P MPs have as members of the UEMOA parliament. 
The other MPs who are non-members actually believe this affects their effective working 
and impact and reach of the parliament and if not handled diplomatically will easily 
degenerate into a viable obstruction and cause gridlock when it came to issues affecting 
francophone West Africa.  
 
However, Salih (2013) insists that the ‘ECOWAS Parliaments’ limited influence over the 
executive branch is typical of other regional parliaments,(ECOWAS-P 2006) other examples 
include the and CEMAC and UEMOA all in Africa. These are also ill-equipped to fulfil 
parliamentary functions and the only area where they have a measure of success is 
leverage of democratic gains from the national to the regional level(:156-157). 
 
Meanwhile at the Commission, there is an opposite tendency when it comes to perception 
of the parliaments work in conflict prevention. Oversight for them is blunted through the way 
the parliament is seeking to enhance its powers, internally and externally. It is also asserted 
that the parliament is not ‘trying to work within the tenets of their mandate as stipulated in 
the treaty documents’.  
  
The ECOWAS-P is in many ways still consolidating, transitioning, transforming and trying 
to accrue powers to be an effective legislature. Thus under the terms of its current mandate, 
it is fulfilling or exercising its role as a parliament for democratic development. However, at 
the stage that is envisioned as part of the much larger context of the broader tenets of 
economic and political dimensions, its enhanced powers will help assume effective 
legislative and democratic oversight functions to be the viable democratic organ in the 
region. 
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